The silence contrasts with BRICS’ frequent calls for a more “multipolar” world order and its ambition to amplify the political influence of developing nations in global affairs.

Several member states have responded individually. China and Russia condemned the strikes and warned they violated international law, while South Africa called for a ceasefire and warned the conflict risked spreading beyond the Middle East.

But the organisation itself — which now includes Iran — has not taken a collective position.

This reflects growing divisions within the bloc, particularly after its rapid expansion.

Fractures within BRICS

Originally formed in 2009 by Brazil, Russia, India and China, with South Africa joining the following year, BRICS began primarily as an economic partnership among emerging economies. In 2024, the group expanded to include Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Ethiopia and Indonesia.

Supporters hailed the enlargement as a milestone for a rising coalition of Global South powers seeking greater influence in international institutions traditionally dominated by the West.

However, the Iran war has highlighted the challenges of maintaining unity among members with competing strategic interests.

Iran, under attack from the U.S. and Israel, has launched retaliatory strikes against American assets across the region, including in Saudi Arabia and the UAE — both fellow BRICS members. The attacks marked the first time one member of the organisation has fired missiles at another, underscoring internal tensions within the bloc.

India’s position has drawn particular attention. As the current BRICS chair, New Delhi has limited its response to calls for dialogue and de-escalation, avoiding direct criticism of Washington or Tel Aviv.

This cautious approach comes as India strengthens ties with both countries. Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Israel weeks before the war began, announcing a “special strategic partnership” that includes defence and technology cooperation.

At the same time, India has sought to stabilise trade relations with the U.S. following tariff disputes with the Trump administration.

Those overlapping relationships have complicated efforts for BRICS to adopt a unified position on the conflict.

While BRICS leaders frequently emphasise their role as a voice for the Global South, the differing responses to the Iran war suggest the alliance still struggles to coordinate on major security crises — even when one of its own members is directly involved.

Sardana contends that institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank remain largely shaped by Western interests, often advancing political priorities rather than addressing the development needs of the Global South. In this context, the dollar is increasingly viewed not just as a reserve currency but as a strategic tool that enables countries like the United States to impose sanctions and exert influence over nations that diverge from its policy positions.

Momentum for alternatives has been reinforced by reports that India’s central bank has proposed linking the official digital currencies of BRICS members to facilitate cross-border trade and tourism payments. Such a system, supporters argue, would reduce exposure to dollar-based transactions and enhance global financial stability. The idea builds on commitments made in the 2025 BRICS declaration in Rio de Janeiro, which called for greater interoperability between national payment systems.

India has formally assumed the BRICS presidency for 2026, with External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar unveiling the official website, theme and logo in New Delhi on Tuesday, January 13. Jaishankar said India’s chairship “will adopt a ‘humanity-first’ and ‘people-centric’ approach,” aimed at resilience, innovation, cooperation and sustainability. “Launched preparations for BRICS India 2026 with the unveiling of website, theme and logo,” he wrote on X, adding that the presidency would “seek to bring together the potential of the member countries of the grouping to promote greater global welfare.” Noting that BRICS will mark 20 years since its inception in 2026, Jaishankar said the bloc has evolved into a key platform for cooperation among emerging markets and developing economies. India took over the presidency from Brazil on January 1, marking its fourth turn at the helm, having last chaired the grouping in 2021 during the Covid-19 pandemic.

Labour reforms

Major delivery platforms Blinkit, Zepto, Zomato and Swiggy have begun moving away from their 10-minute delivery model following an intervention by Union Labour Minister Mansukh Mandaviya. The decision comes after gig workers staged a one-day strike on December 31, citing safety risks and health concerns linked to ultra-fast delivery timelines. Ministry sources said Blinkit has already removed the 10-minute delivery promise from its branding, with others expected to follow. A senior official said Mandaviya raised concerns with aggregators, urging them to stop the practice “considering the health and welfare of delivery workers,” a request the companies agreed to. Blinkit has since revised its tagline to “30,000+ products delivered at your doorstep.”

Army chief issues blunt warning to Pakistan

India’s Army Chief General Upendra Dwivedi on Tuesday warned Pakistan that any future provocation would be met with a firm response, describing the counterterror Operation Sindoor as “ongoing.” Speaking at the Army Day press conference, he said , “At least 6 terror camps still active across the LoC & 2 across the International Border after Operation Sindoor against Pakistan. Will act, if any (nefarious) attempts are carried out.” Dwivedi said the operation was executed with precision, dismantling terror infrastructure and “resetting strategic assumptions.” He added that around 100 Pakistani personnel were killed during heightened tensions along the Line of Control and International Border, and acknowledged the coordinated role of intelligence agencies, civil authorities and multiple ministries in the operation.

India slips to third place in Russian fossil fuel imports

India fell to third place among importers of Russian fossil fuels in December 2025 after private and state-owned refiners sharply reduced crude purchases, according to the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA). India’s imports dropped to €2.3 billion in December from €3.3 billion in November, with Türkiye overtaking India as the second-largest buyer. China remained the top importer. CREA said crude oil made up 78 percent of India’s purchases, with coal and refined products accounting for the rest. The think tank noted that Reliance Industries halved its Russian imports in December, while state refiners cut purchases by 15 percent, amid tighter sanctions on major Russian producers Rosneft and Lukoil.

Trump’s Iran tariffs add to India’s trade worries

U.S. President Donald Trump has announced a 25 percent tariff on goods from countries “doing business” with Iran, a move that could further strain India’s trade outlook. “Any Country doing business with the Islamic Republic of Iran will pay a Tariff of 25% on any and all business being done with the United States of America,” Trump said , adding that the order was “final and conclusive.” India’s bilateral trade with Iran stood at $1.34 billion in the first 10 months of 2025, with exports including rice, tea, sugar and pharmaceuticals. The new tariffs come as India is already grappling with 50 percent U.S. levies linked to Russian oil purchases, with exporters warning that sectors such as textiles, gems and jewellery, leather and marine products could be hit hardest if the Iran tariffs are applied on top of existing duties.

What began as tactical responses to pressure increasingly took institutional form, as blocs such as BRICS+ and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) moved beyond political signalling to more structured cooperation.

US sanctions and rising non-Western alliances emerged as defining forces this year. 

US pressure

One of the year’s most visible sanctions flashpoints remained Venezuela. After limited relief in earlier years, the US reimposed tighter restrictions on Caracas’s oil sector as negotiations over political reforms stalled.

The measures complicated crude exports by targeting licensing, shipping and insurance channels, further constraining one of Venezuela’s few remaining sources of hard currency. Authorities in Caracas accused Washington of economic coercion, while Russia and China reiterated diplomatic support and criticised the use of unilateral sanctions.

Global South World tracked the standoff closely throughout the year, including an exclusive interview with Rollie Flynn, chief executive of the Arkin Group and a former CIA officer, who warned that the confrontation carried risks beyond counter-narcotics work.

With Western sanctions on Russia still in place and restrictions on Iran largely intact, 2025 underscored a wider reality: energy producers operating outside the US-led system increasingly faced fragmented trade rules, rerouted supply chains and parallel payment arrangements. 

For oil-importing developing economies, the impact was indirect but tangible, adding volatility to prices and procurement even when they were not direct targets.

BRICS+ rising

Against this backdrop, non-Western groupings sought to tighten coordination .

At the BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro in July, leaders of the expanded bloc reaffirmed cooperation on development finance, trade and global governance reform. 

While the group stopped short of unveiling a common currency or alternative payment system, the summit reinforced political alignment among members that now include major energy exporters in the Middle East and Africa — significantly expanding BRICS’ economic weight and diplomatic reach.

In response, US President Donald Trump warned that countries aligning with what he described as BRICS’ “anti-American policies” could face additional tariffs, a statement that underscored how sanctions and trade pressure have become increasingly intertwined.

SCO hardening

Momentum was more institutional at the SCO summit in Tianjin in late August. The organisation adopted a Development Strategy extending to 2035 and approved new permanent centres focused on security threats, transnational crime, information security and narcotics control.

Leaders also signed the Tianjin Declaration, which explicitly opposed unilateral sanctions and protectionism — language widely interpreted as a direct response to US and European coercive measures.

Taken together, the developments highlighted a paradox of US foreign policy under Trump. While sanctions and tariffs were intended to weaken rivals, analysts say they have instead nudged competitors — and even uneasy neighbours — toward closer cooperation.

“This is a strange time when unlikely bedfellows like India and China are now overtly comfortable with each other, which was not the scene until three or four months ago,” said Dr Pooja Bhatt, director of the Jindal School of International Affairs in India, in an interview with Global South World this year .

“This shows how the U.S.’s excessive use of force — through policy and diplomacy — can push even the most unlikely countries to come together,” she said.

All things considered, the Global South does not seem to move toward a complete realignment, but rather toward steady repositioning. 

US sanctions remained powerful, particularly for countries dependent on Western finance and technology. At the same time, forums such as BRICS+ and the SCO increasingly offered diplomatic backing, coordination platforms and limited institutional alternatives.

Putin noted that defence cooperation between the two countries remains strong, with Indonesian military personnel currently undergoing training at Russian institutions. “Our military departments have direct bilateral ties… at the level of good professional interaction, and we are ready to expand this cooperation,” he said.

The Russian leader also congratulated Indonesia on joining the BRICS group in January and reaffirmed support for negotiations between Jakarta and the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) on a potential free trade zone.

Subianto’s official visit to Moscow focused on strengthening the Russian-Indonesian strategic partnership and discussing key international and regional developments, according to the Kremlin.

Many of the provinces carry names rooted in Indigenous languages such as Quechua, Mapuche, and Guaraní. Others have Spanish colonial or religious origins.

For example:

Even more interesting translations, such as “Very Pronounced Point Between Two Rivers” (Chaco) or “Prickly Plant Fruit” (Tucumán), come from Indigenous terms describing local landscapes, flora, or cultural practices.

In Dakar, Senegal, Djibril Gningue of the Research Group and Dappio – Council for Participatory Democracy and Good Governance (GRADEC) dismissed claims that the boycott is linked to allegations of a so-called “white farmer genocide” in South Africa. Instead, he argued that Washington’s decision reflects broader strategic anxieties.

Gningue said a “wind” of countries asserting their sovereignty is “blowing across the world and especially over Africa,” and warned that the US is ramping up pressure on the Global South as a result.

He suggested the boycott highlights a deeper shift in global power. “Isn’t it time to go in that direction, in the direction of a multipolar world ? Isn’t it also in the direction of sovereignism?” he asked, warning that attempts to pressure the Global South “will lead to the definitive decline of the West.”