Ethiopia’s renewed push for access to the Red Sea is sharply escalating tensions with neighbouring Eritrea, with both governments exchanging accusations of military provocations along the border. The briefing warns that “whatever the outcome, war will devastate,” underscoring fears that any miscalculation could trigger conflict reminiscent of past hostilities. The standoff now threatens regional stability, raising concerns among analysts, diplomats, and humanitarian agencies who note that both countries remain deeply sensitive to territorial and security disputes. The dispute is unfolding at a delicate moment for the Horn of Africa, where shifting alliances and competing port access negotiations are increasing geopolitical pressure.

Ethiopia steps up fundamental institutional and legal reforms

The government is advancing far-reaching institutional and legal reforms aimed at strengthening the justice sector and improving governance . According to the briefing, Ethiopia is “implementing reforms to strengthen justice institutions,” changes that could significantly shape internal political dynamics as well as its relationships with regional neighbours, including Eritrea. These reforms, which appear in both the Eritrea and Ethiopia political briefing sections, are described as essential for Ethiopia’s long-term economic development and its aspirations for deeper regional integration. The restructuring of judicial and legal frameworks is also being closely watched as Ethiopia navigates internal fragmentation and post-conflict reconstruction.

National Dialogue Commission intensifies calls for civic and religious involvement

Amid ongoing political fragmentation, the Ethiopian National Dialogue Commission is urging civic, community, and religious organisations to expand their involvement in helping resolve the country’s mounting challenges . The briefing links this appeal to broader concerns about Ethiopia’s political and economic future, noting that “Ethiopia’s political fragmentation is seen as a major economic bottleneck,” and emphasising that the National Dialogue is a “critical step toward reconciliation.” The Commission warns that sustainable peace will require inclusive participation beyond federal and regional elites, particularly from groups that hold significant moral authority among the population. The success of the national dialogue is increasingly seen as pivotal to preventing renewed conflict and unlocking stalled economic recovery efforts.

Ethiopia’s continental influence highlighted as GERD is hailed as a symbol of unity

Ethiopia’s strategic role within Africa is being elevated on multiple fronts. The CEO of the East Africa Law Society has underscored that Ethiopia remains “central to Africa’s transformation,” pointing to the completion of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) as a powerful symbol of national self-reliance and unity. The commentary emphasises that Ethiopia’s internal stability and institutional strength will directly shape regional progress, particularly in areas of infrastructure, energy, and economic integration. This recognition comes as Ethiopia also assumes a leadership role within the UN-ECA Committee on Social Policy, Poverty, and Gender, alongside Eswatini and other African states—a sign of its enduring diplomatic influence despite domestic challenges.

On May 24, 1991, Eritrean forces captured their capital, Asmara, a victory which effectively marked the end of decades of war and ultimately secession from Ethiopia. This was the first such case in post-colonial Africa. Just six days earlier, the Somali Republic, which was created in 1960, split as Somaliland (a former British colony) declared independence from Somalia (a former Italian colony). 

Eritrea seceded from a union with Ethiopia, which had been imposed on it in 1962, but Somaliland seceded from a greater Somalia to which it had consented.

Ethiopia’s own government ultimately facilitated Eritrea’s recognition as a sovereign state by the international community.

Thirty-four years after its secession, Somaliland is still in search of international recognition in the face of fierce opposition from Somalia. And then, suddenly, Ethiopia suggested on January 1, 2024, that a quid pro quo may be possible after all: diplomatic recognition in return for access to the sea. If the deal were carried through as planned, it would be the most consequential international event in the Horn of Africa in decades. The hope was that Ethiopia’s recognition would pave the way for similar actions by other states, eventually leading to the birth of the world ’s newest state, the Republic of Somaliland.

So, to recap the two scenarios:

Inter-state and inter-ethnic conflicts continue to define the Horn of Africa.

Blinded by post-colonial logic

Even if Ethiopia and Somaliland had been able to execute as planned without any negative repercussions, their solution would have fallen short of addressing the seemingly intractable problem of the Horn of Africa. But why is the region so chronically unstable, and what can be done about it for the long term? All parties have an interest in the prosperity that a more stable region would generate.

The challenge, as so often, is about history. Ethiopia, alone among the states in the Horn of Africa, was never colonised.”. But its borders were nevertheless a product of struggles and arrangements made in capitals thousands of miles away. The ultimate consequence of the partition of the Horn of Africa was that cohesive nations of people who should have been governing themselves found borders separating them into different states. Conversely, those who should have been separated found themselves on the same side of the line as people with conflicting cultures, histories and traditions. 

This is the fundamental root of the political instability of the Horn of Africa.

What came into being in the region in the post-colonial period was Ethiopia, a state in search of a nation, and Somalia and Djibouti, nations in search of a state. Eritrea is neither a state nor a nation—it is an entity in search of both.

The political concept of state denotes administrative structure and control, and the sociological concept of nation denotes collective identity. 

Over the years, several proposals have been put forward for addressing the challenge of political instability in the Horn of Africa. One element that these proposals had in common was the need to maintain existing colonial borders, even if the countries in the region were to form some kind of union. The logic of avoiding the inevitable disputes and wrangling over a redrawing of boundaries is understandable. But is it compatible with a solution to the underlying problems?

What if our fixation with national borders with customs points, and fences is merely entrenching the errors of the past? What if we look instead at governance and decision-making and consider a framework that can support the needs of people without simply recreating existing problems in new locations? In fact, this formula is consistent with what is seemingly being practised in Ethiopia at the moment—ethnic federalism. But this approach also transcends it. The autonomy of different ethnic regions should be disproportional or asymmetric, reflecting the distinctive historical experiences of various regions. Some areas have greater cohesion and more unity, others need more independence.

It should be noted that such a concept is not new to Eritrea: Eritrea enjoyed a special status between 1952 and 1962. It was granted a federal status in an otherwise unitary Ethiopia. After a decade, however, Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia abrogated the federal treaty with the support of the US, which, because of the Cold War, had a significant geostrategic interest in the region.

Such a special status should be extended not only to Eritrea but also to other regions in the Horn of Africa, including particularly Somaliland. If this type of asymmetric constitutionalism is implemented, the result could be the United States of the Horn of Africa. In theory, this would also become a stepping stone toward the realisation of the long-dreamt United States of Africa.

Author’s note: In this essay, I have referred to the Horn of Africa as Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti, and Eritrea. The Greater Horn of Africa clearly also encompasses Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya, and Uganda.

The opinions and thoughts expressed in this article reflect only the author's views.

Seifudein Adem is a visiting professor at the Institute of Advanced Research and Education at Doshisha University, Kyoto, Japan. He has taught in Ethiopia, the US, Japan and China and is the author of several books on international relations.

The letter, seen by AFP, warned that the alleged collusion “had become more evident over the past few months.”

The Ethiopian government accused both Eritrea and the TPLF of “funding, mobilising and directing armed groups” in the Amhara region, where Fano militiamen have been engaged in conflict with federal forces.

Eritrea has not yet commented on the contents of the letter. However, relations between the two neighbours have been increasingly strained in recent months, with the Red Sea emerging as a major flashpoint.

Eritrea gained control of the Red Sea coastline when it became independent from Ethiopia in 1993. The two countries later fought a brutal border war from 1998 to 2000, which killed tens of thousands of people .

Tensions between them had eased after Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed came to power in 2018 and built an alliance with Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki. But relations have since deteriorated, especially as Ethiopia pushes for renewed access to the Red Sea.

According to Addis Standard, the letter from the foreign minister accused Eritrea and TPLF hardliners of supporting Fano's attempted capture of Woldiya, a town in the Amhara region, in September. The paper reported that “TPLF commanders and fighters participated directly in the operation,” quoting the letter.

The letter also stated that the Eritrean government is attempting to destabilise Ethiopia as it felt threatened by Addis Ababa's bid to gain access to the Red Sea.

A faction of the TPLF led by Debretsion Gebremichael controls the government in Ethiopia’s Tigray region, which borders Eritrea. That faction accuses Abiy’s government of failing to fully implement the 2022 peace deal that ended the Tigray conflict. It also claims that another TPLF faction, led by Getachew Reda, is working with the federal government in Addis Ababa.

Eritrea, which supported Ethiopian forces during the Tigray conflict, was not a party to the 2022 peace deal. It is now being accused of aligning itself with the Debretsion-led TPLF faction against the federal government.

Meanwhile, conflict in Ethiopia’s Amhara region has intensified. The Fano militias, formerly allies of the government against the TPLF, have refused to disarm, accusing the government of targeting the Amhara ethnic group. The militias appear to be expanding their goals, with increasing efforts to topple the federal government and mounting deadly operations.

Speaking in Ethiopia’s parliament on Monday, President Taye Atske Selassie described the Red Sea and River Nile as “great water resources, which are essential to our country's existence.”

In response, Eritrea’s Information Minister Yemane Gebremeskel dismissed the comments, saying the rhetoric was “too crass and pathetic to sell.” He added that the Ethiopian ruling party's “obsession” with the Red Sea and River Nile was “bizarre and mind-boggling by all standards.”

Despite the strict accusations, Ethiopia's letter to the UN also indicated a desire for peaceful resolution, stating that the country “hoped to negotiate with the Eritrean government over this issue.”