China was winning in MENA before 2023. It’s winning even more now: Opinion

Historically, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region served as a hub between ‘eastern’ and ‘western’ powers, accumulating great wealth and cultural influence as a result. Today, it is returning to that position with its nations increasingly able to exert their influence in a more multipolar world.

• The opinions and thoughts expressed in this article reflect only the author's views.

Because of this, it has become a central focus for both the US and China in terms of economic and political influence. Prior to 2023, China gained the upper hand with its focus on non-intervention and economic collaboration, particularly through the Belt and Road programme. Following the war that erupted on October 7, China has engaged in the region much more actively, and its popularity has soared.

Since its founding, the People’s Republic of China has built its foreign policy on the “five principles of peaceful coexistence”. These principles, known as “mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence”, have been China’s “red lines” both during the Cold War and in subsequent years. China remained outside the bipolar system of the Cold War and opted for a “third way” by supporting the emergence of the Non-Aligned Movement at the Bandung Conference in 1955. Despite the entry into a period of détente in international politics in the 1970s, China’s approach to non-alignment with any polarisation persisted, leading the country to make “non-alliance” a state policy in 1982. 

A clean record

MENA countries were among the regions where China’s fundamental foreign policy principles were practically implemented. At the aforementioned Bandung Conference, China established contact with nationalist parties in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, which were under French rule at the time, as well as in independent Libya. These initial contacts exemplified the parties’ revolutionary and anti-colonial solidarity. In the Middle East, diplomatic relations between China and the Gulf countries, in particular, began with Iraq in 1958, followed by Iran and Kuwait (1971), Oman (1978), the United Arab Emirates (1984), Qatar (1988), Bahrain (1989) and Saudi Arabia (1990). As can be seen, these countries, having gained their independence from Western colonial rule, quickly established a rapprochement with China. 

Following the end of the Cold War, relations between China and the MENA region entered a period of further development. MENA countries viewed China as a power with which to cooperate because it lacked a history of colonialism, military intervention, or regime change in the region. China, on the other hand, aimed to establish multi-layered interaction with the region to realise its interests within the emerging international system. To this end, China proactively established the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000, followed by the China–Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF) four years later. 

The Arab Spring, which began in Tunisia at the end of 2010 and then spread throughout MENA, initiated a transformational process whose effects would last for years. People living in MENA began protesting against the authoritarian regimes in their countries that had long deprived them of economic prosperity and fundamental rights and freedoms. This wave of uprisings created the potential to fundamentally reshape the region’s “political ecology”. While historically significant developments were taking place in MENA, China’s regional strategy was embodied in the Belt and Road Initiative, which funds infrastructure aimed at bolstering international economic links. For China, the region provided an opportunity to prioritise its economic and geostrategic interests and place less emphasis on political engagement. Despite the liberal ideals of the Arab Spring, the persistence of autocratic and nationalist regimes in the region has also presented a positive picture for China. Regimes in the region have prioritised economic growth and development over democratisation. This has opened the door for China to promote an alternative to the liberal order created by the West after 1945. 

Through the Belt and Road Initiative, China has established a successful method for achieving its desired goals. In exchange for energy agreements signed with MENA countries, which represent a strong option for meeting China’s need for energy resources such as oil and natural gas, China has built infrastructure and transportation projects in the region. These partnerships, which foster a win–win relationship between the parties, have significantly contributed to China’s interaction with the non-Western world. Unlike Western powers, which lost prestige in the region, particularly for their open support of opposition movements during the Arab Spring, China is perceived as a reliable actor by governments in MENA. Driven by this momentum, China signed strategic partnership agreements with Qatar, Iraq, Kuwait and Oman, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates between 2014 and 2018. Furthermore, in addition to striving to establish partnerships with MENA countries through bilateral relations and regional forums, China has also worked to mediate conflict resolution in the region. On 10 March 2023, Iran and Saudi Arabia, mediated by China, agreed to re-establish diplomatic relations. Bringing two strategic MENA actors, who had not had diplomatic contact since 2016, to the same table strengthened China’s prestige significantly. 

During this period, China presented a position in MENA radically different from the colonialism, use of military force, and conditional aid to achieve economic interests pursued by Western powers, particularly the US. China’s MENA strategy, particularly in the post-Arab Spring period, was based on a theoretical foundation of soft power and anti-colonialism. 

Change of approach

The events of 7 October, 2023 changed everything in the region and inevitably led to a shift in China’s approach connected to its long-standing support for Palestinian statehood. Since establishing the Special Representative for the Middle East in 2002, China has sought to host peace talks between Palestine and Israel and current Chinese President Xi Jinping has presented draft peace plans to the parties at various times. In these draft peace plans, China emphasised the importance of global recognition of the State of Palestine, the continuation of negotiations between Palestine and Israel, and the role of the international community in guaranteeing Palestinian sovereignty. These proposals were also included in the Arab Policy Paper published by China in 2016. 

Chinese officials have visited MENA to meet with all stakeholders in the region, particularly Hamas and Israel. As a result of these visits, an important mediation activity was carried out by bringing together the two major Palestinian groups, Fatah and Hamas, in Beijing in April 2024. Thus, in the face of the unconditional military support for Israel from the US and European powers, China has maintained its diplomatic stance. Even during the crisis, China has maintained its foreign policy of avoiding direct involvement in conflicts, maintaining political neutrality, and acting with caution. With these steps, which differentiate it from Western powers, China has assumed the role of a mediator seeking regional security and stability. China aims to end the regional crisis through an approach that emphasises a “two-state solution” and the role of regional organisations. 

That approach is bearing fruit, as results from the Arab Barometer reveal, although the challenge for China will be adapting to its new position in the world order on issues less binary than the conflict in Gaza.

The opinions and thoughts expressed in this article reflect only the author's views.This essay is based on research featured in the paper Perceptions of China in the Middle East and North Africa: an analysis in the context of Israel’s war on Gaza published in Third World Quarterly.