You know climate change is deadly. But have you thought about how?

A few weeks ago, the European Commission released a report that passed almost unnoticed. Its findings, however, were striking. The past decade has been the warmest ever recorded, and in 2024 there were 61 civil and interstate conflicts worldwide - the highest number on record. Conflict-related deaths have also reached their highest level in four decades, with particularly sharp increases across Africa and the Middle East.

Correlation is not causation, and the report is clear about that. But drawing on 15 years of research, it concludes that climate change is making conflict more likely - not as a sole cause, but as a force that intensifies existing pressures such as poverty, weak governance, and competition over land and water.

Few people have explored this relationship as closely as Peter Schwartzstein, author of The Heat and the Fury: On the Frontlines of Climate Violence. After more than a decade reporting from over 30 countries, he argues that climate change is deeply embedded in modern conflict, even when it is not immediately visible. As he puts it: “We are not adequately taking into account how climate change is acting on other drivers of instability, like corruption and inequality and state mismanagement. And as a consequence, I think we are systematically underestimating the sheer volume of violence that has at least some kind of climate and environment component.”

Climate amplification

The European Commission identifies Iraq and the wider Middle East as regions where these risks are particularly acute. Schwartzstein spent three years in Iraq, conducting hundreds of interviews to understand how environmental stress can evolve into outright conflict. His reporting suggests that climate change often acts as an accelerant. “Perhaps the simplest way to think about climate’s contribution to violence,” he explains, “is that climate is amplifying whatever a society’s existing weaknesses are.”

In Syria, for example, a prolonged drought in the years leading up to 2011 placed immense strain on already fragile rural communities. Farmers described how worsening conditions eroded their tolerance for corruption and state neglect. As Schwartzstein recounts, “The very fact that they were facing demands for bribes at a time when their agricultural fortunes were just worsening and worsening was just a proverbial bridge too far.” In the hardest hit areas, resentment deepened, creating fertile ground for extremist recruitment. “The more drought-battered an area… the greater ISIS recruiters’ capacity to bring people into their ranks,” he says, adding: “Think of climate as a force that’s just seizing upon whatever the existing troubles are and running with it.”

In Iraq, these dynamics became even more complex. Schwartzstein found that ISIS recruiters learned to exploit not just poverty, but perceptions of inequality. Villages on the outskirts of Mosul - close enough to see the city’s relative prosperity - experienced some of the highest recruitment rates. “The very fact that they were on the doorstep of the city… meant that expansion in relative inequality was just an extremely useful recruiting lever,” he explains. Recruiters also manipulated environmental hardship for political ends, framing drought as a deliberate act by the government. “On a certain level it didn’t really matter whether local people believed this narrative… they were happy to seize upon it because it suited their priors.”

While much of the focus is on fragile states, Schwartzstein warns against viewing climate-driven instability as a distant problem. Its effects are already visible in wealthier countries. “If we look in the US, violence against women almost always spikes very aggressively in the aftermath of hurricanes,” he notes, with shelters overwhelmed in their aftermath. In Europe, rising temperatures are also linked to increased aggression. “Aggressive behaviour… is significantly more intense in summer months,” he says, pointing to physiological responses to extreme heat. Making these connections visible, he argues, helps bring the issue closer to home: “We’re that bit more likely to convey what’s going on… when describing [it] in ways that the average person… can understand.”

Political capital

Climate stress can also reshape politics. As livelihoods and landscapes change, uncertainty and anxiety create opportunities for more extreme narratives. “Populist movements are beneficiaries of climate stresses in quite a few ways,” Schwartzstein explains. Economic pressures such as inflation, combined with a broader sense of disruption, can drive shifts in voting behaviour. “Climate change contributes to… a sort of devil-may-care attitude… a shock among so many people who… notice that so much of what they love and care about is changing.” In that atmosphere, he argues, populist leaders gain traction by offering simple explanations and clear scapegoats: “That climate of shock and confusion… is the sort of political ambiance that populists tend to make hay from.”

Yet climate is not only a driver of conflict - it is also a casualty of it. In times of crisis, environmental concerns are often pushed aside as governments and populations focus on immediate survival. Schwartzstein points to Iran as a current example, where escalating tensions risk sidelining urgent climate challenges. “This is just more months - at best - in which these fast-intensifying climate shocks will be left to fester,” he warns. While acknowledging the severity of ongoing conflicts, he adds that from a global perspective, such distractions come at a high cost: “This is just the kind of… shenanigans… that we absolutely cannot afford at this time.”

World Reframed episode 36. More episodes of World Reframed.

World Reframed is produced in London by Global South World, part of the Impactum Group. Its editors are Duncan Hooper and Ismail Akwei.

ISSN 2978-4891