Some multinational brands have exited parts of Africa in recent years. However, this does not automatically mean the continent is unprofitable. It reflects a period of transition. Many of those companies were structured for mature Western markets with heavy infrastructure , import-dependent systems, and slower adaptation cycles. Africa’s current business environment rewards different models.

A central theme was the need for African countries to process their natural resources locally instead of exporting them in raw form. Leaders argued that local beneficiation would increase economic returns and strengthen industrial development.

Ghana announced a specific policy measure during the summit. President John Dramani Mahama declared that by 2030, the country will end the export of unprocessed mineral ores. The directive applies to manganese, bauxite, and iron ore.

"By 2030, there will not be any raw mineral ores leaving Ghana," Mahama said at his "Accra Reset" side event. The policy aims to promote local industrialisation and increase the value Ghana gains from its natural resources.

South African President Cyril Ramaphosa also warned against what he described as a "new form of colonialism", where foreign economies target Africa’s natural resources. He said minerals should be processed locally. "It should no longer be a case where rock, soil and dust is exported out of Africa without being beneficiated," Ramaphosa told delegates. He urged African nations to work together to ensure their resources benefit their citizens.

United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres condemned the historical exploitation of Africa’s resources. "No more exploitation, no more plundering," he said, stressing that "the people of Africa must benefit from the resources of Africa". He called for fair and sustainable value chains to ensure African countries benefit "first and fully" from their critical minerals.

President Mahama also announced changes to Ghana’s cocoa financing system. For nearly 30 years, Ghana has relied on syndicated loans from international banks to purchase cocoa, using cocoa beans as collateral.

According to Mahama, this system has limited domestic processing because collateralised beans must be exported to international financiers. Ghana has the capacity to process 400,000 tons of cocoa locally, but local processors have not had sufficient access to raw beans.

Under the new approach, Ghana will raise domestic bonds in cedis to finance cocoa purchases. "Ghana has enough cedis to pay for its cocoa," Mahama said, adding that the change will "immediately" release 400,000 tons of beans for local processing. Beginning with the 2026–27 season, at least 50% of all cocoa beans must be processed within the country.

The policy announcements were presented under the "Accra Reset" initiative. The framework focuses on strengthening resource sovereignty and shifting from aid dependency to investment-led growth.

Mahama criticised delays in implementing AU decisions. "African leaders come with decisions, agree and develop frameworks, but what is missing is urgency and implementation," he said. He urged leaders to "stop talking and start implementing" to create opportunities for young people and reduce irregular migration.

The summit also marked leadership changes within the AU. Burundi’s President Évariste Ndayishimiye will assume the AU chairmanship for 2026. Outgoing chairperson President João Lourenço of Angola said Africa’s development is not possible "if we leave anyone behind," and called for continued investment in infrastructure and human capital.

Sanchez said that following “the events of the last month, Venezuela is peacefully moving forward, and ready to receive investment, and trying to compete in the market, in the international market, like every other player.” He also referred to recent economic activity and projected growth, noting that even with past restrictions, the government aims for rapid economic expansion.

On Venezuela’s role in oil production, Sanchez stated: “We would like to be… We know that the reference for Venezuela is that the country with the biggest oil reserve. And we want to stop being known about this, and we want to be known as one of the countries with the highest production levels.” He added that the government intends to use oil revenues to diversify the economy .

The comments come amid significant political developments in Venezuela. A recent U.S. military action resulted in the arrest and removal of former President Nicolás Maduro, and Delcy Rodríguez has been designated interim president. The transition has drawn international attention and debate over the future leadership and governance of Venezuela.

Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez met US Chargé d’Affaires Laura Dogu at the Miraflores Presidential Palace on the afternoon of  Monday, February 2, in what Communications Minister Miguel Pérez Pirela described as part of a “working agenda” between Caracas and Washington. National Assembly President Jorge Rodríguez also attended. Dogu confirmed the meeting on social media, saying she reiterated US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s proposed “three-phase plan” for Venezuela: “stabilisation, economic recovery and reconciliation, and transition.” Dogu arrived in Caracas on Saturday, January 31, pledging her team was “ready to work,” as US officials continue assessing conditions for reopening the US embassy. Foreign Minister Yván Gil said Venezuela seeks cooperation on “issues of bilateral interest,” and announced that Félix Plasencia will serve as Venezuela’s diplomatic representative in the United States and will travel to Washington soon.

US issues OFAC license delaying Citgo debt actions

The US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued a new license on Monday, February 2, allowing holders of Petróleos de Venezuela SA (PDVSA) bonds maturing in 2020 to conduct certain transactions beginning March 20, while keeping the Citgo auction blocked. The measure effectively delays creditors from invoking US courts to collect debts against Citgo Petroleum Corporation. The Venezuelan government has condemned the process authorising the auction as “fraudulent,” arguing the country was excluded from legal proceedings and denied the right to defend itself. Caracas has also warned that the “illegal sale” of its main foreign asset is in its “final phase,” and maintains the US judicial process violates international law.

Delcy Rodríguez proposes mass amnesty and justice reforms

Acting President Delcy Rodríguez announced on Friday, January 30, a proposal for a broad amnesty law covering “the entire period of political violence from 1999 to the present.” Speaking at the Venezuelan supreme court before top officials, Rodríguez said the measure aims to “heal the wounds left by political confrontation, fuelled by violence and extremism,” while also launching a “major national consultation for a new judicial system.” She further announced plans to close El Helicoide prison in Caracas—long criticised by rights groups—and convert the facility into a sports, cultural, and commercial centre for police families and surrounding communities.

Brazilian labour leader warns US aims to dominate Venezuelan oil

A senior Brazilian labour leader accused Washington of targeting Venezuela’s energy sector to gain control over its oil resources, warning that US actions mirror strategies used to reshape Brazil’s own industry. Deyvid Bacelar, general coordinator of Brazil’s Unified Federation of Oil Workers (FUP), told Xinhua that US pressure “has nothing to do with defending democracy or combating drug trafficking,” but instead seeks “imperial domination and the appropriation of natural wealth.” He argued weakening PDVSA would open the door for US firms, and compared the situation to Brazil’s Operation Car Wash (Lava Jato), which he claimed facilitated foreign access to Petrobras-linked deep-water reserves.

Chinese refiners shift to Iranian crude as Venezuelan shipments stall

Chinese independent refiners are reportedly purchasing discounted Iranian heavy crude to replace Venezuelan shipments that have slowed sharply after the US claimed control of Venezuela’s oil sales last month. Sources said the drawdown of Iranian oil stored in China and on ships is helping cover the drop in Venezuelan supply. Venezuelan shipments to China reportedly fell significantly after mid-December following a US blockade on sanctioned vessels, amid a broader campaign that culminated in Nicolás Maduro’s capture by US forces on January 3. Washington has reportedly assigned trading firms Vitol and Trafigura to market Venezuelan crude, but China’s “teapot” refiners in Shandong have prioritised heavily discounted sanctioned grades over Venezuelan cargoes and other alternatives.

The agreement, which began in June 202,5 was established through cooperation between Burkina Faso’s Centre for the Promotion of Poultry Farming and the Multiplication of High-Performing Animals (CPAMAP) and the Daniel Franco Institute in Brazil. 

The imported cattle include specialised breeds such as Guzéra, Gir, Holstein, and Nelore. The first three breeds are targeted at strengthening dairy production, while the Nelore breed is expected to support beef production, with the ability to reach weights of up to 1,100 kilograms by the age of five.

Burkina Faso’s local dairy cows currently produce between 0.5 and 1.3 litres of milk daily. The imported Brazilian breeds are capable of producing between 15 and 40 litres per day. 

“Brazil has expertise in breeding high-performing breeds and also similarities in climatic conditions with Burkina Faso. We thought that the animals coming from this country might adapt better,” said Ardiouma Sirima, Director General of CPAMAP.

This importation is part of Burkina Faso's broader efforts to reduce its dependence on dairy imports, which averaged 25,000 tonnes per year from 2020 to 2024. Supporting programmes include Faso Kosam, which focuses on dairy processing, and Faso Abattoir, which aims to improve meat production and export infrastructure .

While Burkina Faso looks to strengthen its domestic capacity, Brazil continues to set records in beef exports. 

In October 2025, Brazil exported 357,000 tonnes of beef, the highest monthly figure in its history. This represents an 18.7% increase compared to October 2024 and generated revenue of US$1.90 billion.

Data from the Association of Brazilian Beef Exporters (ABIEC) shows that Brazil’s total beef exports from January to October 2025 reached 2.79 million tonnes, with a revenue of US$14.31 billion—a 35.9% increase over 2024. 

Brazilian beef reached 162 markets during the year. China accounted for 53% of October exports, while exports to Mexico rose by 213%, the European Union by 109%, and the United States by 45%, despite increased tariffs.

The flagship project of President Prabowo Subianto, the free nutritious meal programme, known by its Indonesian acronym MBG, is already feeding 55 million children , pregnant women and new mothers. Currently the second largest project of its kind in the world, after a similar project in India, it has grown exponentially over the past 12 months by harnessing private partnerships to create nearly 20,000 kitchens around the country.

The man in charge of the project, Dadan Hindayana, told Global South World that the impact was already being felt through higher school attendance rates and a boost to local economies.

"This is a very huge impact to the economy because once a service unit is built, it means 50 people will be joined directly in the service unit as the workers. And then we need one service unit, need a minimum of 15 suppliers for the supply of all materials. Just like rice, eggs, chicken, and so on and so on, vegetable, also fruit. Each day, we need 200 kilograms of rice, 350 kilograms of vegetables, 350 kilograms of fruit and also we need 3,000 eggs."

Each meal station also has its own nutritionist, tasked with finding the best combination of local ingredients to meet nutritional needs — particularly around protein — using locally sourced produce. Teams have even produced recipe books showcasing local cuisine based on their offerings. Each meal is budgeted at 15,000 rupiah, a little under one US dollar, and Dadan says nutritional value is the first priority, but creating meals that children enjoy is also key.

Crisis relief

When the country was hit by a massive cyclone at the end of last year, another benefit of the programme was revealed. With hundreds of thousands of people impacted by severe flooding, the food centres swung into action. Hundreds of kitchens operated at full capacity, producing millions of meals over the past month, he said.

"We already train the people, we have the logistics, and we have infrastructure. When the tragedy comes, we're ready."

With such an ambitious project and such tight timescales, Dadan accepts that some problems were inevitable. The programme has gained media attention as a result of a number of food poisoning incidents. Around half were attributable to the use of unclean water , he says, resulting in a new directive permitting use only of water certified as safe to drink. The rest of the incidents were the result of poor food hygiene processes, according to Dadan, who says that clear operating procedures have now been mandated.

The number of incidents is declining, he reports, and he has pledged to eliminate the problem in 2026.

Dadan said private and public benefactors had been crucial to the success of the programme, but also highlighted Prabowo's insistence on protecting its budget against many competing interests. The project has been allocated Rp335 trillion ($20 billion) for 2026.

This is the reality of the Economic Community of West African States, ECOWAS. In 2025, the bloc turned 50 years old. Instead of celebrating unity and progress, it faced its most serious crisis of relevance since its founding.

This moment of doubt comes at a time when West Africa needs regional coordination more than ever. Security threats are multiplying, trade remains fragmented, mobility is expensive, and democratic institutions are fragile. As ECOWAS enters its sixth decade, fundamental questions are being asked openly. Can it still enforce democratic norms? Does it still carry economic weight? And can it survive in its current form?

Paper tiger

On paper, ECOWAS is formidable. It brings together 15 member states, represents more than 440 million people, and has a combined GDP of roughly 600 billion US dollars. That makes it one of the largest regional blocs in the Global South.

In practice, integration remains shallow. Trade between ECOWAS countries still accounts for less than 20 percent of their total trade. In more integrated regions such as the European Union, internal trade exceeds 60 percent. The comparison highlights a central weakness. ECOWAS has scale, but it lacks cohesion.

That weakness became impossible to ignore in 2025, when Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger formally withdrew from the bloc. Together, these Sahelian states represent around 70 million people and nearly 17 percent of ECOWAS landmass. While they contribute less than 5 percent of total GDP, their strategic and security importance is enormous.

Their departure followed years of tension after military coups, sanctions, and repeated threats of intervention. When ECOWAS failed to act militarily after the coup in Niger, it exposed a hard truth. The bloc did not have the political consensus or operational capacity to enforce its strongest decisions.

Empty threats

The crisis of democratic enforcement did not stop there. Later in the year, disputed elections in Guinea-Bissau once again demonstrated how fragile political institutions remain in the region. The military intervened, and ECOWAS responded with condemnation, suspension, and the threat of sanctions.

This has become a familiar pattern. Since 2020, sanctions alone have rarely reversed coups. More often, they have hardened military rule and eroded ECOWAS authority. Each repetition weakens the credibility of the bloc’s commitment to democracy.

The elusive Eco

Economically, ECOWAS continues to pursue one of its oldest ambitions: a single currency. The Eco was first proposed more than 20 years ago and is now tentatively scheduled for 2027 after missing multiple deadlines.

The obstacles are structural. Nigeria alone accounts for more than 60 percent of ECOWAS GDP, while many smaller economies struggle with inflation, debt distress, and fiscal instability. Without real convergence on economic fundamentals, the Eco remains a symbolic project rather than a functional one.

These challenges are made more acute by a fragmenting global economy and shrinking foreign assistance from traditional partners in Europe and the United States . Regional self-reliance is becoming more important just as ECOWAS capacity is being questioned.

Tax-free flying

Yet amid the uncertainty, there is a reason for cautious optimism as 2026 begins.

From January, air travel across ECOWAS member states is set to become tax-free, with sharp reductions in passenger and security charges. This is one of the bloc’s most tangible policy wins in years.

The reform matters because West Africa has some of the highest intra-regional airfares in the world. It is often cheaper to fly to Europe than to a neighbouring country. If fully implemented, the changes could reduce fares by 20 to 40 percent, benefiting traders, students, tourists, and families while advancing free movement in a practical way.

Connectivity has long been neglected in African economic policy, despite its importance for growth. People want to travel, and people travelling drives commerce. Currently, international departure taxes in Africa average around $68 per trip, with West Africa the most expensive subregion. Short flights of just a few hundred kilometres can cost hundreds of dollars.

This reform requires coordination and execution more than large financial outlays. If governments create the right conditions, the private sector can step in. For ECOWAS, this could be a rare example of delivery matching ambition.

A chance for redemption

As 2025 ends, ECOWAS looks like this: large in population, fragmented in politics, slow in economic integration, weak in enforcing democracy, but still capable of delivering reforms that people can feel in their daily lives.

At 50, ECOWAS is no longer just a regional institution. It is a test case for whether African multilateralism can adapt to a changing political reality. The question now is whether the future of regional cooperation will be driven by declarations, or defined by delivery.

The answer will shape not just ECOWAS, but the credibility of regional integration across the Global South in the years ahead.

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World Reframed is produced in London by Global South World, part of the Impactum Group. Its editors are Duncan Hooper and Ismail Akwei.

ISSN 2978-4891

This story is written and edited by the Global South World team, you can  contact us  here.

Some developing economies benefited from rebounds in energy production, strong remittances and post-crisis recoveries. Others were dragged down by violence, political instability and structural weaknesses. 

Global South World reviewed the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) 2025 projections — a closely watched outlook produced by the Washington-based lender that monitors economic developments worldwide — to identify the year’s strongest and weakest performers.

BIGGEST WINNERS

Republic of South Sudan (24.3%)

South Sudan’s surge reflects a rebound in oil production following earlier pipeline disruptions and conflict-related shutdowns, amplified by a low base. The IMF cautioned that the recovery remains fragile and almost entirely dependent on crude exports, leaving the economy highly exposed to price and security shocks.

Libya (15.6%)

Libya’s growth was driven by higher crude output after repeated blockades eased, boosting exports and government spending. In May, the North African country recorded a 12-year high in oil production, reaching 1.23 million barrels per day, underscoring the economy’s continued reliance on hydrocarbons.

Guyana (10.3%)

Guyana remained one of the world’s fastest-growing economies as new offshore oil projects came online, lifting exports and funding public investment. This followed a 43.4% expansion in 2024, when oil production reached 225 million barrels. Spillovers from the energy sector continued to fuel construction, manufacturing and agriculture, while non-oil GDP rose 13.1%, driven largely by government-led capital spending.

Kyrgyz Republic (8.0%)

Growth continued to be supported by the services sector, which accounts for nearly half of GDP. In 2025, services, goods production and rising tax revenues emerged as the economy’s main bright spots, helping offset external pressures.

Tajikistan (7.5%)

Tajikistan’s expansion was underpinned by growth in services and industry, optimism over energy investments, strong consumer demand and private-sector activity. Real GDP rose 8.2% in the first three quarters of 2025, while inflation remained contained at 2.8% year on year in September.

BIGGEST LOSERS

Haiti (-3.1%)

Haiti’s economy continued to contract as gang violence, political paralysis and collapsing institutions disrupted trade, investment and basic services. It remains one of the poorest countries in the Western Hemisphere, with nearly two-thirds of the population living below the poverty line.

Myanmar (-2.7%)

Myanmar remained in recession amid ongoing civil conflict, sanctions and capital flight following the 2021 military coup. The economy also grappled with the aftermath of a March earthquake that triggered large reconstruction needs. Inflation is expected to stay above 20% in the near term, further straining household budgets.

Equatorial Guinea (-1.6%)

The contraction reflected heightened global uncertainty and declining hydrocarbon production. Despite falling output, poverty is projected to ease modestly — from 57.0% in 2024 to 55.8% by 2027 — supported by expansion in labour-intensive agriculture and services.

Yemen (-1.5%)

Yemen’s economy remained under pressure from protracted conflict and disrupted oil exports. In areas controlled by the internationally recognised government, inflation continued to erode purchasing power. In Houthi-controlled regions, airstrikes on key ports and persistent liquidity shortages further constrained imports and access to essential goods.

Botswana (-0.9%)

Botswana slipped into contraction as weaker global diamond demand weighed on exports and fiscal revenues, compounded by drought pressures. Rising debt risks prompted the government to introduce austerity measures, tightening conditions further.

Argentine President Javier Milei released a Christmas message on Wednesday, December 24, reviewing his administration’s first year in office, highlighting the elimination of the fiscal deficit, a drop in inflation, the lifting of currency controls and recent electoral gains by La Libertad Avanza (LLA). In a video shared on Instagram, Milei said the consolidated deficit had been reduced from 15% of GDP to zero and claimed that inflation had been brought under control, lifting 12 million people out of poverty. He also praised Security Minister Patricia Bullrich for ending roadblocks, tightening crime policy and creating a Federal Directorate of Investigations. Milei celebrated the adoption of the Single Paper Ballot and LLA’s performance in the legislative elections, which made the party the largest minority in the Chamber of Deputies and secured 20 Senate seats. He closed the message by urging Argentines to “fasten your seatbelts,” signalling further reforms as Congress prepares to debate the 2026 Budget.

Government pushes for Senate approval of 2026 Budget

President Javier Milei’s La Libertad Avanza gained backing from four senators in the Convicción Federal caucus, boosting government confidence that the 2026 Budget bill will pass its first reading in the Senate. If approved, it would be the first budget sanctioned under Milei since he took office in December 2023. The main uncertainty centres on Article 30, which proposes repealing laws that earmark funding for education, science and technical schools. While the government expects broad support for the overall bill, several Peronist senators backing the budget have said they will not vote for that article. The Casa Rosada is seeking to secure more than 40 votes and avoid reopening debate after setbacks in the Chamber of Deputies, where lawmakers failed to repeal university funding and disability emergency laws.

Economy minister signals shift away from Wall Street debt

Economy Minister Luis Caputo said the government will try to avoid issuing new debt under New York law in January, as part of a strategy to reduce Argentina’s reliance on U.S. financial markets. Writing on X, Caputo said the aim is to make Wall Street only a marginal source of financing. His comments followed a recent US$1 billion bond auction that drew higher yields and weaker demand than expected. Caputo said Argentina’s market debt is equivalent to about 25% of GDP, with Wall Street exposure accounting for less than five points. He added that proposed labour reforms include a severance assistance fund that could help develop a domestic capital market of around US$4 billion per year.

San Juan launches Argentina’s first solar highway

The province of San Juan inaugurated Argentina’s first solar highway on the Avenida Circunvalación, integrating photovoltaic generation into road infrastructure. The project includes 36 solar systems mounted on metal monopoles that feed electricity into the grid during the day and power road lighting at night. Developed entirely with local labour and expertise, the initiative aims to optimise existing infrastructure without using additional land. Provincial authorities say the project reduces emissions, cuts long-term energy costs and positions San Juan as a national leader in renewable energy and sustainable urban development.

Report shows sharp rise in security incidents

A national report by private security firm Verisure recorded a 20% year-on-year increase in security incidents across Argentina, highlighting a fragmented and regionalised crime pattern. Tucumán topped the ranking with a 65% rise, followed by Córdoba at 50% and Mendoza at 40%. The Atlantic coast saw a 30% increase, while Buenos Aires Province registered a 15% rise overall, masking a sharp increase in violent robberies in the Greater Buenos Aires area over the past decade. Despite the rise in robberies and violent incidents, Argentina’s homicide rate stood at 3.8 per 100,000 inhabitants, the lowest in two decades. According to the report, 74% of Argentines now cite insecurity as their main concern, pointing to public safety as a key social and political challenge.

Zimbabwe’s energy sector has reached a major milestone following the successful completion of the Petroleum Production Sharing Agreement (PPSA) process for the Cabora Bassa Project, led by Invictus Energy. Formal execution of the agreement is expected in January 2026, providing a clear legal and fiscal framework to advance oil and gas exploration and development. Planned next steps include appraisal of the Mukuyu Gas Field and drilling of the Musuma-1 exploration well. The African Energy Chamber welcomed the development, noting that the Mukuyu Gas Field could hold up to 20 trillion cubic feet of gas. In August 2025, Qatar-based Al Mansour Holdings acquired a 19.9% stake in Invictus Energy and committed up to $500 million in conditional funding to support commercialisation.

South Africa steps up border patrols near Zimbabwe

South Africa has intensified efforts to curb cross-border smuggling along the Limpopo River near the Zimbabwean border by deploying armoured, all-terrain vehicles and additional personnel. The Border Management Authority confirmed that three specialised vehicles, including one capable of operating in water, are now patrolling the river corridor. Authorities say the area remains a hotspot for smuggling activities involving fuel, food, cigarettes, stolen vehicles and undocumented migrants.

China backs irrigation upgrades to boost Zimbabwe agriculture

China and Zimbabwe on December 19, signed letters of exchange on the upgrading and maintenance of China-aided irrigation schemes across the country. The project will renovate nine irrigation facilities in six provinces, aiming to strengthen agricultural productivity and climate resilience. Finance Minister Mthuli Ncube said the initiative will support rural farmers, expand irrigated land and help climate-proof agriculture against droughts and erratic rainfall. Chinese Ambassador Zhou Ding described the project as another milestone in bilateral cooperation focused on improving livelihoods and modernising agriculture.

Zimbabwe to roll out long-acting HIV prevention injection

Zimbabwe will begin administering the long-acting HIV prevention drug Lenacapavir to at least 46,500 people in early 2026, health authorities announced on December 15. The twice-yearly injectable, which provides six months of protection, will be rolled out initially in districts with high HIV incidence, including Harare, Bulawayo and Mutare. Officials said rollout sites have been prepared and staff trained, with the first shipment expected in January. The programme will prioritise adolescent girls, young women and other high-risk groups.

Zimbabwe return to AFCON stage against Egypt

Zimbabwe are preparing for their sixth Africa Cup of Nations appearance, returning to the tournament after missing the 2023 edition due to a FIFA suspension. They will face Egypt in their opening match at the Morocco-hosted tournament. Egypt, the most successful AFCON nation, holds a strong historical record against Zimbabwe, having won eight of their 14 meetings. Zimbabwe last defeated Egypt in 1994 during World Cup qualifying and will be seeking to make an impact on their return to continental competition.

Mongolia Prime Minister Zandanshatar Gombojav has directed a government working group to accelerate the implementation of Mongolia’s National Anti-Corruption Program, first approved by parliament in May 2023. The directive was issued during a meeting held on December 9, 2025, at the State Palace. Chaired by First Deputy Chief of Cabinet Secretariat Munkh-Erdene Dembereltseren, the group includes state secretaries from all ministries. Discussions focused on progress in combating corruption, addressing root causes of graft, preventing conflicts of interest, and strengthening the justice system. The Prime Minister stressed leadership, transparency, and integrity across all levels of public service and announced that 2026 will be designated the “Year of Strengthening Discipline and Accountability in the Civil Service,” amid concerns over Mongolia’s declining ranking in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index.

Parliamentary inquiry intensifies scrutiny of Oyu Tolgoi mining project

A high-profile parliamentary inquiry into the Oyu Tolgoi mining project continued last week, led by MP O. Batnairamdal. More than 300 current and former officials and company representatives have been summoned to testify over three days. The hearings are examining Mongolia’s ownership of natural resources, benefit-sharing arrangements, and the possibility of renegotiating the investment agreement. Witnesses included former presidents, senior government officials, and Oyu Tolgoi executives, who addressed issues such as classified documents, loan interest negotiations, and governance decisions. Several testimonies and statements drew public attention, and the inquiry is expected to continue with further evidence review.

Mongolia and UN discuss SDGs and desertification conference

Prime Minister Zandanshatar met with UN Resident Coordinator Jaap van Hierden on December 10, 2025, to discuss accelerating the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals and preparations for hosting the 17th Conference of the Parties to the UN Convention to Combat Desertification in August 2026. The Prime Minister reaffirmed Mongolia’s commitment to cooperation with the UN and highlighted draft reforms aimed at increasing transparency in political and election financing under the UN Convention against Corruption. The UN reiterated its support for addressing Mongolia’s social and economic challenges, reducing inequality, creating jobs, and advancing energy and digital transitions.

Mongolia recovers smuggled dinosaur fossils from France

Mongolia has successfully repatriated 29 sets of dinosaur fossils that were illegally smuggled out of the country and seized by French authorities in 2013 and 2015. The official handover ceremony took place in Paris on December 11, 2025, following a confirmed investigation establishing the fossils’ origin in the Mongolian Gobi Desert. The collection includes remains of Tarbosaurus, Theropods, Ornithomimosaurs, and Hadrosaurs, dating back 65 to 70 million years. Officials said the return concludes nearly a decade of cooperation between Mongolian and French authorities.

Mongolia participates in IOM Council session in Geneva

The Mongolian delegation took part in the 116th Session of the International Organisation for Migration Council, held from December 8 to 10, 2025, in Geneva. Led by Permanent Representative Gerelmaa Davaasuren, the delegation engaged in discussions with representatives from 175 member states and other stakeholders on global migration challenges. Mongolia highlighted cooperation with IOM on safe, orderly, and humane migration, while IOM Director General Amy Pope thanked Mongolia for its continued support and announced plans to launch an IOM Country Office in the nation’s capital, Ulaanbaatar.

Any process of renewal begins with clarity. President Tshisekedi, now in his second term, has never attempted to downplay the challenges facing the country.

Speaking on December 8, 2025, at the Palais du Peuple in Kinshasa before all of the country’s constitutional institutions, he was explicit about the scale and nature of the violence still afflicting eastern Congo. He described it as a “proxy war of aggression” led by neighbouring Rwanda, despite the Washington agreements—an unusually direct and politically frank characterisation in the region.

This clarity is more than rhetorical. It provides the basis for a more structured response. On the ground, the Congolese armed forces are undergoing deep reforms: command structures are being reorganised, professionalisation has accelerated, smuggling networks are being targeted, and the police are being reformed. Stability remains elusive, but the State is no longer merely reacting. It is reorganising, reasserting itself, and embracing its core responsibility: protecting its territory and its people.

Congo’s return to international diplomacy

The second major shift is diplomatic. For many years, the DRC was sidelined in international forums and often excluded from decisions that directly affected its future. That period appears to be coming to an end.

Congo’s election to the United Nations Security Council by an overwhelming majority, its leadership of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, and UN resolutions explicitly condemning Rwandan aggression all point to a strong re-entry onto the multilateral stage. The Washington agreement with Kigali has not resolved every issue, and President Tshisekedi himself has acknowledged continued violations. But the key point is clear: the DRC is no longer isolated or diplomatically unheard.

This repositioning gives Congo new leverage in debates on regional security , strategic minerals, and climate justice.

Economic stabilisation reshaping the political landscape

Signs of renewal are also visible in the economy. Against the backdrop of conflict in the east and global uncertainty, macroeconomic stabilisation sends a powerful signal. Inflation has fallen to historically low levels, the Congolese franc has stabilised, foreign exchange reserves have increased, and growth has outpaced the regional average. These figures may be debated, but they are grounded in reality.

More importantly, they are producing concrete political effects. Fuel prices have declined, purchasing power has improved for certain essential goods, and budget discipline has strengthened. Gradually, the State is rebuilding trust with the population. While Congo remains heavily dependent on mining , the image of an economy spinning out of control no longer aligns with observable trends.

Infrastructure, public services , and a new governing approach

Another indicator of renewal is the push to rebuild the State through infrastructure and public services. Agricultural roads, national transport corridors, energy projects, ports, and airports are underway on a large scale, though progress remains uneven. The Local Development Program for 145 territories has faced delays—some of them serious—which the President has acknowledged openly.

What stands out, however, is the emergence of a corrective approach: contract clean-ups, tighter operational oversight, and a clearer prioritisation of projects. Where fragmentation once prevailed, the State is now seeking to steer, adjust, and be accountable. This emphasis on method is itself a meaningful political signal.

Climate policy as a tool of sovereignty and development

Congo’s climate strategy further reflects this new posture. The Kinshasa–Kisangani–Goma Green Corridor is not framed as a purely environmental initiative. Instead, it integrates security concerns, rural development, infrastructure, and economic sovereignty.

The message is unambiguous: the DRC accepts its role as a global climate solution, but it will no longer bear that responsibility at its own expense. Protecting forests, biodiversity, and peatlands requires real financing, technology transfers, and political recognition commensurate with their global importance.

A fragile but increasingly clear trajectory

Nothing is settled. Violence persists in the east, bureaucratic inertia remains, and social expectations—particularly among young people—are immense. Yet a profound shift is underway.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo no longer sees itself as permanently trapped in crisis. Step by step, it is moving toward a stronger State, a more stable economy, and a more assertive international role. When President Tshisekedi concluded his address by saying that “darkness will not reign forever,” it was no longer mere rhetoric. It reflected a growing and increasingly credible vision of a Congolese renewal in progress.

Because of this, it has become a central focus for both the US and China in terms of economic and political influence. Prior to 2023, China gained the upper hand with its focus on non-intervention and economic collaboration, particularly through the Belt and Road programme. Following the war that erupted on October 7, China has engaged in the region much more actively, and its popularity has soared.

Since its founding, the People’s Republic of China has built its foreign policy on the “five principles of peaceful coexistence”. These principles, known as “mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence”, have been China’s “red lines” both during the Cold War and in subsequent years. China remained outside the bipolar system of the Cold War and opted for a “third way” by supporting the emergence of the Non-Aligned Movement at the Bandung Conference in 1955. Despite the entry into a period of détente in international politics in the 1970s, China’s approach to non-alignment with any polarisation persisted, leading the country to make “non-alliance” a state policy in 1982. 

A clean record

MENA countries were among the regions where China’s fundamental foreign policy principles were practically implemented. At the aforementioned Bandung Conference, China established contact with nationalist parties in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, which were under French rule at the time, as well as in independent Libya. These initial contacts exemplified the parties’ revolutionary and anti-colonial solidarity. In the Middle East, diplomatic relations between China and the Gulf countries, in particular, began with Iraq in 1958, followed by Iran and Kuwait (1971), Oman (1978), the United Arab Emirates (1984), Qatar (1988), Bahrain (1989) and Saudi Arabia (1990). As can be seen, these countries, having gained their independence from Western colonial rule, quickly established a rapprochement with China. 

Following the end of the Cold War, relations between China and the MENA region entered a period of further development. MENA countries viewed China as a power with which to cooperate because it lacked a history of colonialism, military intervention, or regime change in the region. China, on the other hand, aimed to establish multi-layered interaction with the region to realise its interests within the emerging international system. To this end, China proactively established the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000, followed by the China–Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF) four years later. 

The Arab Spring, which began in Tunisia at the end of 2010 and then spread throughout MENA, initiated a transformational process whose effects would last for years. People living in MENA began protesting against the authoritarian regimes in their countries that had long deprived them of economic prosperity and fundamental rights and freedoms. This wave of uprisings created the potential to fundamentally reshape the region’s “political ecology”. While historically significant developments were taking place in MENA, China’s regional strategy was embodied in the Belt and Road Initiative, which funds infrastructure aimed at bolstering international economic links. For China, the region provided an opportunity to prioritise its economic and geostrategic interests and place less emphasis on political engagement. Despite the liberal ideals of the Arab Spring, the persistence of autocratic and nationalist regimes in the region has also presented a positive picture for China. Regimes in the region have prioritised economic growth and development over democratisation. This has opened the door for China to promote an alternative to the liberal order created by the West after 1945. 

Through the Belt and Road Initiative, China has established a successful method for achieving its desired goals. In exchange for energy agreements signed with MENA countries, which represent a strong option for meeting China’s need for energy resources such as oil and natural gas, China has built infrastructure and transportation projects in the region. These partnerships, which foster a win–win relationship between the parties, have significantly contributed to China’s interaction with the non-Western world. Unlike Western powers, which lost prestige in the region, particularly for their open support of opposition movements during the Arab Spring, China is perceived as a reliable actor by governments in MENA. Driven by this momentum, China signed strategic partnership agreements with Qatar, Iraq, Kuwait and Oman, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates between 2014 and 2018. Furthermore, in addition to striving to establish partnerships with MENA countries through bilateral relations and regional forums, China has also worked to mediate conflict resolution in the region. On 10 March 2023, Iran and Saudi Arabia, mediated by China, agreed to re-establish diplomatic relations. Bringing two strategic MENA actors, who had not had diplomatic contact since 2016, to the same table strengthened China’s prestige significantly. 

During this period, China presented a position in MENA radically different from the colonialism, use of military force, and conditional aid to achieve economic interests pursued by Western powers, particularly the US. China’s MENA strategy, particularly in the post-Arab Spring period, was based on a theoretical foundation of soft power and anti-colonialism. 

Change of approach

The events of 7 October, 2023 changed everything in the region and inevitably led to a shift in China’s approach connected to its long-standing support for Palestinian statehood. Since establishing the Special Representative for the Middle East in 2002, China has sought to host peace talks between Palestine and Israel and current Chinese President Xi Jinping has presented draft peace plans to the parties at various times. In these draft peace plans, China emphasised the importance of global recognition of the State of Palestine, the continuation of negotiations between Palestine and Israel, and the role of the international community in guaranteeing Palestinian sovereignty. These proposals were also included in the Arab Policy Paper published by China in 2016. 

Chinese officials have visited MENA to meet with all stakeholders in the region, particularly Hamas and Israel. As a result of these visits, an important mediation activity was carried out by bringing together the two major Palestinian groups, Fatah and Hamas, in Beijing in April 2024. Thus, in the face of the unconditional military support for Israel from the US and European powers, China has maintained its diplomatic stance. Even during the crisis, China has maintained its foreign policy of avoiding direct involvement in conflicts, maintaining political neutrality, and acting with caution. With these steps, which differentiate it from Western powers, China has assumed the role of a mediator seeking regional security and stability. China aims to end the regional crisis through an approach that emphasises a “two-state solution” and the role of regional organisations. 

That approach is bearing fruit, as results from the Arab Barometer reveal, although the challenge for China will be adapting to its new position in the world order on issues less binary than the conflict in Gaza.

The opinions and thoughts expressed in this article reflect only the author's views. This essay is based on research featured in the paper Perceptions of China in the Middle East and North Africa: an analysis in the context of Israel’s war on Gaza published in Third World Quarterly.

For the IMF, the vision is to use the Shanghai Centre as a regional hub for research, policy dialogue and outreach, with a focus on emerging and middle-income economies. 

It is also expected to expand the Fund’s presence in a region that now drives more than half of global growth. China provided financial backing for the facility.

Chinese journalist Xu Zeyu said the opening is also the latest affirmation of China’s rising monetary status, noting that the renminbi joined the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights basket in 2016 with a 10.92% weight, later increased to 12.28% in 2022. 

This, Xu said, proved the currency’s growing acceptance as a “freely usable currency” and its impact on the global monetary landscape.

Johannes Wiegand, a veteran IMF economist, has been appointed the centre’s first director. Its opening was marked by a seminar on macroeconomic challenges in emerging markets, including structural change, finance and the rise of artificial intelligence.

Xu added that the Shanghai Centre could accelerate RMB internationalisation by deepening IMF research on regional financial connectivity and strengthening the yuan’s function as a regional anchor currency—providing Asian economies with more stable, autonomous trade settlement options.

The new outpost comes at a time when demand for IMF lending is at record levels. The Fund currently has around $162 billion in credit outstanding—its highest ever—with 86 countries owing money. Argentina, Ukraine and Egypt account for nearly half of the total.

Founded in 1944 to stabilise the post-war global economy, the IMF now has 191 members and a lending capacity of about $1 trillion. It finances its operations through quotas paid by member states, with wealthier countries acting as creditors and earning interest. Last year, roughly 50 such countries received around $5 billion in interest payments.

Argentina remains the IMF’s largest borrower, with debts of about $57 billion following years of economic crises and repeated bailouts. Ukraine , engulfed in war, owes more than $14bn, while Egypt has leaned on the Fund to manage inflation, currency shortages and fiscal stress.

For Beijing, hosting an IMF hub aligns with its push to expand influence in global economic institutions. Yet the Shanghai centre will not shift the Fund’s decision-making power, which remains anchored in Washington and weighted toward advanced economies.

For emerging Asian countries, the centre could offer easier access to technical support and policy advice, though it does not alter borrowing rules or the IMF’s often-criticised loan conditions.

President Mahama, who secured his long-awaited second coming after previously serving from 2012 to 2017, in an exclusive days before the December 7 vote, told Global South World that Ghana’s economy was in crisis and needed urgent fiscal reforms, and if voted to power,  he planned a “total reset” to get a fresh start.

A year on after the vote, where the then former president secured a landslide 56.42% victory against Dr Bawumia’s 41.75%, is he delivering on his promise?

More than 500 people have died , and hundreds more have been injured after devastating floods caused by rare cyclonic rains swept through Indonesia early last week. Rescue teams are still struggling to reach the worst-affected areas on the island of Sumatra, where thousands of residents remain cut off without access to essential supplies. Cyclone Senyar, described as an exceptionally rare tropical storm, triggered massive landslides and submerged thousands of homes and buildings. The effects of torrential rain extended beyond Indonesia, with Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka also hit by severe storms. Across Asia, more than 900 people have died this month as extreme weather continues to impact millions.

Indonesia posts smaller October trade surplus amid weak Chinese demand

Indonesia recorded a smaller-than-expected trade surplus in October as exports fell unexpectedly due to softer demand from China and reduced shipments of mining products, according to official data released Monday. The surplus stood at USD 2.4 billion, well below economists’ forecasts of USD 3.72 billion and down from September’s USD 4.34 billion, marking the smallest monthly surplus since April. Exports dropped 2.31% year-on-year to USD 24.24 billion, driven by lower coal and copper shipments. Analysts noted that exporters had accelerated shipments to the United States earlier in the year, ahead of tariff measures introduced in August. Operations at Freeport Indonesia’s Grasberg mine were also temporarily halted following a fatal mud-flow disaster in September, adding to the export slowdown.

Bank Indonesia warns of dim global outlook as protectionism reshapes trade

Bank Indonesia Governor Perry Warjiyo has cautioned that global economic uncertainty remains high, driven largely by protectionist policies in the United States, which he said are reshaping the global economic landscape. Speaking at the 2025 Bank Indonesia Annual Meeting, Warjiyo projected a “dim” economic outlook for 2026 and 2027, citing declining world trade, weakened multilateralism, slowing growth in major economies, and persistent inflation complicating monetary policy. He highlighted additional risks, including high government debt in developed countries, rising financial system vulnerabilities, and the rapid growth of private-sector cryptocurrencies amid limited regulation. Warjiyo stressed the need for strong policy responses to maintain stability, strengthen economic resilience, and promote sustainable growth.

Prabowo targets renovation of 60,000 schools next year

President Prabowo Subianto has announced a government plan to renovate at least 60,000 schools across Indonesia next year as part of a nationwide effort to improve education quality. Speaking at the 2025 National Teachers Day event on November 28, he noted that the current pace of upgrades, including the ongoing renovation of 16,000 schools this year, remains insufficient. He instructed the finance ministry to explore possibilities for expanding the programme’s budget beyond the current ceiling of Rp20 trillion (USD 1.2 billion). The government is also advancing its tuition-free Sekolah Rakyat (People’s School) initiative for underprivileged children, with 166 schools established so far, serving approximately 16,000 students. Both initiatives form part of the administration’s long-term strategy to strengthen human resources ahead of Indonesia’s 2045 national vision.

Indonesia re-elected to International Maritime Organisation Council 

Indonesia has been re-elected as a Category C member of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) Council for the 2026–2027 term during the body’s thirty-fourth session in London. Transportation Minister Dudy Purwagandhi, who led the national delegation, confirmed that Indonesia secured 138 votes, placing fifth among 26 candidates. Category C includes states with significant interests in maritime transport and ensures balanced geographical representation. Purwagandhi said the result reflects Indonesia’s growing role as a global maritime hub and supports President Prabowo Subianto’s Asta Cita mission, prioritising maritime development. He reiterated Indonesia’s commitment to strengthening maritime safety, promoting sustainable port development, protecting the marine environment, and supporting seafarers’ welfare as part of global efforts to build a more resilient shipping sector.

Dr Touray attributed the projection to Nigeria’s ongoing economic reforms and renewed regional leadership under President Bola Tinubu. He also commended Nigeria for taking up a leadership role at a time of regional instability. 

He noted that ECOWAS forces had been deployed to Guinea-Bissau to help prevent escalation and support stability in the country. He recognised Nigeria’s active role in promoting peace, security , and development across the West African sub-region.

“While I celebrate this historic milestone, I want to particularly express appreciation to the leadership of Nigeria for advancing ECOWAS integration,” Dr Touray stated. “Despite the security challenges Nigeria is faced with and the loss of lives to terrorism, we continue to see commitment and the willingness to secure the West African region.”

According to the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) World Economic Outlook data released in April 2025, the world’s top five economies by GDP are the United States ($30.50 trillion), China ($19.23 trillion), Germany ($4.74 trillion), India ($4.19 trillion), and Japan ($4.19 trillion).

As of April 2025, the top five economies in Africa are South Africa ($410 billion), Egypt ($347 billion), Algeria ($269 billion), Nigeria ($188 billion), and Morocco ($166 billion). In the third quarter of 2023, over 5% of Nigeria’s GDP was generated by oil.

The Chairperson of the African Union Commission, H.E. Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, has strongly condemned the 26 November military coup d’État in Guinea-Bissau as the country awaited the announcement of the November 25 election results. He reaffirmed the AU’s zero-tolerance stance on unconstitutional changes of government, citing key normative instruments including the Constitutive Act, the Lomé Declaration, the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, and the Ezulwini Framework. The Chairperson also acknowledged the Joint Statement issued on the same day by the heads of the AU, ECOWAS, and West African Elders Forum election observer missions.

Claims emerge that coup may have been staged

Political tensions deepened as Senegal’s Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko and Nigeria’s former President Goodluck Jonathan publicly suggested the ousting of President Embaló may have been fabricated . The military halted the release of election results, claiming it intervened to stop a destabilisation plot — allegations Sonko and Jonathan questioned, saying no evidence had been presented. Some civil society groups and opposition figures accused Embaló of staging a “simulated coup” to block the results in case of defeat, although the former president has not responded to the claims. Embaló, who was flown to Senegal after his release, has previously been accused of using political crises to suppress dissent.

ECOWAS suspends Guinea-Bissau after military takeover

West Africa’s ECOWAS bloc suspended Guinea-Bissau from all its decision-making bodies following an emergency virtual summit on 27 November. The Mediation and Security Council, chaired by Sierra Leone’s President Julius Maada Bio, condemned the military intervention as an “illegal abortion of the democratic process” and urged coup leaders to allow the national election commission to publish the disputed presidential results. Member states from Cabo Verde, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, Benin, and others participated in the session and rejected the army’s decision to halt the vote tally.

Deposed president transported to Senegal as tensions ease

Guinea-Bissau’s deposed leader Umaro Sissoco Embaló arrived in Senegal late on 27 November after negotiations led by ECOWAS secured his release. Senegal’s foreign ministry confirmed he landed “safe and sound” aboard a military aircraft. The coup unfolded hours before provisional results from presidential and parliamentary elections were due. The junta suspended the entire electoral process, banned demonstrations, and imposed a nighttime curfew, citing an alleged plot involving unnamed politicians and a “well-known drug baron” to destabilise the country.

Military installs transitional president and outlines one-year transition

The military high command has appointed Gen Horta N’Tam (also referenced as Horta Inta-A in local reporting), previously army chief of staff and a close ally of Embaló, as transitional president for a one-year period. In a televised address, Gen N’Tam said political actors’ failure to resolve worsening tensions prompted the armed forces to intervene. He later named former finance minister Ilidio Vieira Té as the new prime minister. Opposition candidate Fernando Dias, who also claimed victory in the vote, denounced the takeover as a “fabricated coup” intended to block the release of election results, urging citizens to demand transparency. Despite the turmoil, daily activities resumed gradually on Thursday in the capital, Bissau.

Tanzania has cancelled its 9 December Independence Day celebrations following calls for nationwide protests over mass killings linked to the disputed 29 October general election. Prime Minister Mwigulu Nchemba announced the decision on 24 November, saying funds would instead be used to rebuild infrastructure damaged during last month’s unrest. Opposition parties have urged citizens to use the holiday to protest the government’s handling of the election, in which President Samia Suluhu Hassan was declared the winner with 98% of the vote — a result they dismissed as fabricated. Key opposition figures were either detained or barred from running, including Chadema leader Tundu Lissu, who has been held on treason charges since April. Thousands protested the results, with rights groups condemning the security crackdown as violent and repressive. While the government has yet to release a death toll, it has formed a commission of inquiry that opposition leaders fear lacks independence. Nchemba urged Tanzanians to avoid violence and embrace dialogue, saying the country must not “return to what we went through.”

Government accelerates mining reforms for economic transformation

The Ministry of Minerals has launched an initiative to implement directives issued by President Samia Suluhu Hassan to transform the mining sector into a driver of national economic growth and prosperity. Speaking at a management workshop in Dodoma from 24–25 November, Minister for Minerals Anthony Mavunde said the President expects Tanzania’s mineral wealth to be managed in ways that generate tangible benefits for citizens and support development priorities. The directives — drawn from national addresses, the ruling party’s 2025–2030 manifesto, and the government’s early-term commitments — focus on boosting production, increasing value addition, and improving sector efficiency. Mavunde emphasised the need for innovation, discipline, and speed across the ministry and its agencies to meet these goals.

Energy ministry calls for stronger fuel systems and youth opportunities

Deputy Minister for Energy Salome Makamba has directed the Energy and Water Utilities Regulatory Authority (EWURA) to improve the efficiency of fuel transportation networks to address recurring national fuel shortages. During a working session with EWURA officials in Dodoma, she underscored the importance of expanding fuel storage capacity to safeguard supply and encouraged the regulator to explore ways to reduce the cost of household electrical installation materials to accelerate rural electrification. Makamba also highlighted the need to create more opportunities for young people in the energy sector. EWURA Director General Dr James Andilile reaffirmed the authority’s commitment to ensuring service quality, safety, efficiency, and good governance while implementing presidential directives.

AfDB approves $24.6 million loan to boost Tanzania’s agro-industrial growth

The African Development Bank Group has approved a $24.6 million senior corporate loan to Mohammed Enterprises Tanzania Limited (MeTL) to modernise and expand the country’s agro-industrial production. The investment will rehabilitate ageing tea estates, convert more than 1,000 hectares into organic plantations, and upgrade processing factories to double production capacity. It will also establish 15,000 hectares of sisal plantations and a new 200-hectare macadamia farm, while improving rural infrastructure and strengthening value chains connecting smallholder farmers to global markets. The project is expected to create over 1,400 jobs, generate more than $10 million in new annual export earnings, and contribute approximately $36 million in fiscal revenues. AfDB officials say the initiative strengthens Tanzania’s agricultural resilience and supports inclusive growth, particularly for women farmers. The funding forms part of a broader $74.7 million programme co-financed by ILX B.V. and MeTL equity.

Construction of long-delayed Bagamoyo port to begin in December

Tanzania will begin construction of the long-awaited Bagamoyo port in December, ending more than a decade of delays caused by disputes over earlier contract terms with foreign developers. Government spokesperson Gerson Msigwa said the port — part of a larger special economic zone project that includes industrial parks and transport links — will initially begin with 14 berths, eventually expanding to 28. The deep-water port, located 75 km north of Dar es Salaam, is designed to accommodate larger vessels than any other port in East Africa, with a planned depth of 20 meters. Tanzania originally signed a framework agreement with China Merchants Holdings International and Oman’s State General Reserve Fund in 2013, but the project stalled after the government rejected unfavourable terms. President Samia Suluhu Hassan revived negotiations after taking office in 2021, positioning the $10 billion project as key to boosting trade capacity and regional maritime influence. The port’s revival comes as Tanzania faces economic pressures and strained regional trade relations following a contentious and widely criticised election period.

The new store is managed by an African national and employs over 80 staff members. The opening drew significant interest, with more than a hundred shoppers lining up for hours to access deals during the Black Friday weekend.

"I'm actually here for a specific product that you can't really get in South Africa… It's a children's toy, Labubu," shopper Refilwe Mabale told Reuters .

In addition to a wide range of popular international products, including Labubu dolls, the store also offers a sixty-minute online delivery service for customers within a five-kilometre radius. This service introduces direct competition with Checkers' Sixty60 platform, operated by Shoprite, South Africa’s leading grocery retailer.

“Opening this first Walmart store in South Africa is about much more than a business milestone; it is a commitment to helping customers save money and live better by consistently delivering the lowest total cost for the basket of products they need,” said Andrea Albright, executive vice president and chief growth officer for Walmart.

Globally, Walmart serves approximately 270 million customers each week across more than 10,750 physical stores and multiple eCommerce platforms in 19 countries. In fiscal year 2025, the company reported revenue of $681 billion and employs around 2.1 million associates worldwide.

This concludes our live coverage of Guinea-Bissau's 2025 general elections. With fierce competition between the candidates, counting is underway to determine the country's next president. Polling stations opened at 0700 GMT and are expected to close at 1700 GMT. Provisional results are expected within 48 hours. Follow Global South World for continued updates about Guinea-Bissau post-election.

18:15 GMT: Polling stations end voting processes, counting begins

After 10 hours of voting, Guinea-Bissau has officially closed its polls, and counting is currently underway.

16:32 GMT: Mozambique's Philip Nyusi and Nigeria's Goodluck Jonathan oversee elections

As part of a measure of transparency, the African Union sent its Chief of the Mission of Election Observers, Mozambique's former President, Filipe Nyusi, along with the former President of Nigeria, Goodluck Jonathan, to monitor the ongoing elections.

Filipe's inclusion, however, is being questioned due to the belief that he ruled as Mozambique's president through fraudulent electoral means.

12:40 GMT: “Bissau-Guineans want only solutions and not slogans”

Journalist Samba M. Baldé, explains in an interview with Global South World, that, despite the many campaign messages spread by the various candidates, the citizens need practical solutions to their problems.

11:51 GMT: Voting continues in Guinea-Bissau

10:34 GMT: Incumbent President Umaro Sissoco Embalo votes

President Umaro Sissoco Embalo cast his vote this morning at a polling station in Umaro Djabula in Gabu. The president is seeking to make history as the only president to be given a second term in 3 decades.

9:47 GMT: People queue to vote in Mansôa

Bissau-Guineans in Mansôa are taking turns in casting their votes. Fernando Dias is expected to vote in this town. Citizens, however, remain committed to their desire to have a different economic climate and hope the results reflect that.

What you need to know

Candidates

Embalo is competing against 11 other candidates, including Fernando Dias, a relatively new figure in politics.

Right at his heels is 47-year-old Fernando Dias , backed by a powerful figure from the disqualified opposition leader, Domingos Simões Pereira, of PAIGC. This party led the country to independence in 1973.

Other contenders on the ballot include José Mário Vaz, who served as president from 2014 to 2020 and became the first post-independence leader to finish a full term. Baciro Dja, 52, a former defence minister who briefly occupied the prime minister’s office twice under President Vaz, first in 2015 and again in 2016.

Also in the race is 48-year-old Joao Bernardo Vieira, the namesake and nephew of Guinea-Bissau’s longest-serving president, who held power for most of the years between 1980 and 1999 and returned to office from 2005 to 2009.

The polls are expected to open at 7:00 am GMT and close at 5:00 pm GMT.

What citizens expect

During a conversation with Global South World's Abigail Johnson Boakye, a Bissau-Guinean journalist, Samba M. Baldé, shared that despite the hype around the upcoming elections, electorates seem to be less engaged as they are tired of slogans or manifestos and want real solutions.

"Engagement exists, but it's uneven because voters react to something that has certain benefits than to only promises, because for voters, when candidates fail to translate to voters their proposals into real impact or how they can really impact society , public interest quickly drops. ...But people are, for example, no longer satisfied with slogans. They want clear plans and measurable results in Guinea-Bissau," Samba said.

Under the plan, denominations such as Rp1,000 would become Rp1, and similar changes would apply to other notes, including Rp2,000, Rp5,000, and up to Rp100,000.

This initiative is part of the Finance Ministry’s 2025–2029 strategic programs. The bill is being developed under Finance Minister Regulation No. 70 of 2025 and is expected to be finalised by 2027. "A bill on Rupiah Rate Change (redenomination) is a carried-over bill planned for completion in 2027," the regulation stated.

The rupiah, which currently trades at around 16,717 per U.S. dollar (as of November 19), has high nominal figures that have led to inefficiencies in budgeting and financial transactions, according to reports .

Redenomination has been under discussion for more than a decade. A 2013 bill was delayed due to economic instability. In 2016 and again in 2023, Bank Indonesia expressed its readiness but indicated the need for an appropriate timing, with BI Governor Perry Warjiyo stating that “its execution must be cautious and consider economic and political stability.”

The transition process would be gradual. According to Bank Indonesia’s 2016 estimates, preparing new notes could take two years, and full implementation could extend up to seven more years. During this period, both old and new banknotes would be in circulation.

Economists have also noted potential inflation risks during the transition, particularly if businesses increase prices through rounding. In 2023, Teuku Rifky, an economist at the Institute for Economic and Social Research at the University of Indonesia, commented that while there were upsides to the redenomination, it was not an urgent issue for the Southeast Asian nation.

 “I don’t think there is a significant advantage in this redenomination, while the need or cost for execution is actually quite large,” he said .

The project is being executed in collaboration with global partners Honeywell and Chempolis. It will utilise Ghana’s bamboo resources to produce advanced biofuels and green chemicals, including sustainable aviation fuel (SAF), renewable diesel, green naphtha, bioethanol, furfural, lignin, and acetic acid.

Kambic CEO John Kaku Mason described the project as “a major turning point for Ghana and for Africa as a whole.” 

“By turning locally grown bamboo into high-quality sustainable fuels and green chemicals, we are creating jobs, building new industries, and placing Ghana at the forefront of global green innovation,” he said.

The company highlighted the role of international collaboration in ensuring high standards. Honeywell will contribute its expertise in refining and sustainable fuel production systems, while Chempolis will provide its FormicoR biorefining technology for efficient bamboo biomass processing. 

Kambic stated that the partnership will help the refinery meet top global environmental and operational standards and promote long-term sustainability.

Last week, the Ghanaian government also announced plans to construct the country’s first purpose-built expressway. The 198-kilometre Accra–Kumasi Expressway is expected to modernise transport between the coast and the forest belt, reduce travel times, and boost economic activity in the southern regions.

The announcement was made by Finance Minister Dr Cassiel Ato Forson during the presentation of the 2026 Budget Statement to Parliament on November 13. 

While the minister did not disclose the project’s cost, he confirmed that the expressway is scheduled for completion in three years, with commissioning anticipated in 2028.

Following a disputed October 29 presidential election, Tanzania’s parliament has confirmed Mwigulu Nchemba, a former finance minister and close ally of President Samia Suluhu Hassan, as the new prime minister. The appointment , backed by a near-unanimous parliamentary vote, comes amid unrest and allegations of electoral irregularities that have drawn criticism from opposition groups and human rights observers. President Hassan, who won by a landslide according to official results, has dismissed claims of vote-rigging. The government projects 6% economic growth in 2025, driven by large-scale infrastructure projects, despite reduced foreign aid and political tensions.

Tanzania’s Amsons Group challenges Dangote with Kenyan cement acquisition

Tanzania’s Amsons Group has made a bold entry into Kenya’s cement market after acquiring a 29.2%  stake in East Africa Portland Cement (EAPC). The $5.6 million deal, executed through its subsidiary Kalahari Cement, involved purchasing 26.3 million shares from Associated International Cement Limited (AIC) and Cementia Holding AG. The acquisition, finalised in late July, strengthens Amsons’ position as one of the largest shareholders in the Nairobi-listed EAPC. Managing Director Edha Nahdi described the move as a strategic investment to reshape Kenya’s cement landscape through enhanced production capabilities and innovation, adding that it aligns with the company’s goal of building long-term regional value.

UN calls for probe into post-election killings in Tanzania

UN Human Rights Chief Volker Türk has urged Tanzanian authorities to investigate reports of hundreds of killings, detentions, and disappearances following the October 29 elections. The UN Human Rights Office cited credible information suggesting security forces removed bodies from streets and hospitals to undisclosed locations in what may be an attempt to conceal evidence. Türk called on the government to disclose the whereabouts of missing persons and return bodies to families for burial. He also demanded the release of opposition figures, including Chadema leader Tundu Lissu, and condemned the arbitrary detention of more than 150 people, some reportedly charged with treason.

Tanzania’s inflation hits two-year high amid unrest

Tanzania’s annual inflation rate rose to 3.5% in October 2025, the highest since June 2023, according to the National Bureau of Statistics. The rise , driven mainly by higher food and beverage prices, reflects growing economic instability following post-election unrest. Year-on-year food inflation reached 7.4%, while modest monthly price declines were observed in essentials such as poultry, bread, beans, and fuel. Despite the uptick, analysts note that the overall inflation rate remains manageable but could worsen if political instability continues to disrupt supply chains and investor confidence.

Rwanda and Tanzania advance cross-border payment integration

Rwanda and Tanzania have begun technical discussions to link their national retail payment systems — Tanzania’s Instant Payment System (TIPS) and Rwanda’s National Payment Switch (RSWITCH). The initiative, discussed during a high-level meeting in Kigali, aims to enable instant, low-cost money transfers between bank accounts and mobile wallets across the two nations. Once implemented, the system will simplify cross-border transactions for citizens and businesses, supporting trade and financial innovation in the East African region.

In an interview with Global South World, the CEO of Spiro, Kaushik Burman, explained how the African company has found not just a market, but a mission.

“I love Africa,” he said. “I’ve already converted myself to Africa. I love the spirit of Africa.”

The African company is behind what is now Africa’s largest-ever investment in electric mobility. In October 2025, Spiro closed a US$100 million funding round .

Spiro began not in a boardroom, but in a field. Its founder, Gagan Gupta, who also leads the Equitane and Arise groups, was visiting an agricultural site in rural Togo when he witnessed how costly and difficult gasoline transport had become. The realisation sparked an idea: if the continent could leapfrog to mobile banking, why not leapfrog to electric mobility?

By 2022, Spiro had launched its first fleets in Benin and Togo, two West African neighbours whose bustling motorcycle taxi networks are the lifeblood of local economies. In less than three years, the company has expanded into six countries, including Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Nigeria, Benin and Togo and is preparing to enter its seventh, Cameroon.

The overall African two-wheeler market is estimated at US $9.15 billion in 2025, and projected to reach US $11.11 billion by 2029, with a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of around 4.97%.

65,000 electric motorbikes have been deployed, nearly 2,000 battery-swap stations already operating, 20 million battery swaps and a target to double that to 4,000 by year’s end. Each station works like a miniature power hub. Riders pull in, exchange their depleted batteries for fully charged ones in under five minutes, and ride off.

“Think of it like filling up gas,” Burman explains. “Except this time, you’re filling up with clean power.”

Riders pay only for the energy they consume, eliminating the up-front battery cost that often makes EVs unaffordable.

According to Burman, a typical rider saves between US$1.50 and $2 a day compared to petrol bikes, a small figure that translates into life-changing relief for many in Africa’s informal transport sector.

“That’s school fees. That’s food on the table,” Burman said.

Spiro has already created over 10,000 jobs across its six markets, from factory workers and engineers to sales teams and swap-station operators. Its Spiro Academy, launched last year, trains local youth and women in assembly, servicing, and maintenance. Nearly 45 percent of the company’s workforce is made up of women.

“It’s not just about mobility,” Burman insists. “It’s about dignity. It’s about creating pathways into the financial ecosystem for people who were left out.”

Every Spiro bike on the road saves about two tonnes of CO₂ per year compared with a petrol motorcycle.

The environmental argument is matched by a macroeconomic one. Many African nations spend billions of dollars importing fuel each year. By reducing dependence on petrol, Spiro’s model helps conserve foreign exchange and stabilise local currencies.

Across the continent, electric mobility is accelerating. The Africa E-Mobility Alliance reports that electric two- and three-wheelers grew by 38 percent year-on-year in 2025. Research firm Mordor Intelligence projects Africa’s two-wheeler market to reach US $11 billion by 2029, with electric models leading growth.

For Spiro, the next phase is growth — in capital, markets, and impact. The company plans to raise more funds to scale its manufacturing footprint and extend its swap network. But the vision is long-term.

In a world too used to seeing Africa as a consumer of technology , Spiro is flipping the script — turning the Global South into the stage for the next industrial revolution.

Here are some factors behind the slump

With global expansion accelerating and high-end models on the horizon, BYD’s next growth phase is expected to depend on whether it can stabilise margins and outpace China’s fierce EV rivalry.

Yet, behind these displays of its military muscle, Xi Jinping’s China is waging an equally strategic campaign to dominate through something far less tangible —and also far more innocuous —soft power.

From the viral success of the Labubu blind box dolls to the global reach of video-sharing app TikTok, Chinese-originated cultural exports are reshaping global tastes and narratives, bolstering Beijing’s status as the world’s No. 2 soft power nation, second only to the US.

And while these seemingly harmless tools of power contrast sharply with China’s tormentor image in Asia, in reality, the two work hand in hand, according to Dylan Loh, an associate professor at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore who specialises in Chinese foreign policy.

“China's attempt to cultivate or build an image of a peace-loving, open country sometimes rubs up against the fact that it pursues more assertive actions on the ground,” Loh told Global South World.

“But I stress again that the fact that using soft power doesn't mean that countries give up more blunt tools of foreign policy,” he added. “Using soft power does not preclude using coercive measures.”

Among China’s most successful recent cultural exports are the Labubu dolls, a pop culture phenomenon that sent sales of their creator, Pop Mart, soaring by over 100% in 2024, thanks in part to their growing popularity in Western markets.

Their rise has been fuelled by TikTok, the video app built by Beijing-based ByteDance and now used by more than one billion people, including almost half the population of the United States.

TikTok’s rise is peculiar as the app is banned in China, a country known for blocking popular social media platforms like Facebook, Instagram and X. 

As well, this app’s global dominance has demonstrated how lines between soft power and geopolitics intersect. Recently, the US and China reportedly reached an agreement to transfer TikTok’s U.S. operations to American investors, ending years of speculation that the platform could be used by Beijing to spread propaganda through its algorithm.

The agreement even became one of the most-discussed outcomes of Presidents Xi Jinping and Donald Trump’s meeting at the APEC summit in South Korea in October.

For Loh, the Labubu craze represented a more organic way of harnessing soft power for China — one detached from the ruling Communist Party’s influence, and therefore less prone to Western suspicion. 

“Labubus have underlined the potential of private industry, of society , of apolitical elements of soft power and how it can go global pretty quickly with very little intervention from the state,” he said. 

“In many ways, these are the most authentic kinds of soft power because you see the absence largely of the state,” he added. “It's done almost on a purely commercial basis. People do not think that it is threatening or suspicious.”

With or without Xi’s direction, China is rapidly emerging as a formidable challenger to the Western-dominated cultural landscape. Whether this ascent — like the Labubu dolls and TikTok themselves — will prove a passing fad or a lasting trend remains to be seen.

“It shows that Chinese-created cultural products can have global aesthetic appeal,” Loh said. “It shows that cultural products from the West do not have a complete monopoly or dominance over media , cultural entertainment, or sporting domains.” 

“Whether or not this represents a longer-term shift into the acceptance of Chinese products or Chinese cultural products, we will have to wait and see for a bit longer. 

At the official launch in Accra on October 28, Bank of Ghana Governor Johnson Bandit Asiamah noted that the economy is showing renewed signs of stability. He described the anniversary as a milestone for national reflection and confidence in Ghana’s economic direction.

“Ghana has turned a decisive corner,” said Asiamah. He attributed the improvement to falling inflation and stronger foreign reserves, which he said have “provided a robust cushion against external volatility and restored our investor confidence.”

The initiative follows a period of economic difficulty. In August 2024, Bloomberg named the cedi as the worst-performing among Africa’s top currencies.

As of October 2025, the cedi has appreciated by approximately 37%. The World Bank reports it was the best-performing currency in sub-Saharan Africa during the first eight months of the year.

“We have learned painful lessons from fiscal indiscipline, overborrowing, and ignoring right principles, but today, the cedi has not only recovered. It has soared,” said Vice President Jane Naana Opoku-Agyemang.

Finance Minister Cassiel Ato Forson urged a reduction in reliance on foreign currency. “The Ghana Cedi remains the only legal tender. The US dollar is not our currency. The Cedi is our only currency,” he stated.

Bank of Ghana data showed that as of October 28, the cedi was trading at a market average of 10.85 Ghana cedis to 1 US dollar. This is a significant improvement compared to 16.15 Ghanaian cedi to 1 US dollar during the same period in 2024.

“Our commitment to fiscal discipline has contributed to the strengthening of the Ghana Cedi… We shall stay the course to ensure that the Ghana cedi remains stable,” the finance minister said.

Once political identity becomes part of who we are – “I am CCM” or “I am Chadema” –  the goal shifts. People stop comparing policies and start defending their side while attacking the other. Political scientists call this affective polarisation : when people become emotionally attached to one camp and hostile toward another, no matter the issues.

Studies show that when this happens, support for equality, accountability, and the rule of law weakens .

In Tanzania, this is most visible in the long dominance of Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM). Many citizens identify with the party out of loyalty to its name rather than its performance. Wearing party colours, chanting slogans, and attending rallies become symbols of belonging, not of debate or reform.

From Citizens to Fans

Why does this happen? Because political membership increasingly looks like fandom. Fans stay loyal even when their team sucks. They love the colours, the chants, and the stars more than the results. And they rarely criticise their own side, even when things go wrong.

When politics becomes fandom, activism turns into performance. Supporters cheer louder instead of asking harder questions.

But this blind loyalty doesn’t just weaken citizens – it blinds the rulers too. In trying to maintain the illusion of mass approval, leaders begin to lose sight of the truth.

In Tanzania, we’ve seen politicians pay people to attend rallies, dress them in party regalia, and transport them in lorries and buses – sometimes even including secondary school pupils below voting age. The goal is simple: to stage a spectacle of popularity, to look powerful and loved.

Yet the reality is sobering. In a country where most people still struggle to make ends meet, many will cheer for anything that brings a free meal or a few coins. These displays are not signs of genuine support but symptoms of desperation. They show how easily loyalty can be bought and how rulers mistake performance for legitimacy.

This illusion feeds itself. Leaders surrounded by paid crowds and endless praise stop hearing reality. They listen to applause, not hunger. And when they can no longer see the truth, they lose the ability to reform. Real change requires vision – the courage to face uncomfortable facts, not the comfort of staged approval.

Party switching has become another symptom of this culture. Politicians move between parties not for ideology but for survival – chasing influence, resources, or relevance. At the same time, few parties have clear policy differences , making membership more about identity than conviction.

CCM’s dominance reinforces this trend. Although Tanzania is a multiparty state, the playing field is far from level. Some analysts describe the system as “ authoritarianism in disguise ,” where loyalty matters more than reform.

The Culture of Uchawa

Then there is uchawa – sycophancy. The term comes from the Swahili word chawa , a louse that feeds on blood. Figuratively, it describes people who feed off power through uncritical praise.

In Tanzanian politics, Uchawa is the culture of flattering leaders in exchange for favours, protection, or visibility. Musicians, businesspeople, and public figures often rush to declare support for the ruling party, not because they believe in its policies, but because loyalty pays.

It goes beyond ordinary political support. It becomes a performance of devotion – singing praise songs, wearing party colours, appearing at rallies, and posting flattering messages online. The message is clear: to survive or advance, you must be seen cheering for those in power.

The darker side of uchawa is silence. Those who depend on proximity to power often refuse to speak up against human rights abuses, corruption, or politically motivated prosecutions. They look away because the perpetrators are “on their team.” Their duty becomes defending and praising their leaders, not holding them accountable.

This mindset has spread far beyond party offices. In Tanzania, carrying a CCM membership card can feel like carrying a passport to opportunity. It signals safety, access, and belonging. Many people join the party not out of conviction, but because those connections open doors – to jobs, contracts, or local government support.

There are countless small examples: drivers flying party flags to avoid fines, shopkeepers displaying portraits of leaders to attract goodwill from officials. These gestures reveal a larger truth – political loyalty has become a survival strategy in a system where dissent is risky and power is centralised.

We have arrived at a culture where loyalty is currency and silence is self-preservation.

When blind loyalty rules

When blind loyalty replaces debate, democracy suffers. Citizens become less critical. If your identity is tied to a party or leader, it’s hard to question them, even when projects stall or money disappears.

Flexibility fades, too. Reform requires openness to new ideas and alliances, but fan-like loyalty clings to the tribe. Politics loses its results-oriented focus. Success starts to mean staying in power, not improving lives.

Parties that prize unity over honesty suppress dissent and stagnate. Politics becomes theatre – passionate, noisy, but empty of progress.

Tanzania’s risk

In Tanzania, political identity is woven into history, patronage, and regional networks. CCM’s power rests not only on ideology but also on deep institutional reach and state resources. Opposition parties face financial and legal barriers, leaving many citizens frustrated or disillusioned.

When people feel the system is predetermined, membership becomes about belonging, not changing outcomes.

One survey found that while 77 percent of Tanzanians support elections, nearly a third see political parties as divisive and irrelevant. It reflects both faith in democracy and fatigue with partisan politics.

Reclaiming change

To move from fandom to reform, both citizens and leaders must refocus on performance and accountability. Civil society and independent institutions can help separate identity from evaluation, encouraging people to judge politics by results, not rhetoric.

Coalitions built around common issues like jobs, health, housing – can bridge party divides. Within parties, internal democracy and open debate can turn supporters into active participants, not just cheerleaders.

There are reasons for hope. Research across Africa shows that while identity and loyalty remain strong, performance still matters . The challenge for Tanzania is turning that potential into real, reform-driven participation.

Conclusion

When partisan identity dominates politics, membership becomes fandom: loyalty and belonging take precedence over ideas and results. In Tanzania, decades of dominance, weak opposition, and deep loyalties have made this culture hard to shake.

But democracy depends on citizens who can see – who question, challenge, and demand better. The true measure of loyalty is not how loudly we cheer, but how firmly we hold power to account.

The opinions and thoughts expressed in this article reflect only the author's views.

Mweha Msemo is a Tanzanian freelance journalist based in Dar es Salaam. He focuses on stories of marginalised communities, social justice, and digital rights. With a passion for amplifying unheard voices, his work highlights the lives and challenges of underrepresented groups, reflecting his commitment to raising awareness and fostering understanding.

What’s at stake?

On September 25, 2025, the AU, UN, Somali government, and UK co-hosted a financing event at the UN General Assembly in New York. Italy, Japan, South Korea, and Spain contributed funds, while the EU is expected to support the $20 million that the AU and £16.5 million that the UK committed.  However, authorities acknowledged that there is still a £22 million deficit.  Leaders from the AU and UN warned that without consistent, long-term support, the mission may fail.

The warning comes in an already violent year that has seen Al Shabaab intensify its offensive.  Twenty recruits were killed by a suicide bombing at the Damaanyo military base in Mogadishu, and 21 people, including elders in charge of local defence, were killed during a hotel siege in Beledweyne earlier this year as well.  A strike on U.S. forces at Kismayo airport highlighted Somalia's vulnerability, while militants overran a garrison in Ceeldheer, seizing supplies and vehicles.  These incidents demonstrate that militants can still destabilise both rural and urban areas in the absence of a significant AU presence.

The background

AUSSOM was established in January 2025 as a leaner version of ATMIS/AMISOM, but it was still charged with securing critical infrastructure, assisting the Somali Security Forces (SSF), and degrading Al-Shabaab.  It operates in five sectors, with a phased drawdown aimed at Somali self-reliance by 2029.

Donor fatigue is glaring despite September's pledges, with the UK having acknowledged a £22 million shortfall. Operational planning is undermined by the fact that many contributions are still one-time rather than consistent over several years.  UN and AU officials have cautioned that if funding sources fail, troop logistics and salaries could be jeopardised.

Regional dynamics

Ethiopia is a major troop contributor, but it is cautious of Egyptian deployments because it views them as destabilising and linked to the geopolitics of the Nile Basin amid tensions surrounding the GERD development. Additionally, Addis Ababa conducts unilateral actions outside of AU coordination. Addis has hinted it may reconsider its own commitments if Egyptian deployments expand.

Egypt is now deploying troops under AUSSOM after finalising agreements with Mogadishu. Egyptian contingents are expected to take over positions in Sector Five (Middle Shabelle), including Bal’ad, Jowhar, and Mahaday, currently held by Burundian forces. Cairo frames this as support for Somalia’s stability, but critics see it as part of its strategic contest with Ethiopia. However, Somali leaders have openly denied that they will be used as a front in a proxy conflict.

Ankara is a longtime bilateral partner that invests in infrastructure, maintains a significant base in Mogadishu, and trains Somali special forces.  Although it complicates AU coordination, its expanding role gives Mogadishu alternatives.

Recalibration of the United States: US President Donald Trump has made it clear that the United States "will not police Somalia or Kenya." Washington is shrinking its footprint, prioritising a focus on intelligence assistance and targeted strikes. Recent airstrikes such as those near Badhan and on Al-Shabaab camps, demonstrate continued engagement, but with fewer resources on the ground.

Comment

AUSSOM is indispensable yet precarious. It stabilises Somalia's fragile transition, but ongoing underfunding erodes planning and troop morale.  International acknowledgement of the mission's importance does not yet translate into sustainable resourcing, as the September financing event demonstrated.

AUSSOM’s credibility also suffers from its uneven relationship with Somalia’s federal and regional authorities. Disputes between Mogadishu and federal member states such as Jubaland and Puntland undermine coordination, leaving gaps that Al-Shabaab readily exploits. For many Somalis, the mission is caught between being a stabiliser and a symbol of dependency, struggling to empower Somali forces while remaining an indispensable promise of security.

The U.S. withdrawal increases accountability for European and African donors.  The problem for Europe is serious: terrorism, migration, and maritime insecurity could spread without strong AU operations, but there is still little desire for greater engagement.  For Somalis, AUSSOM serves as a reminder of the state's vulnerability as well as a source of comfort against Al-Shabaab.

Assessment / Outlook

With the help of recent donor commitments, AUSSOM should be able to maintain its position in the near term, but operational constraints brought on by budget deficits will continue.  Al-Shabaab will most likely keep carrying out asymmetrical attacks, such as raids in central Somalia and suicide bombings in Mogadishu, in an effort to test the resolve of the AU and Somali people.

Looking ahead, if donor fatigue persists, there is a real chance that the mission will be reduced too soon.  Somalia's security forces are unlikely to be fully responsible by 2029 due to the country's unresolved conflicts between the federal government and its regions and its sluggish institutional reform.  AU cohesion and Mogadishu's balancing act will be made more difficult by the escalating regional rivalries, which include Ethiopia's resistance, Egypt's ambitions for influence, and Turkey's growing involvement.

The stakes are high for Europe and other partners. In addition to giving Al-Shabaab more confidence, a weakened AUSSOM would raise the risks to Red Sea trade and encourage migration northward, highlighting the close connection between Somalia's stability and wider international security.

Conclusion

AUSSOM embodies both the promise and limits of African-led stabilisation. It is essential in holding back Al-Shabaab and enabling fragile Somali governance, yet its survival depends on reliable funding and regional consensus. Turkey’s rise and the Egypt–Ethiopia tug-of-war complicate AU unity, while U.S. retrenchment shifts responsibility toward Africa and Europe. For Somalia, the mission is a lifeline. For the West, it is a warning: failure to sustain AUSSOM risks reverberations across the Horn, the Red Sea, and into Europe’s own security corridors.

This report is compiled by  Eigenrac  is a Dubai-based boutique consultancy specialising in security risk management services, with a global presence and deep understanding of complex business risk environments. Eigenrac acts as a trusted enabler for clients operating in high-risk or demanding settings.

He said Ethiopia’s economy expanded by 9.2% during the 2024/25 fiscal year, driven by strong growth in agriculture, industry, and other key sectors.

The president added that the East African nation completed the fiscal year without taking direct loans from the central bank, signalling fiscal discipline and economic stability, local outlet Fanamc reported.

According to BMI, a Fitch Solutions Company, Ethiopia’s economy is projected to grow by an average of 7.2% between 2025 and 2034. However, it warned that ongoing security challenges in the Horn of Africa—one of the world’s most unstable regions—could slow progress in Africa’s second most populous nation, home to over 130 million people.

In September, Ethiopia inaugurated the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), the continent’s largest hydroelectric project, with a capacity of 5,150 megawatts. 

The $5 billion project, located on the Blue Nile in the Benishangul-Gumuz region near the Sudanese border, is expected to provide electricity to millions of citizens.

The growth comes despite challenges in implementing a peace accord aimed at removing Rwandan troops and rebel groups from the country's east.

In the interview he:

Resilience Amid Conflict

Samba highlighted that the Congolese economy has remained “resilient amidst a very difficult context internationally as well as nationally,” citing projected GDP growth of 6.3% this year. Inflation is trending downwards, and the DRC is progressing steadily through its macroeconomic program with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). “We have kept our promises and our commitments in terms of reforms and in terms of the way the budget has been executed,” he said, expressing confidence in a successful second review of the program scheduled for October.

Despite an ongoing war he attributes to Rwandan-backed armed groups, Samba underscored the government’s focus on economic management rather than solely on security spending. “Security is important,” he said, “but the economy is resilient. Growth is there.”

IMF Partnership and Financial Stability

The DRC receives both technical and financial assistance from the IMF, which provides balance-of-payment support. Samba noted that the country currently holds close to three months of official reserves in foreign currencies , an important buffer against external shocks. “It’s a dialogue,” he emphasised, rejecting the idea that IMF reforms are imposed on Kinshasa. “We discuss, we exchange, and we do agree on what has to be done. So far, it’s going well.”

The country recently completed an IMF programme for the first time.

Separately, it has secured commitments from the World Bank and is working with the African Development Bank to fund the world's biggest hydro-electric project, the Grand Inga Dam. Mukoko Samba insisted that the project will go ahead despite large finance gaps remaining and little apparent appetite from private-sector companies to engage.

Regional Economic Integration

The minister acknowledged that political tensions have slowed progress on economic cooperation with Rwanda but reaffirmed President Félix Tshisekedi’s longstanding commitment to regional integration. He identified the potential for joint exploitation of gas reserves in Lake Kivu as one area where the US-brokered talks could bear fruit. However, his words were accompanied by a warning:

"What we don't want is this illegal exploitation of natural resources from DRC, the use of armed groups to instil instability, to disrupt the rule of law and to disrupt the right of the DRC government to rule its own territory and to manage its own resources. So we can go into deals with any neighbour, but that has to be cooperation, collaboration, dialogue, and not imposition."

Trade with the US and AGOA

Asked about the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which is up for renewal in Washington amid a U.S. government shutdown, Samba was optimistic: “I don’t think there is anything to fear about that. We are still willing to discuss with the US government so that we can renew AGOA for the benefit of both.” 

Cobalt and Resource Policy

Samba reaffirmed his government’s ambition to move up the value chain in mining, particularly in cobalt, of which the DRC supplies about 70% of the global market. After months of prohibiting exports of the metal, a new quota system will come into force this month. "The measures that we took in February this year show that there is a way to manage the cobalt market differently," he observed.

The minister argued that local processing is critical to controlling prices and preventing market manipulation by foreign stockpiling. “When you supply 70% of the world market,” he said, “tell me then why you shouldn’t be… at least having a say in where the prices get fixed.”

But prices aren't the only issue; it's important for the DRC to increase its refining capacity so that more profits from the minerals remain in the country. As well as trying to push foreign miners to do more, the government is supporting local initiatives, Mukoko Samba said.

He pointed to the Buenassa project in Katanga, which is establishing a Congolese-led refinery for cobalt and copper with government equity participation.

Interview filmed by Said Echarif at the Crans Montana Forum in Rabat on Oct 3, 2025

The increase in bilateral trade, growing Emirati investments in sectors such as energy, transport, and manufacturing, and the establishment of new institutional linkages—such as business councils—underscore that this partnership extends beyond traditional bilateral relations; it represents the emergence of a collaborative growth corridor. By aligning Tanzania’s ambitions for industrialisation and economic integration with the UAE’s vision to broaden its influence across Africa, both countries are constructing not only stronger bilateral ties but also a strategic route that connects markets, creates opportunities, and anchors prosperity across regions. Notably, this corridor—one of the oldest in the region—is re-emerging with renewed strength and significance, set to play a pivotal role in global trade flows.

BACKGROUND 

During the 7th century, the Indian Ocean trade expanded significantly following the spread of Islam. Experienced Arab seafarers from Oman, Yemen, and the Persian Gulf efficiently utilised the predictable monsoon winds to establish regular maritime routes to the East African coast.

The northeast monsoon (December–March) enabled ships to travel from Arabia to East Africa, while the southwest monsoon (April–September) facilitated their return. This reliable wind pattern supported consistent, biannual maritime commerce.

Consequently, Tanzania’s coastline—including Zanzibar and the key ports of Kilwa, Mafia, and Bagamoyo—became a central hub for trade in commodities such as ivory, tortoise shell, and rhinoceros horn. Many Arab traders established permanent settlements, founding trading towns that contributed to the region’s commercial development.

Archaeological evidence, such as mosques and stone structures in locations like Shanga on the Lamu archipelago, attests to the presence of established trading communities as early as the 8th century, underscoring the historical depth of regional commerce.

These coastal settlements evolved into cosmopolitan centres where Arab, Persian, Indian, and African traders interacted extensively. Intermarriage between Arab merchants and Bantu-speaking communities facilitated cultural integration, laying the foundation for the development of Swahili identity.

By the 10th century, a distinct society had emerged, Muslim in religion, commercially oriented, and closely connected to the coastal environment.

The Swahili language developed during this period, combining a Bantu linguistic structure with significant Arabic vocabulary, particularly in the domains of religion, commerce, and governance. The adoption of Islam began gradually, initially among coastal elites and traders.

By the 9th century, mosques were established along the Tanzanian coast, signifying both a permanent Arab presence and the increasing adoption of Islamic practices.

Conversion to Islam enabled local rulers to form strategic alliances with Arab and Persian merchants. By the 10th century, East Africa, including Tanzania, was firmly integrated into the broader Islamic world economy.

Arab geographers, such as Al-Masudi in the 10th century and Al-Idrisi in the 12th century, documented the East African coast, which they referred to as the Zanj Coast. Commodities from Tanzania were exported to distant markets in Baghdad, Cairo, and other regions, while Arabian textiles, glassware, and ceramics were imported into East Africa.

U.A.E

Situated at the intersection of Asia, Europe, and Africa, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) possesses a significant geographic advantage, which facilitates its emergence as a major hub for transhipment and global connectivity. ( Middle East Briefing )

A substantial proportion of the global population is accessible within a short flight from UAE transport hubs, further reinforcing the nation’s role as a critical transit node. 

Recognising logistics, shipping, and aviation as foundational pillars of its post-oil diversification strategy, the UAE views investment in ports and airports not merely as infrastructure development, but as a strategic means to capture value throughout international supply chains. 

Through active participation and control in overseas port and airport operations, UAE-based companies can extend their influence, secure critical trade routes, and generate returns that transcend domestic boundaries. Some analysts have described this expansion, particularly in Africa and other regions, as a form of 'sub-imperial' outreach. 

Major port operators include DP World, AD Ports Group, and other key stakeholders.

DP World, headquartered in Dubai, is recognised as a global leader in port and terminal operations, managing facilities in numerous countries and handling a significant proportion of global container traffic. AD Ports Group, based in Abu Dhabi, oversees a diverse portfolio of ports, maritime and logistics services, free zones, and industrial parks. Its expanding network includes Khalifa Port and overseas operations such as concessions in Pointe Noire and Luanda, Angola. 

These state-backed or state-affiliated entities function as extensions of the UAE’s infrastructure diplomacy and commercial influence. 

The UAE is making substantial investments in domestic airport infrastructure, exemplified by the development of Al Maktoum International Airport (DWC)—a $35 billion project aimed at establishing the airport as a premier global aviation hub. 

Sharjah International Airport has similarly undergone terminal expansions to support increased capacity and connectivity. 

In April 2024, approval was granted for a major terminal expansion at Al Maktoum International Airport, featuring 400 gates and multiple runways, with the long-term objective of consolidating all of Dubai’s air traffic at this site. 

These targeted investments are designed to enhance capacity, increase connectivity, and reinforce the UAE’s position as a leading global transit and logistics hub. 

The UAE offers a stable and predictable legal and regulatory framework, which fosters investor confidence and facilitates international business operations. 

Numerous free zones across the UAE offer favourable conditions, including full foreign ownership, tax incentives, exemption from customs duties for specific trade activities, and streamlined capital repatriation processes. 

To strengthen legal protections and facilitate cross-border investment, the UAE has entered into multiple Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements (DTAs), Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), and Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreements (CEPAs). 

The UAE integrated ports, airports, logistics zones, free zones, industrial parks, digital platforms, and customs systems to form a cohesive logistics ecosystem. For example, AD Ports utilises advanced digital platforms such as Maqta Gateway and ATLP to synchronise trade and logistics flows across maritime, land, air, and free zone domains. 

Continuous investment in digital infrastructure, innovative technologies, and trade facilitation measures enables the UAE to reduce operational friction and handling times. 

Many organisations benefit from tax exemptions or reductions, particularly within free zones, as well as the absence of personal income tax factors which increases the attractiveness of business operations and profitability. 

The government also offers favourable concessions and tenders for the development and management of strategic assets, such as ports and terminals, often through long-term agreements with international partners. 

These investments yield direct returns through fees, tariffs, and handling services, while also capturing value across the supply chain—including logistics, warehousing, and trade-related services.

Such activities contribute to the growth of non-oil sectors, thereby supporting the UAE’s broader economic diversification objectives.

Ownership or operation of key overseas infrastructure enables the UAE to strengthen trade corridors, forge strategic alliances, and enhance its leverage in partner nations. 

The UAE’s presence in Africa is particularly notable, with UAE-linked operators managing ports and airports across East, West, and Central Africa, thereby expanding the country’s strategic footprint. 

The UAE’s logistics hubs have become increasingly attractive to airlines, shipping companies, logistics providers, and trade flows, fostering a virtuous cycle of connectivity, traffic growth, and further investment.

As infrastructure capacity expands, the marginal cost associated with additional traffic declines, thereby improving the efficiency of transit through the UAE. Overcapacity risk arises if projected traffic and usage levels do not materialise, potentially resulting in the underutilization of costly infrastructure assets.

Geopolitical and sovereignty challenges are inherent in operating infrastructure within foreign jurisdictions, as these activities may be affected by policy shifts, local political dynamics, or disputes regarding operational control.

Regulatory complexity and coordination challenges arise from the need to operate across multiple jurisdictions, free zones, regulatory regimes, customs systems, and legal frameworks, thereby increasing administrative friction and risk.

Competition remains strong, as other global logistics hubs—including Singapore, Rotterdam, and Malaysia—are also actively enhancing their infrastructure and capabilities.

The UAE is expected to further expand its global infrastructure portfolio, particularly across Africa, to support emerging trade corridors and logistics networks.

Greater integration with emerging trade corridors—such as those linking Africa and Asia will further enhance the UAE’s status as a global logistics hub.

Sustainability and green logistics are expected to become increasingly central, with a focus on reducing emissions, adopting smart port technologies, electrification, and utilising clean energy in operations.

Ongoing digital transformation—incorporating automation, blockchain, artificial intelligence, and the Internet of Things—will continue to drive efficiency gains and cost reductions.

TANZANIA

Tanzania shares borders with several landlocked countries, including Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zambia, and Malawi. By improving its infrastructure, Tanzania can facilitate the movement of goods to and from these neighbouring markets, enhancing regional trade integration. Additionally, Tanzania’s Indian Ocean coastline provides inland nations with essential maritime access to global trade networks.

If effectively leveraged, Tanzania could serve as a vital transit corridor for a substantial regional market. Analysts often cite a catchment area exceeding 200 million people in East and Central Africa as an immediate opportunity. With successful regional integration, Tanzania has the potential to function as a primary entry point to a combined market of 300–500 million people across East, Central, and Southern Africa.

Tanzania is assuming a central role in facilitating intraregional trade, with Dar es Salaam surpassing Nairobi in trade volume among East African Community (EAC) countries.

Furthermore, the country continues to improve its macroeconomic stability and business environment , making it increasingly attractive to foreign exporters and investors. Consequently, Tanzania’s geographic position, combined with progressive policy measures, provides a robust foundation for its aspirations to become a regional trade hub.

The Port of Dar es Salaam handles approximately 95% of Tanzania’s international trade and provides services to neighbouring landlocked countries.

Plans are underway to modernise the port by deepening berths, expanding terminals, upgrading cargo handling processes, and implementing advanced digital systems.

The long-anticipated Bagamoyo Port project aims to alleviate congestion in Dar es Salaam and establish a significant new logistics hub, complete with a planned industrial zone. Bagamoyo Port is projected to handle up to 20 million TEUs by 2045, positioning it as a significant regional logistics centre. 

Enhancing maritime connectivity will be essential for accommodating larger container vessels, improving turnaround times, and reducing operational costs.

Corridor development initiatives are underway to integrate mines with rail networks, rail with ports, and ports with international shipping routes.

The effectiveness of the rail system will depend on the development of feeder networks, efficient intermodal transfer points, and harmonised customs and cargo handling procedures.

Tanzania boasts one of the most extensive road networks in East Africa, comprising trunk and regional roads that total approximately 86,472 kilometres.  The construction and improvement of road infrastructure can facilitate the integration of rural and interior regions with coastal and cross-border trade nodes. The Kigongo–Busisi Bridge, spanning the Gulf of Mwanza and measuring approximately 3.2 kilometres in length, represents a significant infrastructure development that has substantially reduced ferry crossing times.

Several border regions, such as Mbeya and Songwe, are emerging as critical trade hubs facilitating integration with the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and neighbouring countries.

Nonetheless, challenges persist, including road maintenance, capacity limitations, weighbridge bottlenecks, customs delays, and inefficient inspection processes.

Customs and trade facilitation processes must be enhanced and harmonised with neighbouring states to reduce delays and promote efficient cross-border trade.

Robust legal and regulatory frameworks, transparent contracting, effective public-private partnerships (PPPs), comprehensive risk mitigation, and sustained political stability are essential for successful infrastructure development. The government has explicitly prioritised infrastructure support in its national investment and development plans.

Successful implementation of these infrastructure and institutional reforms could yield transformative impacts for Tanzania:

Lower Logistics Costs: Enhanced infrastructure can significantly decrease transport and trade costs, positioning Tanzanian routes as more cost-effective alternatives within the region.

Economic Diversification: Improved access will enable the scaling of agricultural zones, mining operations, and manufacturing, fostering value addition beyond the export of raw materials.

Regional Integration and Dominance: Tanzania can establish itself as the backbone of trade for East, Central, and Southern Africa, extending its influence beyond local markets.

Current U.A.E-Tanzania 

Tanzania and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) formally established a diplomatic relationship. Since then, the UAE has maintained an embassy in Dar es Salaam (since around 2011), while Tanzania opened its embassy in Abu Dhabi in 2002.

Over the decades, bilateral relations have remained cordial, steadily progressing from basic diplomatic engagement to more robust economic and sectoral cooperation. 

In December 2024, the two countries marked 50 years of diplomatic ties and held their first high-level political and diplomatic consultations to review past cooperation and set new priorities 

These longstanding foundations provide both political legitimacy and continuity for the evolving partnership.

Trade between Tanzania and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has shown consistent and robust growth, highlighting the significance of economic ties between the two nations. In 2022, non-oil trade exchanges reached approximately USD 2.5 billion, reflecting an expanding commercial partnership. By 2023, Tanzania’s imports from the UAE totalled around USD 1.42 billion, with mineral fuels and oils (about USD 1.08 billion) leading the import categories, followed by plastics, machinery, electronics, and vehicle parts. On the export side, Tanzania supplied goods valued at approximately USD 686.4 million to the UAE in 2023.

A notable subset of this relationship is the trade between Dubai and Tanzania, which grew by about 9% year-on-year in 2023, reaching AED 9.8 billion. By September 2024, around 274 Tanzanian companies were registered with the Dubai Chamber of Commerce, indicating deepening business ties. To further strengthen cooperation, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed between Dubai Chambers and the Tanzania Chamber of Commerce, Industry & Agriculture, aimed at promoting collaboration through trade missions, information exchange, and private-sector linkages.

These developments underscore that trade remains a cornerstone of the bilateral relationship, positioning the UAE as a key trading partner for Tanzania.

Trade between Tanzania and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has shown consistent and robust growth, highlighting the significance of economic ties between the two nations. In 2022, non-oil trade exchanges reached approximately USD 2.5 billion, reflecting an expanding commercial partnership. By 2023, Tanzania’s imports from the UAE totalled around USD 1.42 billion, with mineral fuels and oils (about USD 1.08 billion) leading the import categories, followed by plastics, machinery, electronics, and vehicle parts. On the export side, Tanzania supplied goods valued at approximately USD 686.4 million to the UAE in 2023.

A notable subset of this relationship is the trade between Dubai and Tanzania, which grew by about 9% year-on-year in 2023, reaching AED 9.8 billion. By September 2024, around 274 Tanzanian companies were registered with the Dubai Chamber of Commerce, indicating deepening business ties. To further strengthen cooperation, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed between Dubai Chambers and the Tanzania Chamber of Commerce, Industry & Agriculture, aimed at promoting collaboration through trade missions, information exchange, and private-sector linkages.

These developments underscore that trade remains a cornerstone of the bilateral relationship, positioning the UAE as a key trading partner for Tanzania.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has emerged as a significant investor in Tanzania, with a particular focus on sectors including mining, energy, logistics, manufacturing, and infrastructure. 

A notable example is the high-profile port management agreement with DP World, a Dubai-based company. In 2023, the Tanzanian parliament approved a 30-year contract for DP World to manage four berths at the Port of Dar es Salaam, with performance reviews scheduled every five years.

The Tanzanian government initiated the deal as a strategic initiative to enhance port efficiency, increase throughput, and strengthen connections to regional trade corridors.

 In 2024, GSG Energies, a UAE-based firm, announced a planned investment of USD 500 million in Tanzania across sectors such as transport, mining, manufacturing, and petroleum distribution. This investment is projected to generate over 3,000 jobs over a five-year period. The UAE and Tanzania have also formalised their partnership through cooperation agreements in customs, mining investment, and the establishment of a joint UAE–Tanzania Business Council aimed at deepening private sector collaboration.

In 2022, both countries signed an Agreement on the Avoidance of Double Taxation (ADT), designed to facilitate cross-border investment, reduce tax uncertainty, and prevent double taxation of income in both jurisdictions.

Collectively, these agreements and investments reflect a clear intent to institutionalise and expand investment flows beyond isolated projects.

In addition to formal agreements, trade missions are regularly organised to foster business linkages. For instance, in December 2024, the Dubai International Chamber conducted a trade mission to Dar es Salaam, facilitating 408 business meetings between Dubai and Tanzanian firms. The DUBUY digital platform, launched by DP World in the UAE, further supports commercial engagement by facilitating connections between businesses in the UAE and Africa, including Tanzania.

Reflecting this evolving partnership, Tanzania’s economic diplomacy under President Samia Suluhu Hassan has prioritised opening trade with new partners and leveraging international collaborations, with the UAE frequently identified as a central pillar of this strategy. The Tanzanian Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture (TCCIA) has also signed memoranda of understanding with UAE counterparts to establish frameworks for collaboration, business councils, and joint ventures.

High-level political gestures have further reinforced the bilateral relationship. In 2025, President Samia Suluhu Hassan of Tanzania was awarded the UAE’s Order of the Mother of the Nation by the UAE President, symbolising diplomatic goodwill and alignment between the two nations.

During high-level visits, both countries have emphasised their ambitions to expand cooperation in diverse areas such as trade, investment, energy, logistics, infrastructure, agriculture, and climate response. Both countries have reaffirmed their commitment to broadening bilateral cooperation and strengthening engagement in multilateral forums. On regional and continental issues, Tanzania and the UAE occasionally coordinate or support shared frameworks addressing climate change, trade blocs, and infrastructure connectivity. 

In essence, the political relationship between Tanzania and the UAE remains largely amicable and cooperative, with intermittent friction arising from significant agreements.

Future of U.A.E- Tanzania 

For the UAE–Tanzania corridor to operate effectively, Tanzania is actively upgrading its infrastructure—including railways, roads, and ports—to accommodate increased throughput and support deeper integration.

In 2024, Tanzania inaugurated a USD 3.1 billion standard gauge railway spanning 541 kilometres between Dar es Salaam, the commercial capital, and Dodoma, the administrative capital. This initiative strengthens internal logistics and enhances connectivity between inland regions and the coast. Ongoing and planned expansions of internal railway lines—including connections to Mwanza and Kigoma—aim to link mineral-rich regions and landlocked neighbouring countries with Tanzania’s coastal ports. Regional rail link initiatives, such as the proposed Tanzania–Burundi standard gauge line, are expected to further extend Tanzania’s rail network, providing inland regions with direct access to the country’s ports.

The Mtwara Development Corridor project seeks to connect southern Tanzania with adjacent regions through integrated road, rail, and waterway access originating from Mtwara Port. The planned expansion of Bagamoyo Port aspires to establish it as a major new regional port in East Africa, with a projected capacity of 20 million TEUs by 2045.

These infrastructure developments are essential for the corridor’s effectiveness, creating reliable and efficient routes from production areas in the interior to export gateways along the coast.

Beyond economic considerations, the UAE–Tanzania corridor is shaped by strategic, political, and regional competitive dynamics. The UAE’s East Africa strategy encompasses a geopolitical dimension, seeking to strengthen influence along the Red Sea and Indian Ocean flanks, counterbalance other global powers, secure critical maritime routes, and more closely integrate Africa with Gulf-based logistics networks. More broadly, the UAE aims to position itself as a primary interface between African markets and global supply chains, leveraging its advanced logistics, port operations, and financial hubs. The UAE’s increasing involvement in Africa’s infrastructure sector—including ports, railways, and logistics—is integral to its broader foreign direct investment and influence strategy. The conferral of the “Mother of the Nation Order” by the UAE to Tanzanian President Samia Suluhu Hassan in 2025 underscores symbolic ties and high-level recognition between the two countries. Additionally, the Tanzanian Prime Minister’s visit to Abu Dhabi in mid-2025 served to deepen diplomatic, trade, and bilateral cooperation ties.

Consequently, the process of corridor development is not merely transactional; it carries substantial political significance and is informed by long-term strategic considerations.

While the vision for the corridor is promising, several significant challenges must be addressed:

Return on Investment and Commercial Viability: Large-scale infrastructure projects necessitate sustained demand, meticulous planning, and robust governance, as corridor investments often entail significant capital risk.

Coordination and Institutional Capacity: Successful corridor development requires effective alignment among multiple agencies—such as ports, customs authorities, railways, and local governments—as operational bottlenecks may impede progress.

Competition and Regional Alternatives: Competing corridors, such as those via Kenya, Uganda, and Ethiopia, also vie for trade flows. The UAE–Tanzania corridor must deliver superior efficiency, reliability, and cost competitiveness to attract and retain traffic.

Sustainability and Social Impact: It is critical to ensure that corridor growth benefits local communities, prevents displacement, and aligns with established environmental and social safeguards to maintain legitimacy.

Taken together, these elements reveal a transformative trajectory:

1. Anchor relationships & trust

The diplomatic and institutional foundations established between the UAE and Tanzania provide legitimacy and continuity to the corridor’s development.

2. Trade and investment deepening

Increasing trade volumes, memoranda of understanding, business councils, and direct investments by UAE firms in Tanzania indicate a shift from a traditional supplier–consumer dynamic to one of co-development and co-investment.

3. Infrastructure & logistics integration

Ports, logistics hubs, and internal connectivity infrastructure are being constructed or expanded, with UAE logistics companies positioning themselves as key operators within this growing network.

4. Regional reach

Tanzania’s role extends beyond bilateral trade with the UAE; it is positioned to serve as a gateway to East and Central Africa. The corridor concept envisions Tanzania’s interior and neighbouring markets integrating with the UAE through maritime, air, and rail connections.

5. Strategic positioning

The corridor is both economic and geopolitical in nature, as the UAE views Tanzania as a stable node at the Indian Ocean–East Africa interface, anchoring its strategy as a bridge between Africa, the Gulf, and the wider Indian Ocean region.

6. Growth trajectory ahead

If current momentum is sustained—with infrastructure projects completed, regulatory frameworks streamlined, and investments maintained—the UAE–Tanzania corridor could emerge as one of the most prominent trade and investment axes linking the Gulf and East Africa.

The opinions and thoughts expressed in this article reflect only the author's views.

Dean Tavakoli is an analyst and a senior executive who possesses over a decade of extensive global quantitative investment experience. He is the CEO of Sea Enerji, a petrochemical trading company based in Turkey and has also served as a strategic advisor for the Middle East Oil and Gas.

Ben Belton, a research fellow at the International Food Policy Research Institute and lead author of a recent study published in Science , called the trend “a revolution in terms of how quickly it's happening, but also the implications that it has, in terms of agricultural productivity, greater efficiency in agrochemical use, and the labour savings it affords farmers”.

How are drones used in farming?

Agricultural drones fall into two main categories:

Sensor drones: These smaller drones are used for data collection, detecting early signs of poor crop health, pests, weeds, or diseases—often before human eyes can spot them.

Spreader drones: These larger drones are used to apply pesticides, herbicides, and fungicides. Increasing payload capacity has also made them useful for spreading fertilisers and even seeds across fields.

Belton notes that spreader drones are currently having the most dramatic impact. “These are being used much more widely,” he says, “and are transforming farming practices on the ground.”

What does this revolution mean for farmers?

Many of the countries that have seen the rapid adoption of agricultural drones have experienced dramatic rural-to-urban migration. This has led to a labour shortage in farming communities. Often, farmers themselves are relatively elderly and struggle with physical work like spraying fertiliser and sowing seeds.

   Belton says that in many of these countries, farming is already largely mechanized with tractors, power tillers and combine harvesters, but drones are taking this a step further, “I think of them in a way as being like flying tractors, so a tractor is the one machine, but there are many, many different implements that you can add onto a tractor to perform different functions”.

  Belton also points out that drones reduce the direct exposure of farmers to pesticides, something that many of the interviewees for his study cited as a key factor in their adoption of drones.

How the Global South got ahead

In the early days of drone technology , the key developments were being made in the Global North. Companies commercialised drones for hobbyists to be used for photography and other leisure uses. Then Chinese company DJI became a leader in this field. It was DJI that then led the way in developing drones for agriculture, first smaller ‘sensors’ and then the bigger ‘spreaders’.

China ’s well-established toy industry meant that it had a head start in mass production. Belton says, “There are also spillovers from other industries. So, for instance, the electric vehicle industry in China”. Batteries and LIDAR systems used for helping self-driving used in the EV industry could be used in drones.

There are now close to a million agricultural drones in use in China today. Other early adopters were Japan and Korea. From there, the technology spread rapidly to places like Thailand, Vietnam, Turkey and later Latin America . Now, drone technology is being implemented rapidly across North America.

What should we expect to see in the next 5-10 years?

Belton says that the drone revolution is far from over. In the next 5 to 10 years, he says, we are likely to see the integration of sensing and spraying capabilities into single drone units.

“You'll be able to go out and do the analytics and apply the inputs in a more targeted way. And so, you know, if that starts to happen, then there's really potential for a whole other order of benefits in terms of the increased precision and efficiency.”

As agricultural drones continue to evolve, the Global South is positioned to lead the next wave of global farming innovation.

A fragile mandate amid divided politics

Mutharika’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) secured a decisive presidential win, but parliamentary seats are fragmented, with the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) and smaller groups holding significant sway. This means policy will require coalition building.

A resounding victory for Mutharika but will need cross-party cooperation to advance government's business in parliament.

The economic reality: a country under strain

A new analysis by Fitch Solutions’ BMI highlights just how precarious Malawi’s economy has become, underscoring the uphill battle for newly re-elected President Peter Mutharika. The data show Malawi’s budget and current account deficits have remained stubbornly high for years, with both hovering deep in negative territory since 2017.

Fiscal shortfalls consistently exceed 8–10% of GDP, while current account gaps further strain the balance sheet. Real GDP growth, meanwhile, remains modest, projected below 4% into 2026. This combination of sluggish growth and structural deficits leaves Malawi highly exposed to external shocks.

Malawi’s economy is among the most aid-dependent in Sub-Saharan Africa. U.S. foreign assistance and multilateral aid make up a large share of secondary income inflows. At the same time, Malawi has barely 1.5 months of import cover, critically below the IMF’s recommended threshold.

In contrast, regional peers such as Zambia and Tanzania enjoy stronger external buffers, with higher import cover and less reliance on aid.

What Mutharika promises and what stands in the way

Mutharika is remembered for delivering relative stability in his earlier term (2014–2020), when inflation fell to single digits and roads were built. Yet his legacy was clouded by allegations of cronyism, which may affect donor confidence today.

Economists say his government must prioritise:

Cautious optimism, high risks

Fitch Solutions warns that Mutharika will likely need “cross-party deals” to govern effectively, while policy missteps or stalled reforms could push the country into a deeper crisis. His administration must restore economic stability through tighter fiscal discipline, credible monetary policies , and structural reforms. Otherwise, Malawi risks deepening its dependence on aid and falling further behind its regional peers. overshadowing recovery.

The same trend was observed in real GDP per employed person, which slowed to 1.6% from 3.0% in the same period, indicating weaker productivity.

“It could indicate the needs of technological advancement, better capacity building and improved management practices in the economy for obtaining higher productivity so that it will drive higher economic growth,” the report stated.

Based on separate ASEAN data, the region’s population stood at 671.7 million in 2022, representing a 1.2% growth rate, faster than the 0.8% recorded the previous year.

These indicators reflect Asean’s progress under SDG 8, or Decent Work and Economic Growth, which seeks to promote inclusive growth, full employment and decent work for all.

Far from full employment

Under the same SDG, the report noted that the region remains far from full employment. The unemployment rate inched down only slightly, to 3.8% from 3.9% in 2016, which the report described as “relatively slow” progress.

Disparities remain between sexes and age groups. Unemployment among men was 3.7% in 2023, compared with 4.0% in 2016, while women’s unemployment rose to 3.5% from 2.6%.

Youth unemployment was the highest, standing at 8.5% in 2023, though down from 11.2% in 2016. The share of young people not engaged in education, employment or training also fell to 16.8% from 18.7%.

Southeast Asia remains a relatively young region, with a median age of 30.4, compared with the Asian average of 32.5 years. 

The figure is expected to fall further when Timor-Leste, Asia’s youngest democracy, which also happens to have one of the world’s youngest populations, formally joins the bloc.

Regional outlook

BMI ’s analysis indicates that smaller and mid-tier economies will continue to outperform the region’s largest markets. From 2010 through 2024, these economies have consistently recorded stronger growth than the so-called “Big 5.” This pattern is expected to continue in 2026.

The “Big 5” economies — South Africa , Nigeria, Kenya, Angola, and Ghana — are forecast to expand at a slower pace. Structural issues, including limited investment and weaker productivity, are expected to constrain their performance compared to smaller peers.

Several countries are set to record some of the highest growth rates. Rwanda, Zambia, Ethiopia, Senegal, Niger, and Côte d’Ivoire are listed among the top performers. Other economies such as Uganda, Tanzania, Ghana and the Democratic Republic of Congo are also projected to deliver solid growth.

Regional growth figures show that momentum in Sub-Saharan Africa will largely come from smaller economies. In 2026, BMI projects the “Big 5” will continue to lag behind the wider group of markets, reinforcing a clear divide.

Some economies are set to struggle in 2026. Zimbabwe, Sudan, Eritrea, Somalia, Mozambique, Malawi, Angola, Lesotho, and South Africa are forecast to post weaker growth compared to the rest of the region.

Southern Africa focus

The analysis highlights how Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe are entering 2026 with very different economic conditions, shaped by both domestic and external pressures.

Lesotho: Tariffs and aid dependence

Lesotho’s economy is slowing under the weight of US tariffs. Real GDP growth is forecast to remain weak in 2025 and 2026. The country is heavily reliant on exports to the United States, which account for around 40–50% of total exports. Added to this, Lesotho is exposed to a fall in development aid. USAID funds represented a significant share of GDP in 2023, leaving healthcare especially vulnerable. The report notes that HIV prevalence remains high, with more than 20% of adults aged 15–49 affected.

Malawi: Election and weak economy

85-year-old Peter Mutharika secured a resounding win in the September 16 presidential election, signalling a demand for political change. However, parliamentary seats remain divided between the Democratic Progressive Party and the Malawi Congress Party, meaning policymaking will require cooperation. Malawi’s economy faces major hurdles. The fiscal deficit has stayed above 10% of GDP in recent years, and the current account is also in deficit. Real GDP growth is forecast to remain below 4%, showing the country’s vulnerability to aid shocks and external disruptions.

Mozambique: Recovery under pressure

Mozambique’s economy is projected to recover, but at a slower pace. Real GDP growth for 2025 and 2026 is forecast below the 2014–2023 average. The report highlights continued political and social risks, with the society risk index showing elevated scores. Foreign reserves are expected to improve slightly, supporting exchange rate stability. The metical is forecast to remain stable against the US dollar under BMI’s base case scenario.

Zambia: Growth and fiscal improvement

Zambia’s macroeconomic outlook is more positive. Real GDP growth is expected to accelerate in late 2025 and into 2026. Fiscal consolidation is also underway, with revenue and expenditure levels improving. However, political uncertainty remains. While President Hakainde Hichilema is in a strong position ahead of the 2026 election, his United Party for National Development risks losing legislative control, which could complicate policymaking.

Zimbabwe: Short-term gains but inflation persists

Zimbabwe’s short-term outlook has improved due to stronger performance in agriculture and gold production. Real GDP growth is forecast to remain positive through 2026. Inflation, while slowing, is still high and remains a challenge for households and businesses. Public confidence in government performance is low, with surveys showing high dissatisfaction on issues such as job creation, corruption, and living standards.

Horn of Africa outlook

The Horn of Africa is described as one of the riskiest regions in the world despite its strategic location along major global shipping routes—the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.

Political tensions and security challenges remain widespread.

According to the report, Ethiopia, which recently inaugurated the $5 billion Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) , is forecast to grow by an average of 7.2% between 2025 and 2034, far higher than its neighbours. Djibouti is expected to grow at 4.2%, while Eritrea will expand at 3.8%. Somalia is projected to record the weakest performance, averaging 2.8% growth over the same period.

Despite Ethiopia’s strong outlook, the commentary warns that security challenges could weigh on growth. Data shows rising fatalities from incidents in regions such as Amhara, Oromia, and Tigray. BMI highlights that ongoing domestic instability remains a key downside risk.

A complex network of bilateral relationships among Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, and external powers such as the UAE and Turkiye adds to geopolitical tensions. Ethiopia’s search for sea access has also been identified as a potential flashpoint.

BMI’s Country Risk & Industry Research covers more than 200 countries and over 20 industry sectors.

He emphasised the need for greater use of local currencies in cross-border trade, expanded lending from the New Development Bank (NDB), and joint investments in energy, infrastructure, and emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence.

“BRICS can and must play a central role in shaping a fairer, more inclusive global economic order,” Abdelatty said, according to Egypt’s Foreign Ministry.

The appeal comes as global debt levels hit $315 trillion in 2025, according to the Institute of International Finance , with emerging markets accounting for nearly a third. Many African and Asian countries face rising debt-servicing costs as U.S. interest rates remain high and access to concessional financing tightens.

Abdelatty also used the platform to denounce Israel’s war in Gaza, calling it an “unprecedented humanitarian catastrophe,” and reiterated Egypt’s opposition to any forced displacement of Palestinians. He welcomed this week’s UN General Assembly resolution reaffirming international support for a two-state solution.

BRICS , founded in 2009 as a counterweight to Western-led financial institutions, expanded in 2024 to include Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE, Ethiopia, Iran, and Indonesia, alongside original members Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.

The bloc says its goal is to amplify the voice of the Global South in institutions such as the IMF, World Bank , and WTO.

On September 8, 2025, the Constitutional Council published the final list of five candidates for the October 25 presidential election: President Alassane Ouattara, Jean-Louis Billon, Don Mello, Simone Gbagbo, and Henriette Lagou. The candidatures of Laurent Gbagbo (PPA-CI) and Tidjane Thiam (PDCI) were rejected, citing a lack of sponsorships, among other reasons.

PPA-CI raises alarm over arrests of activists

The executive president of the African Peoples' Party-Côte d'Ivoire (PPA-CI), Dano Djédjé Sébastien, expressed concern on September 16 in Abidjan about the situation of party activists and executives reportedly arrested since August 1, 2025. According to the PPA-CI, 29 members, including Pascale Zaholy, Moïse Lida Kouassi, and Boubacar Koné, have been victims of “kidnappings or forced disappearances.” The party announced plans to meet with the Ministry of the Interior and Security for clarification, while reaffirming its commitment to peaceful political engagement. Djédjé emphasised the importance of safeguarding political freedoms and avoiding intimidation ahead of the October presidential election.

UN envoy urges peaceful and inclusive elections

Leonardo Santos Simão, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative for West Africa and the Sahel, met with Ivorian political leaders in Abidjan on September 20, 2025. He held discussions with both selected and rejected presidential candidates, stressing the need for peaceful, inclusive, and transparent elections. The mission aims to promote stability and social cohesion before and after the vote.

Opening of historic contemporary art museum

A new contemporary art museum, La Maison de l’Art, has opened in Grand-Bassam in a restored colonial-era building. The inaugural exhibition features 28 artists from nine African countries, showcasing paintings, sculptures, photography, and design. The space includes permanent and temporary exhibition halls, an artist residency, and meeting facilities. Ivorian artist Mathilde Moreau described it as a gathering place for exchange and creativity. The project was realised in partnership with the Ministry of Culture and the Société Générale Foundation.

Launch of first forensic art programme in West Africa 

The University of Bondoukou inaugurated a new programme in “Forensic Art and Facial Identification” during a seminar on September 24–25, 2025. The initiative, the first of its kind in West Africa, stems from a collaboration with the forensic science department. Authorities praised the programme as a symbol of innovation and modernity in higher education. University president Professor Ouattara Djakalia emphasised the institution’s commitment to developing training aligned with labour market needs and preparing competitive graduates.

President Gustavo Petro has denounced recent US airstrikes on alleged drug-trafficking boats in the Caribbean as an “act of tyranny,” warning that criminal proceedings could follow if Colombians were among the 17 reported dead. Speaking to the BBC in New York, Petro argued that stopping vessels does not require lethal force and accused Washington of humiliating South Americans. President Donald Trump defended the strikes as necessary to curb fentanyl smuggling, while Democratic lawmakers and UN experts have questioned their legality, calling them possible extrajudicial executions.

US delegation walks out of Petro’s UN speech

The United States delegation left the hall during Petro’s address at the United Nations, where he criticised the Trump administration for decertifying Colombia’s anti-narcotics record and for the Caribbean bombings. The Colombian leader accused Washington of spreading “lies” about drug seizures, stressing that his government extradited over 700 traffickers without resorting to missile strikes. The State Department responded briefly, saying its delegation’s actions “spoke for themselves”.

Peace talks with Clan del Golfo begin in Qatar

Colombia has opened peace negotiations with the Clan del Golfo, a powerful criminal group with roots in paramilitarism. The talks, held in Qatar, focus on disarmament in exchange for judicial benefits. Chief negotiator Álvaro Jiménez said the group’s main income now comes from illegal gold mining and stressed that leaders recognise they are at their “peak” and risk decline. The cartel, with 6,000–7,000 members, has already suffered major setbacks, including the arrest and extradition of former commander “Otoniel” in 2022.

Earthquake shakes Venezuela and Colombia

A 6.1-magnitude earthquake struck western Venezuela late Wednesday, September 24, rattling Colombian border cities including Cúcuta and Bucaramanga. The Colombian Geological Service confirmed the epicentre was in Mene Grande, Venezuela. No casualties or damages have been reported, and authorities ruled out tsunami risk for the Colombian coast. Residents across both countries reported alarm, though tremors are common in the region due to tectonic activity.

US investment in Colombia declines

Foreign direct investment (FDI) from the United States into Colombia has fallen for the second year in a row, reflecting strained relations and economic uncertainty. Central Bank figures show US investment dropped 15% in the first half of 2025, from US$2.66 billion to US$2.26 billion. While the United States remains Colombia’s top investor, accounting for 34.5% of inflows, the decline forms part of a broader 15.2% fall in total FDI last year, hitting mining, oil, and manufacturing sectors hardest.

“It is only right that I concede defeat out of respect for your will as citizens and out of respect for the constitution,” said Chakwera, 70, in a national address.

“It was clear that my rival, Peter Mutharika, has an insurmountable lead over me,” he added. “In the days that remain, I want you to know that I am committed to a peaceful transfer of power.”

The September 16 vote featured three key candidates: Chakwera, Mutharika (who led the country from 2014 to 2020), and Joyce Banda (president from 2012 to 2014). Although the Electoral Commission was expected to announce final results later on Wednesday, early figures showed Mutharika ahead.

According to Reuters, Mutharika secured around 66% of the valid votes in 24 out of the country’s 36 councils. Chakwera trailed with about 24%.

Since Chakwera took office in 2020, Malawi’s economy has struggled. Inflation rose to 33%, and prices of essentials like food, maize, and fertiliser climbed. The World Bank reports that nearly 75% of Malawians live on less than \$3 a day, and about half the population lacks adequate daily nutrition.

Chakwera ran on a promise to tackle corruption , but critics said his efforts were slow and selective.

Mutharika, a former law professor now 85 years old, was credited during his previous term with building infrastructure and controlling inflation. But his leadership also faced allegations of cronyism, which he denied.

His 2019 election win was later overturned by the courts due to irregularities, including the use of correction fluid on results sheets. Chakwera won the re-run held the following year.

Mutharika is now poised to become one of Africa's oldest presidents, only bested by Cameroon's ever-present leader, Paul Biya, at 92. Biya is also seeking reelection in Cameroon's October 12 election that could keep him in office until just months shy of a century.

President Duma Boko described the gold medal as a “historic African win” in an online address. He praised the athletes for their outstanding performance and said the holiday would be held a day before the country’s independence day, which falls on the 30th of September.

The team — made up of Olympic gold medallist Letsile Tebogo, Lee Bhekempilo Eppie, Bayapo Ndori and Busang Collen Kebinatshipi — beat the United States in a rain-soaked final. The US had previously won the event 10 times. South Africa came third.

“I’ll be sure to tell everyone Botswana’s natural diamonds are not just in the ground; they are our world champion athletes,” President Boko said, speaking from New York, where he is attending the UN General Assembly.

Botswana finished fifth overall on the medal table — its best performance yet — with two golds, one silver, and one bronze. Only the US, Kenya, the Netherlands and Canada ranked higher.

This follows another major milestone from the previous year, when Letsile Tebogo became the first African to win Olympic gold in the men’s 200m at the Paris 2024 Olympics . His win sparked nationwide celebrations, with huge crowds welcoming him back at the National Stadium in Gaborone.

Botswana also picked up a silver in the men’s 4x400m relay during the Paris Games, finishing behind the US.

The achievement was marred by a government appeal for public donations to reward the athletes, which sparked a protest among citizens.

As Malawians await the official results of the 16 September general election, a surge of online disinformation has sparked confusion. A fake X account impersonating presidential candidate Michael Usi falsely claimed he conceded to President Lazarus Chakwera before any official tallies were released. AFP Fact Check confirmed the account was fraudulent, and Usi’s assistant, Winnie Nyando, dismissed the concession claims. Meanwhile, the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) denied involvement in Facebook posts smearing human rights defenders. Party spokesperson Shadric Namalomba disowned the propaganda, calling it “very unfortunate and unwelcome.”

Concerns over irregularities at tally centres

Tensions flared as political parties questioned the integrity of the results verification process. Opposition representatives raised alarm over the arrival of unsealed ballot boxes and faulty electronic devices at the national tally centre in Lilongwe. Reports indicated 42 of 45 boxes from Nkhata Bay lacked security seals. After negotiations, the Malawi Electoral Commission (MEC) agreed to share hard copies of electronic results with party agents for verification. While MEC pledged to investigate, both the DPP and United Transformation Movement called the breaches a serious concern.

Election observers urge transparency amid delays

International observers have pressed the MEC to manage results openly to avoid fuelling suspicion. Lucia Annuziata, head of the EU Election Observation Mission, praised the peaceful voting but warned that secrecy around tallying could “erode trust.” Similarly, the SADC Election Observation Mission encouraged tolerance and calm while awaiting results. Civil society groups demanded full transparency, including explanations for delays and protection of election data. Seventeen presidential hopefuls, including incumbent Lazarus Chakwera and former President Peter Mutharika, are contesting what many describe as Malawi’s most consequential vote since 1993.

US cuts deepen Malawi’s struggles

Malawi’s economic and social sectors remain strained following US funding cuts and tariff hikes introduced in January under President Donald Trump. France 24 journalists reported that the suspension of aid — which once accounted for over 13% of Malawi’s national budget — has crippled health, education, and infrastructure projects. Refugee camps face collapse, LGBT clinics have shut down, and students have lost scholarships. Exporters also face tariffs that make their goods uncompetitive. As voters head to the polls, citizens expressed frustration at being left vulnerable in a suddenly self-reliant environment.

Fruit trees linked to better nutrition in Malawi

A decade-long study has found that planting fruit trees on farms significantly improves household diets in Malawi. The research, covering nearly 1,000 households between 2010 and 2020, showed that each additional tree species increased fruit consumption by 5%. Families with trees also ate more vegetables than those without. While overall fruit intake remains far below World Health Organisation recommendations, the findings highlight how small-scale agroforestry can address widespread undernutrition and vitamin deficiencies in rural communities.

Alibaba is now betting heavily on AI to regain its lead in China’s e-commerce market. In February, the company pledged to invest more than 380 billion yuan ($52.4 billion) over three years in AI and cloud infrastructure.

It recently unveiled its latest AI reasoning model , QwQ-32B, saying it “almost entirely surpasses OpenAI-o1-mini and rivals the strongest open-source reasoning model, DeepSeek-R1.” The announcement lifted Alibaba’s Hong Kong-listed shares by 8%.

Alibaba first launched its ChatGPT-style service Tongyi Qianwen in 2023 and has continued to upgrade its models, including January’s release of Qwen 2.5 Max, which it said outperformed DeepSeek’s V3 model.

China’s government has pledged greater support for “emerging industries and industries of the future,” including AI, humanoid robots and quantum technology. Under its 2017 New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan, Beijing set a goal of becoming a global leader in AI by 2030 . In February, Ma and President Xi Jinping were pictured shaking hands during a gathering of top Chinese tech figures, a moment many observers saw as symbolic of Ma’s rehabilitation and return to Beijing’s good graces.

Ma’s renewed involvement comes as Alibaba battles JD.com, Meituan and PDD Holdings for market share. Alibaba’s e-commerce dominance has slipped from the roughly 85% share it once held, though it remains a major player and controls 43% of China’s food delivery market, just behind Meituan.

Alibaba was one of the biggest casualties of Beijing’s crackdown, losing almost US$700 billion of market value after Ma’s 2020 speech criticising Chinese lenders, which prompted regulators to halt Ant Group’s record IPO and tighten oversight of the tech sector.

Since then, Alibaba has restructured its business, replaced former chief executive Daniel Zhang with Ma’s longtime lieutenants Joe Tsai and Eddie Wu, and refocused on technology and its core e-commerce operations.

“Jack has kind of a moral authority in the company to make the big calls and also to criticise executives, indirectly or directly, or criticise strategy when he thinks it’s in the wrong direction,” said Duncan Clark, author of "Alibaba: The House That Jack Ma Built."

Whether Alibaba’s AI investments can restore its dominance remains to be seen. But with Ma back on campus and Beijing pushing to become an AI superpower, Alibaba is once again poised to reclaim its spot at the centre of China’s tech ambitions.

The project is designed to significantly boost employment, with the initial development phase expected to generate 2,300 jobs. Across its full five-phase plan, the gigafactory is projected to create up to 10,000 jobs. The first phase alone is expected to result in 17,000 direct and indirect job opportunities.

Production is scheduled to begin in late 2026 with an initial capacity of 20 gigawatt-hours (GWh), which is expected to scale up to 100 GWh.

What this means

Unlike many other plants that rely on imported materials, this facility will manufacture the core materials required for battery production. By producing electrode materials such as cathodes and anodes on-site, the factory offers Morocco enhanced supply chain security and cost competitiveness. This vertical integration reduces reliance on foreign imports and strengthens Morocco’s autonomy in the high-tech manufacturing space .

Around 85% of the batteries produced at the site will be exported to the European Union. This helps reduce Europe’s dependence on Asian markets and shortens supply chains for the automotive sector. Morocco is shifting from being an assembly point to a key manufacturing hub serving one of the largest consumer markets globally.

The gigafactory’s development will follow a modular roadmap. It will commence with a first stage in 2026 and expand progressively as contracts and funding are secured. This approach is designed to allow flexibility and scalability in response to evolving energy market dynamics.

Local production of essential battery components will help Morocco reduce its import dependency. The project's vertical integration is expected to stabilise regional supply chains and strengthen Morocco's competitive position amid growing global demand for battery technology.

This initiative also marks a strategic shift for Africa. By building manufacturing capabilities on the continent, the project offers a model for transitioning from raw material exportation to high-value industrial production. It allows African countries to gain more economic value from their natural resources.

China-Morocco partnership

China remains Morocco’s third-largest global trading partner and its largest in Asia. In 2024, bilateral trade amounted to $9.04 billion, with China exporting $7.74 billion and importing $1.3 billion from Morocco, China’s Foreign Affairs Ministry reported.

The partnership reflects China's expanding economic involvement in Africa. It aligns with China’s strategy of combining infrastructure investment with industrial development in the clean energy sector. 

For Morocco, the gigafactory represents a step forward into high-tech manufacturing, economic diversification, and a strengthened role as a strategic link between Africa, Asia, and Europe in the global green economy.

China's broader investment strategy in Africa

In May, China pledged to increase its investment across Africa.

Shen Xiang, Director of the West Asia and Africa Department at China’s Ministry of Commerce, stated , “African countries have seen steady economic development in recent years, with the overall business environment continuing to improve and the willingness of Chinese firms to invest in the continent significantly growing.”

According to Shen, annual direct investment from Chinese firms in Africa has exceeded $3 billion over the past five years, covering a variety of sectors.

Colombia, the world ’s largest producer of cocaine, has been under growing scrutiny despite expanding aerial and manual eradication efforts. The government has highlighted record levels of coca crop destruction this year, but U.S. officials remain sceptical about long-term progress. A negative ruling could lead to the suspension of roughly $450 million in assistance for security, development, and technical cooperation.

Analysts point to three possible outcomes: full certification, decertification with a waiver that preserves aid, or outright decertification without exceptions. While the first scenario would strengthen Bogotá’s position, the latter two would send a sharp signal of U.S. disapproval and strain cooperation at a time when Washington has linked drug trafficking to regional instability.

Colombian officials insist they are committed to working with the U.S. regardless of the outcome. Admiral Francisco Cubides, head of the Navy, said last week that “renewing certification is an objective we pursue with actions, not words”. But uncertainty remains high as both governments brace for a decision that could redefine one of Washington’s longest-running security partnerships in Latin America .

On September 11, the European Parliament adopted a resolution (2025/2862(RSP)) condemning the detention of Abdoul Aziz Goma, an Irish-Togolese citizen held in Lomé since 2018. Lawmakers denounced torture, inhumane conditions, and an unfair trial that led to a ten-year sentence after a one-day hearing in February. They urged his immediate release, medical evacuation, and annulment of his conviction, while warning of democratic backsliding in Togo. Goma has been on hunger strike since August 27, with reports of critical health complications.

ECOWAS Parliament relocates session amid rising tensions

The ECOWAS Parliament has shifted its second extraordinary session of 2025 from Lomé to Abuja, citing “circumstances beyond our control”. The move came shortly after the June 6 Movement (M66) announced a September 20 protest demanding President Faure Gnassingbé’s resignation and the release of political prisoners. Civil society actors view the relocation as recognition of mounting unrest following Togo’s contested constitutional changes earlier this year.

Togo summons EU ambassador over resolution

Following the European Parliament’s resolution, Togolese authorities summoned Gwilym Ceri Jones, the EU’s ambassador in Lomé, on September 12. Officials accused the EU of interference and defended the independence of Togo’s judiciary. The move came as international voices, including UN experts, continued to criticise Goma’s detention and trial.

Fintech becomes Togo’s first to win BCEAO authorisation

Togo-based Ollo Africa has become the country’s first fintech to win authorisation from the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO) to operate across the eight-nation UEMOA zone. The company is launching Ohana Africa, a platform designed to digitise traditional group savings systems and expand financial inclusion. Backed by partnerships with Ecobank, Ollo Africa aims to reach one million users in Togo before scaling regionally.

Togo posts sharp economic rebound in 2024

Togo’s economy surged in late 2024, with GDP growing 17.7% in the fourth quarter compared to the same period in 2023, according to INSEED data. Annual growth reached 6.5%, driven by strong performances in agriculture, construction, extractive industries, and services. While electricity, hospitality, and public administration contracted, officials credited reforms under the Government Roadmap 2020–2025 for strengthening economic resilience through diversification, logistics, and infrastructure investment.

For Ethiopia, the continent’s second-most populous nation with more than 120 million people, the GERD is a symbol of national pride and economic transformation. The government says the dam will power homes, factories, and infrastructure projects, creating new opportunities for development and export of electricity to neighboring states.

But the project has also heightened tensions with Egypt and Sudan, who depend heavily on Nile waters for drinking, farming, and industry. Cairo has long feared that the dam will reduce its share of the river, which supplies more than 90% of Egypt’s freshwater. Sudan, too, has expressed concern about how water flows and dam operations might affect its irrigation systems and existing dams.

Ethiopia has dismissed these fears, arguing that the project will benefit the region by regulating floods and expanding power supply. Officials insist that GERD will not significantly harm downstream countries, pointing instead to its role in stabilizing water flows during drought years.

The dispute also touches on history. By moving forward with GERD, Ethiopia is sidestepping the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, a colonial-era pact that gave Egypt veto power over Nile projects and granted it the lion’s share of water rights. Addis Ababa has long rejected the treaty as outdated and unjust.

Talks between Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan have repeatedly stalled, and analysts warn that the absence of a binding agreement could fuel further tensions in an already fragile region.

That’s why Anutin’s election, which followed the removal of Paetongtarn Shinawatra by the Constitutional Court over ethics violations, has raised questions over whether the cannabis sector would get a new lease on life after a series of erratic government policies.

Context may offer a clearer picture of what comes next for weed in Thailand.

What we know 

Thailand first eased restrictions in 2018, allowing cannabis for medical use. It was the first country in Southeast Asia to do so, softening penalties that once carried up to 15 years in prison and a fine of 150,000 baht ($4,700).

In early 2022, Thailand made its most dramatic shift, removing cannabis from the list of narcotics. Anutin, then health minister, was a key backer, calling the move a “win-win” for the Thai people.

The new rules allowed households to grow cannabis without notifying the government , and opened the door for businesses to apply for licenses.

The policy was historic: Thailand became the first Asian nation to legalise cannabis in a region known for some of the world ’s harshest drug laws.

By 2025, more than 18,000 licensed cannabis shops were operating, with the Ministry of Commerce valuing the industry at $1.2 billion. Tourists were drawn by the lax regulations, further fueling the boom.

Sans clear-cut rules to moderate its sale, weed grew faster than oversight could keep up with. Authorities began warning of “social harm” from unregulated recreational use, while smuggling surged. Between October 2024 and March 2025, British officials reported that more than 800 cannabis smugglers were arrested and nine metric tons of cannabis were seized.

In June 2025, the Thai government ultimately pumped the brakes on the green rush as they imposed new rules requiring a medical prescription for cannabis purchases, effectively ending the open market. It also bared plans to reclassify cannabis as a narcotic.

The reversal came as Anutin’s Bhumjaithai Party exited the ruling coalition, following Paetongtarn’s ethics scandal tied to a phone call with Cambodian de facto leader Hun Sen about a border dispute.

What’s next?

Anutin has been in office for less than a week. So far, he has focused on assembling his Cabinet, outlining short-term plans for the economy , and preparing to tackle the border dispute with Cambodia. 

Though the cannabis issue remains untouched, his stance is anticipated by the thousands of cannabis businesses. Over the weekend, just a day after his election, Anutin appeared in a cannabis-print shirt while meeting prospective Cabinet members.

Anutin’s administration, however, is transitional. He has just four months to govern under an agreement with the People’s Party, which backed his premiership bid.

Analysts see both Anutin and the Bhumjaithai Party as middle-ground actors in the cannabis debate: opposed to re-criminalisation, but supportive of tighter rules on recreational use.

Whether Thailand ultimately prioritises profit or principle remains an open question. As Southeast Asia’s second-largest economy, it stands to gain from a thriving cannabis sector. 

But with only months to set clear laws, the future of Thailand’s weed experiment remains clouded in smoke.

According to the government , nine reports from nine ministerial departments were approved, resulting in the dismissal of the officials involved in the diploma fraud cases.

The Council also examined reforms under the Ministry of Civil Service, Labour and Social Protection. A new decree introduced a priority clause requiring public officials to serve the state for at least 15 years, which corresponds to the minimum service period for proportional retirement. Civil Service Minister Mathias Traoré explained that officials who fail to meet this requirement would be obliged to reimburse the state for training costs.

Traoré stated that the measure demonstrates the commitment of Captain Traoré to fight corruption and safeguard integrity in the country’s public administration.

In addition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs presented a decree regulating the conditions of assignment and residence for staff in Burkina Faso’s diplomatic missions. “This decree sets a new salary scale for all agents assigned to embassies, limits the coverage of travel documents and insurance to agents assigned to embassies, and eliminates the coverage of tuition fees,” said Minister Karamoko Jean Marie Traoré.