“Whilst carbon trading has been under implementation in Zimbabwe over the past two decades, urban local authorities have largely not been participating owing to limited awareness and capacity,” she is quoted by the Herald Online .

Ndlovu said climate change impacts were worsening, making it urgent for government institutions to integrate climate action into planning and budgets. She cited the National Development Strategy 2 (NDS2), launched on November 27, 2025, which calls for mitigation and adaptation across sectors, including energy, transport, industry, waste, agriculture and disaster management.

“Our urban environs have vast potential to supply the global carbon market with high integrity carbon credits and in turn benefit us in terms of low carbon development, infrastructure improvement and enhanced revenue inflows,” she said.

She said potential projects include methane capture from engineered landfills to generate electricity, producing biochar from sewage for agriculture, and waste-to-energy initiatives.

The (mal)governance of raw materials such as these even led to the resources being seen as a ‘curse’. In the present day, the scramble for critical minerals has many of the same features – imperial powers seeking to take control of the resources for their own benefit. History seems to be repeating itself.

The US’s new proposed trading club for critical minerals, in conjunction with its more domestically-oriented Project Vault, albeit designed to protect technologies for AI, manufacturing and defence rather than green industries, is but the latest example of an imperial-centred approach.  Such an approach could reinstate previous and reinforce existing power structures instead of recalibrating or even dismantling these structures for a socially-just global transformation that does not mainly serve the interests of the US.

If the world is to undergo a green transition, how might it do so without repeating the colonial and imperial global structures of the past? In short, what might a Green New International Economic Order (GNIEO) look like and how might it come about?

As a first step, greater agency and voice for the Global South are a prerequisite. Notwithstanding the uneven global distribution of critical minerals, many of them are found in the countries of the Global South (for example, China and Brazil alone have over 70% of known rare earth reserves).

If they are to be extracted and used to meet progressive social, political, economic and ecological goals, then countries of the Global South will need to have control over their resources and have access to the technologies which will allow them to use these resources for their own industrial advancement. Ownership of resources and access to technology and finance were, in fact, key aspects of the Global South’s proposals for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) in the 1970s. 

The NIEO was a brave attempt to see an alternative future for global economic governance but it failed to deliver as countries in the Global North, especially the US under Kissinger, sought to divide the countries of the Global South by exploiting the differences of interests between oil exporting and oil importing countries while maintaining Northern unity as much as possible, and as the Global South’s agenda unravelled as a result of the underlying tensions in its goals.

If a GNIEO were to be forged now, it would face many of the same problems. The unity of the Global North might be strained, however, as the US under Trump alienates friend and foe alike. Notwithstanding this, many of the current global governance institutions designed to regulate extractive processes, such as the World Bank’s Climate Smart Mining Initiative and the OECD’s Responsible Business Conduct, are dominated by Northern countries.

A coherent Global South response would require two major features. Firstly, it would need to manage the inherent tensions between resource nationalism and collective action. Secondly, and relatedly, it would need China to be a powerful leader given its global dominance in the extraction and processing of critical minerals.

Resource nationalism - and its associated policy instruments such as industrial policy, the support of State-Owned Enterprises, local content regulations and export bans - has resurfaced in the Global South over the past decade or so. Many countries feel the pull of resource nationalism as a way to protect and secure their own economic destinies in the face of predatory external threats.

Of course, this has often led local elites to engage in predatory behaviour themselves as part of the global structures of extraction and accumulation. Resource nationalism – in the sense of sovereign control over resources - is a necessary but insufficient condition for progressive change. One of the problems, from a global perspective, is how resource nationalism can be made compatible with collective action by the Global South, that is, which parts of nationalism can be reasonably ceded for the greater power offered by the prospect of cooperation with other Global South countries.

This dilemma is especially acute for China in the case of critical minerals. It is faced with geopolitical and geoeconomic threats from the US, is blocked by many Northern countries from investing in key sectors and from purchasing some key technologies. China’s response, perhaps unsurprisingly, has been overwhelmingly nationalist.

An examination of resource policy documents reveals a strong emphasis on domestic regulation covering issues such as environmental mitigation, work safety, export quotas and industrial restructuring and upgrading. There are specific provisions for international cooperation through the Belt and Road Initiative, for example, and in some bilateral agreements (with Russia, for example).

But there is conspicuously little which speaks to the global level, at how global governance structures could be forged to advance the interests of the Global South despite China’s insistence that it sees itself as a key member and supporter of the Global South. 

At present, we are therefore left with critical minerals, essential to the future well-being of the global population and planetary health, being governed by the anarchic interactions of rival powers. A Green New International Economic Order is needed urgently. 

The opinions and thoughts expressed in this article reflect only the author's views.

About the authors

Paul Bowles is Professor Emeritus at the University of Northern British Columbia, Canada. He has published widely on development, globalisation, and extractivism.

Nathan Andrews is an Associate Professor of International Relations at McMaster University whose research focuses on the global political economy/ecology of natural resource extraction and development.

Jing Vivian Zhan is a Professor in the School of Governance and Policy Science at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Her research focuses on comparative political economy, local governance, and natural resource management, especially in the Chinese context.

This opinion piece draws upon the analysis set forth in Nathan Andrews, Paul Bowles and Jing Vivian Zhan, “ Transforming Global Critical Minerals Governance: Is a Green New International Economic Order Possible?”, Third World Quarterly , 18 January 2026 (online first), DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2025.2608840. For extended analysis, see also Paul Bowles and Nathan Andrews (eds.), Extractive Bargains: Natural Resources and the State-Society Nexus , London: Routledge, 2024.

The Central Jakarta District Court has sentenced former ASDP Indonesia Ferry CEO Ira Puspadewi to 4.5 years in prison and a Rp500 million fine for corruption linked to the 2019 - 2022 acquisition of PT Jembatan Nusantara (JN). The court found Ira guilty of enriching PT JN owner Adjie by Rp1.25 trillion (approx. US$78.1 million) through an irregular business cooperation scheme. Chief Judge Sunoto read out the verdict on Thursday, noting it was lighter than the 8.5-year sentence sought by prosecutors from the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). The case is one of Indonesia’s most high-profile corporate graft scandals this year, Kompas reports . ASDP Indonesia Ferry is a state-owned Indonesian company that operates an integrated ferry and port service to connect the archipelago, along with developing waterfront tourism.

500,000 hectares for cattle farms to combat milk shortage

President Prabowo Subianto has ordered the creation of 500,000 hectares of cattle farms to address a milk shortage affecting the government’s Free Nutritious Meal (MBG) program. Deputy Head of the National Nutrition Agency Nanik S. Deyang said 300,000 hectares will be developed outside Java and 200,000 within. “The President has given instructions. A cattle farm will soon be established to meet the needs of the MBG and the Indonesian people,” she said . The farms are expected to produce 3 million litres of milk per day, with Agrinas and the Agriculture Ministry spearheading the effort. Plans also include expanding soy milk production to supplement the dairy supply.

Indonesia and Austria to establish carbon trade agreement

Indonesia is preparing to sign a carbon trade agreement with Austria, Minister of Environment and BPLH Head Hanif Faisol Nurofiq announced after meeting Austrian Minister Norbert Totschnig in Vienna. The partnership will include a mutual recognition agreement (MRA) to support both countries’ carbon market frameworks. “We believe that a well-functioning carbon market will contribute to achieving Indonesia’s climate targets while encouraging green investment,” Hanif said . Indonesia’s carbon trade transactions reached Rp7 trillion (approx. US$437.5 million) at COP30 in Brazil, with a potential of 14.5 million tons of CO₂ in future trading.

Riau flu outbreak among Talang Mamak tribe

Health authorities say an Influenza A outbreak that killed five children and infected more than 200 members of the Talang Mamak Indigenous community in Indragiri Hulu, Riau, is now under control. Acting Health Agency head Heri Permana confirmed that no new cases have been reported since late October. “Hopefully there will be no additional patients so we can focus on recovery efforts,” said Sandra, head of the local health agency. A report by Jakarta Post indicated that the outbreak, which mostly affected children and infants, had spread rapidly through the remote hamlet before medical teams intervened with treatment and supplies.

Over 1,000 evacuated after Mount Semeru eruption

More than 1,000 residents have been evacuated following a series of eruptions at Mount Semeru, East Java’s tallest volcano, which spewed ash clouds up to 2 kilometres high and sent lava flows 13 kilometres down its slopes. Authorities reported several injuries and deployed emergency response teams to Lumajang and Malang regencies to assist displaced residents. The 3,676-meter volcano, one of Indonesia’s most active, has been under heightened monitoring since its previous major eruption in 2021.

This year, all nations are expected to submit their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) outlining their strategies for cutting greenhouse gas emissions to help meet the global goal of limiting temperature increases to 1.5ºC and preparing for the effects of climate change. The NDCs are revised every five years in accordance with the Paris Agreement.

However, Jusper Machogu, a 30-year-old farmer from Kisii, Kenya , questions the morality and fairness of rich countries, asking Africa to abstain from the very path they used to industrialise.

Machogu, a prominent advocate for the use of fossil fuels in Africa through his social media, presents a counter-narrative—one he says is grounded in the lived experiences of many Africans and shaped by a critique of international climate policy dynamics.

 “Why should Africa stop exploring fossil fuels?" he questioned. "There is no country that has developed using solar and wind. Every developed country is literally burning a lot of oil, coal, and natural gas,” Jusper told Global South World.

He suggests that Africa be given a century-long window to use its fossil fuel resources to lift itself out of poverty before committing to a full transition.

 “We can listen to them once we beat poverty and hunger in Africa—maybe by 2100. That is when we should stop burning fossil fuels, after ensuring every other person in Africa is fed, housed, and has access to water and energy.”

Africa contributes just 4% of the world's total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, both in absolute and per capita terms.

Machogu points out the global inequality in energy consumption, highlighting the stark gap between Africa and developed nations.

“The US consumes about 20 million barrels of oil per day. Their population is 330 million people. Africa consumes 4 million barrels per day—our population is 1.5 billion people.”

 “Why should those people expect me to care about the climate?” he questions.

This imbalance, he argues, disqualifies the moral authority of developed nations to lecture Africa on its energy choices.

While renewable energy dominates global discussions, he argues that most of Africa already uses "renewable" sources—but not the kind typically promoted.

 “Almost 90% of our energy in sub-Saharan Africa is from biomass—cow dung, firewood, charcoal, crop residue. That is it.”

He distinguishes between real energy needs and electricity, arguing that the conversation around solar and wind often misses the point.

 “When they say renewable energy, they’re referring to solar and wind. But solar and wind only produce electricity. They cannot run industries, they cannot power transportation... Our energy needs are far broader.”

Africa has historically made much larger investments in fossil fuel infrastructure than in renewable energy initiatives. In the region, solar and wind projects received only $1 USD for every $3 USD invested in fossil fuel power plants between 2015 and 2024. But for the first time in Sub-Saharan Africa's history, investments in wind and solar energy exceeded those in fossil fuels in 2023. 

Leaders set a goal last year to raise $1.3 trillion a year from all international sources to support climate action in developing nations by 2035.

It is pledges like this that he says have fuelled African leaders into chasing green funds for political gain. 

“The green energy industry has got a lot of money... Of course, African leaders are going to say, 'we want solar and wind'—that is what gives them funds. But they’re not doing it for the people.”