His dominance is backed by the ruling party, the People’s Rally for Progress (RPP), which leads the broader governing coalition, the Union for the Presidential Majority (UMP).

A 2010 constitutional amendment removed presidential term limits, allowing Guelleh to run indefinitely. More recently, in 2025, Djibouti’s parliament eliminated the 75-year age cap for presidential candidates, a move widely interpreted as designed to ensure Guelleh, now 78, could stand again.

The electoral field itself underscores the imbalance. In previous elections, Guelleh has secured overwhelming victories, including 87% of the vote in 2016 and over 97% in 2021, figures that international observers and opposition groups have questioned.

Who is contesting IOG?

Mohamed Farah Samatar stands as the sole challenger to President Guelleh, though his candidacy carries its own complexities. A former insider of the ruling establishment, he is now contesting the presidency under the banner of the Unified Democratic Centre (CDU).

During the lead-up to the votes, Samatar took his campaign to the Tadjourah and Obock regions, where he addressed supporters and attempted to project an alternative vision for the country, insisting that “another Djibouti is possible”.

Even so, analysts remain sceptical about the broader significance of the race. Sonia Le Gouriellec, a specialist on the Horn of Africa at Lille Catholic University, told AFP: “There’s not much at stake. It’s just a token competition.”

Criticism has been sharper from civil society. Omar Ali Ewado, who leads the Djibouti League of Human Rights (LDDH), dismissed the process outright, describing the vote as a “masquerade” and a “foregone conclusion”.

This context shapes the core issue about how the election is unlikely to produce political change, but it may intensify uncertainty about what comes next.

Who can vote?

Roughly 243,000 voters are registered for Djibouti’s 2026 presidential election , according to data from the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, out of a national population estimated at just over one million.

That marks a modest increase from the around 215,000 registered voters in 2021, pointing to a gradual expansion in the electoral roll, though still representing only about a quarter of the population.

Historically, turnout has been relatively strong on paper, averaging close to 67%, though critics argue these figures should be viewed in the context of limited political competition.

Polling stations are expected to open in the morning and close later in the day, after which counting is expected to begin.

Despite being labelled an “electoral autocracy” by international monitors, Djibouti is hosting a regional observer mission from the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), with 17 observers from Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan and Uganda deployed nationwide.

The bloc is expected to release its initial assessment after the vote, followed by a formal statement on 12 April.

What is at stake?

Djibouti’s location along the Bab el-Mandeb Strait places it at the crossroads of global commerce. Estimates suggest that around 12–15% of global trade and a significant share of oil shipments pass through this narrow waterway connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden. The country has leveraged this position to build an economy centred on logistics, ports, and foreign military partnerships.

The Port of Doraleh, one of the most important infrastructure assets in the region, serves as a critical hub for shipping and for landlocked Ethiopia, which relies on Djibouti for roughly 90–95% of its imports and exports. Revenues from port operations, logistics services, and foreign base leases form a substantial part of Djibouti’s national income.

This strategic value has attracted a concentration of global military presence rarely seen in such a small state.

Djibouti hosts:

Additionally, although Djibouti has invested heavily in infrastructure, including rail links and port expansion projects often financed through external borrowing, concerns persist about public debt levels, which have at times exceeded 70% of GDP, much of it linked to Chinese-funded projects.

Youth unemployment remains high, and the benefits of growth have not been evenly distributed, contributing to underlying social discontent.

After the pomp and pageantry that greeted Senegal’s national football team back home in Dakar and the extra celebration for some of the players back at their respective football clubs, the decision of CAF’s Appeal Board has rubbed many football fans the wrong way. 

The Appeal Board’s decision, published on Tuesday March 17, noted that in applying “Article 84 of the Regulations of the CAF Africa Cup of Nations (AFCON), the Senegal National Team is declared to have forfeited the Final Match of the TotalEnergies CAF Africa Cup of Nations (AFCON) Morocco 2025 (“the Match”), with the result of the Match being recorded as 3–0 in favour of the Fédération Royale Marocaine de Football (FRMF).”

But the Board’s interpretation of article 84 has come under scrutiny from many analysts and fans alike. CAF’s Disciplinary Board, responsible for enforcing its regulations, investigated the outcome of the tournament and upheld the 1-0 victory, which led to Senegal being crowned continental champions. So why did the Appeal Board decide to apply article 84, and what is contained in that article?

Article 84 of the CAF regulations states: “The team which contravenes provisions of articles 82 and 83 shall be eliminated for good from the competition. This team will lose the match 3-0 unless the opponent has achieved a more advantageous result at the time the match was interrupted; in this case, the score will be maintained. The Organising Committee may adopt further measures.”

The Board’s statement also noted that it found that “the conduct of the Senegal team falls within the scope of Articles 82 and 84 of the Regulations of the Africa Cup of Nations.”

And that is where many have a problem. Former CAF Disciplinary Board member, Raymond Hack, speaking on Robert Marawa’s football show on Wednesday, March 18, pointed out that a crucial component of article 84 may have been overlooked by the Board.

“They (Appeal Board) based their decision on article 82, which says that if a team goes off the field of play without the authority of the referee, article 84 comes into play,” Hack said.

“But they didn’t read article 84 too well. Article 84 says the team that contravenes article 82 AND article 83 will be eliminated from the competition. It doesn’t say the provisions of articles 82 or 83. It says articles 82 and 83 and that’s where they award the three points or 3-0.”

Article 82 of the CAF regulations states: “If, for any reason whatsoever, a team withdraws from the competition or does not report for a match, or refuses to play or leaves the ground before the regular end of the match without authorisation of the referee, it shall be considered the loser and shall be eliminated for good from the current competition. The same shall apply for the teams previously disqualified by decision of CAF.”

Article 83, on the other hand, states: “A team that shall not be present on the ground, dressed to play at the time fixed for kick-off or at most 15 minutes later, shall forfeit the match. The referee shall register the absence of the team and shall write it in his report. The Organising Committee shall take the final decision in this respect.”

So if article 84 kicks in when articles 82 and 83 have been violated, then the Appeal Board should probably not have invoked it at all in this matter. Senegal’s walk-off was in the final minutes of the match - not at the beginning nor 15 minutes after the scheduled kick-off - therefore article 83 does not apply. So if that does not apply, what else did the Appeals Board miss which led them to invoke article 84 anyway?

“The point they’re all missing is [that] the referee’s decision in terms of article 6 of the CAF disciplinary code is final,” Hack said. “So when is final? If you look in terms of the IFAB rules, whether it be 5.2, where it talks about the referee, the game is finished when the referee blows the whistle for it being finished.”

Considering all this, it begs the question of whether the CAF Appeal Board is misinterpreting the confederation’s regulations. Sports journalist Benedict Owusu said such differences in interpretation of the law are common. So is the Appeal Board suggesting that the referee, as an arbiter of the match, no longer has the authority to make a final determination in the match he or she oversees?

Crucially, what does this all mean for African football?

Benedict Owusu has covered African football extensively, including multiple AFCON and World Cup tournaments. He says the Board’s decision puts African football in a bad light.

“There is no hiding from this, it’s an absolute embarrassment not only for football but for the continent,” he said. “AFCON is a tournament many people outside the continent have tried to downplay, and this embarrassment fuels those people to continue spreading their negativity about it. The level of attention this news has received worldwide should tell you where this has gotten to, and it is sad that it is for the wrong reasons.”

Senegal’s football federation, in a reaction to the Board’s decision, said it denounced “this unfair, unprecedented, and unacceptable decision, which discredits African football. To defend its rights and the interests of Senegalese football, the Federation will initiate an appeal as soon as possible before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) in Lausanne.”

The fallout from the CAF Appeals Board’s decision has been swift. There are calls on social media for the nine members of the Appeal Board to be sacked. On Thursday, a video of a news conference surfaced on social media showing Djibouti’s representative on the Appeal Board, Mohamed Robleh Djama, and two others. Djama distanced himself from the decision to strip Senegal of the title, saying he was neither present nor took part in the decision-making process.

While Senegal prepares to present its case to CAS, which some fans on social media are certain will lead to an overturn of the CAF Appeal Board’s decision, Benedict Owusu says, “This will never go away, even if it gets overturned again. The damage has already been caused, and it will be hard to repair it. The tournament’s reputation and CAF’s are in tatters. At this point, you cannot begrudge anyone who talks down on the AFCON. It is a mess, a really big mess.”

The opinions and thoughts expressed in this article reflect only the author's views.

Nii Akrofi Smart-Abbey is an award-winning international journalist, writer, and host of the A55 Podcast. Nii Akrofi has worked with local and international media in Ghana, Congo and the United States. He has contributed to news platforms like Zenger News, Africanews, W42ndST, and foreignpresscorrespondents.com.

That’s the worry of Jim McCarthy, founder of Impresario Strategic Growth Service and marketing expert, raised in a conversation with Global South World. His view is that the tournament’s challenge isn’t only “high ticket prices”, but the full cost of attendance. “It’s not just the tickets but the travel, the hotels,” he said, noting that high-demand events push prices up across the board, from Airbnbs to transport.

McCarthy argues FIFA may be leaning too heavily on an American pricing reality. “The US sports culture is different…people are used to paying a lot for sports tickets,” he said, adding that FIFA could see it as a financial opportunity. The risk, he said, is misreading the audience. “The audience for the World Cup is actually a global audience, not just an American audience…that conflict is going to be a challenge for marketing the tournament,” especially if international supporters feel priced out of group-stage matches, the very games most likely to draw travelling fans.

But the bigger wild card, McCarthy says, is politics and whether fans feel welcome. “Any friction or barrier that people feel about going to a live event is gonna make it harder to sell that event,” he said. In his view, people don’t need much encouragement to stay home when the trip is already expensive; even small anxieties can tip the decision.

That anxiety has been further increased by a year of harder-edged US policy and global tension. From tariff fights and tougher entry rules to expanding military confrontations.

From the last quarter of 2025 and early 2026, the Donald Trump-led government issued new restrictions on entry for certain foreign nationals. Even though there was widespread criticism about these policies, and their consequent ripple effects on travel and events like the World Cup, most stood unchanged or with very little changes.

And the Middle East war is now bleeding directly into football. Iran’s participation has become a live issue. Iran’s sports minister has said the national team would not take part “under no circumstances,” even as other Iranian officials have suggested they could still play if matches were moved out of the US.

For McCarthy, that’s the heart of the 2026 test, FIFA can sell tickets, but it still has to sell a feeling that fans from everywhere belong. “You want people to feel welcome…you want them to feel that they’ll be taken care of,” he said, arguing the tournament could also be an opportunity “to make football fans around the world feel that they belong here.”

The 2026 World Cup is scheduled to take place from June 11 through to July 19, yet with barely three months away, US President Trump is on the geopolitical front, waging war alongside Israel against Iran.

It is important to note that these figures reflect loan commitments, not the total amount disbursed, repaid or currently outstanding.

Where the money went

Chinese loans have largely funded infrastructure projects across the continent. The biggest sectors include: transportation  - railways, highways and ports in countries such as Nigeria, Kenya, Ethiopia, Angola, amongst others. The energy sector - power plants, transmission lines and hydropower projects in Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire; water and sanitation - projects in West African countries, including Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria; education and defence - Smaller but notable investments in school facilities and military equipment.

Nigeria is among the largest recipients in transport financing, while Ghana features prominently in both energy and defence-related loans. Countries such as Angola, Ethiopia, Zambia and Kenya have also received substantial financing over the years.

Chinese lending to Africa rose sharply during the 2010s, especially after the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), with annual loan commitments in some years exceeding $10 billion. More recently, China’s global BRI engagement has reached record levels. In 2025, BRI activity hit its highest level ever, with $128.4 billion in construction contracts and about $85.2 billion in investments worldwide. Energy projects accounted for a major share of that expansion. China’s energy-related engagement in 2025 climbed to $93.9 billion, more than double the level recorded in 2024 and the highest since the BRI began. 

Chinese loan commitments to African countries dropped to $7 billion in 2019, a 30 percent decline from the $9.9 billion recorded in 2018.

More recently, lending fell even further. In 2024, Chinese loans to Africa declined to $2.1 billion, nearly half the previous year’s level and the first annual drop since the COVID-19 pandemic, according to data released by Boston University’s Global Development Policy Centre. The figure is less than a tenth of the $28.8 billion peak recorded in 2016. The decline was attributed to Beijing’s shift away from financing massive infrastructure projects such as railways and highways, and toward smaller, more commercially viable and strategically targeted investments.

Is Africa deep in debt?

China is a major creditor to several African nations, but it is not Africa’s only lender. African governments also borrow from multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and African Development Bank, private bond markets (Eurobonds), and other bilateral lenders. 

In some countries, Chinese loans make up a significant share of external bilateral debt. In others, they represent a smaller portion compared to commercial borrowing. 

Chinese loans have helped build roads, railways, dams and power plants that many African governments say are essential for economic growth. At the same time, rising global interest rates, currency depreciation and weak revenues have made repayment harder for some countries.

The key question is not just how much Africa owes China, but whether these projects generate enough economic return to service the debt.

As if the so-called “towel-gate” scandal during the final game hadn’t generated enough tension between the two teams, coach Pape Thiaw’s decision to have Senegal’s players walk off the field in protest of a contentious Video Assisted Referee (VAR) awarded penalty has left fans divided.

Across social media, many who support Senegal’s walk-off believe it is justified as they point to moments throughout the tournament when they felt Morocco had been given undue advantage by referees and being spared punishment even for fouls they committed.

The fans have criticised the Confederation of African Football (CAF) for poor officiating and criticised FIFA president Gianni Infantino for taking sides by calling out Senegal for their walkout, but not the Moroccan fans.

“Unfortunately, we also witnessed unacceptable scenes on the field and in the stands,” Infantino wrote on Instagram as part of his message congratulating Senegal for their win and Morocco’s hosting of the tournament. “We strongly condemn the behaviour of some 'supporters' as well as some Senegalese players and technical staff members. It is unacceptable to leave the field of play in this manner, and equally, violence cannot be tolerated in our sport, it is simply not right.”

Since the tournament wrapped, Pape Thiaw has apologised for calling on his players to walk off. The Moroccan football federation, on the other hand, has hinted at its plans to pursue legal action over their final match with Senegal, indicating that the 15-minute delay in play impacted the result.

While CAF has condemned the “unacceptable behaviour from some players and officials” in a statement, it has not stated what form of punishment, if any, Senegal would face. CAF’s statement noted that it was “reviewing all footage and will refer the matter to competent bodies for appropriate action to be taken against those found guilty.”

The question on many minds, therefore, is what kind of punishment Senegal is likely to face.

Many commentators have pointed to FIFA regulations that call for a docking of 3 points from the team that walks off during a match. That rule references when a team walks off the pitch and decides not to continue the game. In this case, Senegal returned to finish the game. So do they lose three points?

Sports journalist Benedict Owusu says it is not likely, as this was the final match of the tournament.

But will there be punishment? It is highly likely that there would be some form of punishment based on CAF’s review of footage from the match, and those who are identified as culprits. Benedict explains that punishment in this case could be monetary .

“Potential punishments from CAF could be heavy financial fines, long-term suspensions for coaching staff, and key players who disrupted the game. It could be 4–6 matches and potential disqualification from future tournaments.”

That is likely to be the extent of the punishment, as this was a CAF-related event and not FIFA. “The only time a punishment from a CAF tournament is carried over to a FIFA tournament is for player sanctions. So, for instance, if a player was red-carded in the final or in the qualifiers, that player will serve the ban should their team qualify for the World Cup,” Benedict adds.

While CAF pores over video footage of the final match before reaching a decision, the Teranga Lions of Senegal can focus their energies on the upcoming World Cup this summer. The only worry they may have would be about the ever-changing and expanding US immigration policy. Senegal and the Ivory Coast, which have both qualified for the World Cup, were among the 15 African nations slapped with partial bans from entering the United States in December.

It is highly unlikely that Senegal will play their World Cup matches in half-empty stadiums as there is a sizeable Senegalese population in the United States. That aside, the large Senegalese diaspora in France, especially those with French passports, will be able to travel to the US, probably with less scrutiny than those with Senegalese passports.

In African football, the fans have always been the 12 th player on the team. For many fans, being able to watch their national team play in person is akin to a religious experience that is miles away from the television experience. It is why, despite the many challenges with air travel in Africa, thousands of fans still found their way to Morocco to support their national teams.

Unfortunately, that may not be the case this summer as nearly 30 African countries face full or partial travel bans to the US. But whether at the stadium or on television, the one thing that is certain for now is that the Teranga Lions are the new champions of African football, and many would look up to them for a repeat of what happened in Rabat. Not the walkout, but victory in all their matches and possibly best Morocco’s 2022 semi-final finish at the global tournament.

The opinions and thoughts expressed in this article reflect only the author's views.

Nii Akrofi Smart-Abbey is an award-winning international journalist, writer, and host of the A55 Podcast. Nii Akrofi has worked with local and international media in Ghana, Congo and the United States. He has contributed to news platforms like Zenger News, Africanews, W42ndST, and foreignpresscorrespondents.com.

Kosovo also confirmed its participation on Wednesday. President Vjosa Osmani said she was honoured to be invited as a founding member, describing the move as standing “shoulder to shoulder with the United States in the pursuit of a safer world .”

“America helped bring peace to Kosovo. Today, Kosovo stands firmly as America’s ally, ready to help carry that peace forward,” Osmani wrote on X. Kosovo has been a close US ally since Washington backed its independence from Serbia in 2008.

UN response? The initiative has raised concerns about whether it could undermine the United Nations. La Neice Collins, spokesperson for the President of the UN General Assembly, said there is only one universal multilateral body mandated to deal with peace and security. “There is one universal multilateral organisation to deal with peace and security issues, and that is the United Nations,” she told RTÉ News . Collins added that the UN’s existing peace mechanisms are established through Security Council resolutions and have specific mandates, stressing that the UN remains the body authorised by the international community to handle global peace and security.

What is the Board of Peace?

According to the White House, the Board of Peace will play a central role in implementing Trump’s 20-point plan to end the Gaza conflict. It is meant to provide strategic oversight, mobilise international resources and ensure accountability as Gaza moves from war to reconstruction and development.

The board will be chaired by Trump and supported by a founding Executive Board made up of senior political and business figures, including US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Trump adviser Steve Witkoff, Jared Kushner, former UK prime minister Tony Blair, investor Marc Rowan, World Bank president Ajay Banga and Robert Gabriel.

Each executive board member will oversee specific areas such as governance , reconstruction, investment, funding and regional relations.

The preamble to the plan says, “durable peace requires pragmatic judgement, common sense solutions, and the courage to depart from approaches and institutions that have too often failed.”

Trump has suggested the board could eventually help broker other global conflicts, prompting comparisons to a parallel version of the UN Security Council.

So far, countries that have agreed to take part include Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Morocco, Vietnam, Kazakhstan, Hungary, Argentina, Belarus and Kosovo. Invitation letters have also been sent to leaders in Paraguay, Canada, Egypt and Turkey, while Russia, India, Slovenia, Thailand and the European Union’s executive arm have confirmed receiving invitations.

This time, it’s different.

Right now, one of the most visible Americans across Africa isn’t a politician, an athlete, or a pop star. It’s a YouTuber.

IShowSpeed, real name Darren Jason Watkins Jr. has become a constant presence on African timelines, phones, and conversations, not because of a concert tour or a state visit, but because he is livestreaming his way across the continent in real time.

Speed is one of the biggest digital creators in the world . He has more than 48 million subscribers on YouTube, nearly 44 million followers on Instagram, over 46 million on TikTok, and millions more across Facebook and Twitch. Altogether, his audience comfortably passes 100 million people worldwide.

Speed is currently in the middle of Speed Does Africa, a continent-wide livestream journey expected to span about 20 countries. From city streets to local hangouts, he streams everyday life as he encounters it unscripted, unfiltered, and live.

So far, his stops have included Angola, South Africa , Botswana, Eswatini, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Morocco and Kenya. In many of these places, crowds have gathered within minutes of his arrival, local media have followed his movements, and livestream clips have spread rapidly online.

In a few countries, the attention has gone beyond social media . Tourism boards and government-linked institutions have publicly reacted to or engaged with conversations around his visit, a sign that what started as internet content is now registering at a national level.

More stops are still expected, including Ghana , Nigeria, Senegal, Egypt, Ivory Coast, and others.

In both countries, youth-led protests have exposed deep frustration with unaccountable leadership, rising living costs and limited job opportunities. In Kenya, the 2024 - 2025 demonstrations against proposed tax hikes driven largely by Gen Z activists organising on social media left a strong impression across the region. The protests forced President William Ruto’s government to withdraw key parts of a controversial finance bill, showing how quickly economic grievances can turn into mass mobilisation.

After its disputed October 2025 elections, Tanzania’s protests were met with a heavy security response, including arrests, internet restrictions and allegations of excessive use of force. While authorities defended the crackdown as necessary to maintain stability, rights groups warned it damaged public trust and narrowed democratic space.

These regional experiences resonate strongly in Uganda, where many of the same pressures are present. Various Afrobarometer reports have highlighted similar issues in Uganda, including a high spate of corruption amongst public officials and appointees, amongst others. Like Kenya and Tanzania, Uganda is grappling with high food prices, rising public debt and widespread youth unemployment.

At the same time, concerns about political freedoms are growing. Security forces have detained more than 300 supporters and officials from the opposition party of presidential candidate Bobi Wine since campaigning for the January election began, according to his party.

“Over 300 have been detained since the campaigns started,” said Joel Ssenyonyi, spokesperson for Wine’s National Unity Platform. “The regime is in panic. They are resorting to arrests to deter and instil fear in our people .”

Wine, whose real name is Robert Kyagulanyi, is challenging President Yoweri Museveni, now 81, for a second time after finishing runner-up in the disputed 2021 vote.

A total of seven candidates were nominated during the two-day exercise held on 23 rd and 24 th September 2025 at the Electoral Commission grounds in Lweza-Lubowa, Wakiso District. The process was overseen by Electoral Commission chairperson Justice Simon Byabakama Mugenyi, who also serves as the returning officer for presidential nominations.

Among those nominated is President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, standing on the ticket of the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM). Now in power for nearly four decades, Museveni first took office in 1986 after leading a guerrilla war that promised to restore democracy following years of instability.

Once hailed as part of a new generation of African leaders, his long rule has increasingly been criticised over alleged human rights abuses, restrictions on political space and the harassment of opposition figures. He won the 2021 election with 58% of the vote, a poll marred by allegations of rigging and a heavy security crackdown.

The opposition field is led by Robert Kyagulanyi Ssentamu, popularly known as Bobi Wine, the candidate of the National Unity Platform (NUP). A former pop star turned politician, Bobi Wine, is widely viewed as Museveni’s strongest challenger. He came second in the last election with 35% of the vote and helped turn NUP into the largest opposition party in Parliament. Dubbed the “ghetto president,” he commands strong support among young, urban and working-class voters but has continued to face arrests, surveillance and restrictions on his activities.

Other candidates include James Nandala Mafabi of the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC), Gregory Mugisha Muntu of the Alliance for National Transformation (ANT), Kasibante Robert (NPP), Joseph Mabirizi (CP), Munyagwa Mubarak Sserunga (CMP) and Frank Kabinga Bulira (RPP).

The official campaign period is set to begin on 29 th September 2025, after the harmonisation of candidates’ campaign schedules.

The key issues

While Uganda’s per-capita income has slowly recovered since the pandemic, job creation has lagged behind rapid population growth, leaving millions of young people unemployed or underemployed. Rising public debt estimated at over 50% of GDP and growing debt-servicing costs have raised concerns about fiscal sustainability, alongside persistently high food and fuel prices.

Corruption is another central voter concern. Uganda ranks 140th out of 180 countries on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. High-profile scandals involving members of Parliament and senior officials have contributed to public frustration. 

Afrobarometer surveys show corruption has risen sharply on the list of issues citizens want addressed, yet many Ugandans say they fear retaliation if they report wrongdoing. In February 2025, an Afrobarometer report noted that Corruption ranked as the fifth-most important issue that citizens want their government to address, up from 12th place in 2005. 

Uganda’s Electoral Commission says the outcome of the presidential vote should be known by 4:00 pm local time (1:00 pm GMT) on Saturday, 17 January

Together, these crisis zones will shape migration flows, global security , trade routes, and diplomatic alignments well beyond their borders.

Sudan

Sudan remains the most severe humanitarian emergency globally. The civil war that erupted in April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces has devastated the country, displacing millions and pushing large populations toward famine. In the last year, the conflict showed little sign of resolution, with fighting increasingly fragmented and spilling into neighbouring states such as Chad, South Sudan, and Ethiopia. This year, the country could risk sliding further toward de facto partition, a scenario that would entrench instability across the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea corridor.

Yemen

In Yemen, the conflict is evolving rather than ending. While large-scale fighting has reduced in some areas, the country is increasingly divided between Houthi-controlled territories in the north and rival factions in the south backed by regional powers. This fragmentation weakens prospects for national reconciliation and carries global implications due to Yemen’s proximity to vital Red Sea shipping lanes. As maritime security concerns grow, Yemen’s instability in 2026 will remain tightly linked to regional geopolitics and global trade.

Myanmar

Myanmar enters 2026 locked in a protracted civil war following the 2021 military coup. Armed resistance groups now control significant territory, while the junta struggles to govern beyond major urban centres. Planned or proposed elections under these conditions risk deepening Myanmar’s legitimacy crisis rather than resolving it. The humanitarian toll continues to rise, with millions displaced and neighbouring countries such as Thailand, China, and Bangladesh absorbing the spillover effects.

DR Congo

In eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, violence persists despite diplomatic efforts to stabilise the region. Armed groups, including M23, continue to challenge state authority, exploiting ethnic tensions, especially in Goma and competition over mineral resources. Peace agreements reached last year still face serious implementation challenges , and failure to consolidate them in 2026 could destabilise the wider Great Lakes region, where conflict has long crossed borders and drawn in neighbouring states.

Nigeria

Nigeria’s crisis heading into 2026 is defined by overlapping insurgency, criminal violence, and worsening economic pressure, with jihadist groups such as Boko Haram and ISWAP continuing attacks across the northeast and northwest. In the Middle Belt and parts of the north, violence has increasingly targeted Christian communities, with deadly attacks in late 2025 killing dozens of civilians in Benue and Plateau states, particularly around the Christmas period.

The situation escalated internationally when the United States carried out airstrikes on December 24–25, 2025, hitting ISIS-linked camps in northwest Nigeria at the request of the Nigerian government. While the strikes disrupted militant operations, analysts warn that without addressing governance failures, poverty, and local grievances, Nigeria’s insecurity is likely to persist and deepen in 2026.

Taiwan vs. China

Beyond active war zones, strategic flashpoints are also reshaping risk in the Global South. Rising tensions between China and Taiwan, while centred in East Asia, carry global consequences that will be felt acutely across developing economies. Any escalation would disrupt trade , shipping routes, and semiconductor supply chains, forcing many Global South countries, deeply tied to both Chinese and Western economic systems, to navigate difficult diplomatic and economic choices.

Bangladesh — February 12

Bangladesh’s 2026 national election is one of the most significant tests of democratic resilience in South Asia. After mass student protests in 2024 toppled long-time leader Sheikh Hasina, the country has been governed by an interim administration led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus.

Scheduled for February 12, the election will determine all 300 seats in the Jatiya Sangsad (national parliament) and will be accompanied by a constitutional referendum. Over 127 million voters are registered, making it one of the largest electorates in the world.

With the ruling Awami League previously barred from contesting and major opposition parties such as the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) re-entering the fray, this election represents a dramatic realignment of political forces.

At stake are fundamental questions about civil liberties, judicial independence, and the role of the military in governance, issues highlighted by analysts who note deep public mistrust and the need for credible electoral processes to prevent renewed instability.

Nepal — March 5

Nepal is preparing for one of the most consequential elections against the backdrop of major political unrest. In September 2025, Gen Z-led protests spread nationwide, driven by discontent with corruption, authoritarian governance, and a controversial social media ban. The protests became the most intense political movement in years, leading to violent clashes and dozens of deaths.

Following the unrest, Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli resigned, and the federal Parliament was dissolved. In response, President Ram Chandra Paudel appointed former Chief Justice Sushila Karki as interim prime minister, making her Nepal’s first female head of government. The interim government’s primary task is to oversee a stable transition toward the March elections.

Republic of the Congo — March 22

The Republic of the Congo will hold its presidential election on March 22, 2026, with long-time incumbent Denis Sassou Nguesso seeking another term after decades in power.

Nguesso, who has governed since 1997 and previously served from 1979 to 1992, remains a polarising figure. Critics argue his extended rule has eroded democratic norms, and freedom indices rate the polity among the lowest in political rights.

The election is significant for domestic governance, but also because Congo holds key natural resources and strategic importance in Central Africa. Opposition coalitions are attempting to unify against Nguesso’s longstanding rule, and the 2026 vote could signal either continuity or a breakthrough for alternative leadership.

Colombia — May 31

Colombia will hold its presidential election on May 31 , following parliamentary elections earlier in March. The contest comes at a critical juncture for the Andean nation as it tackles issues like narcotics-driven violence, economic inequality, and peace process implementation.

The 2026 vote will test the durability of reforms initiated under previous administrations and will shape Bogotá’s diplomatic posture toward neighbouring Venezuela and broader Western Hemisphere cooperation on security and migration challenges.

The country is also expected to elect a new leader as the incumbent President Gustavo Petro has been banned from recontesting.

Ethiopian General Election — June 1

Scheduled for June 1, 2026, Ethiopia’s general election will be the first major vote since ongoing internal conflicts deeply disrupted the nation’s political landscape.

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s Prosperity Party will seek to extend its hold on power in a country still grappling with security challenges, a fragile economy, and questions about electoral credibility.

As East Africa’s second-largest country by population, Ethiopia’s political direction will resonate across the region, particularly in how it handles ethnic tensions, federal governance, and economic reform been high in recent years.

Brazil — October 4

Brazil’s general election, set for October 4, will be closely watched across Latin America and beyond.

Brazil’s election will determine the presidency as well as the composition of both chambers of Congress. With Brazil being the largest democracy in Latin America, influential in regional trade, climate policy, and global diplomatic forums, political shifts here could affect Mercosur, climate cooperation (especially Amazon preservation), and relations with major powers such as the United States, China, and the EU.

Sitting President Lula da Silva is seeking a second term and will be going head-to-head with the son of jailed former President Jair Bolsonaro, Flavio Bolsonaro.

Here is a rundown of elections that made a difference in 2025:

Sri Lanka

One of the most consequential elections was Sri Lanka ’s parliamentary transition in early 2025, which followed the 2024 presidential election won by Anura Kumara Dissanayake after the country’s worst economic crisis since independence. Voters decisively rejected the long-dominant Rajapaksa and Wickremesinghe political establishments, widely blamed for the 2022 debt default, instead backing parties and candidates associated with fiscal discipline, anti-corruption reforms, and continued engagement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) recovery programme.

Crucially, the mass youth-led protest movement known as the “Aragalaya,” which had forced former president Gotabaya Rajapaksa to flee in 2022, evolved into sustained electoral pressure in 2025.

Cameroon

In the October 12, 2025, presidential election, Cameroon’ s long-serving President Paul Biya, aged 92, was declared the winner with approximately 53.7% of the vote, extending his rule that began in 1982 into an unprecedented eighth term. The result sparked widespread protests in major cities such as Douala and Yaoundé, with opposition supporters rejecting the official outcome and accusing the government of electoral fraud and repression. The election and its aftermath underscored deep social tensions between entrenched political authority and a growing demand for democratic accountability among citizens and civil society groups.

Tanzania

Tanzania’s 29 October 2025 general election faced criticism over the exclusion of major opposition candidates and claims of suppressed dissent, fuelling public dissatisfaction with the electoral process and governance. Following the government’s declared victory, protests erupted in major cities, driven largely by young people contesting the outcome and broader political restrictions. Opposition groups and civil society alleged that thousands were killed during the unrest, with some estimates as high as 10,000. These claims have not been independently verified and were dismissed by the government as exaggerated. Prime Minister Mwigulu Nchemba’s administration described the figures as misinformation and announced investigations into the protests and any confirmed deaths. A presidential commission was subsequently established, though no official death toll has been released.

Chile

In the December 2025 presidential election in Chile , José Antonio Kast of the conservative Christian Social Front was elected president, defeating left-of-centre candidate Gabriel Boric and signalling a sharp political shift after years of social unrest and economic uncertainty. Kast’s victory reflected widespread voter concern over crime, public security, and economic challenges, with his campaign promising tougher law-and-order policies and market-oriented fiscal reforms. The result marked a substantive rightward turn in Chilean politics, underscoring a broader social realignment in Latin America as citizens adjusted priorities away from progressive agendas toward stability, security, and economic pragmatism in the aftermath of mass protests and constitutional debates.

Bolivia

In the 2025 Bolivian presidential runoff, Rodrigo Paz —a centrist and former mayor of La Paz— defeated his main rival to secure the presidency with a clear lead in the early official count, ending nearly two decades of dominance by the Movement for Socialism (MAS) party. Paz’s campaign focused on economic stability, reducing political polarisation, combating corruption, and restoring investor confidence after years of tension between MAS supporters and opposition groups, appealing to voters across the political spectrum. The election marked a significant social and political shift in Bolivia, reflecting widespread public desire for consensus leadership and pragmatic governance following periods of protests, contested elections, and economic uncertainty under previous administrations.

These two countries join a host of others, like Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali and Gabon, among others.

Madagascar

After weeks of violent and deadly protests powered by Madagascan Gen Z over alleged corruption, the country's Army Personnel Administration Centre (CAPSAT) seized the sovereign power led by Colonel Michael Randrianirina . The Gen Z demonstrations grew beyond service issues into a broader rejection of the leadership of then-President Andry Rajoelina, who became the world's youngest head of state at 34 through a coup in 2009. The situation reached a tipping point when an elite military unit defected and joined the protesters, refusing orders to fire on civilians, effectively cutting Rajoelina off from core state security support.

This shift in military allegiance significantly undermined his ability to remain in power. Facing explicit threats to his life amid the rebellion and the loss of military backing, Rajoelina left Madagascar for a “safe location,” later confirmed to be outside the country, while claiming an attempted illegal power grab was underway. Colonel Michael Randrianirina has been in power since declaring a two-year transition exercise.

Guinea-Bissau

Army officers in Guinea-Bissau announced on Wednesday, November 26, that they had deposed President Umaro Sissoco Embaló , accusing him of mismanaging the political crisis and undermining democratic stability. The officers declared that the existing government had been dissolved and pledged to restore order and constitutional governance, though details about a transition timeline were not immediately clear. The announcement came amid heightened tensions following contested elections on the 23rd and reflected longstanding military influence over the country’s political landscape.

On the same day, sustained gunfire erupted near the national election commission headquarters amidst tensions over a tightly contested presidential election, with residents fleeing the area as shots were heard near multiple government buildings. The outbreak of gunfire occurred just as provisional results were expected. However, protesters took to the streets in Guinea-Bissau on Friday, December 12, to denounce the military coup and demand the restoration of democratic governance , highlighting deep public frustration with the political instability that has plagued the country.

Benin could have become the third country, but for the swift intervention of Nigeria and the country's loyalist forces that protected President Patrice Talon's sovereignty. Armed soldiers went on national television on December 7 to declare they had taken power in a coup , but by evening, the situation had calmed, and everywhere was clear.

Since August 2020, Africa has experienced ten coups.

FIFA World Cup 2026

One of the most anticipated events of the year is the 2026 FIFA World Cup, which will be the largest ever held in terms of teams and host nations. The tournament runs from June 11 to July 19, 2026, with 48 teams competing across the United States , Canada and Mexico. The number of teams playing in the World Cup 2026 has gone up from 32 in previous editions.

The expanded format, with 104 matches in 16 host cities, is expected to drive unprecedented fan engagement, lucrative broadcasting deals and tourism revenue. Iconic venues like Mexico City’s Estadio Azteca are being updated for the event and will host key fixtures.

Winter Olympic Games in Italy

Before the World Cup kicks off, the Winter Olympic Games 2026 will draw global focus to northern Italy. Hosted jointly by Milan and Cortina d’Ampezzo, the Olympics will run from February 6 to 22, 2026, featuring athletes from across the world competing in traditional snow and ice events. The Milan - Cortina Olympics aim to emphasise sustainability, using existing and refurbished venues, and will also serve as a platform for winter sports innovation and cultural exchange.

US 250th anniversary

2026 will also be a landmark moment in U.S. history, as the country celebrates 250 years since the signing of the Declaration of Independence. On July 4, 2026, the United States will commemorate a quarter-millennium of nationhood, tracing its origins to 1776, when 13 colonies declared independence from Great Britain. Reflecting on the anniversary, President Donald Trump described the Declaration as “a single sheet of parchment and 56 signatures” that launched “the greatest political journey in human history.” Since that moment, the United States has grown from its original colonies into a nation of 50 states, shaping global politics, culture and democracy along the way.

The decision triggered what local media described as the largest protests in Mogadishu in recent years, with demonstrators burning Israeli flags and accusing Israel of attempting to divide the country.

Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud addressed an emergency parliamentary session, calling Israel’s recognition of Somaliland “a blunt aggression” against Somalia’s sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity. He warned that the move threatened not only Somalia but the stability of the wider region, local news Hiiraan reports .

Regional security fears

The issue has quickly taken on a regional dimension as Yemen’s Houthi leader, Abdulmalik al-Houthi, warned that any Israeli military presence in Somaliland would be considered a legitimate military target, describing it as a threat to Somalia, Yemen and Red Sea security.

Further, there are concerns over Somaliland’s strategic location along the Gulf of Aden, which is a vital global shipping route. This has raised fears that the dispute could spiral beyond diplomacy into a regional confrontation.

Palestinian response

Palestinian State has also condemned Israel’s move, rejecting any suggestion that Somaliland could be linked to proposals to relocate Palestinians from Gaza. They said neither Palestinian self-determination nor Somali sovereignty could be used as bargaining chips, accusing Israel of exporting instability into the Horn of Africa. “Neither the future of the Palestinian people nor the territorial sovereignty of Somalia can be used as a bargaining chip…Unequivocally rejects any steps aimed at advancing this objective, including any attempt by Israel to relocate the Palestinian population from Gaza into Northwestern Somalia…Will neither accept nor condone the illegal use of any territory, let alone that of a sovereign State which is a Member of the United Nations, to deny the right to self-determination to a people who have been subjected to crimes against humanity for many years…,” a post on the official Palestinian State account on X read in part.

United Nations reaction

At an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council in New York , 14 of the council’s 15 members criticised Israel’s decision, warning it could destabilise Somalia and set a dangerous precedent.

Somalia’s ambassador to the UN urged the council to reject what he called an act of external interference, saying the recognition risked undermining peace in the Horn of Africa. The United States was the only council member that did not condemn the move, although it said its own policy on Somaliland remains unchanged.

African states push back

Several African governments have also spoken out against the decision by Israel. South Africa warned that Israel’s recognition of Somaliland posed a “direct threat” to peace in the Horn of Africa and violated Somalia’s territorial integrity.

Pretoria stressed the African Union’s long-standing principle of uti possidetis, which upholds borders inherited at independence to prevent conflict , and cautioned that recognising breakaway regions could encourage instability and embolden secessionist movements on the continent.

Governments struggled to contain protests that spread rapidly across cities, often forcing policy reversals or provoking heavy-handed crackdowns that drew international attention.

Together, these uprisings and many others made 2025 one of the most protest-heavy years the Global South has seen in recent memory.

Kenya’s Gen-Z protests

In Kenya, protests that began in 2024 spilt forcefully into 2025 after the government pushed through controversial tax hikes. Led largely by Gen Z activists mobilising online, demonstrations spread from Nairobi to major towns, with protesters storming Parliament and targeting symbols of state power. President William Ruto was eventually forced to withdraw key parts of the finance bill. Human rights groups warned that the state responded by weaponising digital tools to suppress dissent. Amnesty International said young activists faced coordinated online harassment, intimidation and disinformation aimed at silencing the movement. “Our analysis of online activity throughout several waves of protests in 2024 and 2025 and the interviews we’ve conducted with young human rights defenders, clearly demonstrate widespread and coordinated tactics on digital platforms to silence and suppress protests by young activists, including through online threats, intimidating comments, abusive language, smearing, and targeted disinformation,” Agnès Callamard, Amnesty International’s Secretary General is quoted .

Bangladesh student-led uprising

Bangladesh’s student-led protest movement, which erupted in 2024 over public-sector job quotas, reignited in 2025 following the death of prominent student leader Sharif Osman Hadi, who succumbed to gunshot wounds. Demonstrators accused the government and foreign actors of targeting activists, triggering fresh waves of violence, arson and street battles. Universities and major cities were paralysed as protesters demanded accountability and an end to what they saw as systemic economic exclusion.

Mozambique’s post-election unrest

In Mozambique, disputed election results sparked months of unrest after the ruling FRELIMO party was accused of rigging the October 2024 vote. Protests continued into early 2025, culminating in a violent crackdown around President Daniel Chapo’s January inauguration. Civil society groups reported more than 300 deaths and over 3,000 injuries, while authorities put the toll far lower. Amnesty International documented the use of live ammunition, arbitrary arrests and internet shutdowns, raising alarm over democratic backsliding.

Venezuela’s protests over election credibility

Venezuela also saw sustained protests after President Nicolás Maduro secured a third term in a contested July 2024 election. Opposition supporters rejected the results, accusing authorities of manipulation and repression. Weeks of demonstrations were met with mass arrests. Rights groups said around 2,400 people were detained, though many were later released amid international pressure.

Nepal's Gen Z protests

In Nepal, Gen Z protesters led nationwide demonstrations against corruption, political nepotism and a sweeping ban on social media platforms. The unrest turned deadly in September 2025, with at least 22 people believed to have been killed and hundreds injured. The protests were fuelled by years of frustration with an ageing political elite and intensified by a viral online movement criticising the lavish lifestyles of politicians’ children. A sudden shutdown of 26 social media platforms only deepened public anger. “This is a revolution. This is the end of the corruption. It’s our turn now. The government was so corrupt. They used that money to improve their own lives, but there has been no change in the lives of normal people,” said Sujan Dahal, a young Nepali protestor. 

Tanzania's post-election chaos

In Tanzania, security forces used lethal and disproportionate force to suppress election-related protests between October 29 and November 3, 2025. Amnesty International and the UN documented cases of live ammunition being fired at protesters and tear gas being used indiscriminately in residential areas. While the government disputed casualty figures, UN officials said at least 10 deaths were confirmed by credible sources, with many more injured. "We are alarmed by the deaths and injuries that have occurred in the ongoing election-related protests in Tanzania. Reports we have received indicate that at least 10 people were killed," U.N. human rights spokesperson Seif Magango told Geneva reporters, citing "credible sources" in the country.

Togo's uproar

From June 26 to 28 , in Togo, thousands protested constitutional reforms critics say allow President Faure Gnassingbé to remain in power indefinitely. Demonstrations in Lomé were violently dispersed, with civil society groups reporting at least four deaths, dozens of injuries and mass arrests. Verified footage showed beatings and civilians being dragged away by plainclothes officers.

Madagascar's Gen Z rebellion

Madagascar saw deadly demonstrations organised by young protestors, angered by chronic power cuts and water shortages led to the ousting of former President Andry Rajoelina. Demonstrations that began peacefully in September quickly escalated after security forces intervened, leaving at least 24 people dead, including a baby exposed to tear gas. Protesters said years of neglect and hopelessness drove them into the streets, demanding dignity and basic services. Amnesty International called for independent investigations into the killings.“Every death on the streets of Madagascar is a painful reminder that the right to peaceful protest is under violent attack. The authorities must promptly launch thorough and effective investigations into these killings and hold perpetrators to account,” Tigere Chagutah, Amnesty International’s Regional Director for East and Southern Africa, is quoted . “Malagasy people need to unite, that’s what’s causing this movement,” one protester said . “We are tired, fed up and completely lost, so let’s fight for the good of the youth and the next generation,” he added.

However, what many people do not realise is that Africa has been the historic and modern heartland of frankincense and myrrh production.

The biggest producers of these gems in Africa

Somalia

Somalia is the world’s largest producer of frankincense and is internationally known for high-quality varieties such as Boswellia sacra and Boswellia frereana. Harvested mainly in Puntland and Somaliland, Somali frankincense is still used in church incense, perfumery, and wellness products, especially during the Christmas season. According to Horn Frank , Somalia's frankincense market value is estimated at $504.5 million.

Ethiopia

Ethiopia is a major producer of both frankincense and myrrh. For centuries, Ethiopian Orthodox churches have burned frankincense during Christmas liturgies, making the resin both a cultural and spiritual staple. Much of the frankincense used in global religious ceremonies originates from Ethiopian dryland forests. Unfortunately, the West's desire for wellness is reported to be impacting Ethiopia's production negatively.

Until roughly two decades ago, frankincense was largely a niche product with demand concentrated in religious institutions. “The demand for frankincense was mostly from churches,” says Frans Bongers , professor of forest ecology and management at Wageningen University in the Netherlands.

That dynamic has shifted dramatically. Today, the ancient resin has entered global commercial markets, driven by growing interest in its purported health benefits and its adoption by the wellness industry, an industry valued at approximately $5.6 trillion annually.

As demand accelerates, supply chains are also changing. “Now big companies are buying up everything they can,” Bongers says. “Anything you can produce, there is a market.”

Kenya

Northern Kenya produces large quantities of myrrh from Commiphora species. Myrrh remains important not only in Christian tradition but also in African traditional medicine and modern cosmetics, with demand rising during festive and religious seasons. For generations, it has played a central role in traditional medicine , where it has been applied to support wound healing, relieve oral sores, ease pain from injuries and broken bones.

Frankincense and myrrh are not relics of the past. They are living products, still harvested by hand, still sustaining rural African livelihoods, and still carrying spiritual meaning thousands of years after the first Christmas.

It is worth remembering that two of the most sacred symbols of Christmas come from Africa’s soil as the world celebrates.

Despite persistent and systemic challenges, 2025 has delivered meaningful victories in the fight against gender-based violence (GBV) across the Global South.

Landmark legal reforms, policy shifts, regional coordination, and grassroots wins have shown that sustained advocacy and political pressure continue to yield results.

South Africa

Gender-based Violence elevated to a national emergency

In November 2025, South Africa reached a critical policy milestone when the government formally declared gender-based violence a national disaster .

The immediate catalyst was mass mobilisation in the lead-up to the G20. Women For Change coordinated a nationwide “Women’s Shutdown,” including silent lie-down protests, deliberately timed to coincide with heightened international attention.

The action amplified domestic demands while placing South Africa’s GBV crisis squarely under global scrutiny, increasing political pressure on the state to respond decisively.

This declaration means gender-based violence issues are formally recognised as a cross-government priority. Greater public accountability for the implementation of the National Strategic Plan on GBV and Femicide, which says governments and society that respond to GBV issues have strengthened accountability and bold leadership.

Over one in three women in South Africa have experienced physical violence at some point in their lives, while nearly one in ten have been subjected to sexual violence, figures that translate into millions of women navigating daily life under the persistent threat of harm within their homes and communities.

Brazil:

Strengthened Legal Protections for Survivors

Brazil’s president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, has signed a new law aimed at strengthening protections for women facing gender-based violence, a response to public anger over record levels of violence and a series of high-profile cases that sparked demonstrations across the country.

The law enhances judicial powers to protect victims by allowing judges to suspend or restrict an alleged abuser’s access to firearms, remove them from the victim’s home and impose no-contact orders. It also requires offenders subject to protective measures to wear ankle monitors, with associated technology to notify victims if the offender approaches.

In addition, the legislation increases maximum sentences for the rape of children under 14 and substantially raises penalties where a child is raped and killed.

Feminist activists have welcomed the measures as positive but have emphasised the need for greater funding for prevention, support services, and broader systemic and cultural change to reduce violence.

Kenya

Historic State Compensation for Survivors of Sexual Violence

In 2025, Kenya marked a historic breakthrough for gender-based violence accountability by issuing its first-ever state compensation to survivors of conflict-related sexual violence linked to the 2007–2008 post-election crisis.

Following a landmark High Court ruling, the government paid a compensation of 16 million Kenyan shillings (approx. USD $124,000) to survivors who had waited more than a decade for recognition and redress, signalling an important, if overdue, acknowledgement of state responsibility.

While the payments covered only part of what survivors are owed and excluded those harmed by non-state actors, the move set a powerful precedent: sexual violence in times of political crisis is a matter of state accountability, not private suffering.

Civil society organisations framed the moment as a partial but critical victory, renewing calls for a comprehensive national reparations framework, full implementation of victim protection laws, and broader compensation for survivors across regions and periods.

India

Expanded survivor support and digital safety measures

In 2025, India strengthened its institutional response to gender-based violence through the nationwide expansion of One-Stop Centres under the Mission Shakti framework. With more than 800 centres now operational across states and union territories, survivors of violence can access medical care, legal aid, psychosocial counselling, police support and temporary shelter through a single, coordinated entry point.

The scale-up reflects sustained advocacy for survivor-centred services that reduce fragmentation and barriers to justice. Fully funded by the central government and implemented at the state level, the centres also benefit from targeted capacity-building for frontline staff to improve case management and survivor care.

While gaps in access and quality remain, the expansion represents a significant structural win for GBV activism, embedding survivor support more firmly within public service delivery across the Global South.

Egypt

With SDR 6.73 billion still outstanding, Egypt is by far Africa’s largest debtor to the IMF and one of the biggest globally. Egypt is currently under a 46-month Extended Fund Facility (EFF), complemented by an arrangement under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF), approved in March 2025. The program supports a far-reaching adjustment that includes currency flexibility, subsidy reforms and fiscal consolidation.

IMF staff project that Egypt’s obligations to the Fund will gradually decline over the life of the program, but for now the country remains heavily exposed. In the November snapshot alone, Cairo repaid more than SDR 164 million, trimming but not transforming its outstanding stock. 

Côte d’Ivoire

Côte d’Ivoire is the second-largest African borrower, with SDR 3.08 billion in IMF credit outstanding as of 12 November. Abidjan is covered by twin arrangements under the Extended Fund Facility and Extended Credit Facility, plus an RSF program aimed at climate and resilience spending. In June 2025 the IMF Board completed the fourth review of these programs and the third RSF review.

Kenya

In third place, Kenya has SDR 2.96 billion outstanding. Since 2021, Nairobi has been under a blended EFF/ECF program supplemented by an RSF arrangement, aimed at stabilising debt, raising revenue and creating space for social and climate spending. The IMF Board concluded the seventh and eighth reviews in October 2024, approving further disbursements.

In 2025, Kenya and the IMF opted not to proceed with a planned ninth review; the government has instead requested a new lending arrangement , seeking to roll over about US$800 million in undrawn funds while grappling with high debt-service costs and public anger over tax hikes.

Angola

Angola, fourth on the list with SDR 2.66 billion in IMF credit. An oil-dependent economy is still living with the legacy of earlier shocks. The country has no recent repayment history yet. Between 2018 and 2021, Luanda undertook an EFF-backed program that pushed through heavy fiscal consolidation, a value-added tax, exchange-rate liberalisation, partial debt reprofiling and steps toward inflation targeting.

Ghana

Ghana, fifth on the list, owes SDR 2.58 billion, equivalent to roughly US$3.5 billion at current SDR rates.  Accra is in the middle of a US$3 billion, three-year Extended Credit Facility approved in May 2023, designed to pull the country out of its worst economic crisis in decades. The IMF completed a third program review in late 2024, allowing a further disbursement of SDR 269.1 million (about US$360 million), while insisting on continued fiscal tightening, restructuring of domestic and external debt, and reforms in areas such as tax administration and state-owned enterprises.  

By mid-2025, Ghana’s parliament had also approved a US$2.8 billion debt relief deal with official bilateral creditors, pushing out payments due between 2022 and 2026 to the 2039–2043 period and helping keep the IMF program on track.

The white paper presents China as a supporter of the United Nations-centred global order and a “builder of world peace.” It further reiterates Beijing’s calls for countries to uphold existing treaties on nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and argues that developing nations should have a greater say in international security frameworks.

China says it “conscientiously fulfils” its obligations under major arms control treaties, though several Western governments have previously accused Beijing of opacity in areas such as nuclear modernisation.

The country has further restated its long-held positions on nuclear weapons, including its “ no-first-use ” pledge and opposition to nuclear arms races. It calls for global reductions in nuclear arsenals but does not indicate that China intends to cut its own stockpile, which US intelligence agencies believe is expanding.

China accused unnamed states of destabilising global security through military alliances and missile defence systems.

One of the most important sections concerns outer space, cyberspace and artificial intelligence, areas the white paper calls “new territories of global governance .”

China proposes, amongst others, international norms for cyber operations and global oversight of AI systems with military applications. The document warns that rapid developments in emerging technologies could undermine global stability if not properly regulated.

China says it is strengthening its internal non-proliferation controls and improving oversight of sensitive technologies. It also noted that it is advancing programmes aimed at supporting developing countries to use advanced technologies for peaceful purposes.

The white paper concludes by linking arms control to China’s diplomatic agenda, and calls for an “equal and orderly multipolar world” and a “community with a shared future for humanity”.

China has proposed, amongst others, that the United Nations , not military blocs or unilateral partnerships, should oversee global security frameworks. Adding further that arms control must be rooted in consensus-based multilateral institutions, and calls for developing countries to have a stronger voice in decision-making.

Nuclear governance

On nuclear weapons, the white paper reaffirmed China’s position on such matters, including its commitment to no-first-use and maintaining the “minimum level” of deterrence needed for national security . "China's nuclear weapons are not intended to threaten other countries but for defence and self-protection," the paper said.

China criticises what it describes as “exclusive alliances” and missile defence systems, which it argues undermine strategic stability. "Destroying its abandoned chemical weapons in China is Japan's unshirkable historical, political, and legal responsibility, and also an international obligation stipulated by the CWC," it stressed.

Further, some sections of the White Paper focus on outer space, cyberspace, and artificial intelligence, which the country says are becoming central to global security.

China has thus called for a treaty banning weapons in outer space, UN-led standards for cyber operations, and a responsible and transparent development of military AI.

The country further argued that without global rules, technological competition will become a major driver of instability.

In Canada

In Canada, a mysterious new band named the Velvet Sundown emerged on streaming platforms earlier this year. Within a short period, the band gathered more than a million monthly listeners on Spotify. With vibrant rock tracks, retro album covers and seemingly authentic band photos, many listeners believed they had discovered a real up-and-coming group.

However, a few weeks later, it was reported that the entire project, including the music, vocals, visuals, and photos, was AI-generated. The group’s spokesperson was reported by CBC to have said that the project was an “artistic provocation” designed to test whether AI-created content could pass undetected in the streaming ecosystem. 

On the back of this, musicians and unions say that such projects risk diverting already limited streaming royalties away from human artists.

The Director of Canadian Affairs for the American Federation of Musicians said, “It’s obviously a challenge in the industry. Technology gets created and used before there are guardrails in place to protect musicians.”

The union argues that musicians should have to consent before their work is used to train AI systems and should be compensated if they choose to allow it.  

In the United States

Further on, the Artist Rights Alliance, a US-based non-profit advocacy group, issued an open letter demanding that AI companies, developers and music platforms stop using artificial intelligence to “infringe upon and devalue the rights of human artists.”

“This assault on human creativity must be stopped. We must protect against the predatory use of AI to steal professional artists' voices and likenesses, violate creators' rights, and destroy the music ecosystem,” the letter read in part.

The statement was signed by more than 200 artists, including Billie Eilish, Nicki Minaj and Arkells.

In Africa

Meanwhile, in Africa, some musicians are choosing to engage with AI instead of rejecting it outright. Nigerian Afropop singer FAVE decided to officially release an AI-generated version of Intentions, a song which, according to the singer, was originally made by Urban Chords, which had gone viral earlier this year after convincingly imitating her voice.

“ People kept tagging me and saying the song felt like something I would sing,” she said.

“I saw how excited people were, and I didn’t want that excitement to die. If fans already believed in the song, why not make it real?”

Fave re-recorded the track herself, intentionally keeping the AI-created choir vocals. In an Instagram post, she wrote, “My song ‘INTENTIONS’ is on the very short list of songs that I wrote about myself, becoming an adult and realising that you can never be in control all the time. I struggled with accepting the things I could not change, and in the face of change, I staggered too. So when my Mum and my friends told me about an AI version of my song being on the net and my fans began asking me to release it, I struggled sooo hard to accept that. But that’s the old me. It’s happening, so why fight it?”

The event this year initially drew attention after footage emerged of Thai pageant organiser Nawat Itsaragrisil publicly reprimanding Miss Mexico during a pre-pageant engagement in Thailand . In the video, he accuses her of failing to participate in a promotional shoot, reportedly calling her a “dumbhead.”

The confrontation prompted several contestants, including reigning Miss Universe Victoria Kjær Theilvig, to walk out in protest .

The Miss Universe Organisation later distanced itself from the episode, calling the treatment of delegates “unacceptable.” The organisation said Itsaragrisil’s role in this year’s competition had been curtailed. Itsaragrisil later apologised and mended his relations with Miss Mexico on stage.

Following this, another controversy surfaced when two judges at this year’s event, Omar Harfouch and Claude Makélélé, and the president of the selection committee, Princess Camilla di Borbone delle Due Sicilie, resigned days before the finale.

While the series of resignations had begun drawing criticisms, the Miss Universe Organisation moved to douse to controversy with a statement, part of which read, “The Miss Universe Organisation reiterates that all judging procedures for the 74th Miss Universe competition remain official, transparent, and fully governed by MUO protocols. The Beyond the Crown Program operates independently and is not part of the competition’s evaluation process. We encourage all audiences to refer exclusively to verified MUO communications and to continue supporting the delegates who embody the values of Miss Universe.”  

Fátima Bosch ultimately secured the Miss Universe 2025 crown on November 20, 2025, Mexico’s fourth win, but the unfolding row has overshadowed the pageant’s reputation. While supporters acclaimed her victory as a triumph over the initial setback, others said the surrounding controversies had undermined confidence in the event.

A few hours after the grand finale, Harfouch has, in a series of Instagram posts and interviews, alleged amongst others that the list of finalists and winner had been predetermined and there was

“I Omar Harfouch declared yesterday exclusively on the American HBO, 24 hours before the Miss Universe final, that Miss Mexico would win - because Miss Universe owner Raúl Rocha is in business with Fatima Bosch’s father. All details will be showed in May 2026 on HBO. Raul Rocha and his son urged me, week ago in Dubai, to vote for #Fatima Bosh because they need her to win “because it will be good for our business,” they said to me,” he said in an Instagram post.

Aside Harfouch, former title holder, Natalie Glebova who served as a judge this year took to her Instagram to name Miss Thailand as her winner and stated that she will not be participating as a judge in the competition again until organisers adopt more transparent methods.

She wrote, “As a judge this year I can only speak for myself when I cast my votes. Please remember that each person has their own opinion and not one single person can influence the result. However, this must be said…when I competed in 2005 and years prior, I recall there was always an auditor that came on stage with sealed results from accounting firm. I’d like to bring that back, please. Until then I don’t think I will be participating as a judge again.”

Social media reactions

The result also triggered a wave of criticism online, with many users arguing that Miss Côte d’Ivoire, Olivia Yacé, had been unfairly overlooked.

One user wrote that the outcome showed “as a Black woman you have to work a hundred times harder than others, and even that is not enough,” adding that “Olivia, you are the people ’s Miss Universe 2025.” Another post praising Yacé read, “Look at her! That’s the true Miss Universe 2025!”

Others pointed to Yacé’s performance in the final question round, calling it the “winning answer” and arguing she should have secured the crown.

Several users framed the result as part of a wider pattern of bias in global beauty competitions. “This is another case of a Black woman being robbed so their token light-skinned woman can be platformed,” one commenter wrote, insisting “the real Miss Universe is Olivia Yacé.”

Here are a few reactions on X;

However, 47-year-old Fernando Dias also seems to be in a comfortable lead.

After being disqualified from standing as a candidate, opposition leader Domingos Simões Pereira has thrown his weight and support behind the Party for Social Renewal (PRS), a party headed by political newcomer Fernando Dias.

Expectations of the citizenry

During a conversation with Abigail Johnson Boakye, a journalist with Global South World, Samba M. Baldé, a Bissau-Guinean journalist, shared that despite the hype surrounding the upcoming elections, electorates seem to be less engaged, as they are tired of slogans and manifestos and want real solutions.

"Engagement exists, but it's uneven because voters react to something that has certain benefits than to only promises because for voters, when candidates fail to translate their proposals into real impact or how they can really impact society, public interest quickly drops. ...But people are, for example, no longer satisfied with slogans. They want clear plans and measurable results in Guinea-Bissau," Samba said.

On November 23, 860,000 voters head to the polls to decide whether their country can finally break free from decades of political turbulence.

Who is Fernando Dias?

Although new to the political spotlight, Dias is not entirely new to public life. His journey reflects a careful mix of academic training, political apprenticeship and a recent surge in national prominence.

He is a trained lawyer, holding both a Bachelor's degree in Law and a postgraduate qualification in Criminal Law from the Bissau Faculty of Law.

Before emerging as a presidential contender, he had built a steady career within state institutions, serving as the first Vice-President of the National People’s Assembly during the 11th legislature.

His roots in party politics run deeper than his “newcomer” label suggests.

He once served as Secretary-General of the youth wing of the Party for Social Renewal (PRS), eventually becoming its interim leader following a leadership vacancy. In June 2024, he was elected as president of the PRS.

He promises security for the people and desires to ensure the military does not interfere in the West African country's politics again.

"Our mission is clear: free Guinea-Bissau from the shackles of dictatorship and return power to the people. With faith, unity and courage, we will win the polls and build a new time for our nation," he wrote on his Facebook wall.

Background

Guinea-Bissau’s presidential and legislative races come at a moment when institutions are strained, and trust is fragile.

Umaro Sissoco Embaló's bid is seen as controversial because he has strategically reshaped the political arena through sudden dismissals and the appointment of a new prime minister ahead of the vote.

Heavyweight Domingos Simões Pereira and the historic PAIGC party-led coalition, PAI-Terra Ranka, were barred from contesting after the Supreme Court ruled their paperwork incomplete in October. This marks the first time the PAIGC party will be absent on a ballot paper.

Coups d'états, dissolved parliaments, and stalled reforms have marked Guinea-Bissau’s history. Embaló dissolved the National Assembly in December 2023, claiming an attempted coup, and left the country with no operational parliament for nearly two years.

Although his tenure ended in February 2025, Embaló stayed in the seat of power.

Under the plan, denominations such as Rp1,000 would become Rp1, and similar changes would apply to other notes, including Rp2,000, Rp5,000, and up to Rp100,000.

This initiative is part of the Finance Ministry’s 2025–2029 strategic programs. The bill is being developed under Finance Minister Regulation No. 70 of 2025 and is expected to be finalised by 2027. "A bill on Rupiah Rate Change (redenomination) is a carried-over bill planned for completion in 2027," the regulation stated.

The rupiah, which currently trades at around 16,717 per U.S. dollar (as of November 19), has high nominal figures that have led to inefficiencies in budgeting and financial transactions, according to reports .

Redenomination has been under discussion for more than a decade. A 2013 bill was delayed due to economic instability. In 2016 and again in 2023, Bank Indonesia expressed its readiness but indicated the need for an appropriate timing, with BI Governor Perry Warjiyo stating that “its execution must be cautious and consider economic and political stability.”

The transition process would be gradual. According to Bank Indonesia’s 2016 estimates, preparing new notes could take two years, and full implementation could extend up to seven more years. During this period, both old and new banknotes would be in circulation.

Economists have also noted potential inflation risks during the transition, particularly if businesses increase prices through rounding. In 2023, Teuku Rifky, an economist at the Institute for Economic and Social Research at the University of Indonesia, commented that while there were upsides to the redenomination, it was not an urgent issue for the Southeast Asian nation.

 “I don’t think there is a significant advantage in this redenomination, while the need or cost for execution is actually quite large,” he said .

The focus on white South African farmers, cited by the administration as victims of racial violence, has been heavily criticised. The South African government denies these claims , arguing that the narrative has been weaponised to serve ideological agendas abroad.

Maine's refugee support network struggles to cope  

For Maine, a state once praised for its vibrant refugee resettlement programs, the impact of the new policy is already visible. Inza Outtara, the State Refugee Coordinator with Catholic Charities, says the program has been severely downsized. 

“We used to receive around 1,000 refugees per year,” said Outtara. “Now it’s just 50. Our office had 15 or 16 people, now we’re down to eight.”

Two of the state’s three resettlement agencies, Catholic Charities and the Jewish Community Alliance (JCA), have shut down their refugee programs due to funding cuts. The Maine Immigrant and Refugee Services in Lewiston is now the only remaining federally approved resettlement agency.

“In the current political climate with massive grant cuts and unexpected changes to programs and decisions, it is not viable for us to take on further, substantial financial risks to run this program,” the JCA said in a statement.

A politicised humanitarian agenda?

Traditionally, U.S. resettlement efforts have focused on populations fleeing war and systemic violence in places like Syria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, or Myanmar.

In contrast, the Trump administration’s decision to center a small, predominantly white farming community, with little international consensus about their risk level, has raised questions about bias and selective humanitarianism. 

Meanwhile, the communities once sustained by diverse waves of refugees in Maine are left grappling with declining support.

From the United Kingdom to Australia, China, and Brazil, each country is exploring new ways of making the internet safer.

Here are four countries and the restrictions on internet access:

UK’s proof of age

Starting July 2025, the UK implemented a cybersecurity law that required children to prove their age to access the most harmful material on social media and adult websites.

Platforms that host content such as pornography, self-harm, or eating disorder promotion will be legally required to introduce secure age-verification systems, including facial scans, photo ID matching, or credit card checks.

Failure to comply could cost companies up to 10% of their global annual revenue or £18 million, whichever is higher. “This is one of the boldest steps anywhere in the world to reclaim the digital space for young people,” said Technology Secretary Peter Kyle. He described the policy as a response to the mental health crisis among children exposed to “toxic algorithms” and harmful online material.

Australia’s ban of under-16s from social media

Under the Online Safety Amendment (Social Media Minimum Age) Bill 2024, passed last November, anyone under 16 will soon be banned from creating accounts on major platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, YouTube, Snapchat, X (formerly Twitter), Threads, Reddit, and Kick.

The policy decision is the first of its kind anywhere in the world and is designed to shield minors from addictive and harmful content, cyberbullying, and predatory behaviour. Communications Minister Anika Wells admitted the policy is imperfect but insisted it was necessary: “There is no perfect solution to keeping young Australians safe online. But the social media minimum age laws will make a meaningful difference.” Platforms will be legally required to enforce the ban using age-verification technology.

China’s only verified influencers regulation

In East Asia, China’s Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) now requires social media influencers to prove their professional credentials before posting about sensitive topics such as law, medicine, finance, or education. Under the new policy, creators must show a degree, license, or certification to speak on these subjects. Platforms like Douyin (China’s TikTok), Weibo, and Bilibili are required to verify credentials and flag posts containing AI-generated material or research references.

Persons who misrepresent qualifications could lose monetisation rights, face temporary bans, or be fined. The CAC says the move aims to curb misinformation and promote a “cleaner cyberspace,” part of President Xi Jinping’s wider campaign to ensure online content is “factual, educational, and socially responsible.”

Brazil’s cyber responsibility

A landmark Supreme Court ruling in June 2025 declared that social media companies must act immediately to remove hate speech and criminal content once they become aware of it.

Previously, companies could only be penalised if they failed to remove content after a court order. Now, platforms are directly responsible for what circulates on their networks.

“We preserve freedom of expression as much as possible,” wrote Supreme Court President Justice Luis Roberto Barroso, “without allowing the world to fall into an abyss of incivility,” he added. The ruling also urged Congress to revise Article 19 of the country’s main internet law, the Marco Civil da Internet, to strengthen protections against disinformation and online violence.

While COVID-19 intensified the emotional strain, Gallup’s findings show that this trend predates the pandemic. The causes, researchers say, vary across regions, but one theme keeps emerging about technology and polarisation.

"So, if we look at things like the rates of worry, 39% of the people we interviewed in 2024 reported that they experienced a lot of worry the day before. When we first started tracking that data in 2006, it was only at 30% and so 9% of the global population is a big portion. And we see similar patterns for the other emotions —stress, physical pain, anger, and sadness — over that time frame. With a lot of those gains really coming in the last few years, and it's something that troubles me when I look at this data," Dan Foy thr Global Research Director at Gallup, told Global South World.

In many regions, particularly post-Soviet Eurasia, perceptions of safety have doubled over the last 20 years.

These are countries that have undergone significant political and social transformations, moving from instability toward greater structure and governance.

In Sub-Saharan Africa, the sense of safety has slipped, from 58% to 53%, and in Latin America and the Caribbean, only half of the population says they feel safe walking alone at night.

With this paradox, the world has a long way to go in achieving a balance between the safety and emotional health of its people.

Watch the full interview attached to the story for more insight.

While the bill aims to strengthen national resilience against hacking , fraud, and online abuse, there are concerns that some provisions could blur the line between regulation and surveillance and limit online freedoms.

Prior to the drafting of the amendment bill, the Ministry of Communication, together with the Cyber Security Authority, invited public input .

Here’s what you need to know about the Bill:

The CSA’s proposed investigative, arrest and prosecutorial power may perhaps be one of the biggest and concerning changes in the Amendment Bill. This means that the Cyber Security Authority, which was originally set up as a regulator, can now investigate and prosecute cybercrime on the authority of the Attorney-General. It can even exercise police powers, including arrest, search, and seizure. Under the existing law , the Authority could only enforce compliance through administrative means and recommend prosecutions. However, now, the Authority may now prosecute cybercrime cases directly, apply for confiscation orders, and freeze assets under section 59B, which states that: “(1) The Authority shall, upon the occurrence of a cybersecurity incident or a cybercrime, conduct criminal investigations and prosecute the same. (2) The Authority shall have the jurisdiction to prosecute all offences under the Electronic Transactions Act, 2008 (Act 772)." 

Under the new Section 59B, the CSA can seize and confiscate property, money, or assets believed to be connected to cybercrime. Even if a criminal case fails, the Authority may still pursue civil recovery, meaning your assets could be taken without a conviction if linked to an alleged offence. Section 59B (3) states, “Where a person is convicted of a cybercrime under this Act, the Authority may apply to the Court for an order to confiscate moneys, proceeds, benefits, properties, and assets purchased by a person with proceeds derived from or in the commission of the cybercrime.” The act goes on in subsection (5) that: “In relation to subsection (6), if criminal prosecution fails, civil asset recovery should still proceed, and confiscation orders should have the effect of a civil judgment appealable from the High Court to the Court of Appeal.” Under the existing law, the CSA has no power to confiscate proceeds of crime; this power is reserved for the Attorney General’s office and the Economic and Organised Crime Office (EOCO).

New provisions under sections 59C - 59I give the CSA powers to compel individuals, service providers, or companies to hand over data, including computer records and personal information. Investigators can apply ex parte, without notifying the affected person, to obtain search and preservation orders over data stored on computers or servers. Section 59C(1) states; “The Authority may, for the purposes of carrying out an investigation in respect of a contravention of the Act, Regulations, or any other relevant enactment by the owner of a critical information infrastructure, a licensee, a service provider or any other person, by notice in writing, require a person to: attend at a time and place specified in the notice; and furnish the Authority with information related to a matter relevant to the investigation.”  The goal is to make it easier to investigate cybercrime, but this raises issues about the possibility of opening the door to mass data access and unwarranted surveillance.

For the first time, Ghana’s cyber law explicitly covers Artificial Intelligence (AI), blockchain, Internet of Things (IoT) devices, cloud technology, and quantum computing. The CSA will now set security standards and certify emerging technologies before they are deployed, from banking algorithms to smart home systems, under sections 4A(a) – (c), 58A. In addition, the authority shall accredit non-profit cybersecurity institutions under section 58B. This could help ensure safer technology use, but it also places innovation under state control. In this regard, the CSA becomes Ghana’s tech certifier, which invariably expands its remit from cybersecurity to technology governance.

The Bill introduces new online offences under Sections 67A and 67B, targeting cyberbullying, stalking, and online harassment, especially of children. However, it also makes it a crime to “deliberately spread false or misleading information” online. The problem? The law doesn’t define what counts as “false or misleading.” This vagueness could criminalise legitimate reporting, satire, or political commentary. Penalties range from fines of up to five thousand penalty units to 25 thousand penalty units to three to five years’ imprisonment and not more than ten years, depending on the offence.

The amendments create new funding streams for the CSA, including: 12% of Ghana’s Communication Service Tax, 9% of corporate tax, and 50% of fines collected under the Act. Under the existing law, the authority relies on parliamentary allocations, donor support, and service fees for funding.

Failure to register critical infrastructure, report cyber incidents, or comply with CSA directives could now attract hefty fines of up to 50,000 penalty units. The proposed amendment raises penalties up to 25,000 penalty units, 50,000 penalty units, and 5 - 10 years imprisonment. The monetary value of one penalty unit in Ghana is GHC 12, which means the monetary value of 50,000 penalty units is GHC 600,000 (approximately US$55,000).

Generally, for Ghanaian citizens who use the internet for diverse purposes, including social media, e-commerce and banking, the Amendment Bill, once passed, would regulate online behaviour, digital data, social media content (particularly that considered fake or misleading), devices, and workplace systems. With the intent to sanitise and make Ghana’s cyberspace safer.

In India, shoes were again used as a protest tool. Rakesh Kishore, a 71-year-old lawyer, made headlines after he attempted to throw his shoe at Chief Justice B.R. Gavai in a courtroom.

His outburst, which was a reaction to comments made about a sensitive religious case, cost him his license to practice law but earned him notoriety as one of the few Indians to challenge authority in such an unconventional way.

In 2016, a shoe was thrown at Delhi Chief Minister Arvind Kejriwal during a public event, which eventually became one of India’s most talked-about acts of political dissent.

Hybrid systems, where part of the currency is pegged to gold, have also struggled because they tend to collapse under speculative pressure or are quietly abandoned when fiscal needs demand flexibility.

Some states highlight gold holdings to boost public confidence while continuing to rely on the U.S. dollar for trade and debt payments. A typical example is Zimbabwe, where it launched the ZiG ( Zimbabwe Gold ) last year. A currency supposedly anchored to its bullion reserves, after years of hyperinflation and repeated currency collapses.

Authorities pledged every unit would be backed by gold or foreign currency reserves. The move initially boosted public confidence, but analysts warn the system faces the same risks that doomed previous gold-anchored experiments.

Local schemes, reserve-enhanced fiats, or tightly run currency boards can tie value to gold, but such arrangements demand transparency, strict fiscal discipline, and are rare in national practice. Economists say the model holds up mainly at smaller scales.

Gold is less liquid than modern capital flows, governments need flexibility in crises, and international trade remains dominated by fiat currencies. Without full transparency, markets are quick to test the credibility of any gold peg.

Saulosi told Global South World that fuel price adjustments have been postponed because of the elections, but once the votes are counted, whoever takes office will have no choice but to face these realities.

He pointed to urgent steps highlighted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), including currency realignment and fiscal consolidation , as unavoidable if Malawi hopes to stabilise its finances and resume support from international lenders.

But such measures will come at a cost. “The immediate outcome is likely to be an economic downturn characterised by job losses, elevated inflation, and heightened risks to food security,” Saulosi warned. "However, if these measures are pursued consistently and with discipline, the economy is expected to stabilise and gradually recover."

Campaigns so far have focused heavily on subsidies, handouts, and grand infrastructure promises. Saulosi believes this approach sidesteps the real debate. “What stands out is the persistent emphasis on expenditure, with very little attention given to revenue generation. This imbalance raises the likelihood of worsening public debt ,” he explained.

In his view, much will depend on how the next president manages both economic pressures and political expectations. “The difference will not be whether these measures are implemented, they will have to but how each party chooses to cushion the population from the impact,” he said.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) ended Malawi’s $175 million Extended Credit Facility in May 2025 after only $35 million was disbursed, citing a lack of progress on reforms. Meanwhile, inflation, which averaged 30.7% in 2024, remains one of the highest in Africa, with food inflation hovering above 30%, according to the World Bank.

While Saulosi acknowledged the widespread frustration with the rising cost of living , especially in urban areas, he stressed that rural voters remain fixated on affordable farm inputs and food security. This, he argued, has narrowed the scope of debate.

Saulosi believes the solution lies in changing how the government spends its money. “A strategic reallocation of government spending, from recurrent expenditures toward investment-oriented activities with a strong revenue-generating focus, could accelerate this process. Under such an approach, signs of recovery could emerge within the first two years, paving the way for sustained economic growth thereafter.”

Who’s behind bars?

In recent years, Barbadillo has housed four former presidents in all. Alberto Fujimori (president 1990–2000) was its first occupant. Extradited from Chile, Fujimori was convicted in 2009 of authorising death-squad killings and other abuses and sentenced to 25 years. He then spent 16 years at Barbadillo. As he aged and fell ill, critics fought his 2017 pardon, but a 2023 court ultimately ordered his release on humanitarian grounds. On December 7, 2023, Barbadillo’s gates opened for Fujimori – now 85 – when Peru’s highest court restored his pardon.

Ollanta Humala (2011–2016) was also jailed at Barbadillo, but only briefly. In 2017, Peru built the facility for Fujimori, then transferred Humala there under guard when he faced a money-laundering probe tied to Odebrecht. Humala’s cell was kept separate from Fujimori’s, but both had similar quarters – a bedroom, office and a courtyard for gardening. (Humala and his wife were later freed on appeal.) Martín Vizcarra (2018–2020) spent just 22 days in Barbadillo in 2022 under pre-trial detention on graft allegations as a regional governor before a court ordered his release.

Pedro Castillo was whisked to Barbadillo immediately after his dramatic ouster and arrest in December 2022. Castillo, a former schoolteacher, had declared a self-coup attempt by announcing the dissolution of Congress, triggering his impeachment on charges of “rebellion and conspiracy”. He has been held on a preventive detention order – initially seven days, later extended to 36 months – while facing a trial for these charges. (He also faces separate graft investigations from his time in office.)

Alejandro Toledo arrived at Barbadillo in April 2023 after a lengthy extradition from the U.S. Reuters reports note he was ordered to serve 18 months of pre-trial detention in the Lima police base. Toledo is accused of taking up to $35 million in bribes from Brazil’s Odebrecht for public works (Interoceanica Sur highway). He has denied wrongdoing, but in October 2024, a court convicted him of accepting bribes and sentenced him to 20.5 years, and in September 2025, a second conviction (money laundering) added 13 years. He is now formally serving those terms concurrently in Barbadillo’s Lima police-base prison .

What life inside looks like

Compared to overcrowded Peruvian prisons, Barbadillo offers relatively privileged conditions: a small number of cells, personal bathrooms, study areas, and even garden access. While these amenities have raised debates about whether ex-presidents are being treated too leniently, the facility remains far from luxurious.

Built originally for former President Alberto Fujimori upon his 2007 extradition, Barbadillo sits inside a fenced special-operations police base, and its official capacity is only two (later expanded to three) inmates

In practice , it has become Peru’s “presidential prison,” quietly holding a parade of ex-leaders. Despite its upgraded quarters, Barbadillo is not gilded: authorities stress it has no secret luxuries, only slightly roomier cells than the country’s overcrowded jails.

Each bedroom in Barbadillo is roughly 4×4 meters and comes with basic furniture, including a bed, a couch, and a table, but no bars on the windows.

Wilfredo Pedraza, former head of Peru’s National Penitentiary Institute and now Ollanta Humala’s lawyer, described Barbadillo as “a prison without the usual barred windows.”

For many Peruvians, Barbadillo is both a symbol of justice catching up with corrupt leaders and a reminder of the country’s ongoing governance crisis.

Machar, who has been under house arrest since late March, is accused of being involved with the White Army, a loosely organised militia largely composed of fighters from the Nuer ethnic group, and using “political and military structures” to influence or direct their operations during the attack.

In addition to Machar, seven individuals aligned with his Sudan People ’s Liberation Movement/Army-in Opposition (SPLM-IO) have also been formally charged and suspended from their government posts.

Among them are Petroleum Minister Puot Kang Chol and Lt. General Gabriel Duop Lam, Deputy Chief of Staff of the army. A further 13 suspects remain at large.

President Salva Kiir, whose political relationship with Machar has been uneasy since the 2018 peace deal ended South Sudan’s five-year civil war, has suspended Machar as first vice president following the charges.

Machar’s spokesperson dismissed the charges as a “political witch-hunt”, arguing that the judicial system in South Sudan is not independent but instead “politically directed courts”. The SPLM-IO has warned that the move threatens to undermine the 2018 Revitalised Peace Agreement and could risk reigniting armed conflict.

Roads to Machar’s residence in Juba have been blocked by soldiers and tanks, heightening concerns about the potential for escalation. International actors, including the United Nations and the African Union, have urged restraint.

Mkhutche explained that Malawian politics remains strongly shaped by tribal allegiances, with the two leading parties drawing support primarily from the country’s two largest ethnic groups. While economic issues are at the centre of campaign rhetoric, he stressed that “we cannot ignore the tribal part.”

Neutral voters, however, could prove decisive. “This election has left many people undecided on who can be the best president. Besides the two leading candidates drawing from their core tribes, neutral voters will also decide who comes out on top,” he noted.

Recent polling has suggested momentum swings between the ruling Malawi Congress Party (MCP) and the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Afrobarometer surveys earlier this year indicated the DPP had an edge, but the analyst cautioned that the dynamics have since shifted. “The opposition has the people’s attention because they promise to rescue the country from economic decline. But the ruling party has gathered momentum, crisscrossing the country and positioning itself as the party that can deliver.”

The survey done in collaboration with the University of Malawi (UNIMA)’s Centre for Social Research indicates that 43% of respondents would have cast their vote for the DPP, placing the party ahead of its closest competitor, the Malawi Congress Party (MCP), which garnered 29% of potential support.

With both sides locked in fierce competition, he believes a second round is highly likely. “We do not expect either of these two to go past the 50 percent plus one mark required in our electoral system. The likelihood of a runoff is high.”

Concerns also linger about the credibility of the electoral process. A recent dry run of the electronic transmission system exposed multiple technical failures, fueling opposition scepticism. “Even though the Electoral Commission is working to fix these issues, they are likely to reappear during the vote. Should the opposition lose, the result will almost certainly be challenged,” Mkhutche warned.

Despite the tensions, the analyst said Malawi’s democratic institutions remain intact. “Our democracy is good. There is a clear separation of powers, and each arm of government is acting within its mandate.”

Still, he called on international observers and partners to closely monitor the process. “We expect a peaceful election, but times are changing. The world must keep an eye on Malawi. Should anything go wrong, global partners should help put things in order.”

The election, he said, will be a test not just of leadership but of Malawi’s democratic resilience. “After this election, we want to show the world that our democracy is consolidating, growing, and moving forward.”

What began as calm protests quickly took a dark turn when police opened fire on demonstrators earlier this week. Nineteen people were killed in the crackdown, most of them students — one was just 12 years old.

The government’s response included a temporary ban on social media . That move backfired. Instead of calming tensions, it added fuel to the fire and sparked even more outrage across the country.

“The social media ban was the straw that broke the camel’s back,” said Pratik Kunwar, a Nepali youth activist, in an interview with Global South World . He added that the viral #NepoKids trend, which drew inspiration from movements in the Philippines and Indonesia, helped mobilise young people across the country.

As protests grew , parts of the movement turned violent. Key public institutions, including the Parliament building, the Supreme Court, and the government’s Singha Durbar headquarters, were ransacked or set ablaze.

According to Kunwar, Several key political leaders of leading parties were targeted, their houses raided and arsoned - with video evidence of corruption in their homes (like bundles of cash).

“The protest spiralled into anarchy,” Kunwar explained. “There is firm belief among young people that the protest was hijacked by outside or political groups who turned it from a non-violent to a violent one.”

The burning of the Supreme Court has been particularly damaging, leaving around 30,000 pending cases in limbo due to the lack of digital systems for case management. Protest organisers have since distanced themselves from the violence, reaffirming their commitment to peaceful resistance.

In response, Nepal’s armed forces have been deployed under a constitutional mandate to safeguard public order and protect lives and property. “The army, the armed police force and the police force have mobilised to protect citizens from this anarchy,” Kunwar said.

With the prime minister and home minister already resigning and reportedly fleeing for safety, attention has now turned to what comes next. Activists and sections of the public are calling for the creation of an interim government led by youth representatives, the dissolution of parliament, and expedited fresh elections .

“There will be an immediate resignation of the government at the federal and provincial levels,” Kunwar predicted. “An interim government under the leadership of youth representatives is to be constituted, followed by fresh elections. Those responsible for the shootings will be prosecuted.”

Despite the chaos and destruction, Kunwar described the mood among Nepalis as one of “cautious optimism.” Many believe the protests could pave the way for change, even as the country grapples with the scars of violence.

The stakes are high. Malawi’s last tripartite election in 2019 was annulled by the courts over widespread irregularities, the first time in African history that a presidential result was legally overturned. That precedent has raised the bar for credibility in this year’s vote.

Who are the main candidates?

President Lazarus Chakwera (Malawi Congress Party, MCP): Elected in 2020 after the annulment of the 2019 polls, he is seeking a second term. Chakwera has framed his campaign around continuity, arguing that his government has laid the foundation for reform despite setbacks.

Peter Mutharika (Democratic Progressive Party, DPP): The 85-year-old former president is attempting a comeback. He was ousted after the court-sanctioned rerun in 2020 and remains a divisive figure. Supporters see him as a seasoned leader; critics recall the protests that ended his rule.

Joyce Banda (People’s Party, PP): A former president (2012–2014) running again, Banda is emphasising women’s empowerment and youth inclusion. Her return adds weight to an already crowded field.

In total, 16 candidates have been cleared by the Malawi Electoral Commission (MEC), though analysts say only five or six are serious contenders.

Electoral system & voter roll

Malawi’s president is elected by an absolute majority (50% + 1), which almost guarantees a runoff in a fragmented race. Members of the National Assembly are chosen under the first-past-the-post system in 193 single-member constituencies.

According to the MEC, 7.2 million voters are registered, representing about 66% of eligible adults. Women account for a majority of registered voters at 57%.

The economic backdrop

The election comes amid one of Malawi’s toughest economic periods in decades. Inflation has consistently ranked among the highest in Africa, hovering above 25% since early 2024. By May 2025, it stood at 27.7%, with food inflation even higher at 31.6%.

The Reserve Bank of Malawi has revised its 2025 forecast , now expecting inflation to close at 32.4%. Growth projections were cut in February as protests over rising prices and shortages spread in major cities.

Public debt is another pressing concern, estimated at 86–88% of GDP by late 2024. Hopes for stabilisation collapsed in May 2025 when the IMF terminated its $175 million Extended Credit Facility, having disbursed only $35 million.

Credibility and institutions

After the 2019 annulment, Malawians expect nothing less than transparent and accountable elections. The Malawi Electoral Commission (MEC) has received technical support from the African Union, COMESA, and International IDEA, and at least six observer missions have been accredited.

Still, scepticism remains. In 2019, the EU Observer Mission endorsed elections that were later overturned by the courts. This has raised doubts about the effectiveness of international monitoring this year.

Campaign issues

While the race is wide open, many voters feel trapped between familiar but uninspiring choices.

What you need to know

The FMBA reported that the vaccine showed significant results in reducing tumour size and slowing disease progression. Effectiveness ranged from 60% to 80%, depending on the type of cancer, and increased survival rates were also observed

The agency plans to first apply the vaccine to colorectal cancer treatment. According to the Moffitt Cancer Centre , survival chances are particularly strong with early detection. Patients diagnosed with stage 1 colon cancer have a survival rate exceeding 92% over five years.

Skvortsova explained that the vaccine development has taken several years, with the last three focused on mandatory preclinical studies. “The research spanned several years, with the last three dedicated to mandatory preclinical studies,” she said.

While awaiting official approval, the FMBA is also pursuing vaccine research for glioblastoma and melanoma.

Currency losses push up the price of imported essentials from food and fuel to fertiliser, denting living standards.

Nigeria's naira has fallen by over 30% in 2025, following a Central Bank decision to float the currency and remove fuel subsidies, moves that spiked inflation and the cost of living. Today, it trades at approximately ₦1,500 per dollar.

The Malawian kwacha has collapsed by nearly 40% over the past year, reaching around MWK 1,700/USD, deepening economic hardship in an agriculture-dependent, import-reliant economy. Malawians now face fertiliser costs that are five to seven times higher than just two years ago, a disaster for farming communities already stretched by economic and climatic shocks. The African Exponent

Other currencies like the Rwandan franc and Congolese franc have depreciated by approximately 19% and 17% , respectively, driven by struggles in export capacity, political instability, and import dependence.

Meanwhile, the South African rand remains volatile, recently flirting with multi-month lows around ZAR 19.40/USD. Although linked to bleeding investor sentiment, the rand has not collapsed entirely, thanks to gold prices and occasional policy support.

What’s causing the crisis?

Many African nations owe large sums in USD. As local currencies lose value, servicing that debt becomes exponentially more expensive, leaving little flexibility for governments already contending with rising inflation and budget shortfalls.

Several economies export largely raw materials but then import finished goods, often priced in dollars at significantly higher costs. That imbalance puts extreme pressure on currencies, especially when global demand softens.

In times of global uncertainty, whether due to rising U.S. interest rates, geopolitical shifts, or local political instability, investors withdraw funds. This capital flight quickly drains local currency reserves and triggers sharp depreciation.

Many central banks also do not have enough dollar reserves to cushion their currencies during market stress. Without this buffer, even modest shocks can cascade into deeper crises.

Some central banks have responded with sharp interest rate hikes (e.g., in Nigeria, Angola, Egypt), while others, like Kenya or South Africa, have taken a more cautious approach. The inconsistent policy responses can further unsettle markets

Beyond the economics, the crisis has social ramifications: disillusionment is rising, and protest movements are gaining traction as youth struggle to find employment in a shrinking economy

Can the dollar’s grip be weakened?

Some countries are exploring alternatives to dollar-dominated trade. For example, Kenya has started using a Pan-African Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS) to enable intra-African trade in local currencies, an initiative aimed at reducing dependence on foreign exchange.

The African Development Bank also projects further currency declines in 2025 across 21 nations, while noting that a few like Kenya, Morocco, and the CFA franc zone may see modest appreciation.

While depreciation might eventually benefit exporters, it is causing harm to wages, prices, and household security today. Efforts to de-dollarize trade and finance are promising, but current momentum shows most economies remain tethered to U.S. monetary moves for better or worse.

We bring you a continental breakdown of the key participants in the celebration:

Asia dominates the guest list

The strongest presence came from Asia, with Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korea’s Kim Jong Un flanking Xi on Tiananmen Gate as guests of honour. They were joined by Asian heads of state and government, including Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, and Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian, highlighting Eurasian solidarity.

Central Asia was strongly represented with Kazakhstan’s Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Kyrgyzstan’s Sadyr Japarov, Tajikistan’s Emomali Rahmon, Turkmenistan’s Serdar Berdimuhamedov, and Uzbekistan’s Shavkat Mirziyoyev.

From South and Southeast Asia came Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, Nepali Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli, Myanmar’s Acting President Min Aung Hlaing, Mongolian President Khurelsukh Ukhnaa, Maldives President Mohamed Muizzu, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto, Vietnam’s President Luong Cuong, Laos’ President Thongloun Sisoulith, and Cambodia’s King Norodom Sihamoni.

European representation

Europe was represented by only two leaders. These were the Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić and Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico. Both have been outspoken critics of sanctions on Russia and have sought closer ties with Moscow.

Africa ’s representation slashed

From Africa , the Republic of the Congo President Denis Sassou Nguesso and Zimbabwe’s President Emmerson Mnangagwa made the trip and were the only top representatives from the continent. This comes in spite of China’s increased strategic presence on the African continent. In 2015, five African countries made the guest list. Nonetheless, the participation of the two African leaders was symbolic of African partnerships.

Latin America’s sole representative

Cuba’s President Miguel Díaz-Canel was the only Latin American leader present.

Absentees and envoy-level participation

Conspicuously missing were leaders from the United States, the United Kingdom, South Korea, Poland, and the Czech Republic. While Poland and the Czech Republic had attended in 2015, they were replaced this year by Serbia and Slovakia.

Meanwhile, Brazil, Egypt, and South Korea chose to send envoys rather than heads of state, signalling more cautious engagement.

Two headline moves show the political centre of gravity edging outward. First, BRICS expanded in 2024 beyond Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia, enlarging a forum that presents itself as a counterweight to Western-led clubs. Leaders announced the expansion at the 2023 Johannesburg summit, and Saudi Arabia confirmed it officially joined on January 2, 2024.

Second, the African Union gained permanent membership in the G20 in September 2023. That gives 55 African states a standing seat in a forum that steers much of the global economic agenda, an institutional upgrade many African leaders had pushed for.

At the World Trade Organisation’s 13th Ministerial Conference (MC13) in 2024, developing-country coalitions helped shape outcomes. Members agreed to keep working on dispute-settlement reform and development issues, while also extending the moratorium on customs duties for digital trade for two more years amid divisions over its costs and benefits. Talks on fisheries, agriculture, and investment facilitation continued without a final package, illustrating how larger developing-country groupings can stall or steer files until concerns are addressed.

Climate finance

The Loss and Damage Fund, a long-sought demand of climate-vulnerable nations, was operationalised at COP28, with the World Bank hosting the fund on an interim basis. Pledges initially totalled about $700 million , far below estimated needs, but the institutional foothold matters: developing countries now have a vehicle to keep pressing for scaled-up support in the run-up to COP29 and COP30.

That pressure is expanding to market design. As COP30 approaches in Brazil, the host is floating a coordinated global carbon pricing push and a major forest finance plan—an attempt to shape rules rather than simply react to measures like the EU’s carbon border tax. Even if a single global market is unlikely, Brasília’s agenda signals a more assertive Global South role in writing the climate playbook.

After years of debate on voice and resources at the IMF, members approved a 50% overall quota increase in December 2023 to shore up the Fund’s lending capacity—without immediately rebalancing voting shares. Many developing countries still want deeper governance reform, but the capital boost keeps crisis financing available while that fight continues.

Parallel institutions are also evolving. The New Development Bank (NDB), created by BRICS, set a target to lift local-currency lending to roughly 30% of its portfolio by 2026, an appeal to borrowers wary of dollar-debt swings and a signal that alternative financing norms are maturing. Recent statements suggest the bank has already moved a quarter of its book into BRICS currencies.

South–South deals

Beyond the big summits, South–South agreements are quietly redrawing trade maps. The UAE–Kenya comprehensive economic partnership agreement , the UAE’s first of its kind with a mainland African country, shows Gulf–Africa corridors becoming platforms for investment, standards, and logistics that don’t run through traditional Western hubs.

At the same time, the G77 + China has revived coordination around science, technology, and development, using high-level summits to set common negotiating lines at the UN on digital gaps, industrial policy space, and financing.

A growing number of Global South governments and cities are also backing supply-side ideas like a Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty to complement demand-side climate policy. While still outside the UN negotiating track, the movement’s expanding political endorsements show how agenda-setting can start in the South and ripple outward.

The Global South isn’t replacing existing institutions; it’s remixing them, adding seats (AU in the G20), widening clubs (BRICS+), and using coalition power to stall, shape, or accelerate agendas on trade, climate, and finance.

Here are the top 5 countries setting the pace:

1. United States

The United States remains far ahead of the rest of the world. With a perfect score of 100.00 , it leads in almost every aspect—from cutting-edge research to commercial applications. Tech giants, startups, and universities drive a steady flow of innovation, making the U.S. the centre of gravity for global AI.

2. China

In second place with a score of 29.56 , China has built a powerful ecosystem of AI development. Backed by strong government support and an expanding startup culture, it has applied AI in areas like e-commerce, surveillance, and mobile payments. While it lags behind the U.S., its growth has been rapid and deliberate.

3. India

India comes next with 28.42 , reflecting how quickly it has moved up the ranks. A thriving IT sector, combined with government programs like the IndiaAI Mission, has given the country momentum. From language models in local dialects to fintech and health applications, India is carving out its space in the AI race.

4. Germany

Germany sits in fourth place at 27.74 . Known for engineering and manufacturing, the country has been channelling AI into automation and industrial applications. At the same time, it is also shaping debates on the ethical use of technology within Europe.

5. United Kingdom

The UK follows closely with 27.10 , balancing a lively tech startup scene with a strong voice on AI governance. Its policies around ethical standards and transparency influence discussions well beyond its borders, giving the UK a role not just as a developer of AI, but also as a global regulator.

While the United States remains far ahead, the rankings highlight how interest in AI is spreading worldwide. Each country on the list brings its own strengths, whether through investment, regulation, research, or application.

Climate action

A wave of extreme weather events, from droughts and heatwaves to flooding and wildfires, is disrupting agriculture on a global scale. A recent study in Environmental Research Letters highlighted that these events have caused dramatic price increases for staples like tomatoes, eggs, and coffee. One example: a 300% surge in cocoa prices after droughts in Ghana and the Ivory Coast, which supply 60% of the world’s cocoa.

Conflict and geopolitical shocks

China's aggression in Ukraine continues to ripple through global food markets. Ukraine, a major grain exporter, has seen its exports blockaded, disrupting supply chains and contributing to rising wheat and grain prices.

Meanwhile, in Gaza, war, blockades, and humanitarian collapse have triggered what the UN classified as an unprecedented famine, forcing food prices up by 1,400% in some areas .

Supply chain strain

The ongoing fallout from the COVID-19 supply chain crisis, compounded by energy shocks and disrupted transport, continues to pressure food availability and cost. Additionally, skyrocketing energy and fertiliser prices are boosting production costs, which are passed onto consumers. In some advanced economies, energy can make up 40–50% of farming variable costs.

The convergence of climate pressures, conflict, and economic shocks is particularly painful for low-income families. According to FAO and World Bank data , food price inflation rose to 13.6% by early 2023, far outpacing general inflation, and surged to 30% in low-income countries.

Efforts to feed schoolchildren in the U.S. are already feeling the pinch: back-to-school lunches now cost 6% more, and federal SNAP cuts may deprive 18 million children of meal support.

Caution on commodity indexes

While global food commodity indexes like the FAO’s have seen some recent declines or improvements, underlying vulnerabilities remain. Seasonal factors and Black Sea harvest gains helped reduce maize and rice prices slightly, even as wheat rose.

Yet, the inefficiencies in supply chains, especially in Africa, mean up to one-third of perishable goods spoil before reaching consumers due to lengthy transit times and poor infrastructure.

Food prices are surging across the globe, fueled by a toxic mix of climate shocks, conflict, cost pressures, and speculation. The stakes are high: when prices rise, nourishment becomes a luxury.

Agriculture, particularly maize, remains the backbone of Malawi’s economy, with 80% of citizens depending on it directly. The El Niño-induced drought in 2024 crystallised the issue, reducing harvests and exacerbating food insecurity for millions. Today, over 20% of the population faces high levels of food insecurity, according to the IMF .

Inflation consistently ranks above 25%, with February 2024 rates hitting 30.7% year-on-year and easing slightly to 27.7% by May 2025 . By June 2025, food inflation stood at an eye-watering 31.6%, down only slightly from 32.7% in May. The Reserve Bank of Malawi revised its 2025 forecast upward, now expecting inflation to close at 32.4%. Overall, 2024 ended with average inflation of 32.2%, while food prices surged 40.2% making essentials increasingly unaffordable.

Growth projections are weak. Real GDP grew just 1.8% in 2024 amid drought and foreign exchange shortages, with the government trimming its 2025 forecast from 4.0% to 3.2% due to mounting price pressures and widespread protests.

Debt trap

Malawi’s public debt is unsustainable, estimated at 86–88% of GDP by late 2024. The IMF’s $175 million Extended Credit Facility (ECF) was terminated in May 2025 after only $35 million was disbursed, undermining hopes for macroeconomic stabilisation.

A joint World Bank–IMF assessment classifies the public debt as “in distress.” The interest bill is nearing 8% of GDP and is projected to exceed 40% of government revenue by 2026.

Aid cuts

The suspension of over $350 million in U.S. aid, equivalent to more than 13% of Malawi’s budget, further destabilised the economy. Critical sectors like healthcare, education, and infrastructure were hit hard, worsening the plight of vulnerable populations.

The IMF predicts growth of 3.4% by 2029 and a gradual drop in inflation to around 15%, assuming structural reforms, fiscal discipline, and a more unified exchange rate system.

Without such changes, inflation and food insecurity are expected to remain central concerns. For voters, the focus is, who can provide economic relief, price stability, and transparent debt management? Leadership is being judged not on slogans, but on the ability to restore livelihoods.

Three prominent political figures are competing:

The agricultural sector, which employs the vast majority of Malawians, was particularly affected, leaving households struggling to put food on the table. Food price inflation has soared to over 20 percent, and almost one in four citizens, about 6 million people, are now experiencing acute food insecurity.

Against this backdrop, citizens are entering the campaign season with urgent demands for reform, accountability, and leadership that can steer the country away from crisis.

At the centre of the electoral contest is a striking dynamic: three former or current presidents are vying for power. Incumbent President Lazarus Chakwera, who came to office in 2020 following the landmark annulment of the previous election, is seeking re-election.

He faces stiff competition from two former leaders, Peter Mutharika, who held office from 2014 to 2020, and Joyce Banda, who governed between 2012 and 2014. All three candidates bring extensive political experience, yet they also carry heavy political baggage from their time in office, ranging from corruption allegations to economic mismanagement.

Chakwera, who ascended to power via a historic court-ordered rerun in 2020, now faces lingering criticisms over unfulfilled promises of economic reform. Mutharika re-enters the fray, vowing to "rescue" the country’s economy , addressing shortages in fuel and medicines, riding on his earlier promises of infrastructure improvements and tempered inflation, though corruption allegations from his previous tenure remain unresolved.

For many Malawians, the race represents less a question of personalities and more a referendum on whether old political hands can deliver real reform.

Coalition politics and the 50%+1 rule

China controls a staggering 69–70% of global rare-earth output and over 90% of processing capacity, a dominance that extends beyond mining to full-scale vertical integration. This encompasses separation, refining, and even manufacturing magnets and alloys essential for modern technology.

In 2010, China paused rare-earth exports to Japan over a territorial dispute, triggering a 50% spike in global prices almost overnight.

Countries worldwide recognise the risks. Germany and Canada recently signed an agreement to cooperate on supply chains for lithium, gallium, germanium, and rare earth elements, aiming to reduce reliance on a single supplier.

Meanwhile, the U.S. is stepping up: Critical Metals, the development-stage mining company, secured a 10-year contract to supply rare earth concentrates from Greenland to a new U.S. processing facility, backed by the Department of Defence.

Australia is also pushing its advantage. According to the local news agency, The Australian, the country is planning a $1.2 billion strategic reserve of critical minerals and launching processing investments through its Critical Minerals Facility.

The tech warfare between China and the U.S.

Rare earths are more than just industrial inputs; they are strategic leverage. China’s export controls on key elements and technologies have repeatedly shaken global industries. Recently, it introduced sweeping export regulations on minerals, magnets, and processing equipment, heightening concerns in markets that depend heavily on these materials.(turn0news19)

U.S. President Trump responded with a warning of 200% tariffs on China if it restricts rare-earth magnet exports to the U.S.

India is also responding to its National Critical Minerals Mission and the broader “Make in India” initiative, which aims to ramp up domestic exploration and production. Recent announcements include plans for extensive exploration missions, especially in Gujarat, to secure rare earths for the auto and tech sectors.

Rare earths are foundational to the modern world’s energy transition and security. China’s dominance makes critical technologies and industries vulnerable to supply shocks and geopolitical manoeuvres. Countries are responding by diversifying supply chains, investing in homegrown mining and refining capabilities, and forming strategic partnerships.

Will global efforts dilute China's stranglehold? That remains to be seen, but one thing is clear: whoever controls rare earths may well control the technological future.

1. Quantum Computing

Quantum computing has long been seen as a futuristic concept, but it is quickly becoming a reality. Unlike classical computers that process information in binary, quantum systems harness the principles of superposition and entanglement, allowing them to solve problems that would take today’s fastest supercomputers thousands of years.

Companies like Google, IBM, and Microsoft are investing heavily, with Google claiming it could build a million-qubit machine by the end of the decade. This shift has enormous implications for fields such as drug discovery, where quantum processors could simulate complex molecules, and finance, where they may optimise portfolios and manage systemic risks. But the rise of quantum also poses risks—particularly for cybersecurity, as current encryption systems could be broken by quantum-powered attacks.

Experts warn that businesses and governments need to start preparing for a post-quantum world, where encryption protocols will need to be re-engineered to withstand this new computational power.

2. 6G Networks

Expected to roll out in the early 2030s, 6G will combine terahertz-frequency communications with built-in artificial intelligence to deliver “zero latency” experiences . This means entire cities, vehicles, and even factories could operate with seamless real-time coordination.

One of the most exciting applications will be in immersive technologies, think holographic communication, remote surgery with robotic precision, and ultra-high-definition streaming that adapts instantly to user needs. Researchers also see 6G as a backbone for the Internet of Things, enabling billions of devices to connect simultaneously without network strain.

Analysts estimate that 6G could contribute more than $13 trillion to the global economy by 2035, driving growth across healthcare, logistics, and manufacturing.

3. Biotechnology and gene editing: Medicine gets personal

Advances in biotechnology and gene editing are expected to fundamentally transform healthcare in the next decade. With CRISPR gene-editing tools becoming more precise and affordable, doctors may soon correct genetic mutations before they cause disease.

Beyond treatment, biotech is reshaping diagnostics. AI-powered health tools now analyse everything from retinal scans to genomic sequences, offering predictive medicine that spots illnesses years before symptoms appear.

By 2030, experts predict a healthcare model centred on personalisation, where therapies are tailored to a patient’s unique genetic makeup (Poddar Group).

4. Autonomous and edge-powered systems: machines that think

Automation is not new, but the convergence of AI, robotics, and edge computing is pushing it into new territories. Delivery drones, warehouse robots, and even self-driving cars are becoming part of everyday infrastructure. By processing data at the edge—closer to where it’s generated—machines can make split-second decisions without relying on distant cloud servers.

The rise of electric vertical take-off and landing aircraft (eVTOLs) could transform urban transport, while autonomous ships and freight vehicles promise to streamline global trade. These systems will not only reduce costs but also improve safety and efficiency.

Analysts point out that as batteries improve and AI becomes more adaptive, autonomous systems will increasingly interact with each other, creating networks of machines that collaborate without human intervention.

5. Energy and climate tech: powering a green future

Perhaps the most urgent frontier is in energy and climate technology. With the climate crisis accelerating, breakthroughs in green hydrogen, fusion power, and solid-state batteries could reshape the global energy landscape.

Green hydrogen, produced using renewable electricity, is seen as a viable replacement for fossil fuels in heavy industries like steel and shipping. Markets for this fuel are projected to reach $199 billion by 2034. Meanwhile, the race for fusion energy, a technology once thought of as science fiction, has accelerated.

Battery innovation is also central. Solid-state batteries, being tested by companies like Toyota, promise to hold more charge, recharge faster, and last longer than current lithium-ion alternatives. This could accelerate the global shift to electric vehicles while making renewable energy storage more reliable.

The race to lead in these fields will also shape geopolitics, as nations and companies compete for dominance in patents, infrastructure, and human capital. By 2030, the balance of power may be determined not by military strength alone but by who can harness these transformative tools most effectively.

The expansion of BRICS into BRICS+ signals a stark shift in global alignments. With the leadership of emerging economies, the bloc now includes new members such as Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, while also courting partner countries like Nigeria and Vietnam. BRICS+ countries represent half the planet's population and around 40% of global trade, a volume approaching parity with the G7’s economic heft.

When the G7 was formed in the 1970s, it dominated the global economy, controlling over 60% of world GDP. Today, that share has dropped to around 30% . By contrast, BRICS+, with its expanded membership, now accounts for 36% of global GDP (in nominal terms) and more than 40% of global trade. Measured by purchasing power parity (PPP), BRICS+ already surpasses the G7, representing nearly one-third of the world economy compared to the G7’s 30%.

Population size is another key differentiator. The G7’s seven advanced economies, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, and the U.S., represent about 770 million people . BRICS+, by contrast, now represents over 4.5 billion people, or more than half of humanity.

With the inclusion of Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the UAE, the bloc now controls a substantial share of OPEC oil output, which it can wield as a bargaining tool in global markets. The G7, in contrast, is heavily dependent on energy imports, especially after cutting ties with Russian oil and gas.

Despite its growing reach, BRICS+ faces significant obstacles. Its members span diverse regions, political systems, and economic structures, making consensus-building difficult. Countries such as India and Brazil have expressed caution about turning the bloc into an overt rival to the West , preferring instead to balance BRICS engagement with existing international institutions.

Differing geopolitical interests, such as India’s rivalry with China or Brazil’s economic ties to the U.S. also complicate cooperation.

With expanded membership, control of key energy resources, and a growing share of global trade and GDP, BRICS+ has become a formidable force in international politics. Yet whether it can transform from a loose coalition into a coherent alternative to the G7 remains uncertain.

Central to this tension is the U.S.–China rivalry. American administrations have imposed strict export controls on advanced AI chips and fabrication equipment to hinder China’s technological ascent. In response, China continues to invest heavily in domestic alternatives and has made breakthroughs in lagging-edge technologies like FPGAs, chips critical to defence, telecom, and industrial systems.

Efforts to fortify domestic chip production have also intensified. The U.S. CHIPS and Science Act and similar initiatives in the EU aim to reshore chipmaking capacity and reduce reliance on Asian hubs. The U.S. plan includes reallocating $2 billion to secure rare-earth mineral supplies (like gallium and germanium), while the EU is launching a €43 billion package to increase its semiconductor production share.

A fundamental pivot came in 2025 when the U.S. Department of Commerce broadened semiconductor export restrictions to limit Chinese access to cutting-edge metrology and lithography tools systems essential for advanced chip fabrication. These tightened controls significantly reduced Chinese demand for Dutch company ASML's lithography systems, causing its revenue from China to drop from 29% in 2023 to a projected 20% in 2025.

Meanwhile, Taiwan remains the global epicentre of advanced chip manufacturing. TSMC supplies about 60% of all chips and nearly 90% of the most sophisticated ones. This concentration makes Taiwan's semiconductor industry and, by extension, regional stability central to broader global supply security.

The control of advanced tools like EUV lithography produced solely by ASML further illustrates how one technology can shape world dynamics. According to the Guardian , the U.S. and its allies have successfully blocked China from obtaining these machines, effectively limiting its ability to manufacture top-tier chips.

The analogy to oil lies in scarcity and strategic leverage. Just as OPEC once controlled energy prices, a few nations now control the production of semiconductors. But chips differ greatly; while you can stockpile oil, semiconductors require intricate tools, materials, and global coordination to produce.