In a video shared on social media on Sunday, De la Espriella said the first phase of the overhaul would involve closing Colombian embassies in Algeria, Azerbaijan, Barbados, Cuba, Czechia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Haiti, Hungary, Malaysia, Nicaragua, Romania, Senegal and South Africa .

He said Colombia needed diplomacy that was "modern, efficient, and at the service of national interests", instead of what he described as "politicking and bureaucracy."

"We cannot maintain such a costly structure that does not produce concrete results for the country," he said.

De la Espriella said Colombia would continue relations with most of the affected countries through concurrent representation, with ambassadors serving from diplomatic missions elsewhere in their respective regions.

"These decisions do not mean breaking diplomatic relations with those countries (...) except with Cuba and Nicaragua. In my government there will be no ties whatsoever with tyrannies," he said.

The president-elect also announced that his administration would halt plans to open a Colombian embassy in Palestine , saying the mission had never begun operating. He added that around 15 consulates would also be closed.

According to De la Espriella, the changes would allow Colombia to expand its diplomatic presence in countries offering "real strategic opportunities."

He also reaffirmed his campaign pledge to reopen Colombia's embassy in Israel , based in Jerusalem.

De la Espriella further said he would ask the House of Representatives to move his August 7 inauguration from Popayán to Cali, arguing that volcanic activity in south-western Colombia could disrupt flights and affect the ceremony's logistics.

It was a crisis response dressed up as diplomacy.

For those who have watched Australia’s agricultural supply chains with growing alarm, the arrival of the MV Medi Luna was not a triumph. It was a confession - that Australia, a continent that feeds 100 million people and exports more agricultural produce per capita than almost any other nation on earth – relies for its own food on a 21-mile-wide passage in the Persian Gulf.

The Strait of Hormuz is Australia’s farm gate. And someone else has the key.

How Australia got here

Australia consumed 8.7 million tonnes of fertiliser in 2024, valued at A$5.5 billion (US$3.8 billion). Of that, 7.9 million tonnes - more than 85 per cent - were imported. Domestic production has collapsed to just 1.3 million tonnes, 15 per cent of national consumption. When Incitec Pivot shut the Gibson Island urea facility near Brisbane in 2022, citing an inability to secure affordable long-term gas supply, Australia lost its last significant domestic nitrogen production capacity. From that point on, Australian farmers became entirely dependent on the goodwill of Middle Eastern petrochemical states and the uninterrupted passage of cargo ships through one of the most contested waterways in the world .

Perdaman’s planned new facility Karratha, Western Australia won’t go near to closing the shortfall.

Australia imports approximately 3.85 million tonnes of urea annually. More than half comes from the UAE, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia - countries whose gas production and export terminals are anchored in the Persian Gulf. More than 60 per cent of that urea travels through the Strait of Hormuz, a passage barely 21 miles wide at its narrowest point. As the UN has confirmed, up to 30 per cent of internationally traded fertilisers - nitrogen, phosphate, sulphur - move through this chokepoint. When the Strait closes, Australian farming is suffocated.

When the gulf closed

Following the US-Israeli strikes on Iran, maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz declined by more than 95 per cent. Qatar Energy halted downstream urea production. Saudi and UAE terminals fell silent. Nearly a million metric tonnes of fertiliser cargo were physically stranded in the Gulf, with major producers declaring force majeure. For Australian farmers entering their critical winter-crop planting window - April through June - the timing could not have been worse.

The price response was immediate and severe. Urea, which had traded at around A$675 per tonne in February 2026, broke through A$1,000 per tonne by the end of March - a 50% increase in seven weeks. As Professor Marit Kragt of the University of Western Australia observed: “The current impacts are much more profound. We seem to have not learned anything.”

She was right. This was Australia’s third major fertiliser supply chain disruption this decade. COVID-19 severed Chinese export pipelines. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 pushed prices to historic highs and shuttered the Gibson Island plant, at first temporarily and then permanently. After each disruption, Australia scrambled and promised to rethink its supply chains. After each one, it didn’t.

By April 2026, according to government figures, Australia had secured only 20 per cent of the urea it needed for the current farming season - still 1.25 million tonnes short. The government threw A$7.5 billion into a Fuel and Fertiliser Security Facility. Minister for Agriculture Julie Collins worked around the clock. Prime Minister Albanese cut short a trade tour to return to Geelong after a fire at one of Australia’s two fuel refineries added a second crisis to the first. To be clear, the country was never in danger of famine. But it is in danger of something that, for Australian farming, is almost as bad: a season in which the numbers just don’t add up.

What farmers actually lose

The arithmetic of fertiliser deprivation is merciless. Canola requires around 80 kilograms of nitrogen per hectare to reach optimal yield. Without it, farmers have three choices: plant anyway and accept lower yields, switch to lower-input crops like barley, oats or pulses, or leave land fallow. Each choice is a loss. ABARES forecast in March 2026 that the gross value of Australian agricultural production would fall to around A$95 billion in 2026–27, down from an expected A$101 billion the year before - a A$6 billion contraction driven substantially by fertiliser uncertainty and rising input costs. Farm profits were forecast to decline following several strong seasons, not because of drought or flood or disease, but because a geopolitical event 10,000 kilometers away had closed the pipeline through which Australia’s fields are fed.

The FAO has estimated that cereal producers globally could face income losses of up to 5 per cent in 2026, with lasting impacts through 2030. For Australian wheat and canola farmers competing in global markets, a 5 per cent yield reduction means a mortgage payment, a school fee, a piece of machinery not purchased, a farm debt that rolls forward another year.

And the damage is not limited to farms. One in five Australian households currently skips meals or goes full days without food, according to the 2025 Foodbank Hunger Report. Claiming that Australia is food-secure simply because it exports more calories than it consumes - as governments have repeatedly done - is, as Kimberley Reis of Griffith University puts it, “a mind-numbingly unenlightened thing to say.” Food security isn’t an abstraction about aggregate calories. For the household facing a grocery bill inflated by a conflict it cannot influence, in a country that chose not to build the buffer it needed, it is a weekly calculation.

Indonesia steps in

The deal with Indonesia was important, and welcome. PT Pupuk Indonesia, the state-owned fertiliser producer whose subsidiary PT Pupuk Kalimantan Timur operates the Bontang terminal, has a production capacity of 9.4 million tonnes of urea annually. Against domestic demand of 6.3 million tonnes, that leaves a meaningful export surplus. Indonesia is, in fact, the world’s fourth-largest urea producer. It was able to help when the Gulf could not, and it chose to do so.

The government-to-government framework coordinated by President Prabowo and Prime Minister Albanese - formalized into a commercial deal between Incitec Pivot Fertilizers and PT Pupuk Indonesia - will deliver 250,000 tonnes of urea to Australia by year’s end, with the potential to scale to 500,000 tonnes in a second phase worth approximately USD 440 million. The first cargo of 47,250 tonnes, loaded from PT Pupuk Kalimantan Timur’s terminal in Bontang, arrived in Brisbane on 22 June 2026. Indonesian Ambassador Siswo Pramono called it a demonstration of Indonesia’s growing contribution to regional food security. Australian officials called it a testament to the strength of the bilateral relationship.

It is both of those things. But the deal also illustrates exactly how fragile Australia’s position remains. In a moment of acute crisis, the country’s fertiliser security rested entirely on the discretion of a foreign government - one that, however friendly, had no obligation to prioritize Australian farmers over its own. Indonesia’s domestic fertiliser stockpile stood at 1.23 million tonnes as of June 2026, and its domestic subsidized distribution was running 30 per cent above the previous year. It could afford to be generous. In a different configuration of crisis, the answer from Jakarta or Riyadh or Doha might not be yes.

Alliances and bilateral frameworks are instruments of statecraft, not substitutes for industrial policy. The 250,000 tonnes secured from Indonesia covered roughly 20 per cent of what was still needed for the season. The remaining 80 per cent had to be sourced from wherever it could be found, at whatever price the disrupted market demanded. Prime Minister Albanese is right that strong regional relationships matter. What he hasn’t said is that relationships work best when there is something to offer in return. Australia imports its key fertiliser. It does not make any.

The case for domestic production

Australia has all the ingredients to be a world-class urea producer. It has vast natural gas and coal resources - not the coal of conventional open-cut mines, but deep seams, stranded deposits, coal that cannot be sold on export markets but can, through the proven technology of underground coal gasification, be converted into the syngas that feeds an ammonia and urea plant. It has the land, the port infrastructure, the regulatory frameworks, and - if it chose to deploy them - the sovereign capital.

For decades, Australia has debated sovereign fuel reserves, domestic manufacturing capacity, critical minerals supply chains, and defense self-sufficiency with varying degrees of urgency. Fertiliser has always been way down the list. The two largest short-term threats to Australian agricultural output are drought and a closed strait. We build dams for the first. We are still debating the building of plants for the second.

The question is when

Australia feeds 100 million people, including almost 30 million Australians. That is a responsibility, and currently, a gamble. Every tonne of wheat sown in the Wheatbelt, every canola crop planted across the Eyre Peninsula, every nitrogen application on every paddock from Western Australia to Queensland depends on an unbroken supply chain that passes through one of the world’s most contested maritime chokepoints.

The current crisis will pass. The Strait of Hormuz will reopen, as it has before. Urea prices will fall. Shipments will resume. And Australian agriculture ministers will announce that the supply chain has been “diversified” - meaning a few more cargo shipments from Southeast Asian producers have been penciled into trade agreements, and a working group has been established.

It can be done, as Perdamon’s Project Ceres demonstrates. But one plant won’t be enough.

Another domestic urea and ammonia plant, built in South Australia or Western Australia or Queensland, fed by gas produced beneath Australian soil, employing Australian workers, would still not entirely eliminate the risk of another disruption. But it would mean that the next time a strait closes or a government says no, Australia farmers aren’t scrambling. The MV Medi Luna was a lifeline. The question is whether Australia will use the time between crises, or simply wait to need another one.

Youssouf also highlighted Russia’s backing for reforms to the UN Security Council, including support for Africa’s long-standing demand for greater representation. The African Union is calling for two permanent seats with full rights, as well as five non-permanent seats, as part of efforts to strengthen the continent’s voice in global decision-making.

"China and Belarus are good friends. We are developing a comprehensive strategic partnership, and our relations have withstood challenges from international turbulence. Our friendship is only growing stronger," Xi said, adding that he was ready to hold further in-depth discussions with Lukashenko on issues of mutual interest.

Xi also highlighted the two countries' co-operation under China's Belt and Road Initiative and Beijing's broader global initiatives, saying the partnership had produced "new results" while maintaining close co-ordination on international affairs.

Lukashenko told Xi he had travelled to Beijing directly from the Moscow region, where he had met Russian President Vladimir Putin a day earlier before flying to China.

"It feels like home," Lukashenko remarked as he greeted Xi, who described the Belarusian leader as "my dear friend" and noted that the pair met regularly to discuss a wide range of issues.

The visit comes as China and Belarus continue to strengthen diplomatic and economic ties despite heightened geopolitical tensions and Western sanctions imposed on Minsk over its support for Russia following the invasion of Ukraine.

China has remained one of Belarus' closest international partners, expanding trade, investment and infrastructure co-operation while backing closer political engagement between the two countries.

The decision, announced by the government on Friday June 26, accuses France of pursuing “neocolonial ambitions” and interfering in domestic affairs, a claim Paris has rejected, calling the move “hostile and baseless” while reviewing its response. The rupture follows years of deteriorating relations, including the expulsion of French troops and diplomats, and reflects a broader regional trend in West Africa where leaders are increasingly pushing back against France’s presence.

Lula said Trump was free to support the Bolsonaro family but should refrain from attempting to influence Brazil's democratic process.

"As for me, he can keep sympathising with Bolsonaro, with the father, the son, or the grandson. There is no problem at all. That is his business. But do not interfere in Brazil's elections ," Lula said.

The remarks come amid scrutiny over Eduardo Bolsonaro's contacts with US officials. According to Brazil's Supreme Court, the congressman sought support from the US government to influence legal proceedings involving his father and to encourage sanctions and international pressure against Brazil and members of its judiciary.

"If there is anyone who needs to learn from civilised elections in Brazil, it is my friend Trump," Lula said. "I only hope he does not violate the code of ethics among nations that want their sovereignty to be respected," he added.

Lula said he briefly met Trump during the G7 gathering and stressed that relations between the two countries should be based on mutual respect and respect for national sovereignty.

"The only thing I want is the same respect for Brazil that I have for the United States ," he said. The Brazilian president also revealed that he handed Trump a document outlining alleged links between organised crime in Brazil and the United States, arguing that both countries could cooperate more closely to combat criminal networks.

"I gave him everything in writing because I do not want to limit myself to talking; President Trump talks a lot and listens little," Lula said.

[This article was corrected on June 19th, 2026 to remove incorrect details about the upcoming election.]

Speaking to Atlantico , Deputy Prime Minister Ernest Hilaire said:

Hilaire is confident of retaining his island's precious visa-free access to Europe, as a result of upgrades to its Citizenship by Investment Programme (CIP). The European Union has taken a tougher stance on citizenship-by-investment schemes, with its latest Visa Suspension Mechanism report arguing that the operation of such programmes could itself become grounds for suspending visa-free access to the Schengen Area. The report specifically highlighted Caribbean countries operating citizenship programmes, including Saint Lucia.

Hilaire says he is working to convince the EU of the importance and justification for retaining their in-depth partnership.

"The dialogue we maintain with Brussels is real, continuous and conducted in good faith," he said in an interview.

The debate is about more than passports. For Saint Lucia, it is also about preserving one of the benefits that have made Caribbean citizenship programmes attractive: visa-free access to Europe. The issue has become even more sensitive after the European Union pointed to Vanuatu as an example of a country that lost its visa-free status over concerns related to investor citizenship schemes.

However, Hilaire argues that Saint Lucia's programme has changed significantly in recent years.

"Following the Caribbean memorandum of understanding signed in early 2024, we have raised the minimum thresholds, strengthened due diligence, harmonised our standards with our four regional partners and introduced, from 2026, a five-year initial passport, a mandatory orientation programme, a thirty-day stay in the country and full biometric registration."

Hilaire, the Deputy Prime Minister responsible for Tourism, Investment and Commerce, among others, says the debate goes beyond technical requirements.

"Saint Lucia is a sovereign democracy of 180,000 people, facing climate vulnerability, debt constraints and limited fiscal space. We are not asking Europe for charity: we are asking for a partnership grounded in facts. The conversation must be about evidence, not only about fears."

Zone of peace

Beyond the debate over investment migration, Saint Lucia is also responding to a changing geopolitical landscape. Increased military activity, diverging positions within CARICOM and competition among global powers have brought renewed attention to the Caribbean.

Hilaire believes the region's traditional approach remains relevant.

"Saint Lucia's position is one of quiet diplomacy. We have always regarded the Caribbean as a zone of peace, and we continue to do so," he said.

He argues that small states can play an important role in an increasingly multipolar world, serving as what he calls "honest brokers" in international affairs.

The government is also looking to strengthen ties with France through Martinique and Guadeloupe. Hilaire describes the relationship as "one of the most underestimated in the Atlantic" and sees opportunities for deeper cooperation on climate resilience, security and culture.

Tourism remains central to Saint Lucia's economy, but the government is seeking new markets. While North America remains the island's largest source of visitors, Hilaire believes France offers untapped potential, particularly through Saint Lucia's shared Creole heritage and creative industries. The key challenge, he says, is improving air connectivity with Europe.

Despite concerns about climate change, debt pressures and shifting global alliances, Hilaire remains optimistic.

"Small states have one underestimated asset: agility," he said. "We can move faster than the major powers on regulation, on partnerships, on positioning."

Image from Depositphotos.com

Xi's visit to North Korea comes as Beijing seeks to strengthen ties with its long-time ally amid Pyongyang's growing relationship with Moscow and rising tensions across East Asia . The two leaders pledged deeper cooperation and reaffirmed the importance of their decades-old partnership.

The Pyongyang trip followed a busy diplomatic schedule in Beijing.

In mid-May, Xi hosted US President Donald Trump for a closely watched summit aimed at stabilising relations after years of trade disputes and strategic competition between the world's two largest economies.

Less than a week later, Xi welcomed Russian President Vladimir Putin to the Chinese capital. The two leaders reaffirmed their strategic partnership and issued a joint statement criticising aspects of US foreign policy , underscoring the growing importance of Sino-Russian ties.

Taken individually, each meeting reflected a different set of interests and priorities. Together, however, they highlight China's unique position in an increasingly fragmented world .

The musical interlude came after bilateral talks focused on deepening ties between the Philippines and Japan , two longstanding partners in trade, security and infrastructure cooperation. The dinner formed part of Marcos’ official visit to Japan, where both sides discussed regional stability, economic collaboration and maritime security.

What caught the attention of many viewers was the setting of the performance. Rather than using karaoke equipment, the two leaders appeared to sing through conference microphones normally reserved for diplomatic discussions, lending an unusual informality to the event.

Karaoke has long been associated with Japan, where the modern form of the pastime emerged in the 1970s, though the patent for the sing-along version is credited to a Filipino inventor.

For a brief moment, the state dinner appeared less like a diplomatic engagement and more like a late-night singalong between friends.

The dispute followed remarks by Petro describing the situation in Bolivia as a “popular insurrection” and a “Bolivian political crisis,” while offering Colombia’s support for a peaceful solution.

“President Petro’s statements are spreading misinformation, making value judgments and implying direct interference in Bolivian internal politics ,” Aramayo said.

He stressed that the move did not mean Bolivia was severing diplomatic relations with Colombia.

Petro later told Radio Caracol that Bolivia was experiencing “extremism” following the ambassador’s expulsion.

The diplomatic row comes amid growing tensions in Bolivia, where protests and roadblocks have disrupted transport and supplies of food and basic goods across parts of the country.

“We were getting ready to do a very major attack tomorrow. I’ve put it off for a little while, hopefully, maybe forever, but possibly for a little while because we’ve had very big discussions with Iran and we’ll see what they amount to,” Trump said.

He added that leaders from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates had urged Washington to allow more time for diplomacy.

“I was asked by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE and some others if we could put it off for 2 or 3 days, a short period of time, because they think that they are getting very close to making a deal,” he stated.

Earlier, Trump posted a longer statement on Truth Social confirming the discussions with Gulf leaders.

“I have been asked by the Emir of Qatar, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud, and the President of the United Arab Emirates, Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, to hold off on our planned Military attack of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which was scheduled for tomorrow, in that serious negotiations are now taking place,” Trump wrote.

He added that Gulf leaders believed a deal could still be reached.

A ceasefire between the US and Iran was declared in April, with both sides reportedly exchanging proposals through Pakistani mediators. However, tensions have continued in the Strait of Hormuz, where Iran has restricted passage for what it describes as “unfriendly” countries, while the United States continues restrictions targeting Iranian ports.

The principle of Thucydides Trap, originally based on the conflicts between Greek Sparta and its rising rival Athens, was that conflict becomes the default when an emerging power begins to challenge a dominant rival. In interviews with Professor Allison at Davos and elsewhere, he consistently emphasised a single point: while structural contradictions are inevitable, human wisdom must prevail over historical destiny.

With President Trump’s current visit to China and the establishment of a new positioning for China-US relations - ‘Constructive Strategic Stability’  -the ‘Questions of History, the World, and the People’ previously posed by President Xi have finally found a clear, realist footnote. This positioning is no longer an abstract, grand vision; it is a ‘strategic contract’ forged from the realities of power dynamics and a shared consensus on survival.

How relations have evolved

The economic relationship between China and the US has long been regarded as the ‘ballast’ and ‘propeller’ of the bilateral bond. However, this ballast is undergoing a profound structural metamorphosis. In earlier decades, the trade relationship was often characterised by the phrase ‘800 million shirts for one Boeing aircraft’. This reflected the early stages of China as the ‘world’s factory’, relying on labour-intensive exports of garments and toys to exchange for American high-tech aviation.

I recall covering the early stages of the trade war in 2017 when ‘intermediate goods’ was the buzzword for understanding bilateral trade. At that time, an iPhone assembled in China featured design from California and key components from Japan and South Korea; China contributed only low-cost assembly labour. The ‘trade deficit’ debated so fiercely then often ignored the reality of global value chains, where the lion’s share of profit flowed back to American corporations.

Nine years later, as we re-examine the economic landscape between Beijing and Washington, the structure has fundamentally shifted. China has evolved from the era of ‘8亿 (800 million) trousers’ to a burgeoning epoch of robotics, artificial intelligence , and electric vehicles. The resulting competition is unavoidable, yet it has brought a new clarity: challenges such as AI safety, cross-border pandemics, and climate change (even if the current US administration remains sceptical) are ‘existential challenges’ that transcend national borders. These threats compel the two nations, amidst intense strategic competition, to carve out a ‘limited yet precise’ path for cooperation.

Even in the eyes of Washington’s staunchest hawks, the reality of this shift is inescapable. In recent days, the sight of US Secretary of State Marco Rubio giving a ‘thumbs up’ while gazing at the starlit ceiling of the Great Hall of the People , or the Chinese-style attire and ‘tiger-head pouch’ worn by Elon Musk’s young son, serve as micro-footnotes to this macro transformation.

A long history of interconnection

As a journalist who spent seven years stationed in the United States, I know intimately that the resilience of this relationship has never existed solely in diplomatic communiqués. At the Chinese Historical Society of America (CHSA) in San Francisco, I once stood for a long time staring at the rudimentary tools left by the Chinese labourers who built the First Transcontinental Railroad. They recorded blood, sweat, and a monumental contribution. From the Flying Tigers who fought side-by-side against fascism in WWII to the ‘Ping-Pong Diplomacy’ that thawed the icy silence, these bonds have played a role at every historical turning point.

Today, these ties are reviving in unexpected ways in the digital age. From the ‘Pickleball’ craze sweeping America to the ‘Chinaxxing’ tag trending on TikTok—where American youths share their authentic experiences of travelling in China—to US netizens singing and dancing along to the melodies of a Chinese ‘Auntie’, this bottom-up emotional exchange is deconstructing the cold narratives of politicians.

A former CNN colleague once shared a story with me about interviewing a ‘bangbang’ (porter) on the streets of Chongqing. The man, drenched in sweat, told him his greatest wish was to work hard to buy a car and send his daughter to the best school. My colleague remarked: “Isn’t that the purest form of the American Dream? The ‘Chinese Dream’ and the ‘American Dream’ are essentially the same.” The shared values of family responsibility, the pursuit of efficiency, and the belief in prosperity through hard work are deeply synchronised in the genes of both peoples. If Tsinghua University and the Peking Union Medical College are monuments to early cooperation, today’s scientists working side-by-side in labs and netizens engaging spontaneously on social media are writing the next chapters of this human connection.

The Four Stabilities

As President Trump’s motorcade swept past Beijing’s Central Axis towards the Temple of Heaven, the weight of history met the realism of modern diplomacy. The beauty of Chinese architecture is encapsulated in the concept of ‘Zhonghe’ (Centrality and Harmony). Within the red walls and blue tiles of the Temple of Heaven lies a dynamic balance—not a pursuit of absolute uniformity, but a search for coordination amidst opposites.

The newly established ‘Four Stabilities’— stability based on cooperation, healthy stability through moderated competition, routine stability through controllable differences, and enduring stability with the prospect of peace —represent a departure from earlier romanticism in favour of this ‘Zhonghe’ wisdom. This is a higher form of pragmatism. It acknowledges ‘cooperation without excluding competition,’ as competition drives efficiency; it insists on ‘peace without evading differences,’ as a mature relationship requires no feigned harmony. For too long, the West has misunderstood the Chinese concept of ‘Win-Win’ as China wanting to ‘win twice.’ The true Dao of ‘Zhonghe’ is that the world is not a zero-sum game; the vast Pacific Ocean is wide enough for two great powers to compete in their respective orbits and shake hands where they intersect.

A shared future

As the United States approaches its 250th anniversary, facing a China with five millennia of civilisational composure, both sides are learning how to manage expectations in an imperfect world. Compared to previous frameworks, ‘Constructive Strategic Stability’ is more honest: it accepts competition but rejects chaos; it acknowledges differences but pursues a lasting peace .

As President Trump noted at the state banquet, the American founding fathers held a profound respect for the wisdom of Confucius. Transcending the Thucydides Trap does not require the erasure of differences, but rather, like the structural integrity of the Hall of Prayer for Good Harvests, achieving steadfastness through the balanced intersection of diverse forces. The Pacific is indeed wide enough for two great nations. Seeking cooperation within competition and anchoring peace amidst differences may well be the most stable strategic dividend our generation can offer the world.

Du Yubin is a journalist and producer for CGTN. He was stationed in Washington, D.C. and London for six years each, focusing on China-US and China-EU relations. He has over 15 years of experience in international communication and new media. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

The last time Trump and Xi met was in Busan, South Korea, in October 2025. That meeting came during an escalating tariffs dispute between both countries, but the talks helped pause tensions. Cameras captured the two leaders exchanging handshakes before sitting down for discussions.

This time around, trade will once again dominate discussions. The United States is expected to push for an extension of China’s suspension of export controls on rare earths, an agreement reached during the Busan talks. Possible deals involving planes, agriculture and energy are also expected to come up.

But the meeting is likely to go beyond economics. Discussions are predicted to touch on the Iran war, which Trump repeatedly insisted would be resolved before his visit, as well as nuclear weapons and Taiwan.

The upcoming talks also bring back memories of Trump and Xi’s earlier meetings during Trump’s first term. In 2017, Xi visited Trump at Mar-a-Lago in Florida , where Trump praised the relationship between the two countries.

Later that year in Beijing, both leaders again spoke positively about cooperation, despite concerns over trade imbalances.

The two leaders met again during the 2019 G20 summit in Osaka, Japan, where Xi said, “China and the United States both benefit from cooperation and lose in a confrontation.”

Trump responded by describing his earlier trip to Beijing as “one of the most incredible” experiences of his life and said a fair trade deal between the two countries “would be historic."

Now, years later, both leaders are preparing to meet once again — with trade, diplomacy and global security once again at the centre of the conversation.

Noboa highlighted that this addition is part of a broader security strategy involving international allies like the United States and the United Arab Emirates, aiming to restore safety and stability across the country.

“The issue of the Strait of Hormuz was one of our serious topics of discussion,” Araghchi said.

He added that Chinese officials believe Iran’s position has changed since the war .

“Our Chinese friends also believe that Iran after the war is different from Iran before the war,” he said, adding that a new phase of cooperation between Iran and other countries lies ahead.

China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said Beijing supports Iran in safeguarding its sovereignty and national security , while welcoming Tehran’s willingness to pursue a political solution through diplomacy.

The talks came as media reports suggested the United States and Iran could be moving closer to a deal. Araghchi arrived in Beijing on Tuesday for diplomatic consultations ahead of U.S. President Donald Trump ’s planned visit to China on May 14.

Trump on Wednesday threatened to resume bombing Iran at a “much higher level and intensity” if Tehran fails to agree to a deal.

Earlier, he announced a pause in “Project Freedom,” a U.S. operation aimed at escorting ships through the Strait of Hormuz, to allow time to assess whether an agreement with Iran can be finalised. However, Trump said the U.S. naval blockade would remain in “full force.”

“Although we have kept in touch through phone calls and various other means, since the United States and Israel launched their illegal war against Iran, a war that has been ongoing, our stance remains adhering to the principle of peaceful coexistence,” Wang said.

Araghchi reportedly thanked China for its support during the conflict and said cooperation between the two countries would deepen.

“Iran appreciates China's firm stance and especially the condemnation of the United States and Israel... China is a close friend of Iran, and in the current circumstances, our cooperation will be even stronger. Iran will only accept a just and comprehensive agreement,” he said.

Araghchi arrived in Beijing on Tuesday for diplomatic consultations expected to focus on bilateral relations as well as regional and international developments.

The meeting came amid continued tensions in the Strait of Hormuz following the conflict between the US and Iran.

Once a barren settlement where “the land could not sustain its people,” Banyan has been transformed into a thriving rural community, with white-walled houses, paved roads and growing local industries. By leveraging its natural conditions , the village has developed distributed solar power, expanded forest coverage and adopted clean heating, charting a green path to prosperity.

Walking through the village, President Chapo learned how tailored policies and industry-driven approaches helped lift residents out of poverty. At a relocated household, he showed keen interest in traditional Tu ethnic embroidery, now a source of income for local women. The experience underscored a key lesson: development is most sustainable when it builds on local strengths and empowers communities.

As President Chapo later wrote, such practices show how “structured policies can transform realities and create opportunities for all,” adding that improving people’s livelihoods remains a core commitment of his government.

This message resonates strongly in Mozambique. As one of Africa’s most promising renewable energy markets, the country possesses abundant solar and wind resources, alongside rich cultural and human capital. By adapting development models to local conditions, Mozambique has the potential to chart its own inclusive and sustainable growth path.

Beyond rural revitalisation, President Chapo’s one-week-long state visit in China also highlighted the broadening scope of China-Mozambique cooperation. He examined intelligent power solutions, observed cutting-edge engineering equipment in operation, and visited automated agricultural processing facilities, gaining first-hand insight into China’s industrial and technological strengths.

In Beijing, President Chapo met with Chinese President Xi Jinping, where the two leaders agreed to elevate bilateral relations to a China-Mozambique community with a shared future in the new era. More than 20 cooperation documents were signed, covering areas such as Belt and Road cooperation, trade, agriculture, energy and people-to-people exchanges.

These outcomes reflect both the depth of political trust, and the expanding economic complementarity between the two countries. Mozambique, endowed with rich natural resources, stands to benefit from enhanced cooperation in infrastructure , energy and industrial development. With Chinese support, it can extend industrial chains, increase added value and better convert its resource advantages into sustained growth momentum.

Concluding his China trip, President Chapo said that Mozambique’s strategic partnership with China strengthens development. Indeed, at its core, such cooperation is people-centred and mutually beneficial, offering a forward-looking model for shared prosperity.

Gao Junya produces the China Africa Talk podcast.

China has voiced strong support for Panama’s sovereignty over the canal, framing its position as backing a “just struggle” by the Panamanian people . This comes amid renewed strategic interest in the canal, a key global trade route, where influence carries major economic and political weight.

At the same time, the United States is reportedly considering moves to counter China’s presence in the region, turning the canal once again into a focal point of great-power competition. The situation highlights how infrastructure in Latin America is increasingly tied to broader global rivalries.

Panama now finds itself navigating a delicate balance between competing powers. Its priority remains maintaining control and stability over the canal, while avoiding escalation in a dispute that reflects shifting dynamics in global geopolitics.

From April 11 to 15, Sánchez conducted a five-day official visit to China, his fourth in four years. During his stay, he explored Beijing’s cultural landmarks, including the Drum Tower and the Summer Palace, met with President Xi Jinping and other top leaders; visited two of China’s elite universities; and toured the Xiaomi Science and Technology Park, where he experienced Xiaomi’s latest smartphones, electric vehicles, and AI glasses. His visit generated significant buzz on Chinese social media. His previous stances on Middle Eastern issues—specifically his willingness to say "no" to the United States—had already bolstered his popularity. Now, footage of his travels captured by onlookers has gone viral on short-video platforms. Chinese netizens have dubbed the tall, athletic Prime Minister "dashing," turning him into something of a digital icon.

Changing the perspective

The metaphor of Ricci’s map introduced by Sánchez has become a focal point for Chinese media . Historians often marvel at Ricci’s adaptability: when the Jesuit missionary realized his Eurocentric map clashed with the worldview of the "Middle Kingdom," he collaborated with Ming official Li Zhizao to create the Kunyu Wanguo Quantu (A Map of the Myriad Countries of the World). By shifting the prime meridian 170 degrees to the left, he placed China at the center of the world.

This 400-year-old "cartographic correction" finds a modern echo between Madrid and Beijing. During his visit, Sánchez remarked that even today, some still view the world through that same "distorted map." In an era of accelerating multipolarity, refusing to see Asia as a periphery is not just a geographical acknowledgment, but an act of strategic self-reflection.

Sánchez’s metaphor is more than a historical retrospective; it is a profound geopolitical allegory. It traces the journey from an era of "perceptual bias"—where Europe was the centre and Asia the edge—to a present where both nations seek new coordinates in a turbulent international order. A redrawing of "strategic resolve" is quietly underway.

Fragile order

In the early spring of Beijing, the talks between the two sides touched upon deeper anxieties. The Chinese side invoked the idiom "Li Beng Yue Huai" (the collapse of rites and music ). Originating from the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods (770 BC–221 BC), this term describes the disintegration of social ethics and order—a description that strikes a chord with the current global state of affairs.

 From Venezuela to Iran, the proliferation of unilateralism and the weaponization of sanctions are viewed as the squeezing of justice by raw power. Here, China and Spain reached a subtle moral consensus: in an age where the "law of the jungle" threatens to return, defending the UN-centered international system is no longer a mere formality, but a sovereign responsibility toward global order.

Official Chinese statements described this consensus as "jointly answering the questions of our time." According to the press release, President Xi Jinping noted that how a country treats international law and order reflects its worldview, values, and sense of responsibility.

In response, Spain expressed its desire for close communication and coordination with China to uphold international law and address global challenges. Spain’s embrace of multipolarity is, in essence, an attempt to revise the "obsolete map" dominated by a few superpowers.

Industrial transformation

If diplomatic rhetoric provides the latitude and longitude of the map, industrial cooperation represents the actual cultivation of the land. Under the shadow of EU tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles, Sánchez’s visit carried a strong sense of "risk hedging." Spain’s ambition is clear: it is no longer content to be a mere destination for Chinese exports. Madrid seeks "technology sharing rather than simple imports," and Chinese companies are responding with tangible investment:

Chery Automobile has taken over and renovated a former Nissan plant in Barcelona.

Envision Energy is building Europe’s first LFP (Lithium Iron Phosphate) battery gigafactory in Extremadura, and CATL is partnering with Stellantis to build a battery plant in Aragon.

Consumer choice is the ultimate proof. Statistics show that 2025 marked a historic turning point for Chinese cars in Spain, with their market share surpassing 10% for the first time. While in China, Sánchez’s took the opportunity to test drive the high-powered Xiaomi SU7.

Stability and law

In the final stages of the visit, "strategic resolve" became the keyword of the bilateral relationship. Sánchez emphasized that Spain is committed to developing a partnership characterized by such resolve. His statement—"Just like China, we are a stable and predictable country"— is unusually bold by European standards and reflects Sanchez’s position as one of the longest serving EU leaders..

On the "Matteo Ricci map" of global geopolitics, Spain is consciously shifting its position. It is no longer satisfied with being a follower on the fringes of the EU. Instead, it is using its "predictability" as leverage, seeking long-term economic stability through deep industrial integration amidst the frictions of China-EU trade.

From the corrected map of four centuries ago to the green supply chains spanning half the globe today, the China-Spain relationship proves one thing: in this chaotic era of "collapsed rites," the ability to sit down, realign coordinates, and refuse a return to the law of the jungle is a piece of strategic foresight of immense value.

Du Yubin is a journalist and producer for CGTN. He was stationed in Washington, D.C. and London for six years each, focusing on China-US and China-EU relations. He has over 15 years of experience in international communication and new media. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Iran maintained that its nuclear programme is civilian, stating it is used for energy and medical purposes and is within its sovereign rights.

Uranium enrichment is not unique to Iran. Several countries have operated enrichment facilities, including Argentina, Brazil , China, France, Germany, India, Japan, the Netherlands, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The US position has often been based on concerns about security and stability, arguing that other countries with such capabilities are allies or partners. Iran, however, is located in a region with multiple neighbouring states.

"I bring you my letter of credence as well as my letter of recall from my predecessor. Mr. President, before I arrived here, I cannot tell you how many people told me that, in short order, I'd fall in love with the country. It's only taken two months, and I can confirm that that has happened," he said.

Bozell said the United States and South Africa shared important values and interests, and pledged to build on mutual respect and cooperation. He also praised South Africa’s Constitution, telling Ramaphosa he hoped to take bilateral relations “to places they’ve never been before.”

"We are two nations with great shared values and interests. Perhaps not enough people understand this, but you, Excellency, were the primary author of your Constitution. You do understand that," he added.

South Africa has in the past month called in the new US ambassador, Leo Brent Bozell III, less than a month after he arrived in the country, after comments he made about the struggle song “Kill the Boer” sparked a diplomatic backlash.

The Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) has ordered stricter enforcement of ordinances banning street drinking, shirtless roaming and late-night videoke as part of its “Safe City” initiative, initially covering Metro Manila. Interior Secretary Juanito Victor “Jonvic” Remulla said police would ensure compliance, citing links between street drinking and violence. Videoke use must follow local time limits, typically beyond 10 p.m., with complaints handled via emergency services. Authorities will also enforce curfews for minors. The Philippine National Police will deploy additional personnel and crack down on taxi overcharging following a recent viral incident.

US extends rotational Marine deployment in Philippines

The United States Marine Corps is extending the deployment of its Marine Rotational Force–Southeast Asia (MRF-SEA) in the Philippines beyond its usual six-month cycle to deepen military cooperation. A new command element from the I Marine Expeditionary Force has taken over, integrating forces with Philippine counterparts under Task Force-Philippines. The move, made at Manila’s invitation, aligns with the country’s Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept. MRF-SEA, deployed since 2023, is a scalable force supporting joint operations, crisis response and capability coordination, with the current rotation operating primarily from the Philippines rather than moving across Southeast Asia.

Japanese troops take part in US-Philippines war drills

Japanese troops have joined military drills in the Philippines for the first time, marking a milestone in regional defence cooperation. Around 420 personnel from the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force are participating in the annual Salaknib exercises alongside Philippine and US forces under the US-led Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center. The drills, running until May 20, include live-fire and operational training across northern Luzon. Forces involved include about 4,400 Filipino and 2,800 US troops, with smaller contingents from Australia and New Zealand, as multinational exercises expand across the archipelago.

Manila named among world’s best destinations for 2026

Manila has been named among the world’s best destinations for 2026 by National Geographic, cited mainly for its food scene. The Philippine capital joins cities such as Milan, Québec and Beijing, with highlights including Binondo bakeries like Eng Bee Tin and Ho-Land, and restaurants such as Manam and Toyo Eatery. The recognition comes despite a downturn in Philippine tourism, with arrivals falling to 5.24 million in 2025, while regional peers saw growth. Analysts cite weak promotion, infrastructure gaps and rising travel costs. A Klook study, however, points to resilient domestic travel demand.

Marcos urged to resist joint oil deal with China

Critics have warned the Philippine government against compromising maritime rights as it resumes energy talks with China. The Stratbase Institute and Bayan Muna chair Neri Colmenares said joint exploration in the West Philippine Sea risks undermining sovereignty and ignoring Beijing’s actions. They stressed any deal must comply with the 2016 arbitral ruling affirming Philippine rights. Concerns follow President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s remarks that the energy crisis could open room for agreement. Officials from both sides recently held initial talks on potential oil and gas cooperation in China.

KCNA said the visit was part of efforts to improve living standards and promote a “socialist civilisation.”

During the tour, Kim pointed to a rise in pet ownership in Pyongyang and other areas, and called for expanded production of pet-related goods, including food, grooming tools and veterinary medicines. 

He wanted to develop consumer-oriented industries, a notable emphasis in an economy still constrained by international sanctions.

The appearance also offered a rare glimpse of a more domestic, curated image of the North Korean leader — one that contrasts with the state’s usual focus on military capability and strategic strength.

Yet animals, particularly dogs, have long played a role in Kim’s political signalling.

In 2018, following a summit in Pyongyang, Kim gifted two white Pungsan hunting dogs — a breed indigenous to North Korea — to then South Korean president Moon Jae-in. The move was widely seen as a gesture of goodwill during a brief thaw in inter-Korean relations.

The dogs, named Gomi and Songgang, were initially hailed as symbols of reconciliation. However, their fate later reflected the fragility of such diplomacy. In 2022, they were transferred to a South Korean zoo after a dispute over the cost of their upkeep between Moon and the administration of President Yoon Suk Yeol.

More recently, Kim extended a similar gesture to Russian President Vladimir Putin, gifting him a pair of Pungsan dogs in 2024 as ties between Pyongyang and Moscow deepened.

Kim ultimately leverages such gestures to serve dual purposes: reinforcing diplomatic ties while projecting a softer imagery of leadership. 

From symbolic gifts to staged public appearances, dogs have become an unlikely but consistent feature of Kim’s political playbook.

But in recent month, Takaichi has shown a markedly different side.

During a January meeting with South Korean President Lee Jae-myung, Takaichi sat behind a drum kit and joined him in a brief performance of K-pop hits, including BTS’ “Dynamite.” The jam session, held in Nara, her hometown, capped Lee’s official visit and quickly went viral online.

It was a nod to Takaichi’s past as a heavy metal drummer and, as she later wrote, fulfilled Lee’s long-held wish to play the instrument.

Weeks later, Takaichi again leaned into cultural symbolism during talks with French President Emmanuel Macron. At a joint appearance in Tokyo, the two leaders cupped their hands and mimicked the “Kamehameha,” a signature move from the globally popular anime Dragon Ball.

The moment, shared widely on social media, offered a stark contrast to the substance of their discussions, where Macron stressed Europe’s “predictability” in uncertain times, taking an apparent swipe at U.S. policy under Donald Trump .

As she navigates a complex geopolitical landscape, Takaichi appears to be adding a new tool to her playbook.

From drum kits to anime gestures, Japan’s “Iron Lady” is showing that even the most hardline leaders can wield a softer touch — and that, in diplomacy, personality can be as powerful as policy .

Afghan Taliban officials said renewed clashes on Wednesday came after a temporary Eid ceasefire expired, killing at least two civilians in eastern Afghanistan, while each side accused the other of starting the exchange.

That has not stopped Islamabad from making a conspicuously public play for a role in the Middle East crisis.

Since the US-Israel war on Iran began on Feb. 28, Pakistan’s civilian and military leadership have been engaging what one of the source reports described as “regional and friendly countries” while repeatedly calling for de-escalation. 

Foreign Office spokesman Tahir Andrabi said earlier this week that Pakistan remained committed to resolving the conflict “through diplomatic means and engagements,” even as he urged the media to avoid speculation.

In a post on X, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif formally offered Islamabad as a venue for talks between Iranian and US officials, saying Pakistan stood “ready and honoured” to host “meaningful and conclusive talks” if both sides agreed. 

Sharif tagged President Donald Trump, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and US special envoy Steve Witkoff. The idea of Islamabad hosting talks had in fact come from Washington, reporters revealed. Trump later shared Sharif’s post on Truth Social.

A messenger to Tehran

Pakistan’s role has not been limited to offering conference rooms.

Washington had sent a peace proposal to Tehran through Pakistan, with Reuters and the New York Times naming Islamabad as the messenger. A senior Iranian official told Reuters that either Turkey or Pakistan was being considered as a possible venue if talks advanced. 

Rafael Grossi, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, added to the speculation when he said he thought talks could take place in Islamabad over the weekend, though he stressed nothing had been settled.

Pakistani officials then moved from hint to confirmation, though not all the way to clarity. Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar said on X on Thursday that “indirect US-Iran talks” were taking place through messages relayed by Pakistan. He added that the United States had shared 15 points that Iran was considering. 

But he stopped short of saying Pakistan would definitely host any face-to-face meeting. Andrabi did the same in his weekly briefing, insisting this was a “process,” not an “event,” and saying any concrete developments would be announced later. He also rejected suggestions that security concerns were holding up Islamabad as a venue, saying Pakistan was “very safe and secure.”

Walking a tightrope

Islamabad has also sought to show that it has access to both sides. Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, spoke with Trump on March 23, while Sharif spoke the next day with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian. 

In the Senate, Dar said he had conveyed Tehran’s position to U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and backed Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear energy, while also making clear that Pakistan “would not allow itself to be dragged into a broader regional conflict.”

About 35,000 Pakistanis were in Iran and that 792 had already been evacuated by land through the Taftan-Zahedan crossing.

Still, Pakistan’s emergence as a mediator remains real but provisional. The White House has warned against treating reported talks as official, and Araghchi has said exchanges through mediators do not amount to negotiations with Washington. 

For now, Pakistan is trying to end one war — even as it fights another at home.

“I think it's certainly going to happen… It's happening now,” he said, pointing to what he described as a “very, very serious restructuring” of global systems.

Marcos indicated that changes in international relations — shaped by rising geopolitical tensions — would likely force countries to “withdraw, redraw” even their legal frameworks, resulting in a “new normal.”

Despite persistent maritime disputes in the South China Sea , Manila has continued to separate security tensions from economic cooperation with Beijing. 

Marcos said the Philippines has “always tried to differentiate the territorial disputes from our trade arrangements,” noting that Chinese investments still support major government programmes.

“And they have not used this as somehow, they haven't leveraged this in any way… they’ve been very, very helpful in terms of, for example, fertilizer,” he added.

The Philippines and China remain locked in a long-running dispute in the South China Sea, where Beijing continues to reject a 2016 international arbitration ruling that invalidated its sweeping claims.

Marcos also said Manila is open to reviving stalled discussions with China on joint oil and gas development in disputed waters, suggesting that ongoing global tensions — particularly in the Middle East — could provide impetus for progress.

“That’s something we’ve been talking about for a great deal, but territorial disputes are getting in the way of that,” he said. “Maybe this provides impetus for both sides to come to an agreement.”

At the same time, the Philippines is seeking to diversify energy sources amid supply concerns linked to the Middle East crisis, including exploring potential fuel imports from Russia , a non-traditional supplier.

Marcos stressed that Manila’s foreign policy remains anchored on stability.

“We never want war… It’s peace and the national interest,” he said.

That frustration is being driven by several flashpoints at once. They include US criticism of South Africa’s transformation policies, land reform, farm attacks, and Pretoria’s genocide case against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

For many South Africans, the problem is not just disagreement with the US. It is the sense that America is attempting to dictate domestic policy.

This perception has been sharpened by claims from Donald Trump that South Africa is enabling a “white genocide” through attacks on farmers. The South African government has rejected that claim, as have civil society groups and international observers. President Cyril Ramaphosa has said farm attacks are a serious crime problem, but not genocide.

The issue has become even more contentious because of Gaza .

South Africa’s case against Israel at the ICJ has placed Pretoria in direct conflict with Washington, one of Israel’s strongest allies. On 13 March, the US formally intervened in the case, arguing that Israel does not have the specific intent required to prove genocide under the Genocide Convention.

Washington also said civilian deaths in urban warfare do not by themselves prove genocidal intent.

That position has angered many in South Africa, who see a double standard.

Tensions have also grown because of recent remarks by US Ambassador to South Africa Leo Brent Bozell III. He reportedly expressed frustration over Pretoria’s failure to act on Washington’s so-called “five asks”, which include broad-based black economic empowerment, farm attacks, the ‘Kill the Boer’ song, land expropriation, critical minerals and digital transformation.

That language has been poorly received within the ANC, which sees it as a direct challenge to South Africa’s sovereignty and post-apartheid policy choices. ANC deputy secretary-general Nomvula Mokonyane criticised the ambassador for making “undiplomatic statements”.

For the ANC, the dispute may also bring political benefit. With the 2026 local government elections approaching, the party has an opportunity to present itself once again as a defender of national sovereignty in the face of outside pressure.

Belgium has long faced scrutiny over the killing. A 2002 parliamentary investigation concluded the Belgian state was “morally responsible” for Lumumba’s death.

Prosecutors say Davignon, who was a junior diplomat at the time and later became a European commissioner, is accused of war crimes linked to Lumumba’s unlawful detention or transfer, the denial of his right to an impartial trial, and what they described as “humiliating and degrading treatment.” He is also accused in connection with the deaths of Lumumba’s political allies Maurice Mpolo and Joseph Okito.

Davignon is the only living suspect among those accused of involvement in the killing. The case was brought by Lumumba’s family and later taken up by Belgian federal prosecutors.

After the ruling, Lumumba’s granddaughter Yema Lumumba said it was “a step in the right direction,” adding: “What we want is to search for truth and establish different responsibilities.” The family’s lawyer, Christophe Marchand, called it “a gigantic victory,” saying it is difficult for a country to judge its own colonial crimes.

Lumumba, who was 35 when he was executed, remains a symbol of African independence movements. The only known remains of the slain leader, a single gold-capped tooth, were recovered years later after being held by the family of a deceased Belgian officer linked to the disappearance of his body.

The trip also includes a bilateral meeting with UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer at 10 Downing Street, expected to culminate in the signing of memoranda of understanding and agreements covering trade, investment, defence, immigration and cultural cooperation, the presidency noted in a statement.

A key commercial highlight is Tinubu witnessing the signing of a £746 million financing deal between UK Export Finance (UKEF) and Nigeria’s Ports Authority (NPA) and the Federal Ministry of Finance. The agreement is aimed at supporting the refurbishment of two major maritime facilities, the Lagos Port Complex (Apapa Quays) and the Tin Can Island Port Complex.

During the visit, the royal household is expected to show Tinubu a special exhibition of Nigeria-related items from the Royal Collection. Tinubu is also expected to attend the Nigerian Modernism exhibition and meet Nigerian and British business leaders, as well as members of the diaspora.

Members of Tinubu’s entourage include Senate President Godswill Akpabio, National Security Adviser Nuhu Ribadu, Attorney-General Lateef Fagbemi, and several ministers, including Wale Edun (Finance), Jumoke Oduwole (Trade and Investment), and Bosun Tijani (Communications and Digital Economy).

At the same time, Ramaphosa’s international investment adviser, Alistair Ruiters, has emerged as South Africa’s key channel to US officials, operating as a chief negotiator with Washington while based in Pretoria. Officials have indicated that part of Ruiters’ effectiveness comes from being located in the Presidency, allowing faster decision-making and giving US counterparts access to someone close to the highest office.

The vacancy follows a turbulent period in the relationship. Ramaphosa’s previous envoy to the second Trump administration, Ebrahim Rasool, was declared persona non grata and expelled after comments made during a public webinar. Soon after, Ramaphosa appointed former deputy finance minister Mcebisi Jonas as special envoy, but the Trump administration reportedly denied him a diplomatic visa.

Government officials have told Daily Maverick that, in a shifting diplomatic scene, an unorthodox approach may work better, especially given what they describe as the Trump administration’s preference for unconventional channels. For now, South Africa appears to be relying on a mix of an acting head of mission in Washington and a Presidency-linked negotiator at home, rather than risking another high-profile ambassadorial standoff.

Meanwhile, the South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation (Dirco) confirmed on March 11 that it had démarched Leo Brent Bozell III, less than a month after he arrived in the country, after comments he made about the struggle song “Kill the Boer” sparked a diplomatic backlash.  

The controversy has reignited debate over the chant after South Africa’s Constitutional Court ruled in March 2025 that the phrase does not amount to hate speech under South African law, following a case brought by AfriForum.

The Patriotic Alliance (PA) moved to back Bozell on the chant, even while rejecting claims of “white genocide.” In a statement after PA leader Gayton McKenzie met Bozell, the party said a chant calling for the killing of a specific group is “totally unacceptable” and “hate speech, pure and simple,” adding, “No historical context can justify repeating language that celebrates the killing of fellow citizens.”

But the ANC and EFF were among those who attacked Bozell’s intervention, arguing a foreign ambassador should not undermine South Africa’s institutions or weigh into domestic political disputes. Parliament’s justice committee chair Xola Nqola also supported Dirco’s rebuke, saying, “Contemptuous remarks regarding our judicial system undermine the rule of law that both South Africa and the US state they uphold.”

On the other side, the Freedom Front Plus (FF+) defended Bozell and said it agreed with what it described as US “ conditions ” for improved ties, including denouncing the chant and scrapping the Expropriation Act and BBBEE. Dirco said it would keep monitoring the ambassador’s public conduct, while the department’s director-general said Bozell had apologised and expressed regret, including for remarks that appeared to question the judiciary.

The move followed remarks Bozell made at a BizNews conference in Hermanus, where he was quoted as saying, “I am sorry, I don’t care what your courts say, it’s hate speech,” referring to the chant.  

In March 2025, South Africa’s Constitutional Court refused AfriForum leave to appeal earlier rulings and effectively upheld findings that the chant does not constitute hate speech under South African law . 

Dirco Minister Ronald Lamola said South Africa welcomes public engagement by foreign diplomats, but stressed it must be consistent with diplomatic etiquette and international protocols. He said the department called in Bozell to explain what it described as “undiplomatic remarks”, including comments that appeared to undermine the judiciary.  

Dirco Director-General Zane Dangor said Bozell expressed regret and apologised for the comments, adding this was the department’s second meeting with the ambassador since his arrival in February.  

Asked for comment, a US State Department official said Washington does not discuss private diplomatic conversations.  

The routes had been suspended since early 2020 when North Korea sealed its borders at the start of the Covid-19 pandemic, cutting off most cross-border travel.

A strategic railway corridor

The reopening revives a railway corridor long viewed as both a logistical and political bridge between Beijing and Pyongyang.

The Beijing–Pyongyang service is one of the few direct international rail connections into North Korea. Meanwhile, the Dandong route feeds into the P’yŏngŭi Line, a major North Korean trunk railway linking Pyongyang with Sinŭiju on the Chinese border.

A bridge over the Yalu River connects Sinŭiju to Dandong and integrates the line with China’s wider rail network, making it one of the most important overland routes between the two countries.

Chinese authorities have described the trains as a “moving link” strengthening the long-standing friendship between China and North Korea.

Limited access for travellers

Despite the resumption, travel remains tightly controlled.

Travel agents said tickets are currently available only to passengers holding valid visas. This includes Chinese citizens working or studying in North Korea and North Koreans travelling abroad for work, education or family visits.

Tickets for the first train departure reportedly sold out quickly, with passengers including entrepreneurs, government officials and journalists.

International travellers may be allowed on certain carriages of the Beijing–Pyongyang service, though tourism access remains limited.

North Korea’s gradual reopening

The rail resumption comes as North Korea cautiously emerges from years of pandemic isolation.

The country began allowing a limited number of foreign tourists to enter again in 2024. Authorities have also promoted new projects, including a seaside resort, as part of efforts to revive the country’s small tourism sector.

Before the pandemic, Chinese visitors accounted for the majority of foreign tourists entering North Korea.

A diplomatic signal?

The reopening also coincides with renewed diplomatic messaging between the two governments.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un this week told Chinese President Xi Jinping that cooperation between their countries would grow closer as they pursue what he described as a shared socialist cause.

Kim’s message came in response to a congratulatory letter from Xi after the North Korean leader secured another term as general secretary of the ruling Workers’ Party.

While North Korea has strengthened military ties with Russia , its relationship with China remains a crucial economic and political lifeline — one now visibly reinforced by trains once again crossing the border.

Under diplomatic practice, a host country must issue an agrément, formal consent, before an ambassador can take up the post. Nigeria’s officials told The Punch the hesitation is tied to timing rather than the nominee, with some countries viewing the Tinubu administration as nearing the end of its current term.

The report notes that Nigeria is trying to persuade India to make an exception, arguing that bilateral ties could help “scale through” the hurdle.

Tinubu approved postings for 65 ambassadors-designate and high commissioners on March 6, but the foreign ministry has so far received agrément only from the United Kingdom and France , leaving most deployments pending.

The silence contrasts with BRICS’ frequent calls for a more “multipolar” world order and its ambition to amplify the political influence of developing nations in global affairs.

Several member states have responded individually. China and Russia condemned the strikes and warned they violated international law, while South Africa called for a ceasefire and warned the conflict risked spreading beyond the Middle East.

But the organisation itself — which now includes Iran — has not taken a collective position.

This reflects growing divisions within the bloc, particularly after its rapid expansion.

Fractures within BRICS

Originally formed in 2009 by Brazil, Russia, India and China, with South Africa joining the following year, BRICS began primarily as an economic partnership among emerging economies. In 2024, the group expanded to include Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Ethiopia and Indonesia.

Supporters hailed the enlargement as a milestone for a rising coalition of Global South powers seeking greater influence in international institutions traditionally dominated by the West.

However, the Iran war has highlighted the challenges of maintaining unity among members with competing strategic interests.

Iran, under attack from the U.S. and Israel, has launched retaliatory strikes against American assets across the region, including in Saudi Arabia and the UAE — both fellow BRICS members. The attacks marked the first time one member of the organisation has fired missiles at another, underscoring internal tensions within the bloc.

India’s position has drawn particular attention. As the current BRICS chair, New Delhi has limited its response to calls for dialogue and de-escalation, avoiding direct criticism of Washington or Tel Aviv.

This cautious approach comes as India strengthens ties with both countries. Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Israel weeks before the war began, announcing a “special strategic partnership” that includes defence and technology cooperation.

At the same time, India has sought to stabilise trade relations with the U.S. following tariff disputes with the Trump administration.

Those overlapping relationships have complicated efforts for BRICS to adopt a unified position on the conflict.

While BRICS leaders frequently emphasise their role as a voice for the Global South, the differing responses to the Iran war suggest the alliance still struggles to coordinate on major security crises — even when one of its own members is directly involved.

Flexibility was a crucial strategy in navigating this uncertainty, as exporters redirected shipments towards neighbouring Asian markets and Europe, reducing reliance on the US without stalling overall trade.

“The region’s resilience has been driven by redirecting trade toward alternative markets, which has sustained export growth even as shipments to the United States have declined in some economies,” the ADB said. 

China offers the clearest example. Although its exports to the US fell by nearly 20% in 2025, its global exports still grew. Shipments to other Asian economies and to the European Union and United Kingdom rose strongly, offsetting losses from the American market. 

Japan and South Korea followed a similar path, recording modest declines in US-bound exports but continued global growth.

Elsewhere, performance was even stronger. Taiwan posted the region’s fastest export growth at 35%, driven by soaring global demand for semiconductors linked to artificial intelligence. 

Exports to the US surged, despite tariffs, as buyers prioritised access to advanced chips over higher costs. Several Southeast Asian economies, including Vietnam, the Philippines, and Thailand, also reported double-digit export growth.

Three-pronged strategy

According to the report, three strategies helped firms cope with the new tariff regime. Some exporters absorbed higher costs to retain access to the US market. Others redirected goods to alternative destinations, particularly within Asia. A third group routed trade through tariff-exempt partners such as Canada and Mexico under the USMCA framework.

Asian economies continued moving up global value chains, focusing on higher value-added and more upstream activities. Deeper regional production networks helped cushion shocks from external policy changes and kept factories running.

“The region also continues to structurally upgrade within global value chains, moving into more upstream, higher value-added activities and deepening regional production networks,” the ADB said.

However, the ADB warned that heavy reliance on imported inputs leaves supply chains vulnerable to disruption, while rising geopolitical tensions are pushing up trade costs. Tariffs on metals have already raised production expenses, with pharmaceuticals and semiconductors also exposed.

To sustain resilience, the report urged: “The region should thus promote product and partner diversification, deepen and effectively implement trade agreements, and strengthen trade facilitation and logistics cooperation.”

The visit comes weeks after Israel’s controversial recognition of Somaliland as an independent state. Herzog’s trip is viewed as part of Israel’s diplomatic engagement in the Horn of Africa.

There is speculation that Herzog may seek to convince Ethiopia to also recognise Somaliland. In 2024, landlocked Ethiopia signed an agreement with breakaway Somaliland to obtain access to the Bab El-Mandeb Strait in the Gulf of Aden by leasing a corridor from Somaliland for 50 years. However,  Somalia asserted that Somaliland is part of its territory and rejected the agreement.

Other regional actors have expressed concerns about the recognition of the breakaway region. During a recent visit to Ethiopia, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said: “I would like to emphasise that Israel’s recognition of Somaliland does not benefit Somaliland or the Horn of Africa.”

On the Middle East, Selassie told Herzog that Ethiopia supports a two-state solution to resolving the Israel-Palestine conflict "where Israelis and Palestinians live side by side in peace".

Herzog also referred to the Ethiopian Jewish community in Israel, stating that it creates a bridge between the two nations. In a statement upon his arrival, he said: “The relationship between our peoples is woven deep into the pages of history and human tradition. At the heart of the story of both our nations lies a clear common thread – the ability to join hands, unite resources of spirit and substance to innovate, develop, and grow for the benefit of all.”

Herzog’s visit is the first presidential trip to Ethiopia since 2018. He met with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. Abiy said the two leaders discussed “ways to improve collaboration in areas of mutual interest", without providing further details.

The visit follows remarks by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu proposing a network of allied nations in the Middle East and Africa to stand against what he described as “radical” adversaries. He said the proposed “ hexagon of alliances” would include Israel, India, Greece, Cyprus, and others.

Iran and affiliated groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen are widely seen as the primary focus of this proposal.

Among those named were:

The companies span aerospace, shipbuilding, heavy industry and defense-linked manufacturing, which are sectors central to Japan’s military modernization drive.

China’s commerce ministry said the measures are aimed at curbing Japan’s “remilitarisation” and nuclear ambitions and described them as “legitimate, reasonable and lawful.” Tokyo called the move “absolutely unacceptable” and said it had lodged a formal protest.

Why this matters

The export controls are the latest step in a widening economic confrontation triggered by Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s remarks in November that Japan could intervene militarily in the event of a Taiwan emergency.

Since then:

Strategic backdrop

Japan has approved a record ¥9 trillion ($57 billion) defense budget and is moving to acquire “counterstrike” capabilities, marking a significant shift from its post-war pacifist posture. China views those steps as destabilizing.

It remains unclear whether rare earth minerals — critical to advanced manufacturing and defense supply chains — are included in the latest restrictions. 

Uncertain global trade

The escalation comes as global trade tensions again rise.

U.S. President Donald Trump has imposed a 15% tariff on all U.S. imports. This, after the Supreme Court struck down his “reciprocal” tariffs, which were found unconstitutional for lacking congressional approval.

The signing covered a grant contract for the “Project for the Development of Supporting Environment for Startups Addressing Social Challenges.” Under the arrangement, JICA will provide $14 million in grant support, while NSIA will contribute up to $20 million as matching funds as part of the wider $50 million initiative.

NSIA said the fund will operate as an onshore public vehicle and will combine financing with technical assistance, helping startups refine products, scale operations and expand into new markets.

NSIA Managing Director and Chief Executive Officer Aminu Umar-Sadiq said the initiative is designed to strengthen early-stage ventures working in high-impact areas.

“The Fund represents a transformative step for Nigeria ’s startup ecosystem,” he said. “By providing early-stage ventures in high-impact sectors with the capital and support they need to grow, we are enabling innovators to tackle some of Nigeria’s most pressing challenges.”

Japan’s Ambassador to Nigeria, Suzuki Hideo, said Japan sees the project as part of a broader cooperation package aligned with its foreign policy priorities.

“This initiative aims to achieve development goals by the ‘co-creation’ of social value through dialogue and collaboration with Japan’s partner countries, while mobilising private finance in combination with ODA,” he said.

Suzuki added that the project is Japan’s first implementation of this development model globally, involving a fund that incorporates private capital, and said interest in Tokyo is high.

“For over 20 years, Brazil, India, Japan and Germany have defended the increase of the UN Security Council,” Lula said, referring to the G4 bloc. “The UN needs more representation.”

The G4 proposal calls for expanding the 15-member Council to 25 seats, adding six permanent and four non-permanent members to better reflect contemporary geopolitical realities.

Lula argued that expanding both permanent and non-permanent categories of membership is necessary for a more credible multilateral system, adding that Brazil and India should be part of any reconfigured Council. 

Framing the bilateral meeting as more than routine diplomacy, Lula described India and Brazil as the two largest democracies in the Global South and as emerging superpowers in their respective domains.

“This is a meeting of superlatives,” Lula said. “We are both mega diverse countries and hubs of the cultural industry and we both defend multilateralism and peace.”

He said closer coordination between New Delhi and Brasília would not only strengthen bilateral ties but also amplify the voice of developing nations in global forums, including the UN, the World Trade Organization and the G20.

Lula also emphasized a shared commitment to multilateralism, dialogue and peace, warning that sustainable development cannot be achieved in a conflict-ridden world.

By elevating their partnership and pressing for Security Council reform, Lula signaled efforts to consolidate India and Brazil’s roles as leading voices for a more assertive Global South.

"India and Brazil's partnership on the global stage has been strong and influential,” he said. “As democratic nations, we will continue to advance the priorities and aspirations of the Global South.” 

“When India and Brazil work together, the voice of the Global South becomes stronger and more confident,” he added. 

Prabowo emphasized Indonesia’s readiness to contribute significantly to the international stabilization effort. 

“There will be problems, but we will prevail. We will achieve our dream of peace in Palestine , a lasting and peaceful solution for the Palestinian problem and in Gaza,” he said. 

At the landmark meeting, Prabowo also reiterated that Indonesia is prepared to provide up to 8,000 troops to the International Stabilization Force, stating, “We are prepared to contribute the troops to take part actively … to make this peace work.”

The announcement aligns with statements from the Indonesian military, which said up to 8,000 personnel could be ready for deployment by June, with an advance team of roughly 1,000 prepared by April. 

The Indonesian National Armed Forces, known as TNI, have finalized the troop structure and a timeline, though actual deployment requires presidential approval and adherence to international mechanisms.

Indonesia’s participation would mark the first formal troop commitment to the U.S.-led Board of Peace stabilization effort in Gaza . The country has long supported Palestinian statehood, provided humanitarian aid, and participated in global peacekeeping.

Prabowo framed the move as both a humanitarian and strategic mission: “The achievements of the ceasefire are real, we commend this and therefore we reaffirm our commitment.” 

“We have to make a meaningful deal. Otherwise, bad things happen,” he added.

Still, Trump appeared to leave the door ajar for reconciliation with Tehran — even the possibility of Iran joining the Board of Peace. "Now is the time for Iran to join us on a path that will complete what we're doing. If they join us, that'll be great. If they don't join us, that'll be great too — but it'll be a very different path," he said. "They cannot continue to threaten the stability of the entire region."

Trump’s remarks came as the United States continues to position military forces in the Middle East , reportedly preparing for a possible strike on Iran as soon as this weekend. 

While Trump has not made a final decision, multiple news outlets, including the New York Times, CBS News, and CNN, report that sufficient air and naval resources are in place for potential military action.

According to senior U.S. officials cited by Reuters, national security advisers have been instructed to ensure all forces are deployed in the region by mid-March. 

The Board of Peace gathering in Washington brought together representatives from more than two dozen countries to discuss reconstruction and stabilization efforts in Gaza.

Trump framed the meeting as part of his broader Middle East strategy, calling the region “the biggest thing of all — we have peace in the Middle East right now.”

Yet the juxtaposition between the diplomatic forum and his stern warning to Tehran highlights the ongoing tension between Trump’s public promotion of stability and the looming possibility of military action.

Iran is expected to submit a written proposal following indirect talks in Geneva this week. 

White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt described the progress as limited, emphasizing that “diplomacy” remains the administration’s “first option,” even as the timeline for potential U.S. action tightens.

According to a statement from the National Intelligence Service (NIS) presented to the House, as of February, 39 Kenyans are hospitalised, 30 have been repatriated, 28 are missing, 35 remain in military camps, 89 are on the frontline, one is detained, and another has completed his contract.

Ichung’wah said the agencies lured recruits with promises of monthly salaries of about $2,300, bonuses ranging between $6,900 and $9,200, and the possibility of Russian citizenship.

He added that some recruits initially travelled through Istanbul in Turkey and Abu Dhabi in the United Arab Emirates. Following increased interceptions at Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (JKIA), others have reportedly begun routing through Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo and South Africa to avoid detection.

“For the close to over 1,000 estimated to have gone, not all have travelled from Kenya; some are already in the diaspora who have since moved to go and fight in Russia,” he is quoted by the Standard media .

The Majority Leader also alleged that some rogue airport officials and staff in immigration, investigative agencies and employment authorities may have colluded with recruiters. He further claimed that certain individuals at the Russian embassy in Nairobi and the Kenyan embassy in Moscow were involved in facilitating travel visas.

One of the agencies named in Parliament was Global Face Human Resources Limited, which is not accredited by the National Employment Authority. Authorities previously raided a holding base in Athi River, where passports, unsigned contracts and other materials were seized.

Recruits reportedly underwent about three weeks of training in Moscow before being deployed to the battlefield. Some returnees told investigators they were required to open Russian bank accounts and make payments of up to Sh975,000 (about $7,600) during the recruitment process.

Ichung’wah warned that the recruitment poses serious risks to young Kenyans and could strain diplomatic relations.

“We have drastically reduced our presence in Europe and the UK,” Lavrov told lawmakers. “And 90% of these redundant employees have been redeployed to African destinations.”

Since Russia ’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, hundreds of Russian diplomats have been expelled from Western countries amid accusations of espionage and sabotage. According to Russia’s state-run Tass news agency, at least 574 diplomats were declared persona non grata in the first year of the war alone.

As relations with Europe deteriorate and Russia faces economic strain from the war, Africa has emerged as a key arena for Moscow’s diplomatic outreach. Unlike China or the United States , Russia is not offering large-scale infrastructure investments. Instead, it is relying on lower-cost tools of influence.

The Russian Orthodox Church has expanded its presence to at least 34 African countries in recent years. At the same time, Russia has tripled the number of scholarships available to African students to study in Russian universities.

Bloomberg also reported that the Kremlin has created a new international relations department focused on countries selected by President Vladimir Putin, with a special team dedicated to Africa policy .

The strategy allows Moscow to increase its global footprint while avoiding major financial commitments.

“We are a proud nation with a sense of dignity and we want to develop in this spirit, honestly and decently,” he said.

The remarks come as Burkina Faso continues to distance itself from France and strengthen ties with new partners, including Russia . Since a military coup in 2022, the West African country has expelled French troops and ended several long-standing defence agreements.

Despite criticism from some Western governments, Traore rejected claims that Burkina Faso is isolating itself diplomatically.

“At the same time, we are not a closed country,” he said. “We are open to cooperation with all partners provided they treat us with respect and consider our point of view.”

He added that portrayals of Burkina Faso as turning inward are misleading. “In certain circles there is an attempt to depict our country as having taken the path of isolation, but that is simply not true,” he said. “Those who visit Burkina Faso know very well there is enough to be open and sincere to build mutual and beneficial partnerships.”

Burkina Faso is currently governed by a military administration led by Captain Ibrahim Traore and continues to face serious security threats from jihadist insurgents.

Tajikistan is moving toward tougher enforcement against individuals who evade child support obligations. The briefing notes that new penalties may include restrictions on access to certain state services as well as limits on travel for offenders. This signals a stronger domestic policy approach aimed at ensuring compliance and strengthening protections for children and families.

Tajikistan and Switzerland expand agricultural cooperation talks

Diplomatic engagement between Tajikistan and Switzerland is highlighted, with discussions focused on agricultural cooperation . While the briefing does not provide names or specific meeting dates, the emphasis suggests that Tajikistan is seeking stronger international partnerships in agriculture, a key sector for food security and rural livelihoods.

Tajik ambassador meets Iranian Foreign Ministry officials on property management

Tajikistan’s ambassador held talks with officials from Iran’s Foreign Ministry. The discussions centred on the management of diplomatic property , an issue that often reflects broader diplomatic and operational coordination between states. This meeting points to ongoing engagement between Dushanbe and Tehran on formal bilateral matters.

Authorities warn against illegal currency exchange operations

Currency exchange and financial regulation remain in focus, with warnings issued against illegal exchange activity. Exchange rates and regulations indicate continued state attention on monetary controls and enforcement in the financial sector.

The Philippines and the United States conducted a joint sea patrol, signalling a firm position on maritime sovereignty at a time of heightened regional pressure. The patrol reflects Manila’s continued alignment with Washington in asserting its role in contested waters and reinforcing defence cooperation. This development is framed as a strong stance on the Philippines’ maritime rights and security posture.

Senate leaders push for a ceasefire in the China-Philippines diplomatic dispute

Philippine Senate leaders called for a ceasefire amid an ongoing diplomatic dispute between China and the Philippines. The intervention suggests concern within the country’s political leadership over escalation and the need for de-escalatory measures in regional diplomacy. The issue highlights how maritime and foreign policy tensions are now being debated at the highest legislative level.

House panel dismisses impeachment complaints against President Marcos Jr.

A House panel dismissed impeachment complaints filed against President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., effectively shutting down a major political challenge at this stage. The dismissal underscores the President’s continued institutional support within Congress and signals the difficulty of advancing impeachment efforts in the current balance of power.

Major raid exposes illegal cigarette factory tied to politicians and trafficking

Authorities carried out a major raid uncovering an illegal cigarette factory , reportedly linked to politicians and connected with human trafficking. The case highlights the intersection of organised crime, illicit manufacturing, and political protection networks, raising broader concerns about governance and enforcement capacity.

Comelec strained by budget shortfall ahead of Antipolo special election

The Commission on Elections (Comelec) is facing a budget shortfall in preparation for a special election in Antipolo, triggered by the death of a lawmaker . The situation points to logistical and financial vulnerabilities in election administration, even for single-district contests, and raises questions about institutional readiness for broader electoral demands.