How China became the world’s leading producer of Antarctic research and why it matters globally — Opinion
Since 2022, China has overtaken the United States as the world’s leading producer of Antarctic scientific research, marking a pivotal moment in the geopolitical and scientific landscape of the Antarctic.
This development comes at a time when Western nations struggle with funding cuts and infrastructure challenges. For China, a relative latecomer that established its first Antarctic station only four decades ago, this ascendance represents far more than scientific achievement alone; it reflects a comprehensive national strategy blending scientific ambition, geopolitical influence, and international collaboration.
Strategic scientific investment: building capacity on the ice
China’s Antarctic journey began in 1985, with the establishment of the Great Wall Station on King George Island. This modest beginning secured China’s position as a consultative party to the Antarctic Treaty, granting it formal decision-making power over the continent’s future. From a single station in 1985, China has developed a strategically distributed network of five research bases: Great Wall Station (ecological research), Zhongshan Station (glaciology and atmospheric physics), Kunlun Station (astronomy and deep ice drilling), Taishan Station (logistical support), and the recently completed Qinling Station in the Ross Sea region. This network, the third-largest by any nation, spans crucial geographical zones from the Antarctic Peninsula to the remote interior and strategically significant coastal areas.
Recent expeditions showcase increasingly sophisticated technology, including six-legged robotic dogs equipped with ice-penetrating radar, drones for meteorite searches, and specialised equipment for sampling deep-sea sediments. These investments have yielded measurable scientific returns. According to bibliometric analysis, China became the world’s largest producer of Antarctic research papers in 2022 and extended this lead in high-quality publications by 2024. These scientific achievements are not merely academic exercises; they translate directly into influence within the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), where substantial research output determines a nation’s decision-making authority.
Governance and geopolitical influence: securing a seat at the table
Antarctica is governed by a unique international framework—the ATS—that suspends territorial claims, prohibits military activities, and prioritises scientific cooperation. Within this system, scientific productivity directly translates to political influence: only the 29 consultative parties that demonstrate “substantial scientific research activity” have voting rights on the continent’s management.
China’s growing influence under the ATS manifests in several ways. In 2017, Beijing hosted the 40th Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting and issued its first quasi-white paper on Antarctic affairs, articulating a vision of “understanding, protecting, and utilising” the polar regions. In late 2025, China proposed a draft legislation titled the “Antarctic Activities and Environmental Protection Law”. This legislation aims to create a comprehensive domestic legal structure to oversee all Chinese activities in Antarctica, regulating expeditions, scientific research, fisheries, tourism and shipping. By introducing this legislation, China is taking a significant step to formalise its presence in Antarctica, shifting from policy guidance to a defined legal framework. This move aligns with a growing trend among leading Antarctic Treaty nations, which use national laws to ensure adherence to international treaty commitments.
International collaboration: South-South cooperation and selective partnerships
Recent initiatives highlight deepening scientific cooperation with South American nations that serve as gateways to Antarctica. A Chinese Academy of Sciences-funded project (2021-2024) has fostered partnerships with institutions in Argentina and Chile, focusing on climate resilience, satellite technology, and Antarctic ecosystem studies. These collaborations have produced formal agreements, including a memorandum of understanding with Argentina’s National University of Tierra del Fuego and plans for a joint China-Argentina Climate Change and Sustainability Research Centre.
China also increasingly engages in multilateral polar initiatives within emerging geopolitical frameworks. In 2024, Chinese early-career scientists participated in the International Antarctic Coastal Circumnavigation Expedition alongside researchers from Brazil, Russia, India, Chile, Argentina, Peru, and Switzerland—a cohort notably rich in BRICS and Global South representation. These collaborative endeavours serve dual purposes: they generate valuable scientific data while cultivating diplomatic relationships with nations that share China’s developing-world perspective on polar governance.
Conclusion
China’s Antarctic journey—from newcomer to research leader in just four decades—reveals a sophisticated understanding of how scientific investment translates into geopolitical influence. Through deliberate infrastructure development, technological innovation, and targeted international partnerships, China has established itself as an indispensable actor in Antarctic affairs. This position serves multiple national interests: it enhances China’s status as a global scientific power, secures influence in a strategically significant governance regime, provides access to potentially valuable resources, and fosters relationships with Global South nations.
A final factor shaping China’s Antarctic calculations is the return of a more unilateral and transactional US approach under Trump 2.0. While Antarctica has not yet become a central focus of US polar rhetoric, renewed scepticism toward multilateral institutions, environmental regulation, and climate governance could weaken Washington’s traditional role as a steward of the Antarctic Treaty System. Thus, for China, the immediate effect of U.S. policy is one of opportunity, but the long-term implication is an increasingly complex and potentially volatile polar environment where great power friction could threaten the stability of the entire Antarctic regime. In this context, China’s Antarctic engagement is shaped not only by its own ambitions but also by the shifting priorities of established powers and the future credibility of global governance itself.
The opinions and thoughts expressed in this article reflect only the author's views.
About the author
Meijie JIANG (蒋梅杰) is a post-doctoral researcher at the School of International Studies of Sun Yat-sen University (China). She earned her PhD in International Relations from Pompeu Fabra University (Spain). Her research focuses on polar area, China’s foreign policy, Latin America, and the Global South. She has published in Third World Quarterly, Ibero-America Studies, Círculo de Lingüística Aplicada a la Comunicación, and the Spanish Yearbook of International Law, among others.
