This is the end of our live coverage of the 2026 Hungarian parliamentary election. Follow all Global South World Channels for more updates.

01:43 GMT : After 16 years of Orbán, Hungary votes for change as Magyar vows return to Europe

H ungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has lost power after 16 years following a decisive election defeat , with more than 98% of votes counted in a result expected to have political implications beyond Hungary.

Near-final results from the National Election Office show that Orbán’s ruling Fidesz-KDNP alliance suffered a heavy loss in the 199-seat parliament, while opposition challenger Péter Magyar and his TISZA movement secured a commanding lead.

With 98.89% of the vote counted, TISZA won 138 seats, Fidesz-KDNP secured 55 seats, and Mi Hazánk obtained 6 seats.

In his speech to supporters, Magyar promised to return Hungary to the main fold of European politics, pledging a pro-European Union and pro-NATO direction for the country.

20:50 GMT : Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban has conceded defeat in key parliamentary elections, marking a significant political shift after 16 years in power. Orban lost to his rival, conservative Peter Magyar, a former government insider and political newcomer who has promised “system change.” The election outcome signals a challenge to Orban’s long-standing leadership in the central European country. “The election results, though not yet final, are clear and understandable; for us, they are painful but unambiguous. We have not been entrusted with the responsibility and opportunity to govern. I congratulated the winning party,” Orban said.

19:51 GMT : After 16 years in power, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán is on course to lose by a wide margin in Sunday’s vote. With more than 53 % of the vote counted, his opponent Péter Magyar was projected to win 136 seats in the 199-seat parliament, while Orbán’s Fidesz party was on track to secure 56 seats. Magyar stated on his official social media account that Orbán had called to congratulate him.

17:43 GMT : Polling stations across Hungary have closed following the national parliament election held today. The National Election Office (NVI) is expected to begin the official vote count, with preliminary results scheduled to be released later tonight.

17:40 GMT : Voter turnout in Hungary’s national parliament election reached 77.80% by 18:30 (1630 GMT) in 2026, according to data from the National Election Office. The figure marks an increase compared to previous election years. In 2022, turnout at the same time stood at 67.80%, while in 2018 it was recorded at 68.13%. The data indicates a rise of 10 percentage points from 2022 to 2026, and a 9.67 percentage point increase from 2018 to 2026.

16:26 GMT : Less than an hour to go before polls close. Over 5.5 million voters had already cast their ballots as of 17:00 (1500 GMT). According to the National Election Office, the current voter turnout is at 74.23% of eligible voters, with 25.77% yet to vote.

14:42 GMT : Voters in Budapest expressed mixed views on Sunday as they queued outside polling stations for Hungary’s parliamentary elections, following a campaign marked by allegations of foreign interference.

"We have never encountered such a disgusting campaign before," one voter said.

13:52 GMT : Less than 4 hours to go before polls close, and the voter turnout data remains high. According to the National Election Office, more than 4.9 million, representing 66.01% of eligible voters, had already cast their vote at 15:00 (1300 GMT).

13:02 GMT : Turnout in Hungary’s closely watched parliamentary election reached record levels by midday on Sunday, April 12, according to figures from the National Election Office.

More than 4 million voters had cast their ballots by 13:00 (1100 GMT), representing 54.14% of eligible voters. Authorities reported that turnout hit 54% by noon, which is more than 14 percentage points higher than at the same stage in the 2022 election.

Opinion polls suggest that the Tisza party, led by pro-European conservative Peter Magyar, is performing ahead of Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s party. Magyar, a former government insider, has pledged a “system change,” and analysts say the high turnout could work in his favour.

11:33 GMT : 7 hours of voting done, 6 hours more until polls close in the pivotal Hungarian parliamentary elections. Voter turnout continues to remain high, according to the figures from the National Election Office, with over 4 million voters (54.14% of eligible voters) as at 13:00 (1100 GMT).

10:52 GMT : Magyar has described the country’s parliamentary election as a decisive moment for political change, positioning it as a choice on governance and public communication. After casting his vote, Magyar, who is the main rival of Prime Minister Viktor Orban, said the election could mark a turning point in Hungary’s political system. He stated that “today, there will be a change of system in Hungary.”

10:02 GMT : Peter Magyar, leader of the pro-European conservative TISZA party, has cast his ballot in Hungary’s closely watched parliamentary elections. The vote is being seen as a significant political moment that could bring an end to Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s 16-year period in power. Magyar’s participation comes as voters decide whether to continue with the current leadership or support a shift in direction.

09:53 GMT : 5 hours since polls opened, recorded voter turnout as at 11:00 (0900 GMT) is 37.98%, representing over 2.8 million voters. The turnout so far from this year's vote stands higher than the last 4 elections.

09:27 GMT : Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban spoke to journalists at a polling centre as voters went to the polls in Budapest for the parliamentary elections, outlining his position on Hungary’s relationship with the European Union and responding to a question about Ukraine.

He responded to reports that officials in Brussels could challenge the outcome if he secured victory, stating, “To deny? No, they have to accept the intention and the will and express the opinion of the people.”

“We are members of the European Union, and this is the right which belongs to the member states,” he added. “We firmly stand on the basis of the national rights and sovereignty.”

When asked whether he would consider ceding territory to Russia in a hypothetical peace deal if he were leading Ukraine, Orban replied, “I'm lucky enough not to be Zelensky.”

08:37 GMT : Orban cast his ballot on Sunday as he faces his most significant electoral challenge in more than ten years. Footage showed Orban arriving in a van alongside his wife, Anikó Lévai, entering a polling station surrounded by journalists, voting, and then leaving the premises.

08:16 GMT : Voter turnout recorded as at 09:00 (0700 GMT) is 16.89%, representing 1,271,768 of registered voters, according to the National Election Office. Voting has been ongoing for over 3 hours since polls opened at 0400 GMT. The turnout so far has exceeded the last 4 elections

06:31 GMT : Over 2 hours since polls officially opened at 6 a.m. (0400 GMT) across the various voting centres in the country. The voting is expected to end at 7 p.m. (1700 GMT), with results expected later in the evening.

06:18 GMT : As at 07:00 local time, the voter turnout recorded was 3.46%, representing 260,556 of registered voters, according to the National Election Office.

06:02 GMT : US Vice President JD Vance accused the EU of interfering in Hungary’s elections, describing it as one of the most serious cases he has seen. Speaking at a joint press conference with Prime Minister Orban in Budapest on Tuesday, Vance said the EU had taken actions that negatively affected Hungary.

05:43 GMT : During a final campaign address in Budapest, Orban described the country’s election as a defining moment for national sovereignty, warning of foreign interference and outlining his government’s position on the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

He said Hungary would not support Ukraine with resources or military assistance. “We will not give our children to Ukraine, we will not give our money, and we will not give our weapons,” he said. “Hungary will remain an island of peace and will continue to be the safest country in Europe after the elections.”

05:06 GMT : In the lead-up to the polls, the ruling Fidesz party saturated Hungarian streets with posters that frame the upcoming election as an existential choice between "war or peace" by depicting foreign leaders and the domestic opposition as menacing threats. Prominent billboards feature "harshly lit" and unflattering portraits of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, portraying them as the faces of a "pro-war lobby" in Brussels intent on dragging Hungary into the conflict. At the same time, opposition leader Magyar is branded as an “agent of Brussels”.

04:53 GMT : Magyar, 45, is not a typical opposition figure. He comes from Orbán’s inner circle and broke away after a corruption and pardon scandal. Since then, his Tisza Party has gained momentum. His focus is different. He talks about the economy, corruption, and the rule of law, what he calls everyday issues. He has also promised to unlock between €18 billion and €22.5 billion in frozen EU funds by restoring Hungary’s alignment with European standards. Unlike past challengers, Magyar connects with voters in rural areas through retail politics, and his right-leaning background makes him harder to dismiss. Read more

04:43 GMT : Ahead of Sunday's election, Prime Minister Orbán urged voters to back his ruling Fidesz party, warning that Hungary could lose key achievements on migration, energy protection and its confrontational stance toward Brussels if the opposition prevails.

04:29 GMT : Why Hungary's election could change more than just its government

Hungary heads to the polls in what many are calling its most important election since the end of communism in 1989.

For the first time in 16 years, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán is facing a serious challenge not from the usual opposition but from someone who once stood beside him.

That challenger is Péter Magyar, a former Fidesz insider who now leads the Tisza (Respect and Freedom) Party. What looks like a domestic political contest is also being watched closely far beyond Hungary, with implications for the EU, the US, Russia, and Ukraine.

Orbán’s campaign has focused heavily on the idea of “war or peace.” He has positioned himself as Hungary’s protector, warning that “progressive forces” in the West and Ukraine are trying to pull the country into conflict. Read more

04:00 GMT : Polls open in Hungary

Polling stations open at 6 a.m. (0400 GMT) and close at 7 p.m. (1700 GMT), with results expected later in the evening. According to the National Election Office, there are over 8.1 million eligible voters.

What to know about the election and possible outcomes

The election is being hailed as the most pivotal moment for the country since the collapse of communism in 1989. Opinion polls suggest that Prime Minister Viktor Orban and his nationalist Fidesz party could lose power after 16 years to the centre-right, pro-European Union Tisza party, led by former Orban loyalist Peter Magyar.

The Key Players

How the voting works

Exactly 8,114,688 registered voters will elect 199 members of parliament. Of these, 106 are chosen in single-member constituencies under a first-past-the-post system, while 93 are selected from national party and ethnic minority lists.

Since 2010, Orbán has rewritten election laws, including gerrymandering districts and making it easier for Hungarians living abroad to vote. Ethnic Hungarians living abroad have the right to citizenship and can vote on party lists by letter. According to National Election Office data, close to 500,000 such citizens have registered for the 2026 election, and most have traditionally supported Fidesz.

The Tisza Party may need to lead Fidesz by at least six percentage points nationally just to secure a simple majority. Voters with a registered Hungarian address must vote in person, either at polling stations in Hungary or at official representations abroad.

Parties must secure at least 5% of the vote to enter parliament.

What happens after the election

President Tamas Sulyok will convene the new parliament within 30 days of the election, likely in May.

Parliament elects the prime minister by a simple majority vote. The president proposes a candidate, usually from the winning party, and parliament votes on the nomination.

If the proposed candidate is not elected, the president must submit a new proposal within 15 days. If parliament fails again to elect a prime minister, the president can dissolve parliament and call a new election.

Core campaign issues

International and geopolitical stakes

Potential scenarios

That challenger is Péter Magyar, a former Fidesz insider who now leads the Tisza (Respect and Freedom) Party. What looks like a domestic political contest is also being watched closely far beyond Hungary, with implications for the EU, the US, Russia, and Ukraine.

Orbán’s campaign has focused heavily on the idea of “war or peace.” He has positioned himself as Hungary’s protector, warning that “progressive forces” in the West and Ukraine are trying to pull the country into conflict.

Across Budapest, that message is hard to miss. Posters show Volodymyr Zelensky and Ursula von der Leyen as threatening figures, often described as part of a “pro-war lobby.” Orbán has also claimed—without evidence—that Ukraine could attack Hungary. His allies have gone further, branding Magyar as an “agent of Brussels.”

Magyar, 45, is not a typical opposition figure . He comes from Orbán’s inner circle and broke away after a corruption and pardon scandal. Since then, his Tisza Party has gained momentum.

His focus is different. He talks about the economy, corruption, and the rule of law, what he calls everyday issues. He has also promised to unlock between €18 billion and €22.5 billion in frozen EU funds by restoring Hungary’s alignment with European standards.

Unlike past challengers, Magyar connects with voters in rural areas through retail politics, and his right-leaning background makes him harder to dismiss.

The outcome matters on several levels. At home, Hungary is ranked as the most corrupt country in the EU, with most of its media and judiciary under state control. A Magyar win would aim to reverse that and dismantle what critics call a “soft autocracy.”

In Europe, Orbán has built a reputation as the EU’s “disruptor-in-chief,” often blocking aid to Ukraine and sanctions on Russia. Some EU leaders are now even considering suspending Hungary’s voting rights.

There are also wider geopolitical stakes. Hungary has been accused of acting as Moscow’s “mole” inside the EU, with leaked calls suggesting coordination with Russian diplomats. If Orbán loses, Russia could lose a key ally, and Ukraine could find stronger support.

In the US, Orbán has backing from Donald Trump and has hosted Vice President JD Vance, but some US Senators are pushing sanctions over Hungary’s ties to Russian energy.

Even with polls putting Tisza ahead by 10 to 12 points, victory is not certain. Orbán has reshaped the system, rewriting the constitution and gerrymandering districts to favour Fidesz.

Experts say Magyar may need at least a six-point lead just to win a majority. The campaign has also been hit by claims of Russian-backed disinformation, known as “Gamechanger,” aimed at damaging the opposition and even suggesting staged assassination plots.

Africa’s exposure to global disruptions is closely tied to its reliance on imports and limited intra-continental trade, Kuagbedzi said, arguing that recent crises have underscored the urgency of reducing that dependence.

“Well, I think that we have to deepen African trade,” he said, referencing the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which was created to boost trade among African countries but has yet to reach its full potential.

He warned that continued reliance on external suppliers for essential goods leaves African economies vulnerable when global supply chains are disrupted.

“We cannot continue as a continent to depend on, you know, others for our, you know, supplies in terms of crude oil, in terms of our cereals, in terms of sugar, in terms of everything that we actually import into this country.”

Economists have long argued that such dependence amplifies the impact of global shocks. Analysts, including Dani Rodrik, have pointed to the need for diversification and stronger domestic industries.

"Economic growth and development are possible only through the accumulation of capabilities over time, in areas ranging from skills and technologies to public institutions," wrote in his book, " The Globalisation Paradox ".

Nelson, during the discussion with Abigail Johnson Boakye, intimated that Africa must move beyond exporting raw materials and instead invest in value addition. “I think that we need to diversify our economic basis by adding more value to the raw materials,” he said, pointing to Ghana’s plan to stop exporting raw gold by 2030 as an example of policy direction.

He added that heavy reliance on imports has implications for employment and economic growth. “Once you continue to import, you are creating unemployment in your country, and you are creating a corresponding employment in that country.”

For Nelson, strengthening intra-African trade is central to reducing vulnerability.

“We should try as much as possible to trade within ourselves. We should try as much as possible to deepen our economic and financial relations. And we should also try as much as possible to build our economies based on African solutions that can solve African problems.”

Watch the full interview attached above.

Major General Samir Farag told Global South Voices’ Kadria Kassem that the current fighting cannot end regional tensions and that a coordinated approach would be necessary.

“We hope the Arab states will heed the advice of President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi and form an Arab Army with real military capabilities,” he said in an interview.

Wealthy Arab nations could fund a regional defence industry with the ability to bind their militaries together temporarily in times of war, Farag said.

He pointed out that Washington’s military involvement in the region would fluctuate, but the underlying problems would remain, especially after Tehran’s policy of retaliating against its neighbours.

“The war might end, but the conflict will persist,” he warns.

Egypt’s three demands

Farag, who has held a range of positions in the military at home and abroad and is a former governor of Luxor, set out Egypt's position on the conflict:

That Iran should not have nuclear weapons

That Iran should not attack the Gulf states

That Iran’s government should not fall.

The latter, according to Farag, would create a vacuum and disrupt the regional balance between Turkey, Egypt, Iran and Israel. “Iran’s exit would be harmful to the strategic balance in the Middle East,” he said

Strategic regional balance

Historically, Egypt’s policy has swung from close links with the Soviets under President Abdel Nasser to tight ties with America. Today, according to Farag, President Sisi is seeking a strategic balance, building relationships with Russia, China, the European Union and the USA as well as regional partnerships.

A key part of this careful navigation is a desire to avoid conflict.

It would have been easy, Farag notes, for his country to have been drawn into the conflict in Gaza.

“We in the military know the cost of war, its problems, the various dimensions and dangers. We know what problems can occur. That is why we are careful,” he says.

Nevertheless, despite avoiding conflict itself, Egypt is profoundly impacted by wars elsewhere. As the largest importer of wheat from Russia and Ukraine, it has been hard hit by price rises and disruptions from the fighting there. And the turmoil in the Gulf has had a profound impact on shipping, hammering important revenues from the Suez Canal.

Farag points out that Egypt has taken in 10 million refugees – he calls them guests – far more than any of its neighbours. And those displaced peoples have found a home in the country that means they are not trying to move on towards Europe, he observes: “Egypt always offers help to every country.”

Standing at the lectern, Chávez pointed to the podium and said:

“Yesterday, the devil came here. Yesterday, the devil was right here. In this very spot. It still smells like sulphur... Ladies and gentlemen, from this very podium, the President of the United States, whom I call the devil, came here speaking as if he owned the world.”

During his nearly six-minute speech, Chávez used the platform to criticise what he described as Washington’s efforts to impose its political and economic model on other countries, often through military force. According to Chávez, the United States was attempting to shape the world in its own image while dismissing critics as extremists.

He also challenged Bush’s claim that the United States wanted peace, arguing that the actions of the US government told a different story.

“The United States does not want peace; it wants to impose its model of exploitation and looting and its hegemony at the point of a gun.”

The former Venezuelan leader also condemned military actions in the Middle East and accused what he described as imperialist powers of targeting civilians.

“Imperialist fire. Fascist fire. Murderous fire and genocidal fire. That of the Empire and Israel against the innocent people of Palestine and the people of Lebanon.”

Nearly two decades later, the issues Chávez raised during that speech are once again being debated amid rising tensions in the Middle East.

On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched a large-scale offensive against Iran after weeks of military buildup and threats from US President Donald Trump. Later, it was confirmed that the strikes on Tehran killed Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

Iran quickly retaliated by firing ballistic missiles at Israel and US facilities across the Middle East, including in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates.

In a Truth Social post, Trump said the goal of the operation was to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon and “to defend the American people by eliminating imminent threats from the Iranian regime", urging the people of Iran to capitalise on the attack as what he described as the “only chance for generations” to take over their government.

Before the Iran attack, Chávez’s own successor, Nicolás Maduro, was removed from power after US special forces carried out a direct military operation in Venezuela on January 3. Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, were captured and flown out of the country to face drug trafficking and narco-terrorism charges in the US.

The operation included coordinated airstrikes in Caracas and naval deployments along the Venezuelan coast. Trump later described it as a “flawless” mission and said there were no American casualties.

Operations of this kind are intended to decapitate a regime by removing its central decision-makers and disrupting its chain of command. Such strikes rarely occur by chance.

They typically reflect a prolonged process of intelligence gathering, surveillance and operational preparation. The ability to target senior figures simultaneously suggests highly detailed knowledge of internal structures and movements. In tactical terms, therefore, an operation that reaches the political and security leadership of a state constitutes a significant success. Yet the strategic implications are less straightforward.

But this isn't the end

The removal of high-ranking leaders does not automatically translate into the collapse of a political system. Authoritarian regimes in particular are often structured to withstand the loss of individuals, even at the highest level.

The Islamic Republic of Iran is not merely a collection of personalities. It is a layered institutional system combining ideological authority, religious legitimacy and an extensive security apparatus.

Succession mechanisms exist, formal and informal, and historically the regime has demonstrated an ability to replace key figures relatively quickly.

For this reason, the real test following such strikes lies not in the immediate casualties but in the regime’s ability to reconstitute its command structure. Can the leadership rebuild a coherent chain of authority?

Can it maintain internal order and prevent fragmentation within its security forces?

If the answer to these questions is yes, the strikes will ultimately represent a dramatic tactical blow rather than a decisive structural rupture.

And strikes can be counterproductive

The Iranian system has never been entirely unified. Long-standing tensions exist between hardliners and more pragmatic elements, between ideological conservatives and reform-oriented factions.

Even within the security apparatus there are differing views about strategy and risk. Some actors interpret the current confrontation as an existential struggle requiring uncompromising resistance. Others may consider that uncontrolled escalation threatens the survival of the regime itself.

External pressure can therefore produce contradictory effects. On the one hand, it may strengthen internal cohesion by rallying elites around the defence of the state. On the other, it can intensify disagreements over how best to respond. In moments of acute crisis, these divisions may become more visible.

The battle for control

The durability of the regime is closely linked to the interests of those who benefit from it.

Iran’s security elite is deeply embedded in networks of economic patronage and institutional power. At the centre of this system stand the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, numbering roughly 190,000 personnel, supported by the Basij militia and a range of internal security organisations.

These forces possess the capacity not only to defend the regime externally but also to suppress dissent domestically. The persistence of checkpoints, surveillance and internal security operations even during periods of external bombardment demonstrates that this apparatus remains operational. As long as the coercive machinery of the state remains intact, the regime retains the capacity to endure.

Alongside the Revolutionary Guards stands Iran’s regular army, a separate institution with a different historical identity and organisational culture. The Guards function as the ideological army of the Islamic Republic, closely integrated with the political leadership. The regular army, by contrast, represents a more traditional state institution. Should the regime face a severe crisis, the behaviour of the regular army could become decisive. It might remain neutral, support the existing system or attempt to act as an arbiter.

Iranian history offers a relevant precedent. During the revolution of 1979 the army initially participated in suppressing demonstrations but ultimately declined to intervene at a decisive moment. That episode continues to influence contemporary strategic thinking within the country.

So what IS next?

Another question concerns what might follow a weakened or collapsing regime. Some observers argue that Iran’s social structure and national identity make a descent into chaos less likely than in countries such as Iraq after 2003.

Iranian society possesses a strong sense of historical continuity and a relatively high level of education. Moreover, opposition movements exist, even if they remain fragmented and often operate outside the country.

These groups range from monarchists and republicans to centre-left movements and representatives of ethnic minorities.

Many share common demands centred on democratic governance, secular institutions and minority rights. Reza Pahlavi, the son of Iran’s last monarch, remains a controversial figure in this debate. While some see him as a possible rallying point for a transitional process, others question the legitimacy of any political figure who has spent decades in exile. A more sceptical view holds that organised opposition within Iran has been largely dismantled by decades of repression.

From this perspective, the absence of a coherent alternative could create the conditions for instability should the regime weaken dramatically.

This uncertainty creates a paradox.

Many Iranians may desire political change, yet fear the instability that might accompany the collapse of the current system.

The prospect of disorder can therefore slow political momentum and, in some cases, enable regimes under pressure to reconstitute themselves. It also explains why diplomatic appeals for negotiation may appear disconnected from the strategic reality of the conflict.

Once military operations begin targeting the highest levels of leadership, the confrontation moves beyond ordinary disputes. For the regime, the struggle becomes one of survival.

Under such circumstances, entering negotiations can appear indistinguishable from accepting defeat. The priority becomes internal consolidation rather than external dialogue.

There's a blame game

Perhaps the most destabilising element in such operations is not the immediate loss of leaders but the questions they raise about internal vulnerability.

Strikes that successfully target high-level meetings suggest either exceptional intelligence capabilities or the presence of informants within the system itself. In authoritarian regimes, the mere suspicion of infiltration can be corrosive.

Trust within the leadership becomes fragile. Senior figures begin to question the loyalty of colleagues and subordinates. Decision-making becomes slower and more defensive as individuals prioritise personal survival.

History shows that many authoritarian systems do not collapse primarily because of external pressure. Instead, they weaken when internal cohesion begins to erode.

The decisive question

For this reason, the critical issue is not simply the removal of key leaders. The decisive question is whether the Islamic Republic can maintain institutional, military and psychological cohesion after such losses.

If the regime’s elites retain confidence in one another and successfully reconstruct their command structures, the system may endure despite the shock. If, however, suspicion spreads within the leadership and the chain of authority begins to fracture, the consequences could be far more profound. In that scenario, the most consequential battlefield may not lie outside Iran’s borders but within the regime itself. This article is based on writing by François Chauvancy and Jean-Marie Montail for Atlantico.fr

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz bent down to take a closer look. The scene was rich in symbolism: more than 30 years ago, German experts came to China with blueprints and Siemens machine tools, teaching local factories how to achieve precision manufacturing. Today, the German chancellor has come in person, seeking a new support point for German industry at the intersection of artificial intelligence and humanoid robotics.

This shift in vantage point reflects a profound adjustment in Berlin’s China policy . If the defining theme of the Olaf Scholz era was the defensively framed notion of “de-risking,” then Merz’s first visit to China in the Year of the Horse signals that Germany is moving into a more pragmatic and bold phase - a phase of “re-calibration.”

Farewell to the “De-risking” Illusion

When the idea of “de-risking” first emerged, it was seen as a way for Europe to maintain a “middle ground” and save face amid the strategic rivalry between China and the United States. But as a new wave of tariffs rolls in with the “Trump 2.0” era, Berlin has come to realise that if it were to sever its ties with the world’s largest market, German industry would not truly “de-risk.” Instead, stripped of scale effects and innovation sources, it would face the risk of functional decline.

Merz’s itinerary in China - from Hangzhou to Beijing - is a concrete enactment of this “re-calibration.” “Calibration” here no longer means simply reducing dependence, but achieving a defensive form of symbiosis through “deep embedding.” His appearance at Siemens Energy’s plant in Hangzhou sent a clear signal: rather than pacing anxiously outside the walls, Germany would do better to become an indispensable technological node in China’s forthcoming “15th Five-Year Plan.”

Xi Jinping’s “Three Points” and Strategic Steadiness

At the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse in Beijing, Chinese President Xi Jinping put forward “three points” to Merz, providing a Chinese frame of reference for this “re-calibration” of China–Germany relations.

Reliable partners : Against the backdrop of growing scepticism in Washington toward the multilateral trading system, Beijing has stressed “mutual support,” hoping Germany will continue to play the role of a stable “guardian of order.”

Innovation partners : This cuts right to Germany’s core position. Whether it is BMW integrating DeepSeek’s reasoning capabilities, or Siemens collaborating with Shanghai Electric to advance the green and digital transformation of power grids, China and Germany are trying to build a new industrial standard of “German precision plus Chinese algorithms.”

People-to-people partners: This is aimed at repairing the social and cognitive rifts widened by ideological narratives.

Embedded within these “three points” is a core logic: in a geopolitical landscape marked by overlapping turbulence, the stability of China–Germany ties is itself a strategic asset that can hedge against external uncertainties.

Joint Statement: Growing Up in Competition

The “China–Germany Joint News Statement” issued during the visit charted the course for this round of policy re-calibration.

First, the statement defines bilateral ties as an “all-around strategic partnership,” emphasising that their economic and trade relations should be long-term, balanced, reliable and sustainable. For Germany, this is a defensive framework designed to buffer the shocks of Trump-style unilateralism.

Second, the two sides explicitly wrote their respective concerns into the joint document, no longer sidestepping problems in the relationship. In other words, China–Germany ties are entering a more mature stage in which competition and cooperation co-exist: the goal is no longer to avoid friction, but to “manage competition” through institutionalised consultation mechanisms.

“German Hardware, Chinese Soul”

Merz did not just bring home an order for up to 120 Airbus planes. A deeper shift is unfolding at the technological foundations. BMW is leveraging Alibaba’s ecosystem and DeepSeek’s algorithms to redefine “driving pleasure,” while at Siemens Energy’s plant in Hangzhou, the German chancellor saw a complete local value chain that spans R&D, engineering design, manufacturing, testing and validation, project execution, and operations and maintenance.

China is no longer just an important market for German companies; it has become a pillar of their global supply chains, and of their innovation and manufacturing systems. Siemens Energy is working with Chinese partners to tap markets in the Middle East, Central Asia, the Asia-Pacific and Latin America . German firms once embraced the motto “In China, for China,” but a more accurate description today would be “In China, for the world.”

When Merz watched the humanoid robot in Hangzhou write that character “Fu,” the scrutinizing look in his eyes may well have captured Germany’s current state of mind: a mix of urgency about China’s technological surge, and anticipation for a new order of future cooperation.

Du Yubin is a reporter and chief editor at China Global Television Network (CGTN). He previously served two six-year postings in Washington D.C. and London, focusing on coverage of China–US and China–Europe relations, and has worked in international communication and digital media for over 15 years. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author

The crux of the tension lies in Tokyo’s recent strategic pivot. The Takaichi administration in Japan has been increasingly vocal about its “survivability” in a Taiwan conflict, effectively linking the security of the Taiwan Strait to Japan’s own sovereign defence. Wang Yi didn’t just rebut this; he weaponised the venue itself. Standing on German soil - a nation that has spent eighty years performing the arduous work of historical “liquidation”. Wang drew a stinging parallel. He lauded Germany for its moral clarity while accusing Japan of harbouring “unabandoned colonial ambitions” and allowing the “ghost of militarism” to dictate its modern defence posture.

His warning was devoid of typical diplomatic ambiguity:  “If Japan seeks to gamble once more, it will face a swifter defeat and a more disastrous loss.”  This was a calculated move to frame Japan as the “Revisionist Power” in the eyes of the West, using the memory of World War II to invalidate Japan’s current push for security “normalisation.”

A House Divided: The Transactional West

While Beijing was drawing red lines in Asia, the “Western” front showed deep fissures. The discourse from Washington has shifted from “leadership” to “leverage.”

Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s presence in Munich was less about reassuring allies and more about setting the terms of a new, transactional contract. The message to Berlin and Paris was clear: the American security umbrella is no longer a public good: it is a conditional service. This has forced Germany into a state of “Anxious Realism.” Chancellor Merz’s government is now walking a razor’s edge, scrambling to build a “European pillar” of defence to appease Washington, while simultaneously resisting “de-coupling” from China to save its struggling industrial heartland.

Meanwhile, France continues to play the “Strategic Autonomist.” The French delegation’s rhetoric suggests they have already mourned the death of the old transatlantic order. For Paris, the instability is an opportunity to forge a “Third Pole,” seeking a pragmatic, if tense, coexistence with Beijing to offset the “Wrecking-ball Politics” coming out of a polarised Washington.

The article solely represents the views of Yubin Du, a journalist for Chinese broadcaster CGTN who was based in Washington DC and London between 2012 and 2025.

Strategic scientific investment: building capacity on the ice

China’s Antarctic journey began in 1985, with the establishment of the Great Wall Station on King George Island. This modest beginning secured China’s position as a consultative party to the Antarctic Treaty, granting it formal decision-making power over the continent’s future. From a single station in 1985, China has developed a strategically distributed network of five research bases: Great Wall Station (ecological research), Zhongshan Station (glaciology and atmospheric physics), Kunlun Station (astronomy and deep ice drilling), Taishan Station (logistical support), and the recently completed Qinling Station in the Ross Sea region. This network, the third-largest by any nation, spans crucial geographical zones from the Antarctic Peninsula to the remote interior and strategically significant coastal areas.

Recent expeditions showcase increasingly sophisticated technology, including six-legged robotic dogs equipped with ice-penetrating radar, drones for meteorite searches, and specialised equipment for sampling deep-sea sediments. These investments have yielded measurable scientific returns. According to bibliometric analysis, China became the world’s largest producer of Antarctic research papers in 2022 and extended this lead in high-quality publications by 2024. These scientific achievements are not merely academic exercises; they translate directly into influence within the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), where substantial research output determines a nation’s decision-making authority.

Governance and geopolitical influence: securing a seat at the table

Antarctica is governed by a unique international framework—the ATS—that suspends territorial claims, prohibits military activities, and prioritises scientific cooperation. Within this system, scientific productivity directly translates to political influence: only the 29 consultative parties that demonstrate “substantial scientific research activity” have voting rights on the continent’s management. 

China’s growing influence under the ATS manifests in several ways. In 2017, Beijing hosted the 40th Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting and issued its first quasi-white paper on Antarctic affairs, articulating a vision of “understanding, protecting, and utilising” the polar regions. In late 2025, China proposed a draft legislation titled the “Antarctic Activities and Environmental Protection Law”. This legislation aims to create a comprehensive domestic legal structure to oversee all Chinese activities in Antarctica, regulating expeditions, scientific research, fisheries, tourism and shipping. By introducing this legislation, China is taking a significant step to formalise its presence in Antarctica, shifting from policy guidance to a defined legal framework. This move aligns with a growing trend among leading Antarctic Treaty nations, which use national laws to ensure adherence to international treaty commitments. 

International collaboration: South-South cooperation and selective partnerships

Recent initiatives highlight deepening scientific cooperation with South American nations that serve as gateways to Antarctica. A Chinese Academy of Sciences-funded project (2021-2024) has fostered partnerships with institutions in Argentina and Chile, focusing on climate resilience, satellite technology, and Antarctic ecosystem studies. These collaborations have produced formal agreements, including a memorandum of understanding with Argentina’s National University of Tierra del Fuego and plans for a joint China-Argentina Climate Change and Sustainability Research Centre. 

China also increasingly engages in multilateral polar initiatives within emerging geopolitical frameworks. In 2024, Chinese early-career scientists participated in the International Antarctic Coastal Circumnavigation Expedition alongside researchers from Brazil, Russia, India, Chile, Argentina, Peru, and Switzerland—a cohort notably rich in BRICS and Global South representation. These collaborative endeavours serve dual purposes: they generate valuable scientific data while cultivating diplomatic relationships with nations that share China’s developing-world perspective on polar governance.

Conclusion

China’s Antarctic journey—from newcomer to research leader in just four decades—reveals a sophisticated understanding of how scientific investment translates into geopolitical influence. Through deliberate infrastructure development, technological innovation, and targeted international partnerships, China has established itself as an indispensable actor in Antarctic affairs. This position serves multiple national interests: it enhances China’s status as a global scientific power, secures influence in a strategically significant governance regime, provides access to potentially valuable resources, and fosters relationships with Global South nations.

A final factor shaping China’s Antarctic calculations is the return of a more unilateral and transactional US approach under Trump 2.0. While Antarctica has not yet become a central focus of US polar rhetoric, renewed scepticism toward multilateral institutions, environmental regulation, and climate governance could weaken Washington’s traditional role as a steward of the Antarctic Treaty System. Thus, for China, the immediate effect of U.S. policy is one of opportunity, but the long-term implication is an increasingly complex and potentially volatile polar environment where great power friction could threaten the stability of the entire Antarctic regime. In this context, China’s Antarctic engagement is shaped not only by its own ambitions but also by the shifting priorities of established powers and the future credibility of global governance itself.

The opinions and thoughts expressed in this article reflect only the author's views.

About the author

Meijie JIANG (蒋梅杰) is a post-doctoral researcher at the School of International Studies of Sun Yat-sen University (China). She earned her PhD in International Relations from Pompeu Fabra University (Spain). Her research focuses on polar area, China’s foreign policy, Latin America , and the Global South. She has published in Third World Quarterly, Ibero-America Studies, Círculo de Lingüística Aplicada a la Comunicación, and the Spanish Yearbook of International Law, among others.

On 20 January 2026, Donald Trump criticised the UK’s decision to recognise Mauritian sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago, framing it as a strategic weakness rather than a legal issue. While he did not challenge Mauritius’ claim, he argued that ceding sovereignty, even with the Diego Garcia base secured, signalled declining Western power. For Mauritius, the remarks highlight the fragility of small-state gains in a more transactional global order. The UK has defended the agreement as both legally unavoidable and strategically sound, but Trump’s intervention has politicised the deal in Britain. Mauritius’ restrained response remains its strength. International law is on its side, and by clearly separating sovereignty from security and avoiding public confrontation, it continues to project credibility in an increasingly unstable international landscape.

Vallée-des-Prêtres residents wait three years as flood promises stall

Residents of Morcellement Ramlagan in Vallée-des-Prêtres say three years of government promises to address chronic flooding have delivered no results , despite the area being officially classified as high risk. The community remains traumatised by severe floods in 2022 and 2024, with heavy rain now triggering constant fear. Locals blame repeated ministerial visits and unfulfilled pledges, pointing to failing drainage works, a hazardous Terminus Bridge, and rejected stopgap solutions. They say the absence of concrete action has left families exposed to an ongoing cycle of damage and anxiety.

Debate over the Chagos deal reveals deep concerns about long-term guarantees

In an interview with the Mauritius Times , journalist Shyam Bhatia argues that the Chagos dispute exposes how powerful states treat international law as optional when the costs are low. Small states cannot overpower great powers, he notes, but they can raise the reputational price of defiance by anchoring their claims in law and stability. Bhatia links Trump’s attack on the Mauritius–UK Chagos deal to his push for Greenland, framing both as part of a worldview in which territory equals strength and concession equals weakness. Chagos, he argues, has been recast from a decolonisation issue into a transactional asset, signalling a shift away from a rules-based order towards a system where sovereignty is negotiable for the weak and law becomes little more than risk management.

Electoral reform is emerging as a high-stakes test of democratic credibility

The immediate threat to the Alliance du Changement government has eased after talks between Prime Minister Navin Ramgoolam and Paul Bérenger, but the calm is fragile. The crisis has been defused, not resolved. The real fault line remains electoral reform, a long-standing and deeply divisive issue in Mauritian politics. Recent controversies around advisers and the Finance Ministry may be distractions. At the centre is Bérenger’s enduring push for proportional representation. Having stepped back from his claim to the Finance portfolio, he has made his continued support for the government conditional on “genuine” progress on reform. The question is not whether reform is needed, but whose interests it serves. For the MMM, proportional representation is less a democratic ideal than a political necessity. Under the current First-Past-the-Post system, parties can be wiped out despite substantial national support. For a party in decline, PR would guarantee parliamentary presence, reduce reliance on pre-electoral alliances, and preserve long-term influence whether in government or opposition.

Governance failures surface in public services, environment, and local infrastructure

Mauritius Post recorded a deficit of about Rs 85 million last year, roughly USD 1.9 million , according to ICT Minister Avinash Ramtohul, who described the situation as worrying and blamed past mismanagement. Speaking at a strategic workshop in Ébène, the Minister said the government is rolling out a recovery plan centred on institutional reorganisation, tighter management, and new operational frameworks to stabilise finances. A key focus will be on accelerating digitalisation, to modernise postal services and keep them relevant in an increasingly digital economy.

Kosovo also confirmed its participation on Wednesday. President Vjosa Osmani said she was honoured to be invited as a founding member, describing the move as standing “shoulder to shoulder with the United States in the pursuit of a safer world .”

“America helped bring peace to Kosovo. Today, Kosovo stands firmly as America’s ally, ready to help carry that peace forward,” Osmani wrote on X. Kosovo has been a close US ally since Washington backed its independence from Serbia in 2008.

UN response? The initiative has raised concerns about whether it could undermine the United Nations. La Neice Collins, spokesperson for the President of the UN General Assembly, said there is only one universal multilateral body mandated to deal with peace and security. “There is one universal multilateral organisation to deal with peace and security issues, and that is the United Nations,” she told RTÉ News . Collins added that the UN’s existing peace mechanisms are established through Security Council resolutions and have specific mandates, stressing that the UN remains the body authorised by the international community to handle global peace and security.

What is the Board of Peace?

According to the White House, the Board of Peace will play a central role in implementing Trump’s 20-point plan to end the Gaza conflict. It is meant to provide strategic oversight, mobilise international resources and ensure accountability as Gaza moves from war to reconstruction and development.

The board will be chaired by Trump and supported by a founding Executive Board made up of senior political and business figures, including US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Trump adviser Steve Witkoff, Jared Kushner, former UK prime minister Tony Blair, investor Marc Rowan, World Bank president Ajay Banga and Robert Gabriel.

Each executive board member will oversee specific areas such as governance , reconstruction, investment, funding and regional relations.

The preamble to the plan says, “durable peace requires pragmatic judgement, common sense solutions, and the courage to depart from approaches and institutions that have too often failed.”

Trump has suggested the board could eventually help broker other global conflicts, prompting comparisons to a parallel version of the UN Security Council.

So far, countries that have agreed to take part include Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Morocco, Vietnam, Kazakhstan, Hungary, Argentina, Belarus and Kosovo. Invitation letters have also been sent to leaders in Paraguay, Canada, Egypt and Turkey, while Russia, India, Slovenia, Thailand and the European Union’s executive arm have confirmed receiving invitations.

Uruguay continues to position the EU–Mercosur agreement as a historic opportunity, with supporters describing it as the creation of the world’s largest free trade zone. The deal is seen by the government as a strategic bet to expand market access, attract investment, and strengthen Uruguay’s role as a reliable trading partner between South America and Europe, even as negotiations face resistance within the EU.

European Union proposes unlocking €45 billion to ease agricultural protests linked to Mercosur

The European Union has proposed mobilising €45 billion (US$52.2) to calm widespread agricultural protests opposing the EU–Mercosur agreement. The move reflects internal European tensions over the deal, particularly concerns from farmers about competition, standards, and market disruption, developments closely watched in Uruguay, given the agreement’s centrality to its export strategy.

Uruguay’s political system remains divided over the situation in Venezuela

Uruguay’s political landscape is once again split over how to approach the crisis in Venezuela . Disagreements persist across parties on diplomatic positioning, recognition of leadership, and responses to human rights concerns, underscoring long-standing ideological divisions in the country’s foreign policy debates.

Antifascist organisation challenges Yamandú Orsi over comments on Nicolás Maduro

An antifascist organisation has publicly questioned Uruguay's President Yamandú Orsi following his comments on Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. Orsi stated that Maduro’s departure would be positive only if it led to the end of authoritarianism and the restoration of democracy, remarks that have sparked criticism and renewed scrutiny of political discourse surrounding Venezuela.

Economic debate intensifies over exchange rate lag, flat dollar, and competitiveness

Uruguay is facing renewed debate over what has been described as a “so-called” exchange rate lag, with data from the end of 2025 fuelling concerns about competitiveness. A flat dollar has helped keep inflation low but at the cost of export competitiveness, while water stress has also brought the issue of guaranteeing potable water supply back into focus, highlighting the interconnected pressures facing the country’s economic model.

The deployment of small numbers of troops and reconnaissance teams from Sweden, Norway, France , the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, and Finland forms part of Operation Arctic Endurance, a Danish-led military exercise in Greenland aimed at strengthening defence cooperation within NATO’s northern flank.

Greenland is a self-governing territory within the Kingdom of Denmark, with long-standing strategic importance due to its location above the Arctic Circle and its role in North Atlantic security. The island sits along key air and sea routes and hosts the United States' Thule Air Base, part of early warning and space surveillance systems dating back to World War II and the Cold War.

Tension intensified after U.S. President Donald Trump reiterated his belief that Greenland is essential to U.S. national security — an argument he has publicly used to justify efforts to obtain control over the island, including through economic or even military means. Trump’s comments have drawn sharp rebukes from Danish and Greenlandic leaders, as well as from European capitals.

Copenhagen and Nuuk have made it clear that Greenland “is not for sale” and that the island’s future is for its people to decide. Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen has called the defence of Greenland a “common concern” for all NATO allies, and emphasised that any notion of unilateral control is incompatible with international law and alliance unity.

“If the United States chooses to attack another NATO country militarily, then everything stops. That is, including our NATO and thus the security that has been provided since the end of the Second World War,” Frederiksen told Danish broadcaster TV2 .

The European troop contributions are symbolic more than combat-ready: they number in the dozens, not hundreds, and are focused on exercises, reconnaissance, and interoperability rather than establishing a large standing force. France has sent mountain infantry units, Germany a reconnaissance detachment, and other allies are participating in logistical and planning roles as part of Operation Arctic Endurance.

Denmark’s Defence Minister has also confirmed plans for a more permanent allied presence on Greenland, with rotating forces under NATO auspices, a step seen as both a deterrent and a reassurance to smaller member states concerned about great-power competition in the High North.

“The intention is to create a more permanent military presence,” Denmark’s Defence Minister Troels Lund Poulsen told Danish public broadcaster DR on Thursday, January 15.

Analysts say the Arctic’s importance is rising as climate change alters sea routes and exposes new natural resources. The region is increasingly viewed through a strategic lens, with Russia’s northern capabilities and China’s polar interests informing Western defence planning. However, Greenland’s sovereignty remains a red line for European leaders, who argue territorial acquisition by force would undermine NATO’s foundational principles.

India has formally assumed the BRICS presidency for 2026, with External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar unveiling the official website, theme and logo in New Delhi on Tuesday, January 13. Jaishankar said India’s chairship “will adopt a ‘humanity-first’ and ‘people-centric’ approach,” aimed at resilience, innovation, cooperation and sustainability. “Launched preparations for BRICS India 2026 with the unveiling of website, theme and logo,” he wrote on X, adding that the presidency would “seek to bring together the potential of the member countries of the grouping to promote greater global welfare.” Noting that BRICS will mark 20 years since its inception in 2026, Jaishankar said the bloc has evolved into a key platform for cooperation among emerging markets and developing economies. India took over the presidency from Brazil on January 1, marking its fourth turn at the helm, having last chaired the grouping in 2021 during the Covid-19 pandemic.

Labour reforms

Major delivery platforms Blinkit, Zepto, Zomato and Swiggy have begun moving away from their 10-minute delivery model following an intervention by Union Labour Minister Mansukh Mandaviya. The decision comes after gig workers staged a one-day strike on December 31, citing safety risks and health concerns linked to ultra-fast delivery timelines. Ministry sources said Blinkit has already removed the 10-minute delivery promise from its branding, with others expected to follow. A senior official said Mandaviya raised concerns with aggregators, urging them to stop the practice “considering the health and welfare of delivery workers,” a request the companies agreed to. Blinkit has since revised its tagline to “30,000+ products delivered at your doorstep.”

Army chief issues blunt warning to Pakistan

India’s Army Chief General Upendra Dwivedi on Tuesday warned Pakistan that any future provocation would be met with a firm response, describing the counterterror Operation Sindoor as “ongoing.” Speaking at the Army Day press conference, he said , “At least 6 terror camps still active across the LoC & 2 across the International Border after Operation Sindoor against Pakistan. Will act, if any (nefarious) attempts are carried out.” Dwivedi said the operation was executed with precision, dismantling terror infrastructure and “resetting strategic assumptions.” He added that around 100 Pakistani personnel were killed during heightened tensions along the Line of Control and International Border, and acknowledged the coordinated role of intelligence agencies, civil authorities and multiple ministries in the operation.

India slips to third place in Russian fossil fuel imports

India fell to third place among importers of Russian fossil fuels in December 2025 after private and state-owned refiners sharply reduced crude purchases, according to the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA). India’s imports dropped to €2.3 billion in December from €3.3 billion in November, with Türkiye overtaking India as the second-largest buyer. China remained the top importer. CREA said crude oil made up 78 percent of India’s purchases, with coal and refined products accounting for the rest. The think tank noted that Reliance Industries halved its Russian imports in December, while state refiners cut purchases by 15 percent, amid tighter sanctions on major Russian producers Rosneft and Lukoil.

Trump’s Iran tariffs add to India’s trade worries

U.S. President Donald Trump has announced a 25 percent tariff on goods from countries “doing business” with Iran, a move that could further strain India’s trade outlook. “Any Country doing business with the Islamic Republic of Iran will pay a Tariff of 25% on any and all business being done with the United States of America,” Trump said , adding that the order was “final and conclusive.” India’s bilateral trade with Iran stood at $1.34 billion in the first 10 months of 2025, with exports including rice, tea, sugar and pharmaceuticals. The new tariffs come as India is already grappling with 50 percent U.S. levies linked to Russian oil purchases, with exporters warning that sectors such as textiles, gems and jewellery, leather and marine products could be hit hardest if the Iran tariffs are applied on top of existing duties.

This interest came sharply into focus just after Christmas, when a short statement appeared on the Israeli government’s website. In it, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu praised Somaliland for fighting terrorism and advancing regional peace and said he accepted its independent statehood. The announcement marked the latest and most controversial chapter in a long-running geopolitical contest over the Horn of Africa.

Two to one

To understand why so many powers are invested in Somaliland’s future, it is necessary to look back to the early twentieth century. What is now Somalia was once divided between two European colonial powers. The northwestern region, shaped like the head of a horse angled toward North Africa, was British Somaliland. The rest, stretching along the Indian Ocean coastline, was an Italian colony. The two territories were administered very differently. Britain was primarily concerned with supplying its naval base in Aden and took a limited interest in the development of British Somaliland. Italy, by contrast, pursued a more ambitious imperial project, establishing plantations and centralising governance in an effort to generate wealth.

In 1960, both territories gained independence and agreed to unite as the Somali Republic. But the new state faltered. A military coup in 1969 brought Siad Barre to power, ushering in a long dictatorship. When Barre was overthrown in 1991, the Somali state collapsed entirely. Amid the chaos, the former British Somaliland unilaterally declared independence. The move attracted little international attention at the time, as global efforts focused on preventing humanitarian catastrophes elsewhere in Somalia. Over the following decades, multinational interventions failed to stabilise the country, while piracy and militant groups, most notably al-Shabaab, flourished.

Since around 2012, however, conditions have improved somewhat. Somalia has re-emerged as a federal state, with Somaliland largely left to govern itself, and the neighbouring region of Puntland also enjoying significant autonomy from Mogadishu. Supporters of Somaliland argue that it has demonstrated political maturity through peaceful transfers of power and the development of its own legal and governmental institutions.

Israel's interest

Israel’s interest in Somaliland is not new. Contacts between the two date back several decades, perhaps driven by a shared sense of isolation. More significantly, Somaliland occupies a strategic position near the Bab el Mandeb strait, the narrow passage guarding the entrance to the Red Sea. This is one of the world’s most important shipping routes and one that could be disrupted with relative ease.

That geography has taken on heightened importance for Israel due to Iran’s presence across the strait in Yemen, where Tehran backs the Houthi movement. From Israel’s perspective, access to bases or partners in Somaliland would provide an opportunity to pressure the Houthis from the south as well as from Israeli territory itself.

The diplomatic push and pull extends far beyond Israel and Iran. The European Union, the African Union, and 21 Arab and African countries have condemned Israel’s move. Among them is Turkey, which has cultivated close security and commercial ties with the Somali government in Mogadishu and harbours its own regional ambitions. China has also voiced opposition, viewing the Horn of Africa as a critical node in its Belt and Road trade network. Beijing is deeply wary of secessionist movements, in part because of concerns about its own territorial integrity, and is sending its foreign minister to Somalia to signal support for the federal government.

But the United Arab Emirates stands out for its absence from the Arab condemnation. The UAE has recently been embroiled in a bitter split with Saudi Arabia over influence in the Gulf of Aden in Yemen. As it seeks to protect its investments and trade routes, tacit support for Somaliland could offer strategic advantages, particularly if the United States were to follow Israel’s lead in recognising the region. Saudi Arabia, by contrast, did sign the declaration opposing recognition.

The possibility of US involvement cannot be dismissed. Donald Trump has repeatedly expressed hostility toward Somalia, going out of his way to insult the country and its people. In that context, it is not difficult to imagine him backing a breakup of the Somali state.

Ethiopia also has a strong stake in the outcome. It is Africa’s second most populous country, yet it is landlocked. Any arrangement that recognised Somaliland in exchange for access to the coast would be highly attractive to Addis Ababa.

United States of the Horn of Africa

With so many countries involved, the implications of recognising Somaliland reach far beyond the Horn of Africa. Such a move would inevitably raise questions about other unrecognised or partially recognised territories, including Western Sahara, Kosovo, and perhaps most sensitively, Palestine.

Some scholars argue that the crisis could also be an opportunity. Writing for Global South World , Ethiopian academic Seifudein Adem has suggested a compromise in the form of a federation of Horn of Africa states, including Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and Djibouti. He notes that tribal and clan relationships in the region often matter more than national affiliations, yet do not align neatly with existing borders. Whether the recognition of Somaliland would bring the United States of the Horn of Africa closer or push it further from reality remains an open question.

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World Reframed is produced in London by Global South World, part of the Impactum Group. Its editors are Duncan Hooper and Ismail Akwei.

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“There’s no such thing as a Collective West. There’s no such thing as a Global South. There are, but nations that can dialogue for their mutual interests,” Barrot said on January 7. His comments come at a time when India is positioning itself as a leader in the Global South. During a recent visit to Ethiopia , Prime Minister Narendra Modi said the “Global South is writing its own destiny.”

Maduro was removed from power and flown out of the country to face drug trafficking and narco-terrorism charges led by U.S. Attorney General Pam Bondi. The U.S. government said Maduro was the head of a transnational criminal enterprise.

“We’re going to run the country until such time as we can do a safe, proper, and judicious transition,” Trump said. “We can't take a chance that somebody else takes over Venezuela.”

In the hours that followed, Venezuela’s Supreme Tribunal of Justice appointed Vice President Delcy Rodríguez as interim president. Much of the existing government structure remained in place.

Years of pressure on Venezuela

The operation did not come out of nowhere. It marked a major moment in a long U.S. effort to shape Venezuela’s political future.

In 2019, the Trump administration backed opposition leader Juan Guaidó as interim president and imposed heavy economic sanctions as part of what it called a “maximum pressure” strategy.

By late 2025, reports said the CIA had been authorised to carry out covert operations inside Venezuela, pointing to a sharper push to remove Maduro. The U.S. has also been linked to the failed 2002 coup against then-President Hugo Chávez, though Washington has disputed the extent of its involvement.

Venezuela’s oil wealth has remained a key issue. The country holds an estimated 17% of global oil reserves. Trump has said U.S. companies would play a central role in rebuilding the energy sector.

“We’re going to have our very large United States oil companies… go in, spend billions of dollars, fix the badly broken infrastructure… and start making money for the country,” he said.

A familiar pattern

Maduro’s removal places Venezuela among many countries where the U.S. has pursued regime change.

Since 1947, the United States has been involved in about 100 regime-change operations, according to estimates by scholar Jeffrey Sachs. These efforts have ranged from open military action to covert political and economic interference, often targeting governments seen as hostile to U.S. interests.

Early interventions before the Cold War

U.S. involvement in regime change began long before modern geopolitics.

In 1893, American-backed groups overthrew Queen Liliʻuokalani in Hawaii, a move that later led to U.S. annexation. From 1912 to 1933, U.S. forces occupied Nicaragua and took control of key parts of the government and economy .

During the “Banana Wars” between 1903 and 1925, Honduras experienced repeated U.S. military interventions that helped install or protect governments friendly to American business interests.

World War II and occupation politics

During World War II, U.S. forces played a direct role in defeating fascist governments in Germany, Italy, and Japan.

After the war, American-led occupations reshaped political systems in South Korea from 1945 to 1948 and in Austria from 1945 to 1955.

Cold War coups and covert actions

The Cold War era saw a sharp rise in secret operations.

In Iran in 1953, Operation Ajax removed Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh and restored the Shah. A year later in Guatemala, the CIA’s Operation PBSuccess overthrew elected President Jacobo Árbenz.

In 1963, the U.S. supported a coup against South Vietnam’s President Ngo Dinh Diem, who was later assassinated. In Chile, U.S.-backed economic pressure helped set the stage for the 1973 coup that removed President Salvador Allende and brought Augusto Pinochet to power.

In 1989, the U.S. invaded Panama under Operation Just Cause and removed President Manuel Noriega.

Post-9/11 

After the 11 September attacks, U.S. military action took on new urgency.

In 2001, the U.S. invaded Afghanistan to dismantle Al-Qaeda and remove the Taliban. Two years later, it led a coalition into Iraq, overthrowing Saddam Hussein over claims of weapons of mass destruction.

In 2004, the U.S. played a direct role in the departure of Haiti’s President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, who later said he was forced out. In Libya in 2011, U.S. and NATO airpower backed rebels who overthrew and killed Muammar Gaddafi.

That same year in Egypt, the U.S. withdrew support for President Hosni Mubarak during mass protests and encouraged a political transition.

But why does this specific island, separated from the Chinese mainland by the 130-kilometer-wide Taiwan Strait, command such an outsized influence on the global stage? To understand the gravity of the situation, we have to look at Taiwan through four distinct lenses: history, geography, economy, and technology.

A geographic and economic crossroads

Positioned at the edge of the southeastern coast of China and bordering the South China Sea, Taiwan sits at the heart of some of the busiest shipping lanes in the world. This strategic location makes it an essential hub for global trade.

Despite its compact size of roughly 36,000 square kilometers, Taiwan is home to 23 million people—a population density comparable to Florida or Australia, but packed into a much smaller area. This high density has fueled an economic powerhouse; Taiwan currently ranks among the top 20 economies in the world by nominal GDP, outpacing nations like Switzerland and Sweden. With living standards comparable to Western Europe , it is a high-income economy that "punches well above its weight."

Perhaps the most critical reason for Taiwan’s global importance today is its role in the advanced semiconductor industry. Taiwan is the world's primary producer of the high-end computer chips that power everything from smartphones and electric cars to massive data centres and sophisticated military systems.

One company in particular, TSMC (Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company), produces chips so advanced that many of the world’s leading tech firms simply could not function without them. This "silicon shield" makes Taiwan indispensable to the modern global economy , creating a situation where any disruption to the island has immediate, catastrophic effects on technology sectors worldwide.

The view from China

While its economic and technological contributions are undeniable, the question remains: why is Taiwan so central to China’s national identity and long-term strategy?

To understand the issue, you need to understand the history. Taiwan was occupied by the Japanese as they expanded westwards at the end of the 19th century. Internal turmoil in China allowed the Japanese to expand their empire prior to and during the Second World War. The island was returned to Beijing on its defeat, but to a nationalist government engaged in a bitter civil war with its communist rival. The conclusion of that conflict saw the communists victorious but the nationalists took refuge on the island of Taiwan, with both sides claiming to be the legitimate rulers of a united China.

Initially the United Nations backed Taipei but soon switched to acknowledging the Communist Party of China as the single entity able to represent the country. Almost every other country in the world followed suit, acknowledging the One China Principle in order to establish diplomatic relations with the world's most populous nation. China focused much of its foreign policy on this goal, offering incentives to states and organisations which came on board.

In Taipei, meanwhile, where a multi-party democracy had formed, the policy has largely been to keep quiet and profit from the status quo, neither renouncing, nor demanding an independent status.

Re-enter Japan

A possibly off-the-cuff statement from Japanese prime minister Sanae Takaichi that her country might be forced to intervene militarily if China acted on its long-stated reunification demand caused consternation in Beijing.

Not only has Japan's military been strictly reserved for self-defence purposes, but the scars of its soldiers' behaviour in China still run deep and raw.

Takaichi declared that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, which has never been ruled out, could constitute a threat to Japan. China views any action across the Taiwan Strait as a domestic matter on which international powers should have strictly no say.

The fallout has had huge economic consequences for Japanese businesses, given the size of the Chinese market. But it also risks having longer term strategic consequences, with America announcing more than $10billion of new arms sales to Taiwan.

Looking forward

While insisting its goal is peaceful reunification, Beijing has been careful to keep its options open regarding its approach to Taiwan. It has avoided any timeframes but responded angrily to any dissent to its world view from Taipei. The prospect of a conflict which could see the world's two superpowers confronting each other for the first time in decades is one which strikes fear into politicians, businesses and hundreds of millions of ordinary people.

Click here to watch our previous episodes

World Reframed is produced in London by Global South World, part of the Impactum Group. Its editors are Duncan Hooper and Ismail Akwei.

ISSN 2978-4891

The infographic, based on 2024 data, shows the top 10 natural gas-producing countries, highlights the dominance of a few energy heavyweights at a time when energy security, geopolitics and climate policy are closely linked.

The United States leads by a wide margin, producing just over 1.030 trillion cubic meters of natural gas in 2024. According to data from the Statistical Review of World Energy by the Energy Institute, US output continues to be driven by shale gas and advanced extraction technologies.

This production strength has helped the country solidify its position as the world’s largest exporter of liquefied natural gas , particularly to Europe, as countries seek alternatives to Russian supply following the war in Ukraine.

Russia, with production of around 630 billion cubic meters, remains a major global gas player despite sanctions and reduced pipeline exports to Europe. Energy Institute data show that Moscow has increasingly shifted exports toward Asian markets while expanding LNG capacity to sustain its influence in global energy trade.

Iran and China, producing roughly 263 billion and 248 billion cubic meters respectively, reflect contrasting pressures . Iran’s gas sector is shaped by sanctions and infrastructure constraints, while China’s rising output aligns with Beijing’s push for energy self-sufficiency amid heightened geopolitical competition.

The rest of the top 10 includes Canada, Qatar, Australia, Saudi Arabia, Norway and Algeria. Qatar and Australia stand out for their strong roles in global LNG supply, particularly to Asia and Europe, while Norway has become Europe’s most dependable pipeline gas supplier since Russian flows declined. Algeria continues to play a key role in supplying gas to southern Europe.

These rankings are especially relevant in 2025 as global energy debates intensify. While investment in renewable energy is accelerating, the Energy Institute notes that natural gas remains widely viewed as a transitional fuel for electricity generation and industry.

At least 37 people were killed after torrential rains triggered flash floods in Morocco’s Atlantic coastal province of Safi, authorities said. State broadcaster SNRT News reported that at least 14 people were hospitalised, including two in intensive care, after heavy rain on Sunday swept cars and debris through the town, about 300km south of Rabat. Local authorities said more than 70 homes and businesses in the historic old city were flooded within an hour, while search and rescue operations and support efforts for affected residents remain ongoing.

Morocco positions itself at the centre of Atlantic geopolitics and long-term reform debates

Morocco is being highlighted as a central actor in discussions around geopolitics , structural reforms, and future-oriented policy planning through the “Perspectives 2030” framework. The Policy Centre’s focus places the country at the heart of the Atlantic Dialogues, underscoring Morocco’s growing role as a convening power between Africa, Europe, and the Atlantic world. This positioning reflects sustained diplomatic engagement, strategic economic planning, and an emphasis on long-term stability and influence in regional and transatlantic affairs.

Morocco–EBRD contracts set to reach a record $1 billion in 2025

Greg Guyett, first Vice-President of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, said 2025 is a record year for EBRD contract signings with Morocco, totalling about $1 billion , driven by strong government partnerships and private sector collaboration. He said the bank will continue investing to support business growth, particularly for SMEs, with a focus on energy, industry, water, renewable energy, grid upgrades, and education programs that empower youth and women.

Government explores a new framework to recognise and support women’s unpaid household work

Morocco is examining the development of a new policy framework aimed at addressing women’s unpaid household labour , a long-standing issue in social and economic policy. This initiative signals increased attention to gender equity, social protection, and the economic value of care work that has traditionally gone unrecognised. The exploration of such a framework suggests a broader reform agenda focused on inclusion, labour recognition, and social justice within national development priorities.

Morocco reiterates a firm and fair position on the Sahara issue under King Mohammed VI’s leadership

The head of government has reaffirmed Morocco’s firm and fair stance on the Sahara issue, emphasising continuity and clarity under the leadership of King Mohammed VI. This position reflects the state’s consistent diplomatic narrative, combining sovereignty claims with calls for pragmatic and realistic solutions. The reiteration underscores the centrality of the Sahara issue to Morocco’s foreign policy, national unity, and international engagement strategy.

Because of this, it has become a central focus for both the US and China in terms of economic and political influence. Prior to 2023, China gained the upper hand with its focus on non-intervention and economic collaboration, particularly through the Belt and Road programme. Following the war that erupted on October 7, China has engaged in the region much more actively, and its popularity has soared.

Since its founding, the People’s Republic of China has built its foreign policy on the “five principles of peaceful coexistence”. These principles, known as “mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence”, have been China’s “red lines” both during the Cold War and in subsequent years. China remained outside the bipolar system of the Cold War and opted for a “third way” by supporting the emergence of the Non-Aligned Movement at the Bandung Conference in 1955. Despite the entry into a period of détente in international politics in the 1970s, China’s approach to non-alignment with any polarisation persisted, leading the country to make “non-alliance” a state policy in 1982. 

A clean record

MENA countries were among the regions where China’s fundamental foreign policy principles were practically implemented. At the aforementioned Bandung Conference, China established contact with nationalist parties in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, which were under French rule at the time, as well as in independent Libya. These initial contacts exemplified the parties’ revolutionary and anti-colonial solidarity. In the Middle East, diplomatic relations between China and the Gulf countries, in particular, began with Iraq in 1958, followed by Iran and Kuwait (1971), Oman (1978), the United Arab Emirates (1984), Qatar (1988), Bahrain (1989) and Saudi Arabia (1990). As can be seen, these countries, having gained their independence from Western colonial rule, quickly established a rapprochement with China. 

Following the end of the Cold War, relations between China and the MENA region entered a period of further development. MENA countries viewed China as a power with which to cooperate because it lacked a history of colonialism, military intervention, or regime change in the region. China, on the other hand, aimed to establish multi-layered interaction with the region to realise its interests within the emerging international system. To this end, China proactively established the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000, followed by the China–Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF) four years later. 

The Arab Spring, which began in Tunisia at the end of 2010 and then spread throughout MENA, initiated a transformational process whose effects would last for years. People living in MENA began protesting against the authoritarian regimes in their countries that had long deprived them of economic prosperity and fundamental rights and freedoms. This wave of uprisings created the potential to fundamentally reshape the region’s “political ecology”. While historically significant developments were taking place in MENA, China’s regional strategy was embodied in the Belt and Road Initiative, which funds infrastructure aimed at bolstering international economic links. For China, the region provided an opportunity to prioritise its economic and geostrategic interests and place less emphasis on political engagement. Despite the liberal ideals of the Arab Spring, the persistence of autocratic and nationalist regimes in the region has also presented a positive picture for China. Regimes in the region have prioritised economic growth and development over democratisation. This has opened the door for China to promote an alternative to the liberal order created by the West after 1945. 

Through the Belt and Road Initiative, China has established a successful method for achieving its desired goals. In exchange for energy agreements signed with MENA countries, which represent a strong option for meeting China’s need for energy resources such as oil and natural gas, China has built infrastructure and transportation projects in the region. These partnerships, which foster a win–win relationship between the parties, have significantly contributed to China’s interaction with the non-Western world. Unlike Western powers, which lost prestige in the region, particularly for their open support of opposition movements during the Arab Spring, China is perceived as a reliable actor by governments in MENA. Driven by this momentum, China signed strategic partnership agreements with Qatar, Iraq, Kuwait and Oman, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates between 2014 and 2018. Furthermore, in addition to striving to establish partnerships with MENA countries through bilateral relations and regional forums, China has also worked to mediate conflict resolution in the region. On 10 March 2023, Iran and Saudi Arabia, mediated by China, agreed to re-establish diplomatic relations. Bringing two strategic MENA actors, who had not had diplomatic contact since 2016, to the same table strengthened China’s prestige significantly. 

During this period, China presented a position in MENA radically different from the colonialism, use of military force, and conditional aid to achieve economic interests pursued by Western powers, particularly the US. China’s MENA strategy, particularly in the post-Arab Spring period, was based on a theoretical foundation of soft power and anti-colonialism. 

Change of approach

The events of 7 October, 2023 changed everything in the region and inevitably led to a shift in China’s approach connected to its long-standing support for Palestinian statehood. Since establishing the Special Representative for the Middle East in 2002, China has sought to host peace talks between Palestine and Israel and current Chinese President Xi Jinping has presented draft peace plans to the parties at various times. In these draft peace plans, China emphasised the importance of global recognition of the State of Palestine, the continuation of negotiations between Palestine and Israel, and the role of the international community in guaranteeing Palestinian sovereignty. These proposals were also included in the Arab Policy Paper published by China in 2016. 

Chinese officials have visited MENA to meet with all stakeholders in the region, particularly Hamas and Israel. As a result of these visits, an important mediation activity was carried out by bringing together the two major Palestinian groups, Fatah and Hamas, in Beijing in April 2024. Thus, in the face of the unconditional military support for Israel from the US and European powers, China has maintained its diplomatic stance. Even during the crisis, China has maintained its foreign policy of avoiding direct involvement in conflicts, maintaining political neutrality, and acting with caution. With these steps, which differentiate it from Western powers, China has assumed the role of a mediator seeking regional security and stability. China aims to end the regional crisis through an approach that emphasises a “two-state solution” and the role of regional organisations. 

That approach is bearing fruit, as results from the Arab Barometer reveal, although the challenge for China will be adapting to its new position in the world order on issues less binary than the conflict in Gaza.

The opinions and thoughts expressed in this article reflect only the author's views. This essay is based on research featured in the paper Perceptions of China in the Middle East and North Africa: an analysis in the context of Israel’s war on Gaza published in Third World Quarterly.

And around much of the world, that framing feels oddly narrow. After all, this was a meeting between the leaders of the world’s sixth- and ninth-largest economies, two pivotal actors in the dramatic transformation of global power over the past two decades. Arguably, only China’s Xi Jinping has played a larger role in reshaping the geopolitical landscape.

Yes, Ukraine is a defining issue for Putin. But for Modi, it is not. India is likely the only major power in the global top ten that genuinely refuses to choose sides between the United States and China. That alone makes this summit significant.

The operative word is multipolar .

The oil story

Let’s begin with the topic Western news outlets tend to foreground: Russia's oil exports.

India, which is now the world’s third-largest oil consumer, once imported just 2% of its crude from Russia. Today that figure sits at roughly one-third. This shift is not primarily an act of solidarity with Moscow. It is the product of market logic: Russian oil has become deeply discounted as Western states attempt to restrict it.

With the world’s largest population and enormous developmental demands, Modi cannot ignore cheap energy. But there is also a political message: India rejects the idea that any other power can dictate who it trades with.

That stance has hardened in recent years. When U.S. President Donald Trump imposed a 25% tariff on certain Indian imports, the move was received in Delhi not as pressure but as a challenge and an opportunity to demonstrate strategic independence, even if the tariff did sting economically and has changed trade patterns.

India has long maintained a strong partnership with the United States, in large part because its principal rivals - Pakistan and China - traditionally aligned with one another. But that relationship is loosening for several reasons.

Four-dimensional chess

First, India no longer feels compelled to pick sides. It can share leadership with China in forums such as BRICS and the G20, institutions where member states have little appetite for lecturing one another on domestic politics or economic management.

Second, India has developed formidable domestic industries while cultivating global partnerships, including a durable relationship with Russia.

Third, the U.S.–India relationship has become strained by immigration tensions. Indians account for more than two-thirds of America’s H-1B visas for highly skilled workers. Recent U.S. proposals to raise visa processing fees dramatically—into the tens of thousands of dollars—have caused anxiety in India’s tech sector and frustration in Delhi.

The local spin

While Europe and the U.S. interpret the summit primarily through the lens of Ukraine, the leaders themselves clearly want to project a different message.

Putin’s travel options are severely limited by an International Criminal Court warrant, yet he remains a welcome guest in Beijing and Delhi. At his joint appearance with Modi, he emphasized Russia’s role in supporting the growth of its partners: not only with discounted oil but also through cooperation in nuclear energy, a sector crucial to sustaining India’s expanding and increasingly digital economy.

Modi, ever attuned to domestic priorities, focused on economic outcomes. For him, economic strength is both policy and political strategy—and it continues to deliver at the ballot box.

But the real significance of the meeting lies deeper.

Russia’s repositioning

Russia’s pivot toward Asia is no longer a temporary response to Western sanctions . It marks a structural shift.

For centuries, Russia oriented itself toward Europe because Europe oriented much of the world toward itself. Yet Europe is now preoccupied with internal technological, social, and environmental challenges. In the meantime, a fundamental change in global order has accelerated with too little recognition.

In 1990, the G7 accounted for nearly 70% of the world economy. Today, it is closer to 40%. The numbers are well known; the implications remain underappreciated.

When European policymakers reduce a Modi–Putin meeting to a referendum on Ukraine, what they are really saying is: “Our priorities still define the global agenda.”

But for much of the world, they no longer do.

What Multipolarity Really Means

Debates on multipolarity often revolve around a single question: When will China surpass the U.S.? Perhaps it already has by some measures; surely it soon will. But this is not a simple handover from one hegemon to another.

India, notably, is the only top-ten power that refuses to align fully with either Washington or Beijing. And many emerging powers - Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia-have no desire to replace American dominance with Chinese dominance.

They want a different system altogether.

Their priorities are clear:

Growth. Energy. Security.

These are the pillars that deliver domestic prosperity and secure a meaningful place on the global stage.

Beyond the handshakes

Here are three takeaways that frame the meeting in a global—not Euro-Atlantic—context:

A multipolar world is messier. It is less predictable. It is more transactional.

But it is also more representative of how the world truly operates in the 21st century.

Click here to watch our previous episodes

World Reframed is produced in London by  Global South  World, part of the Impactum Group. Its editors are Duncan Hooper and Ismail Akwei.

ISSN 2978-4891

Some declared sovereignty in the late 19th century, others only just broke away in the 2000s.

Take Bulgaria, for example: it formally proclaimed independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1908. Meanwhile, Albania did so in 1912.

Fast-forward to the early 21st century, and you’ll find Kosovo, which declared independence in 2008, still a subject of diplomatic contention today.

Because these independence years reflect far more than calendar dates, they signal shifts in imperial control, the rise of nationalism, wartime upheaval and geopolitical gamesmanship.

As the United Nations notes, the 19th and early 20th centuries saw the Balkan region transition out of Ottoman rule into new political realities.

Today, the legacy of those decades echoes in the region’s push toward the European Union and beyond.

At the recent Brdo-Brijuni Process summit , leaders of Western Balkan nations emphasised their shared goal of European integration, a reminder that independence wasn’t always the final stop, but part of a broader journey.

According to Reuters , the countries opposing the motion were the United States, Israel, Ukraine, Hungary, Paraguay, Argentina, and North Macedonia, a small group standing against near-universal consensus.

This year’s vote reflects a slight uptick in support for Washington, compared with last year’s 187-2 outcome, but the global message remains unmistakable: the world rejects the embargo.

The embargo, first imposed in 1960 and expanded in the early 1960s, restricts nearly all trade, financial transactions, and travel between the United States and Cuba.

The map accompanying the vote — dominated by green for “in favour” — shows how isolated Washington’s position is. Nearly every nation across Latin America , Africa, Asia, and Europe supported ending the embargo.

Even U.S. allies like Japan, Canada, and the United Kingdom voted for the resolution. Only a handful of countries, including Argentina this year, broke ranks.

The United States last abstained on the resolution in 2016 during the Obama administration, but since then, successive governments have reinstated their opposition.

This year’s slight shift, with five more nations joining the “against” camp, reflects evolving geopolitical alignments. Ukraine’s vote , for instance, was influenced by its growing tensions with Havana after reports emerged of Cuban nationals allegedly fighting for Russia in the ongoing war. Meanwhile, Argentina’s decision marks a notable departure from Latin America’s traditionally unified stance against the embargo.

Still, the resolution is non-binding, which means it carries moral and political weight but no legal force. The embargo can only be lifted by the U.S. Congress, where opposition remains strong.

According to the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), world proven crude oil reserves stood at 1,567 billion barrels at the end of 2024, up around 2 billion barrels (or 0.1 %) from 2023. In practical terms, global reserves are barely moving up, even though crude remains in demand.

The map highlights a striking concentration of vast oil wealth clustered in just a few regions, particularly the Middle East and parts of South America .

Venezuela leads the world with an estimated 303 billion barrels, followed closely by Saudi Arabia at 267 billion and Iran with about 208 billion. Other major holders include Iraq with around 145 billion and Russia with 80 billion barrels, according to WorldAtlas

What the visual also shows is how the Middle East remains a “reservoir of reserves”. The region holds well over half of the world’s proven stock . For example, OPEC’s time-series chart indicates the Middle East’s share was roughly 871 billion barrels out of about 1,567 billion in 2024.

These reserve figures influence geopolitics, energy security, investment decisions and even how governments shape future policy. But it is surprising that despite decades of consumption, the global total of proven oil reserves isn’t collapsing but stable. That’s because discoveries and extraction in previously uneconomic fields are helping offset withdrawal.

For example, the OPEC press release notes that although global production from some OPEC-member countries dipped in 2024, reserves remained flat.

“The U.S. federal government does not allow Colombian cannabis to be exported, which could have been a great opportunity to reduce these ‘red zones’,” he said, referring to regions hit hardest by drug-related violence .

Petro contrasted Washington’s stance with the scale of its domestic opioid crisis, saying, “They are essentially supporting a mafia inside the United States that produces fentanyl… consumed within the U.S. with an effect that multiplies by 30 the deaths that cocaine used to cause, reaching 100,000 deaths a year.”

The Colombian leader, who has sought to redefine his country’s relations with the U.S., framed the issue as one of double standards, arguing that the same nations calling for drug reform continue to impose trade barriers that hurt developing economies. “Look at what happens with the ‘green,’ the cannabis product hasn’t been produced for three years; it has been abandoned,” Petro said.

The rally reflects a growing appetite among investors for safety amid global economic uncertainty and geopolitical pressure.

The surge is being fuelled by multiple factors. A weaker U.S. dollar and expectations of future interest rate cuts by the Federal Reserve are making gold more attractive, while institutional and central-bank buyers are stepping up their purchases.

This rise in gold value is also tied into broader global trends. For instance, reports show that gold prices surpassed US $4,300 per ounce recently as trade friction and safe-asset flows intensified. Analysts at HSBC have since revised their 2025 average forecast upward, citing this acceleration in demand.

For everyday investors and businesses, the message is clear that gold is not just a long-term investment bet any more but it’s responding in real time to current economic stresses.

That said, while the momentum is strong now, prices can be volatile. Unexpected policy shifts, a strengthened dollar, or easing geopolitical risks could all slow the pace of gains.

In short, gold’s breakout this year underlines how markets are refocusing on stability and diversification.

Yet ironically, both of these superpowers lack significant domestic reserves of many of these minerals. Africa, in contrast, hosts them, from cobalt in the Democratic Republic of Congo to lithium in Zimbabwe and platinum in South Africa .

But much of the value is lost externally. Raw minerals are exported, refined elsewhere, and packaged into high-value goods overseas.

This extract-then-enrich model leaves African countries dependent and undercompensated. The insight is simple: control over resources means control over the future — whether in energy, security, or technological development.

The narrative, however, is shifting. Across the continent, governments and entrepreneurs are pushing to recapture value. Ghana has established a new Ghana Gold Board (GoldBod) to regulate gold trading, buy local output, and discourage smuggling.

Zimbabwe is making a bold move after banning raw lithium ore exports in 2022. The government plans to ban lithium concentrate exports starting January 2027, forcing downstream processing to occur domestically.

Still, challenges remain. Global lithium prices have collapsed from their highs, squeezing margins and putting pressure on miners to survive through volatility.

The geopolitical pressure is also intensifying as China has recently tightened its export controls on rare earths and related technologies, especially around defence and semiconductors, signalling a more assertive posture.

“An official from the embassy came threatening to revoke visas,” Mulino said. “That is not consistent with a good relationship...the bilateral problem between the United States and China does not involve Panama,” he added.

Mulino firmly rejected attempts to pull Panama into the geopolitical rivalry between the two superpowers, stressing that Panama’s diplomatic relationship with China is established and sovereign.

“Panama has a relationship with China. It was not something I invented… I have asked repeatedly that Panama not be dragged into a bilateral problem between the United States and China,” he further remarked.

Mulino, who has sought balanced relations with both Washington and Beijing, emphasised respect as the foundation of diplomacy.

Panama and the People’s Republic of China established diplomatic relations in 2017.

Arrests, protests, and power struggles — Africa’s young people are once again taking to the streets, challenging systems older than their parents. Across the continent, pre-election crackdowns and generational frustration are colliding, revealing deep cracks in long-standing regimes.

Nowhere is that tension more visible than in Côte d'Ivoire, where authorities have intensified arrests of activists, journalists, and opposition figures ahead of the October 25 elections. President Alassane Ouattara, 83, is seeking another term, even as many of his rivals — including former president Laurent Gbagbo and ex–Credit Suisse CEO Tidjane Thiam — have been disqualified.

Madagascar: Gen-Z protests then the military take over

Weeks of youth-led protests in Madagascar have reshaped the country’s leadership. The military stepped in after mass demonstrations forced the government to collapse.

Over 60% of Madagascar’s population is under 25, and youth unemployment sits around 14%. This generation, frustrated by economic stagnation and corruption , coordinated their protests digitally through TikTok, WhatsApp, and Telegram.

But as in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, the promise of change may prove fleeting. Many of Africa’s Gen Z movements begin with the language of democracy, only to end under military rule.

Cameroon's election overshadowed by age and apathy

In Cameroon, the world waits for the results of a tense election. President Paul Biya, at 92, has ruled for 43 years — longer than most of his citizens have been alive. His challenger, Issa Tchiroma, 76, has already claimed victory and called on Biya to concede, before results have even been released.

Cameroon’s youth - 65% of the population, with a median age of just 18 - are largely disengaged from formal politics after decades of repression. Yet online, their voices are growing louder. Hashtags like #CameroonDecides and #TimeForChange have galvanised diaspora communities in France and Canada, creating new digital pressure on an ageing regime.

While Cameroon’s per capita GDP has risen since Biya took power, the gains have not been evenly felt. High inequality, inflation, and youth joblessness have eroded patience.

Côte d’Ivoire: a narrowing window for democracy

Despite years of peace since its 2011 civil conflict, Côte d'Ivoire’s political climate is tightening. Ouattara’s government is accused of political engineering through disqualifications and arrests.

Though the economy grows at 6% annually, youth unemployment remains high at 12%. Nearly 70% of Ivorians are under 30, yet they’re ruled by leaders from a political era that began before they were born.

Across much of Africa, that generational disconnect is stark: the median age of leaders is 63, while the median age of citizens is just 19.

Africa’s population is expected to double to 2.5 billion by 2050, with young people making up the overwhelming majority. Their demands for accountability, jobs, and representation are reshaping political discourse, often outside traditional systems.

When democratic institutions fail to evolve, the youth find new paths: protest, digital mobilisation, or even backing military “resets” that promise swift change.

Measuring fear in authoritarian states

In countries where citizens fear reprisals, measuring genuine public opinion is notoriously difficult. Researchers can use “list experiments” — indirect surveys that hide sensitive statements among innocuous ones like “I play sport weekly” or “I grow my own vegetables.” Rather than say which ones they agree with, respondents simply say how many statements are true. By establishing an average number of true statements on a control group, researchers can establish what proportion of people disagreed that "The government is doing a good job." without being able to attribute the belief to any individual.

By comparing answers between groups, analysts can estimate true support levels without forcing individuals to speak openly. After the 2021 coup in Mali, such a study revealed that while 74% publicly voiced support for the military government, real approval was closer to 63%.

From Antananarivo to Abidjan, Africa’s Gen Z is demanding something their elders rarely had, accountable leadership. Whether that results in deeper democracy or new forms of control depends on who answers their call.

Click here to watch our previous episodes

World Reframed is produced in London by  Global South  World, part of the Impactum Group. Its editors are Duncan Hooper and Ismail Akwei.

ISSN 2978-4891

Within that total, there are some 128 confirmed “bases” in around 49 foreign countries, meaning many sites are smaller “forward operating locations,” cooperative security sites, or rotational deployments rather than full-scale bases.

These installations are spread across all inhabited continents. In East Asia and the Pacific, significant bases include those in Japan (e.g. Kadena, Futenma) and South Korea (notably Camp Humphreys).

In the Middle East , Qatar’s Al Udeid Air Base plays a central role, hosting U.S. Air Force and coalition forces. In Africa, installations like Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti and Camp Simba in Kenya serve counter-terror and intelligence missions.

While many hosts see these bases as partnerships for training, logistics, or regional security, critics argue they raise serious issues of national sovereignty, local social stress, and geopolitical friction.

Current flashpoints elevate base vulnerabilities

In 2025, regional tensions have underscored both their strengths and risks:

“We have no plan for negotiation at this stage [with the United States],” Baqaei said. “We are focused on examining the effects and consequences of the action by the three European countries and the United States. Of course, it is natural for diplomacy, in the sense of ongoing contacts and consultations, to continue. Whenever we feel that diplomacy can be fruitful, we will certainly make decisions based on the country’s interests.”

In a pointed remark aimed at Washington, Baqaei stressed that Iran will not plead for talks.

“The Islamic Republic of Iran never begs for negotiations. Negotiation is a two-way street that must be decided upon with confidence regarding its benefits. Safeguarding national security and national interests is as important as preserving national dignity,” he declared.

The comments came amid international discussions over U.S. President Donald Trump ’s proposed plan for Gaza. Baqaei voiced serious concerns about the reaction of Palestinian resistance groups to the plan, which purports to recognise the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination and to prevent continued Israeli occupation.

The growth comes despite challenges in implementing a peace accord aimed at removing Rwandan troops and rebel groups from the country's east.

In the interview he:

Resilience Amid Conflict

Samba highlighted that the Congolese economy has remained “resilient amidst a very difficult context internationally as well as nationally,” citing projected GDP growth of 6.3% this year. Inflation is trending downwards, and the DRC is progressing steadily through its macroeconomic program with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). “We have kept our promises and our commitments in terms of reforms and in terms of the way the budget has been executed,” he said, expressing confidence in a successful second review of the program scheduled for October.

Despite an ongoing war he attributes to Rwandan-backed armed groups, Samba underscored the government’s focus on economic management rather than solely on security spending. “Security is important,” he said, “but the economy is resilient. Growth is there.”

IMF Partnership and Financial Stability

The DRC receives both technical and financial assistance from the IMF, which provides balance-of-payment support. Samba noted that the country currently holds close to three months of official reserves in foreign currencies , an important buffer against external shocks. “It’s a dialogue,” he emphasised, rejecting the idea that IMF reforms are imposed on Kinshasa. “We discuss, we exchange, and we do agree on what has to be done. So far, it’s going well.”

The country recently completed an IMF programme for the first time.

Separately, it has secured commitments from the World Bank and is working with the African Development Bank to fund the world's biggest hydro-electric project, the Grand Inga Dam. Mukoko Samba insisted that the project will go ahead despite large finance gaps remaining and little apparent appetite from private-sector companies to engage.

Regional Economic Integration

The minister acknowledged that political tensions have slowed progress on economic cooperation with Rwanda but reaffirmed President Félix Tshisekedi’s longstanding commitment to regional integration. He identified the potential for joint exploitation of gas reserves in Lake Kivu as one area where the US-brokered talks could bear fruit. However, his words were accompanied by a warning:

"What we don't want is this illegal exploitation of natural resources from DRC, the use of armed groups to instil instability, to disrupt the rule of law and to disrupt the right of the DRC government to rule its own territory and to manage its own resources. So we can go into deals with any neighbour, but that has to be cooperation, collaboration, dialogue, and not imposition."

Trade with the US and AGOA

Asked about the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which is up for renewal in Washington amid a U.S. government shutdown, Samba was optimistic: “I don’t think there is anything to fear about that. We are still willing to discuss with the US government so that we can renew AGOA for the benefit of both.” 

Cobalt and Resource Policy

Samba reaffirmed his government’s ambition to move up the value chain in mining, particularly in cobalt, of which the DRC supplies about 70% of the global market. After months of prohibiting exports of the metal, a new quota system will come into force this month. "The measures that we took in February this year show that there is a way to manage the cobalt market differently," he observed.

The minister argued that local processing is critical to controlling prices and preventing market manipulation by foreign stockpiling. “When you supply 70% of the world market,” he said, “tell me then why you shouldn’t be… at least having a say in where the prices get fixed.”

But prices aren't the only issue; it's important for the DRC to increase its refining capacity so that more profits from the minerals remain in the country. As well as trying to push foreign miners to do more, the government is supporting local initiatives, Mukoko Samba said.

He pointed to the Buenassa project in Katanga, which is establishing a Congolese-led refinery for cobalt and copper with government equity participation.

Interview filmed by Said Echarif at the Crans Montana Forum in Rabat on Oct 3, 2025

According to the Country Similarity Index , a data-driven ranking that compares nations across five major dimensions, the United States’ closest cultural cousin is its neighbour to the north, Canada, with a striking similarity score of 79.2.

Trailing behind Canada are fellow English-speaking democracies Australia (71.8), New Zealand (70.5), and Great Britain (69.7), with Puerto Rico tying Britain at 69.7, which is unsurprising given its political connection to the U.S.

Ireland (67.3) rounds out the top five before the ranking widens to include European partners like Germany, France, Norway, and Switzerland. These nations share much of the United States’ institutional, infrastructural, and political framework, even if geography and some cultural elements diverge.

Canada and the U.S. not only share the longest undefended border in the world, but their economies are closely integrated under the USMCA trade agreement, their media and entertainment industries cross-pollinate, and both societies are shaped by waves of immigration and shared democratic norms.

The inclusion of Australia and New Zealand reflects a similar pattern, countries built on British colonial legal systems, English language dominance, and comparable political models. Even across the Atlantic, Germany, France, Norway, and Switzerland land on the list thanks to their high standard of living , advanced infrastructure, and liberal democratic traditions, making them natural partners for Washington on global issues.

This cultural and institutional proximity carries weight in today’s geopolitical climate. It explains why the U.S. often finds it easier to coordinate policy and form coalitions with these nations, whether in trade negotiations, climate summits, or military alliances.

Canada and the U.S., for example, are currently negotiating joint energy and security frameworks, while Australia and New Zealand are playing central roles in the U.S.’s Indo-Pacific strategy.

Across the Atlantic, Germany and France continue to collaborate with Washington on everything from NATO’s security posture to AI governance frameworks, even amid occasional tensions over industrial policy.

“Since the removal of its troops from Niger in 2023, the government has implemented a sneaky and subversive destabilisation plan, informing, training, financing, and equipping terrorists, with unfortunate attempts to create the conditions for an inter-ethnic conflict in Niger and the Sahel,” he remarked.

Zeine accused France of running a coordinated disinformation campaign aimed at discrediting Niger’s institutions, political leaders, and army, while also trying to create permanent political tension between Niger and its neighbours.

“This is accompanied by an unprecedented economic and financial war, notably in France’s hateful intent to sabotage all our development projects by demobilising investors and systematically voting against Niger in international financial institutions such as the African Development Bank, the World Bank , and the IMF,” he said.

Since the military-led government in Niamey forced French troops to withdraw last year, relations have soured further, with Niger accusing Paris of meddling in its internal affairs and undermining its sovereignty.

“Let’s do something else for the first time at the UN. Let’s do a pop quiz. Who shouts, ‘Death to America ’?," he queried the Assembly while pulling out a placard. "Is it A. Iran, B. Hamas, C. Hezbollah, D. the Houthis, or E. all of the above? Correct, all of the above. Second question: Who has murdered Americans and Europeans in cold blood? A. Al-Qaeda, B. Hamas, C. Hezbollah, D. Iran, or E. all of the above? Correct again.”

The Israeli leader used the exercise to argue that Iran and its proxies, including Hamas, Hezbollah and Yemen’s Houthis, threaten not just Israel but the entire modern world.

“Our enemies hate all of us with equal venom,” Netanyahu warned. “They want to drag the modern world back to the past, to a dark age of violence, fanaticism, and terror. You know deep down that Israel is fighting your fight.”

Netanyahu claimed that despite public criticism, many world leaders privately thank Israel for its intelligence, which he said has repeatedly prevented terrorist attacks in foreign capitals.

“Behind closed doors, many of the leaders who publicly condemn us, privately thank us,” he said. “They tell me how much they value Israel’s superb intelligence services that have prevented, time and again, terrorist attacks in their capitals, saving countless lives.”

He cited comments by former U.S. Air Force intelligence chief General George Keegan, who once said the U.S. would need “five CIAs” to match Israel’s intelligence capabilities, and noted that German Chancellor Merz admitted Israel was “doing the dirty work for all of us” after Israel struck Iranian nuclear sites in June.

Netanyahu also praised former U.S. President Donald Trump for showing Iran that there is “a price to pay” for targeting Americans.

The assembly hall erupted with jeers as the session’s chair tried repeatedly to call the gathering to order. 

Once at the podium, Netanyahu rejected international calls for a Palestinian state, saying Israel would not “commit national suicide.” He further criticised governments that have recently recognised Palestinian statehood, warning, “It will be a mark of shame on all of you.”

Argentina has endured decades of economic instability, defaulting on sovereign debt three times since 2001 and repeatedly falling short on IMF agreements. Milei, a self-styled libertarian reformer, has sought to stabilise the peso, cut spending, and rebuild confidence after his party’s recent election setback triggered capital flight. The peso has lost over 90% of its value in the past five years, while inflation, although sharply down to 34% this year from 289% in 2024, remains among the world’s highest according to the IMF and the Argentine Central Bank .

The U.S. plan, which includes access to the Treasury’s Exchange Stabilisation Fund, would supplement Argentina’s $20 billion IMF program secured earlier this year.

The move marks a striking reversal for President Donald Trump , who has cut foreign aid elsewhere while confronting Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela. In Argentina, however, Trump is doubling down on Milei, whose pro-market agenda and public praise of Washington have made him a rare regional ally.

The plan has drawn criticism at home, with Senator Elizabeth Warren warning that it amounts to a bailout of “a political ally and his global investors before an election.” Economists, including Brad Setser of the Council on Foreign Relations, caution that the U.S. risks repeating the IMF’s experience of lending heavily to Argentina with little chance of repayment.

Washington’s $20 billion swap line would eclipse Argentina’s existing $18 billion agreement with China’s central bank, signalling a strategic push to counter Beijing’s growing financial footprint in Latin America.

For Milei, the U.S. backing offers both short-term stability and political cover.

This lopsided distribution arises largely because the Northern Hemisphere contains more landmass, including Asia, Europe, most of North America, and a large portion of Africa, which in turn supports dense urbanisation, infrastructure, and economic activity.

When you see that 87% number, it’s more than a curious statistic; it underscores how global power, investment, and influence tend to cluster. Countries with massive populations like China, India, the United States, and most of Europe all lie north of the Equator. Their sheer demographic weight drives innovation, consumption, and geopolitics.

Because so many people and economies are concentrated in one half of the planet, the Northern Hemisphere often commands more attention in global policy, infrastructure, and climate response. Investments in logistics, digital infrastructure, energy grids, and finance tend to gravitate toward where the demand and population are.

Meanwhile, countries in the Southern Hemisphere, though rich in natural resources and biodiversity, often face challenges of remoteness, lower infrastructure density, and lesser influence in some global forums.

In 2025, the weight of Northern Hemisphere populations carries fresh implications in a world grappling with climate change , supply-chain stress, geopolitical competition, and migration pressures.

Consider climate risk: coastal megacities in the Northern Hemisphere, from New York to Mumbai to Tokyo, host hundreds of millions of people living in low-lying zones vulnerable to sea level rise. Governments must plan infrastructure resilience precisely where the most people live.

On trade and supply chains, disruptions in Asia, Europe, or North America can ripple far and wide, because so much of global manufacturing, consumption, and transport passes through northern hubs. When China or Europe issues a supply chain warning, it tends to cascade faster.

Within just a few short years, all three vanished from the map, reshaping the heart of Europe and leaving Poland with an entirely new set of neighbours.

East Germany was absorbed into a reunified Germany in 1990. Czechoslovakia peacefully split into the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1993.

The Soviet Union, once a superpower stretching across eleven time zones, dissolved in 1991 into fifteen independent states, among them Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania, all of which now share a border with Poland.

This dramatic transformation wasn’t just a cartographic curiosity. It marked the collapse of the Iron Curtain and the end of the Cold War order. Borders that had been set in stone for decades were redrawn almost overnight.

Treaties such as the 1990 German-Polish Border Treaty formally recognised the Oder-Neisse line, cementing Poland’s western frontier. New governments emerged, economies transitioned from communism to capitalism, and societies grappled with fresh identities in a new Europe.

The effects of those changes are still being felt. Poland, once part of the Soviet sphere, is now a central player in NATO and the European Union , standing on the front line of Western support for Ukraine as Russia’s war continues to rage.

The very borders that were redefined in the early 1990s have become some of the most strategically important in today’s global security landscape.

What this map highlights is simple but profound: borders are not permanent. They reflect power, politics, and people — and when those forces shift, the map changes with them. Poland’s neighbours before 1990 are gone, replaced by a new geopolitical reality that continues to shape the world today.

El-Sisi accused Israel of brazenly violating international law, humanitarian principles, and established norms, saying its policies are destabilising and reckless. He argued that Israel’s practices risk turning the region into “a lawless arena for aggression,” with consequences not only for Palestinians but for the wider Middle East.

“This is a situation that is utterly unacceptable and cannot be tolerated,” El-Sisi said, stressing that unchecked escalation could push the region into “an uncontrollable spiral.”

In a pointed message to Israelis , the Egyptian leader warned that current events could unravel decades of peace-building efforts, including the accords Israel has signed with its Arab neighbours. He cautioned that the fallout might erode opportunities for new peace deals, damage Israel’s own security, and even invalidate existing agreements.

“The consequences will be severe, and this is a price we will all pay, without exception,” El-Sisi said. He urged Israelis not to allow “the peace efforts of your predecessors to come to nought,” warning that regret may come too late.

El-Sisi also used his speech to express Egypt’s solidarity with Qatar following reports of Israeli aggression against Qatari airspace and territory. He said Cairo rejects any violation of a nation’s sovereignty and condemned the threat to Doha’s security in “the strongest and most unequivocal terms.”

Meanwhile, a 72-page independent United Nations inquiry concluded that Israel is committing genocide in Gaza. The finding indicated that four of the five acts defined under international law have been carried out since the start of the war with Hamas.

While the destruction of the World Trade Centre, the hit on the Pentagon, and the crash in Pennsylvania are often viewed primarily through an American lens, the global casualty pattern reminds us that people from over 60 countries died that day.

The attacks on 9/11 claimed 2,977 civilian lives in the U.S., excluding the 19 hijackers. Beyond U.S. citizens, 372 foreign nationals from 61 countries were among the victims.

Countries most affected (outside the U.S.) included the United Kingdom (67 fatalities), the Dominican Republic (47), India (41), South Korea (28), Canada (24), Japan (24), and Colombia (18).

In addition to the immediate death toll, thousands more were injured, and many first responders and survivors continue to suffer long-term health effects such as respiratory illnesses, cancers, and mental health conditions.

The infrastructure loss alone was staggering; the economic damage during the first weeks ran into hundreds of billions of dollars, considering lost productivity, property damage, disrupted business operations, air travel, and tourism.

The attacks introduced a seismic shift in how markets view geopolitical and terrorism risk. Immediately after the attacks, U.S. markets were closed for several days; once they reopened, losses mounted. For example, the S&P 500 dropped by about 5% on the first trading day, and further declines followed over the subsequent weeks.

Scholars have since found that terrorist attacks correlate with higher market volatility and risk premiums, reduced foreign investment in vulnerable economies, and greater caution in sectors like travel , insurance, and infrastructure. Companies delay investment, and governments often increase spending on security, both of which have trade-offs.

The connection to today’s markets

The past few years, rife with geopolitical shocks, from war in Ukraine to tensions in the Middle East, underscore that markets are ever-attuned to risk.

The International Monetary Fund, in its recent reports , has flagged increasing geopolitical risk, including terrorism, as a factor that can lead to sharp corrections, especially in emerging markets, where volatility tends to be greater.

Investors are increasingly incorporating Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) and security metrics into risk models. Countries or regions perceived as unstable or exposed to terrorist threats often face a higher cost of capital, reduced foreign direct investment, and volatility in sovereign bond yields.

We bring you a continental breakdown of the key participants in the celebration:

Asia dominates the guest list

The strongest presence came from Asia, with Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korea’s Kim Jong Un flanking Xi on Tiananmen Gate as guests of honour. They were joined by Asian heads of state and government, including Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, and Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian, highlighting Eurasian solidarity.

Central Asia was strongly represented with Kazakhstan’s Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Kyrgyzstan’s Sadyr Japarov, Tajikistan’s Emomali Rahmon, Turkmenistan’s Serdar Berdimuhamedov, and Uzbekistan’s Shavkat Mirziyoyev.

From South and Southeast Asia came Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, Nepali Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli, Myanmar’s Acting President Min Aung Hlaing, Mongolian President Khurelsukh Ukhnaa, Maldives President Mohamed Muizzu, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto, Vietnam’s President Luong Cuong, Laos’ President Thongloun Sisoulith, and Cambodia’s King Norodom Sihamoni.

European representation

Europe was represented by only two leaders. These were the Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić and Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico. Both have been outspoken critics of sanctions on Russia and have sought closer ties with Moscow.

Africa ’s representation slashed

From Africa , the Republic of the Congo President Denis Sassou Nguesso and Zimbabwe’s President Emmerson Mnangagwa made the trip and were the only top representatives from the continent. This comes in spite of China’s increased strategic presence on the African continent. In 2015, five African countries made the guest list. Nonetheless, the participation of the two African leaders was symbolic of African partnerships.

Latin America’s sole representative

Cuba’s President Miguel Díaz-Canel was the only Latin American leader present.

Absentees and envoy-level participation

Conspicuously missing were leaders from the United States, the United Kingdom, South Korea, Poland, and the Czech Republic. While Poland and the Czech Republic had attended in 2015, they were replaced this year by Serbia and Slovakia.

Meanwhile, Brazil, Egypt, and South Korea chose to send envoys rather than heads of state, signalling more cautious engagement.

This stems from the late arrival of ballot papers. Initially printed in Port Moresby, the final shipment of ballots was delayed until September 2, well past the original August 23 delivery date.

This compressed timeframe left insufficient margin for packing and distributing the materials for polling on 4 September.

Additionally, quality control concerns emerged regarding the serial numbers printed on the ballots, an essential safeguard against fraud , and prompted officials to take corrective measures before proceeding.

Electoral Commissioner Desmond Tsianai emphasised that the decision was not taken lightly but deemed necessary to uphold a fair and transparent process.

“Every eligible voter should have the opportunity to cast their ballots. Rescheduling polling at this stage is the most responsible decision to ensure that all ballot papers are delivered securely so that all Bougainvilleans can vote on the same day. This step protects the rights of voters and upholds the integrity of the election,” Commissioner Tsianai said.

The Atolls constituency remains an exception, as its ballots were already on track for delivery in time, and hence its polling proceeds as planned on Thursday.

Global South World reported that this year’s general election marks the first-ever one-day polling model for Bougainville. With 46 seats in the House of Representatives up for grabs—including newly added constituencies—and a competitive presidential race, the region is poised for a crucial junction in its political journey.

Over 404 candidates are vying for parliamentary seats, including a record 34 women across both reserved and open-competition seats, while the presidential contest features seven candidates challenging incumbent Ishmael Toroama.

On Friday, 5 September, polling stations across the Autonomous Region will open from 8:00 am to 4:00 pm Bougainville Standard Time. With over 3,000 electoral staff mobilised to ensure smooth operations, the election is expected to proceed with minimal disruption.

Petro accused Trump of dehumanising migrants by portraying them as criminals and supporting detention centers that he likened to concentration camps.

“We cannot allow Trump to say that migrants are criminals and to build prisons that are actually concentration camps, just a repetition of Hitler,” Petro said. Adding that, “I say to Trump, distance yourself from Hitler. Your grandparents - and those of the entire American people - are buried in Europe, where thousands died to destroy Hitler. How is it possible that their grandchildren now support Hitler’s ideas?”

Petro included Europe in his criticism, arguing that anti-immigration rhetoric across the continent reflects a resurgence of fascist thinking.

“All of Europe’s anti-immigration rhetoric is nothing but fascism. They don’t like Arabs, but the Arabs gave them numbers, the concept of good living, love, and poetry,” he said.

The Colombian leader suggested that Western societies were clinging to selective versions of history while ignoring their reliance on cultural and intellectual contributions from non-European peoples.

Petro urged the creation of a political and economic alliance between Latin America and Africa to promote democracy, human diversity, and renewable energy. He called on regional leaders - including Brazil’s Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Mexico’s Claudia Sheinbaum - to assert independence from U.S. dominance.

“We propose a global alliance for global democracy, for human diversity, for freedom, and for a new technology grounded in an economy based on new human relationships,” Petro said.

Petro further suggested that the Statue of Liberty could be relocated from New York to Cartagena if Western societies abandoned their commitment to freedom.

“If they really want freedom, let’s bring the Statue of Liberty from New York to Cartagena. If freedom is real, let it be through an M-19-style operation,” he said, referencing the guerrilla group he once belonged to.

The 70-minute event featured advanced military displays, including missiles, tanks, fighter jets, and hundreds of domestically-built aircraft and ground armaments.

Leaders from 26 countries across Asia, Africa, Europe, and Latin America attended the event. Among them were Iran’s Masoud Pezeshkian, Zimbabwe’s Emmerson Mnangagwa, Slovakia’s Robert Fico, and Serbia’s Aleksandar Vucic.

The parade marks the anniversary of the end of World War II and the Second Sino-Japanese War. It is regarded as China’s largest military parade in decades.

China’s Ministry of Transport reported that the country saw 11.9 billion cross-regional trips between July 1 and August 31, averaging 192 million trips daily, up 4.3 percent year-on-year. Road-based self-driving trips accounted for 8.7 billion journeys, or 73 percent of the total, People's Daily reports. Rural self-driving tours surged in popularity, while student travel, tourism, and study tours helped fuel consumption. An official projected that domestic tourism trips this summer would surpass 2.5 billion, with Beijing, Shanghai, and Xi’an ranking among the top destinations. The rail system set a new summer record with 940 million passenger trips, and civil aviation carried 147 million passengers, a 3.6 percent year-on-year rise. On August 15 alone, flights carried 2.56 million passengers, marking a new single-day high.

President Xi unveils Global Governance Initiative

President Xi Jinping, at the “Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Plus” meeting in Tianjin, proposed a new Global Governance Initiative (GGI) to reshape international cooperation. “I look forward to working with all countries for a more just and equitable global governance system and advancing toward a community with a shared future for humanity,” Xi said . He outlined five guiding principles for the GGI, including sovereign equality, adherence to international rule of law, practicing multilateralism, adopting a people-centered approach, and focusing on concrete action.

China leads the world in nanotechnology patents

A white paper released in Beijing revealed that China holds 43 percent of all nanotechnology patents granted globally over the past 25 years, amounting to 464,000 patents. This surpasses the combined total of the U.S., Japan, and South Korea. The White Paper : China Nanotechnology Industry 2025 highlights key areas of China’s patent portfolio, including semiconductors, catalytic chemistry, biomedicine, and new materials. The Chinese Academy of Sciences topped the global rankings with 23,400 patents. As of May 2025, China had more than 34,500 nanotech enterprises employing nearly 10 million people, with the global market projected to reach $1.5 trillion by year’s end.

China’s summer box office nears 12 billion yuan

The China Film Administration announced that the 2025 summer box office grossed 11.96 billion yuan ($1.68 billion), surpassing last year’s total. More than 100 films were released, drawing 321 million viewers nationwide. The top-grossing film, Dead to Rights - a historical drama on the 1937 Nanjing Massacre - earned 2.89 billion yuan since its July 25 release. Other major hits included animated feature Nobody, Jackie Chan’s crime action film The Shadow’s Edge, the historical drama The Lychee Road, and Universal’s Jurassic World Rebirth.  

Chinese Embassy issues warning in South Korea

The Chinese Embassy in South Korea has urged Chinese citizens to avoid carrying offensive weapons in public after South Korea revised its criminal law earlier this year. The embassy noted that carrying knives, hammers, or other potentially dangerous items without a legitimate reason could now result in up to three years’ imprisonment or fines of 10 million won ($7,300). “Chinese citizens in South Korea or those planning to visit the country should avoid carrying objects that could be regarded as offensive weapons in public. If unavoidable, they must be properly concealed to reduce legal risks,” the embassy said in its statement .

A visual breakdown charts the top ten nations: Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Canada (163 bn), Iraq (145 bn), UAE (113 bn), Kuwait (102 bn), Russia (80 bn), the United States (74 bn), and Libya (48 bn).

These top ten nations “hold strategic leverage in shaping global energy markets and international policy frameworks” and underscore how membership in OPEC or OPEC+ amplifies their global influence.

Political stability, technological access, and strategic alliances significantly influence actual production capacity and how these reserves translate into power.

More than just numbers

Debate over US troops

Opposition senators accused the ruling Morena party of allowing Washington to increase its influence over national security , while Morena lawmakers accused the opposition of using the issue to score political points.

Moreno said he was silenced when trying to speak on behalf of his party about the risks of Mexico following Venezuela’s path.

“I claimed my right to speak on behalf of the people we represent… But Morena and this coward Fernández Noroña changed the agenda to silence us,” Moreno said. “We cannot allow in Mexico what happened in Venezuela: a corrupt narco dictatorship with foreign backing.”

Accusations of violence

Fernández Noroña, for his part, accused Moreno of provoking him and even threatening his life.

“He grazed me, hit my arms, and said, ‘I am going to beat you, I am going to kill you,’” Fernández Noroña alleged. “My colleague Emiliano González, who was filming with a 360° camera, was attacked, his equipment destroyed, and then Moreno went to finish him off with punches,” he told the press.

Videos from the chamber show senators pushing each other as staff tried to intervene.

Fernández Noroña said complaints would be filed and called for Moreno’s immunity to be lifted. “What happened today is very serious; regardless of the political force, this should never happen under any circumstances. None is none,” he told reporters.

No genocide, no refugee claim

Lamola stressed that the Afrikaner community does not face persecution that would qualify them for refugee status under the 1951 UN Refugee Convention.

“We don’t agree that this is a refugee programme, because there’s no genocide in South Africa,” he said. “Afrikaners do not fit the definition of refugees under the UN Convention. This is, in reality, a fast-tracking process of immigration by the US.”

The United States has framed the programme as a humanitarian measure, citing concerns over crime and economic insecurity in South Africa. But Pretoria sees the move as politically charged and unjustified.

Preferential treatment?

South Africa argues that by creating a pathway only for Afrikaners, the US is engaging in preferential treatment that recalls the racial hierarchies of the apartheid system.

“With our history as a country, a preferential treatment of Afrikaners who are not fleeing genocide amounts to Apartheid 2.0,” Lamola said.

South Africa thus maintains it has no duty to assist with the programme, since it does not constitute a legitimate refugee initiative.

In May, the first group of about 50 Afrikaners - descendants of South Africa’s first European settlers - were flown to the US on a chartered flight after former President Donald Trump authorised the move, Viory reports.