The scramble comes as Iran’s actions around the Strait of Hormuz, a major global oil and fuel shipping corridor, have rattled energy markets and forced buyers to diversify supply routes and suppliers. 

Dangote refinery officials said trading firms that buy its products have been shipping fuel across the continent, including to Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Tanzania and Togo this month, with Tanzania receiving its first arrival from the refinery, according to a company representative cited in the report. 

While demand for Dangote’s output is rising abroad, the refinery has also adjusted prices at home in response to swings in crude markets. Nigerian media and market reports have described multiple price moves this month as global oil prices surged and then shifted again amid war-related uncertainty. 

Dangote, Africa’s largest refinery, plans to expand capacity further in the coming years, and the latest round of inquiries highlights how the plant is increasingly being viewed as a regional backstop when traditional import routes are disrupted. 

Africa’s exposure to global disruptions is closely tied to its reliance on imports and limited intra-continental trade, Kuagbedzi said, arguing that recent crises have underscored the urgency of reducing that dependence.

“Well, I think that we have to deepen African trade,” he said, referencing the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which was created to boost trade among African countries but has yet to reach its full potential.

He warned that continued reliance on external suppliers for essential goods leaves African economies vulnerable when global supply chains are disrupted.

“We cannot continue as a continent to depend on, you know, others for our, you know, supplies in terms of crude oil, in terms of our cereals, in terms of sugar, in terms of everything that we actually import into this country.”

Economists have long argued that such dependence amplifies the impact of global shocks. Analysts, including Dani Rodrik, have pointed to the need for diversification and stronger domestic industries.

"Economic growth and development are possible only through the accumulation of capabilities over time, in areas ranging from skills and technologies to public institutions," wrote in his book, " The Globalisation Paradox ".

Nelson, during the discussion with Abigail Johnson Boakye, intimated that Africa must move beyond exporting raw materials and instead invest in value addition. “I think that we need to diversify our economic basis by adding more value to the raw materials,” he said, pointing to Ghana’s plan to stop exporting raw gold by 2030 as an example of policy direction.

He added that heavy reliance on imports has implications for employment and economic growth. “Once you continue to import, you are creating unemployment in your country, and you are creating a corresponding employment in that country.”

For Nelson, strengthening intra-African trade is central to reducing vulnerability.

“We should try as much as possible to trade within ourselves. We should try as much as possible to deepen our economic and financial relations. And we should also try as much as possible to build our economies based on African solutions that can solve African problems.”

Watch the full interview attached above.

The main opposition parties did not field candidates, citing a lack of transparency. Two prominent opposition figures, General Jean-Marie Michel Mokoko and Andre Okombi Salissa, have been in jail for nearly a decade.

Ahead of the vote, human rights activists were arrested, several opposition parties were suspended, and public gatherings were closely monitored, according to Congolese human rights activist Joe Washington Ebina. Sunday's voting was also affected by late openings at some polling stations and a nationwide internet blackout.

More than 3.2 million Congolese were registered to vote. State television reported on Tuesday, March 17, a turnout of 84.65%, higher than the nearly 68% recorded in 2021, when Sassou won his previous five-year term with 88.4% of the vote.

Sassou's closest challenger, Mabio Mavoungou Zinga, a 69-year-old retired customs inspector and former member of parliament, secured 1.48% of the vote.

Defeated candidates have five days to file a challenge, while the Constitutional Court has 15 days to review them before announcing final results.

Sassou, a former paratrooper, first took power in 1979. He lost the country’s first multi-party elections in 1992 but returned to power in 1997 after a civil war. A constitutional change in 2015 removed term limits and the presidential age cap, allowing him to run for an additional five-year term. This latest term is expected to be his last, placing attention on succession within the ruling party.

The country’s economy, which depends heavily on oil, has stabilised in recent years after a prolonged downturn. Congo completed a three-year International Monetary Fund programme last year. However, over half of the population lives in poverty, and many lack reliable access to electricity, running water, and basic healthcare, according to the World Bank.

Congo has also faced ongoing allegations of corruption, with French and U.S. prosecutors investigating assets held abroad by members of Sassou’s close family. Rights groups state that political space has narrowed in recent years, pointing to arrests of activists and the suspension of political parties.

Major General Samir Farag told Global South Voices’ Kadria Kassem that the current fighting cannot end regional tensions and that a coordinated approach would be necessary.

“We hope the Arab states will heed the advice of President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi and form an Arab Army with real military capabilities,” he said in an interview.

Wealthy Arab nations could fund a regional defence industry with the ability to bind their militaries together temporarily in times of war, Farag said.

He pointed out that Washington’s military involvement in the region would fluctuate, but the underlying problems would remain, especially after Tehran’s policy of retaliating against its neighbours.

“The war might end, but the conflict will persist,” he warns.

Egypt’s three demands

Farag, who has held a range of positions in the military at home and abroad and is a former governor of Luxor, set out Egypt's position on the conflict:

That Iran should not have nuclear weapons

That Iran should not attack the Gulf states

That Iran’s government should not fall.

The latter, according to Farag, would create a vacuum and disrupt the regional balance between Turkey, Egypt, Iran and Israel. “Iran’s exit would be harmful to the strategic balance in the Middle East,” he said

Strategic regional balance

Historically, Egypt’s policy has swung from close links with the Soviets under President Abdel Nasser to tight ties with America. Today, according to Farag, President Sisi is seeking a strategic balance, building relationships with Russia, China, the European Union and the USA as well as regional partnerships.

A key part of this careful navigation is a desire to avoid conflict.

It would have been easy, Farag notes, for his country to have been drawn into the conflict in Gaza.

“We in the military know the cost of war, its problems, the various dimensions and dangers. We know what problems can occur. That is why we are careful,” he says.

Nevertheless, despite avoiding conflict itself, Egypt is profoundly impacted by wars elsewhere. As the largest importer of wheat from Russia and Ukraine, it has been hard hit by price rises and disruptions from the fighting there. And the turmoil in the Gulf has had a profound impact on shipping, hammering important revenues from the Suez Canal.

Farag points out that Egypt has taken in 10 million refugees – he calls them guests – far more than any of its neighbours. And those displaced peoples have found a home in the country that means they are not trying to move on towards Europe, he observes: “Egypt always offers help to every country.”

No reason was given for the decision.

The move comes months after political unrest in the country. Former president Andry Rajoelina, who had been elected for a third term in a disputed 2023 poll, was removed from power following weeks of protests over persistent power and water shortages.

In October last year, Rajoelina was formally stripped of his Malagasy nationality after it emerged that he had acquired French citizenship in 2014, a step that violates the country’s nationality laws, which forbid dual citizenship for sitting presidents.

Officials argued that by obtaining French nationality, Rajoelina had automatically forfeited his Malagasy citizenship, making his presidency constitutionally invalid.

Randrianirina, the military officer who led the coup, was sworn in as head of state on 17 October. He pledged to organise elections within two years and restore civilian rule. However, his administration has faced scepticism both domestically and internationally over its legitimacy and the timeline for a return to democracy.

In December, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) directed Madagascar’s military authorities to submit a roadmap for restoring democracy, including plans for fresh elections by the end of February.

On Monday, March 9, Randrianirina dismissed the entire government and assigned permanent secretaries to oversee the day-to-day operations of ministries until a new cabinet is formed.

Randrianirina has not explained the reason for the mass dismissals. However, leaders of the Gen Z movement, whose grassroots mobilisation helped bring the military leader to power, have called for greater inclusiveness in the transition process and more representation in decision-making structures.

Activist groups known as the Gen Z and Gen Y movements recently issued a 72-hour ultimatum demanding Randrianirina’s resignation, citing frustration with his performance, according to local media reports.

Businessman Herintsalama Rajaonarivelo had been appointed prime minister in October in an attempt to bridge the divide between military leadership and civilian governance.

Leaders of the Gen Z movement rejected his appointment at the time, stating that it was made in a “non-transparent” manner and “without consultation”.

The group demanded to know how Rajaonarivelo had been selected, citing what it described as his connections to the previous administration.

They added that the decision “runs contrary to the desired structural change” the movement was seeking.

A central theme was the need for African countries to process their natural resources locally instead of exporting them in raw form. Leaders argued that local beneficiation would increase economic returns and strengthen industrial development.

Ghana announced a specific policy measure during the summit. President John Dramani Mahama declared that by 2030, the country will end the export of unprocessed mineral ores. The directive applies to manganese, bauxite, and iron ore.

"By 2030, there will not be any raw mineral ores leaving Ghana," Mahama said at his "Accra Reset" side event. The policy aims to promote local industrialisation and increase the value Ghana gains from its natural resources.

South African President Cyril Ramaphosa also warned against what he described as a "new form of colonialism", where foreign economies target Africa’s natural resources. He said minerals should be processed locally. "It should no longer be a case where rock, soil and dust is exported out of Africa without being beneficiated," Ramaphosa told delegates. He urged African nations to work together to ensure their resources benefit their citizens.

United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres condemned the historical exploitation of Africa’s resources. "No more exploitation, no more plundering," he said, stressing that "the people of Africa must benefit from the resources of Africa". He called for fair and sustainable value chains to ensure African countries benefit "first and fully" from their critical minerals.

President Mahama also announced changes to Ghana’s cocoa financing system. For nearly 30 years, Ghana has relied on syndicated loans from international banks to purchase cocoa, using cocoa beans as collateral.

According to Mahama, this system has limited domestic processing because collateralised beans must be exported to international financiers. Ghana has the capacity to process 400,000 tons of cocoa locally, but local processors have not had sufficient access to raw beans.

Under the new approach, Ghana will raise domestic bonds in cedis to finance cocoa purchases. "Ghana has enough cedis to pay for its cocoa," Mahama said, adding that the change will "immediately" release 400,000 tons of beans for local processing. Beginning with the 2026–27 season, at least 50% of all cocoa beans must be processed within the country.

The policy announcements were presented under the "Accra Reset" initiative. The framework focuses on strengthening resource sovereignty and shifting from aid dependency to investment-led growth.

Mahama criticised delays in implementing AU decisions. "African leaders come with decisions, agree and develop frameworks, but what is missing is urgency and implementation," he said. He urged leaders to "stop talking and start implementing" to create opportunities for young people and reduce irregular migration.

The summit also marked leadership changes within the AU. Burundi’s President Évariste Ndayishimiye will assume the AU chairmanship for 2026. Outgoing chairperson President João Lourenço of Angola said Africa’s development is not possible "if we leave anyone behind," and called for continued investment in infrastructure and human capital.

He said the healing of historical wounds caused by centuries of slavery and colonial exploitation requires structural reforms and stronger cooperation among AU member states. According to him, progress cannot rely solely on symbolic gestures.

The panel, held under the theme “Reparations, Memory and Sovereignty: Common African Position on the Restitution of Heritage Resources,” focused on the return of African artefacts currently held in foreign museums. President Mahama stated that these objects were “unjustly held” and stressed that their return is central to African dignity.

His address came as the AU marked 10 years of formal demands for reparations. He noted that, despite a decade of advocacy, tangible outcomes have remained limited. He urged participants to move beyond the “moral aspiration” of seeking apologies and instead pursue concrete steps toward “civilisational repair.”

President Mahama said Ghana ’s role in the continental reparations agenda aims to connect historical justice with present-day economic sovereignty.

The meeting preceded the launch of the “Decade on Justice for Africans and People of African Descent through Reparations.” The initiative is expected to produce a formal “Common African Position” to guide negotiations with former colonial powers and international cultural institutions.

The intelligence agency claims that Macron has authorised a plan to “eliminate ‘undesirable leaders’ in Africa,”  comparing the strategy to historical American operations in South America.

The SVR report describes the French leadership as “refined racists from Paris” who are struggling to maintain their reputation as a “parasitic metropolis, robbing its former colonies and hindering their development”.

The agency further alleges that France is “directly supporting terrorists of various stripes” and collaborating with the “Ukrainian regime” to supply militants in the Sahel with drones and instructors to destabilise sovereign governments.

A primary target of this alleged "destructive attention" is Madagascar, where a military takeover in October 2025 ousted President Andry Rajoelina. 

The SVR claims that because the new government under Colonel Randrianirina is “committed to developing relations with BRICS,” Paris is actively “exploring ways to overthrow” the new president to “restore a loyal regime”.

The coup in Madagascar followed a period of intense domestic turmoil triggered by widespread economic discontent, with 80% of the population living below the poverty line and the country suffering from high levels of corruption. The immediate spark for the 2025 protests involved persistent power outages and water shortages in the capital, Antananarivo. 

The movement was largely driven by Generation Z activists, organised via the "Gen Z Mada" social media movement, which used symbols like the "Jolly Roger" flag from the anime One Piece to represent rebellion against oppressive systems. 

The transition of power was finalised on October 15, 2025, after the elite military unit CAPSAT aligned with demonstrators and Parliament impeached Rajoelina, who eventually fled into exile citing an assassination plot.

The SVR’s warnings of French-backed destabilisation coincide with a major security incident in Niger. 

On January 29, General Abdourahamane Tiani, leader of Niger’s military junta, accused France, Benin, and Côte d’Ivoire of sponsoring a "terrorist attack" on the Diori Hamani International Airport in Niamey.

The assault, which involved gunfire and explosions, damaged the fuselage and wings of commercial aircraft belonging to ASKY Airlines and Air Côte d’Ivoire. During a televised address, General Tiani named President Macron as a primary sponsor of the operation. 

“We have heard them bark, they should be ready to hear us roar,” Tiani declared. He also extended specific gratitude to Russian troops stationed at the base for “defending their sector” during the skirmish.

The SVR report also links France to an attempted coup in Burkina Faso on January 3, which aimed to assassinate the country's military leader, Captain Ibrahim Traoré. 

Russian intelligence asserts that “France’s involvement... has already been established,” and claims similar efforts are underway to overthrow President Assimi Goïta in Mali through city blockades and terror against civilians. 

General N’Tam had previously held the rank of brigadier general. With the new designation, he now bears four stars instead of two. His promotion comes two months after the military seized power on November 26, one day before the electoral commission was scheduled to announce the results of the presidential election.

The coup led to the ousting of former president Umaro Sissoco Embalo and the suspension of the electoral process. The military announced that it would govern for one year and named N’Tam, who has been described as a close associate of Embalo, as the transitional president.

Presidential and legislative elections have been scheduled for December 6, 2026, to restore civilian leadership.

According to the military, the takeover was intended to prevent violence between supporters of rival candidates. Both Embalo and opposition contender Fernando Dias had declared victory before the release of official results. 

Embalo was aiming to become the first incumbent to secure a second term in 30 years in the West African nation.

The electoral commission later stated that it was unable to complete the vote tally after armed men seized ballot materials and destroyed servers containing the results.

The coup was part of a cycle of instability in Guinea-Bissau, which has had multiple coups and attempted uprisings since gaining independence from Portugal in 1974. It was the ninth in West and Central Africa in five years.

Other members of the Presidential Council who will attend the side event include President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi of Egypt, President William Samoei Ruto of Kenya , and President Felix Tshisekedi of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Nigeria will be represented by Vice President Kashim Shettima, while Prime Minister James Marape will represent Papua New Guinea.

The Guardians Circle of the initiative, made up of former Heads of State, includes President Olusegun Obasanjo, Rt. Hon. Helen Clark, President Ameenah Gurib-Fakim, and President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf.

The Davos meeting will mark the launch of priority programmes under the initiative. This follows its formal presentation at the 2025 United Nations General Assembly and endorsement at the G20 Leaders’ Summit in Johannesburg. The initiative comes at a time of increasing global power rivalries, a breakdown in traditional aid structures, growing trade conflicts, and the mounting effects of climate change, economic hardship, pandemics, and war.

The Accra Reset, spearheaded by President Mahama and his co-convenor, former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, suggests a new framework based on sovereignty, practicality, and mutual benefits.

Click here to find out more about the Accra Reset: Davos Convening

What they said

The United Nations described the election period as being marred by “widespread repression and intimidation.” Bobi Wine claimed “massive ballot stuffing” was taking place and later said, “Currently, I am not at home, although my wife and other family members remain under house arrest. I know that these criminals are looking for me everywhere, and I am trying my best to keep safe.” His party rejected the outcome, calling it “a sham.” Election observers flagged concerns about “intimidation, arrest and abductions,” and Goodluck Jonathan said the incidents undermined confidence in the process, adding the internet shutdown “disrupted effective observation” and “increased suspicion,” even though voting day was described as “peaceful.”

This interest came sharply into focus just after Christmas, when a short statement appeared on the Israeli government’s website. In it, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu praised Somaliland for fighting terrorism and advancing regional peace and said he accepted its independent statehood. The announcement marked the latest and most controversial chapter in a long-running geopolitical contest over the Horn of Africa.

Two to one

To understand why so many powers are invested in Somaliland’s future, it is necessary to look back to the early twentieth century. What is now Somalia was once divided between two European colonial powers. The northwestern region, shaped like the head of a horse angled toward North Africa, was British Somaliland. The rest, stretching along the Indian Ocean coastline, was an Italian colony. The two territories were administered very differently. Britain was primarily concerned with supplying its naval base in Aden and took a limited interest in the development of British Somaliland. Italy, by contrast, pursued a more ambitious imperial project, establishing plantations and centralising governance in an effort to generate wealth.

In 1960, both territories gained independence and agreed to unite as the Somali Republic. But the new state faltered. A military coup in 1969 brought Siad Barre to power, ushering in a long dictatorship. When Barre was overthrown in 1991, the Somali state collapsed entirely. Amid the chaos, the former British Somaliland unilaterally declared independence. The move attracted little international attention at the time, as global efforts focused on preventing humanitarian catastrophes elsewhere in Somalia. Over the following decades, multinational interventions failed to stabilise the country, while piracy and militant groups, most notably al-Shabaab, flourished.

Since around 2012, however, conditions have improved somewhat. Somalia has re-emerged as a federal state, with Somaliland largely left to govern itself, and the neighbouring region of Puntland also enjoying significant autonomy from Mogadishu. Supporters of Somaliland argue that it has demonstrated political maturity through peaceful transfers of power and the development of its own legal and governmental institutions.

Israel's interest

Israel’s interest in Somaliland is not new. Contacts between the two date back several decades, perhaps driven by a shared sense of isolation. More significantly, Somaliland occupies a strategic position near the Bab el Mandeb strait, the narrow passage guarding the entrance to the Red Sea. This is one of the world’s most important shipping routes and one that could be disrupted with relative ease.

That geography has taken on heightened importance for Israel due to Iran’s presence across the strait in Yemen, where Tehran backs the Houthi movement. From Israel’s perspective, access to bases or partners in Somaliland would provide an opportunity to pressure the Houthis from the south as well as from Israeli territory itself.

The diplomatic push and pull extends far beyond Israel and Iran. The European Union, the African Union, and 21 Arab and African countries have condemned Israel’s move. Among them is Turkey, which has cultivated close security and commercial ties with the Somali government in Mogadishu and harbours its own regional ambitions. China has also voiced opposition, viewing the Horn of Africa as a critical node in its Belt and Road trade network. Beijing is deeply wary of secessionist movements, in part because of concerns about its own territorial integrity, and is sending its foreign minister to Somalia to signal support for the federal government.

But the United Arab Emirates stands out for its absence from the Arab condemnation. The UAE has recently been embroiled in a bitter split with Saudi Arabia over influence in the Gulf of Aden in Yemen. As it seeks to protect its investments and trade routes, tacit support for Somaliland could offer strategic advantages, particularly if the United States were to follow Israel’s lead in recognising the region. Saudi Arabia, by contrast, did sign the declaration opposing recognition.

The possibility of US involvement cannot be dismissed. Donald Trump has repeatedly expressed hostility toward Somalia, going out of his way to insult the country and its people. In that context, it is not difficult to imagine him backing a breakup of the Somali state.

Ethiopia also has a strong stake in the outcome. It is Africa’s second most populous country, yet it is landlocked. Any arrangement that recognised Somaliland in exchange for access to the coast would be highly attractive to Addis Ababa.

United States of the Horn of Africa

With so many countries involved, the implications of recognising Somaliland reach far beyond the Horn of Africa. Such a move would inevitably raise questions about other unrecognised or partially recognised territories, including Western Sahara, Kosovo, and perhaps most sensitively, Palestine.

Some scholars argue that the crisis could also be an opportunity. Writing for Global South World , Ethiopian academic Seifudein Adem has suggested a compromise in the form of a federation of Horn of Africa states, including Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and Djibouti. He notes that tribal and clan relationships in the region often matter more than national affiliations, yet do not align neatly with existing borders. Whether the recognition of Somaliland would bring the United States of the Horn of Africa closer or push it further from reality remains an open question.

Click here to watch our previous episodes

World Reframed is produced in London by Global South World, part of the Impactum Group. Its editors are Duncan Hooper and Ismail Akwei.

ISSN 2978-4891

This is the reality of the Economic Community of West African States, ECOWAS. In 2025, the bloc turned 50 years old. Instead of celebrating unity and progress, it faced its most serious crisis of relevance since its founding.

This moment of doubt comes at a time when West Africa needs regional coordination more than ever. Security threats are multiplying, trade remains fragmented, mobility is expensive, and democratic institutions are fragile. As ECOWAS enters its sixth decade, fundamental questions are being asked openly. Can it still enforce democratic norms? Does it still carry economic weight? And can it survive in its current form?

Paper tiger

On paper, ECOWAS is formidable. It brings together 15 member states, represents more than 440 million people, and has a combined GDP of roughly 600 billion US dollars. That makes it one of the largest regional blocs in the Global South.

In practice, integration remains shallow. Trade between ECOWAS countries still accounts for less than 20 percent of their total trade. In more integrated regions such as the European Union, internal trade exceeds 60 percent. The comparison highlights a central weakness. ECOWAS has scale, but it lacks cohesion.

That weakness became impossible to ignore in 2025, when Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger formally withdrew from the bloc. Together, these Sahelian states represent around 70 million people and nearly 17 percent of ECOWAS landmass. While they contribute less than 5 percent of total GDP, their strategic and security importance is enormous.

Their departure followed years of tension after military coups, sanctions, and repeated threats of intervention. When ECOWAS failed to act militarily after the coup in Niger, it exposed a hard truth. The bloc did not have the political consensus or operational capacity to enforce its strongest decisions.

Empty threats

The crisis of democratic enforcement did not stop there. Later in the year, disputed elections in Guinea-Bissau once again demonstrated how fragile political institutions remain in the region. The military intervened, and ECOWAS responded with condemnation, suspension, and the threat of sanctions.

This has become a familiar pattern. Since 2020, sanctions alone have rarely reversed coups. More often, they have hardened military rule and eroded ECOWAS authority. Each repetition weakens the credibility of the bloc’s commitment to democracy.

The elusive Eco

Economically, ECOWAS continues to pursue one of its oldest ambitions: a single currency. The Eco was first proposed more than 20 years ago and is now tentatively scheduled for 2027 after missing multiple deadlines.

The obstacles are structural. Nigeria alone accounts for more than 60 percent of ECOWAS GDP, while many smaller economies struggle with inflation, debt distress, and fiscal instability. Without real convergence on economic fundamentals, the Eco remains a symbolic project rather than a functional one.

These challenges are made more acute by a fragmenting global economy and shrinking foreign assistance from traditional partners in Europe and the United States . Regional self-reliance is becoming more important just as ECOWAS capacity is being questioned.

Tax-free flying

Yet amid the uncertainty, there is a reason for cautious optimism as 2026 begins.

From January, air travel across ECOWAS member states is set to become tax-free, with sharp reductions in passenger and security charges. This is one of the bloc’s most tangible policy wins in years.

The reform matters because West Africa has some of the highest intra-regional airfares in the world. It is often cheaper to fly to Europe than to a neighbouring country. If fully implemented, the changes could reduce fares by 20 to 40 percent, benefiting traders, students, tourists, and families while advancing free movement in a practical way.

Connectivity has long been neglected in African economic policy, despite its importance for growth. People want to travel, and people travelling drives commerce. Currently, international departure taxes in Africa average around $68 per trip, with West Africa the most expensive subregion. Short flights of just a few hundred kilometres can cost hundreds of dollars.

This reform requires coordination and execution more than large financial outlays. If governments create the right conditions, the private sector can step in. For ECOWAS, this could be a rare example of delivery matching ambition.

A chance for redemption

As 2025 ends, ECOWAS looks like this: large in population, fragmented in politics, slow in economic integration, weak in enforcing democracy, but still capable of delivering reforms that people can feel in their daily lives.

At 50, ECOWAS is no longer just a regional institution. It is a test case for whether African multilateralism can adapt to a changing political reality. The question now is whether the future of regional cooperation will be driven by declarations, or defined by delivery.

The answer will shape not just ECOWAS, but the credibility of regional integration across the Global South in the years ahead.

Click here to watch our previous episodes

World Reframed is produced in London by Global South World, part of the Impactum Group. Its editors are Duncan Hooper and Ismail Akwei.

ISSN 2978-4891

This story is written and edited by the Global South World team, you can  contact us  here.

Any process of renewal begins with clarity. President Tshisekedi, now in his second term, has never attempted to downplay the challenges facing the country.

Speaking on December 8, 2025, at the Palais du Peuple in Kinshasa before all of the country’s constitutional institutions, he was explicit about the scale and nature of the violence still afflicting eastern Congo. He described it as a “proxy war of aggression” led by neighbouring Rwanda, despite the Washington agreements—an unusually direct and politically frank characterisation in the region.

This clarity is more than rhetorical. It provides the basis for a more structured response. On the ground, the Congolese armed forces are undergoing deep reforms: command structures are being reorganised, professionalisation has accelerated, smuggling networks are being targeted, and the police are being reformed. Stability remains elusive, but the State is no longer merely reacting. It is reorganising, reasserting itself, and embracing its core responsibility: protecting its territory and its people.

Congo’s return to international diplomacy

The second major shift is diplomatic. For many years, the DRC was sidelined in international forums and often excluded from decisions that directly affected its future. That period appears to be coming to an end.

Congo’s election to the United Nations Security Council by an overwhelming majority, its leadership of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, and UN resolutions explicitly condemning Rwandan aggression all point to a strong re-entry onto the multilateral stage. The Washington agreement with Kigali has not resolved every issue, and President Tshisekedi himself has acknowledged continued violations. But the key point is clear: the DRC is no longer isolated or diplomatically unheard.

This repositioning gives Congo new leverage in debates on regional security , strategic minerals, and climate justice.

Economic stabilisation reshaping the political landscape

Signs of renewal are also visible in the economy. Against the backdrop of conflict in the east and global uncertainty, macroeconomic stabilisation sends a powerful signal. Inflation has fallen to historically low levels, the Congolese franc has stabilised, foreign exchange reserves have increased, and growth has outpaced the regional average. These figures may be debated, but they are grounded in reality.

More importantly, they are producing concrete political effects. Fuel prices have declined, purchasing power has improved for certain essential goods, and budget discipline has strengthened. Gradually, the State is rebuilding trust with the population. While Congo remains heavily dependent on mining , the image of an economy spinning out of control no longer aligns with observable trends.

Infrastructure, public services , and a new governing approach

Another indicator of renewal is the push to rebuild the State through infrastructure and public services. Agricultural roads, national transport corridors, energy projects, ports, and airports are underway on a large scale, though progress remains uneven. The Local Development Program for 145 territories has faced delays—some of them serious—which the President has acknowledged openly.

What stands out, however, is the emergence of a corrective approach: contract clean-ups, tighter operational oversight, and a clearer prioritisation of projects. Where fragmentation once prevailed, the State is now seeking to steer, adjust, and be accountable. This emphasis on method is itself a meaningful political signal.

Climate policy as a tool of sovereignty and development

Congo’s climate strategy further reflects this new posture. The Kinshasa–Kisangani–Goma Green Corridor is not framed as a purely environmental initiative. Instead, it integrates security concerns, rural development, infrastructure, and economic sovereignty.

The message is unambiguous: the DRC accepts its role as a global climate solution, but it will no longer bear that responsibility at its own expense. Protecting forests, biodiversity, and peatlands requires real financing, technology transfers, and political recognition commensurate with their global importance.

A fragile but increasingly clear trajectory

Nothing is settled. Violence persists in the east, bureaucratic inertia remains, and social expectations—particularly among young people—are immense. Yet a profound shift is underway.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo no longer sees itself as permanently trapped in crisis. Step by step, it is moving toward a stronger State, a more stable economy, and a more assertive international role. When President Tshisekedi concluded his address by saying that “darkness will not reign forever,” it was no longer mere rhetoric. It reflected a growing and increasingly credible vision of a Congolese renewal in progress.

Because of this, it has become a central focus for both the US and China in terms of economic and political influence. Prior to 2023, China gained the upper hand with its focus on non-intervention and economic collaboration, particularly through the Belt and Road programme. Following the war that erupted on October 7, China has engaged in the region much more actively, and its popularity has soared.

Since its founding, the People’s Republic of China has built its foreign policy on the “five principles of peaceful coexistence”. These principles, known as “mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence”, have been China’s “red lines” both during the Cold War and in subsequent years. China remained outside the bipolar system of the Cold War and opted for a “third way” by supporting the emergence of the Non-Aligned Movement at the Bandung Conference in 1955. Despite the entry into a period of détente in international politics in the 1970s, China’s approach to non-alignment with any polarisation persisted, leading the country to make “non-alliance” a state policy in 1982. 

A clean record

MENA countries were among the regions where China’s fundamental foreign policy principles were practically implemented. At the aforementioned Bandung Conference, China established contact with nationalist parties in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, which were under French rule at the time, as well as in independent Libya. These initial contacts exemplified the parties’ revolutionary and anti-colonial solidarity. In the Middle East, diplomatic relations between China and the Gulf countries, in particular, began with Iraq in 1958, followed by Iran and Kuwait (1971), Oman (1978), the United Arab Emirates (1984), Qatar (1988), Bahrain (1989) and Saudi Arabia (1990). As can be seen, these countries, having gained their independence from Western colonial rule, quickly established a rapprochement with China. 

Following the end of the Cold War, relations between China and the MENA region entered a period of further development. MENA countries viewed China as a power with which to cooperate because it lacked a history of colonialism, military intervention, or regime change in the region. China, on the other hand, aimed to establish multi-layered interaction with the region to realise its interests within the emerging international system. To this end, China proactively established the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000, followed by the China–Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF) four years later. 

The Arab Spring, which began in Tunisia at the end of 2010 and then spread throughout MENA, initiated a transformational process whose effects would last for years. People living in MENA began protesting against the authoritarian regimes in their countries that had long deprived them of economic prosperity and fundamental rights and freedoms. This wave of uprisings created the potential to fundamentally reshape the region’s “political ecology”. While historically significant developments were taking place in MENA, China’s regional strategy was embodied in the Belt and Road Initiative, which funds infrastructure aimed at bolstering international economic links. For China, the region provided an opportunity to prioritise its economic and geostrategic interests and place less emphasis on political engagement. Despite the liberal ideals of the Arab Spring, the persistence of autocratic and nationalist regimes in the region has also presented a positive picture for China. Regimes in the region have prioritised economic growth and development over democratisation. This has opened the door for China to promote an alternative to the liberal order created by the West after 1945. 

Through the Belt and Road Initiative, China has established a successful method for achieving its desired goals. In exchange for energy agreements signed with MENA countries, which represent a strong option for meeting China’s need for energy resources such as oil and natural gas, China has built infrastructure and transportation projects in the region. These partnerships, which foster a win–win relationship between the parties, have significantly contributed to China’s interaction with the non-Western world. Unlike Western powers, which lost prestige in the region, particularly for their open support of opposition movements during the Arab Spring, China is perceived as a reliable actor by governments in MENA. Driven by this momentum, China signed strategic partnership agreements with Qatar, Iraq, Kuwait and Oman, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates between 2014 and 2018. Furthermore, in addition to striving to establish partnerships with MENA countries through bilateral relations and regional forums, China has also worked to mediate conflict resolution in the region. On 10 March 2023, Iran and Saudi Arabia, mediated by China, agreed to re-establish diplomatic relations. Bringing two strategic MENA actors, who had not had diplomatic contact since 2016, to the same table strengthened China’s prestige significantly. 

During this period, China presented a position in MENA radically different from the colonialism, use of military force, and conditional aid to achieve economic interests pursued by Western powers, particularly the US. China’s MENA strategy, particularly in the post-Arab Spring period, was based on a theoretical foundation of soft power and anti-colonialism. 

Change of approach

The events of 7 October, 2023 changed everything in the region and inevitably led to a shift in China’s approach connected to its long-standing support for Palestinian statehood. Since establishing the Special Representative for the Middle East in 2002, China has sought to host peace talks between Palestine and Israel and current Chinese President Xi Jinping has presented draft peace plans to the parties at various times. In these draft peace plans, China emphasised the importance of global recognition of the State of Palestine, the continuation of negotiations between Palestine and Israel, and the role of the international community in guaranteeing Palestinian sovereignty. These proposals were also included in the Arab Policy Paper published by China in 2016. 

Chinese officials have visited MENA to meet with all stakeholders in the region, particularly Hamas and Israel. As a result of these visits, an important mediation activity was carried out by bringing together the two major Palestinian groups, Fatah and Hamas, in Beijing in April 2024. Thus, in the face of the unconditional military support for Israel from the US and European powers, China has maintained its diplomatic stance. Even during the crisis, China has maintained its foreign policy of avoiding direct involvement in conflicts, maintaining political neutrality, and acting with caution. With these steps, which differentiate it from Western powers, China has assumed the role of a mediator seeking regional security and stability. China aims to end the regional crisis through an approach that emphasises a “two-state solution” and the role of regional organisations. 

That approach is bearing fruit, as results from the Arab Barometer reveal, although the challenge for China will be adapting to its new position in the world order on issues less binary than the conflict in Gaza.

The opinions and thoughts expressed in this article reflect only the author's views. This essay is based on research featured in the paper Perceptions of China in the Middle East and North Africa: an analysis in the context of Israel’s war on Gaza published in Third World Quarterly.

President Mahama, who secured his long-awaited second coming after previously serving from 2012 to 2017, in an exclusive days before the December 7 vote, told Global South World that Ghana’s economy was in crisis and needed urgent fiscal reforms, and if voted to power,  he planned a “total reset” to get a fresh start.

A year on after the vote, where the then former president secured a landslide 56.42% victory against Dr Bawumia’s 41.75%, is he delivering on his promise?

Ekane was arrested on October 24 in Douala following the post-election protest and was detained at a military garrison in Yaoundé on charges of hostility against the state, incitement to revolt, and calls for insurrection. Ekane denied all accusations.

The arrest came after the contested presidential election on October 12, in which President Paul Biya, aged 92, was declared the winner. Ekane, along with other opposition figures, rejected the results. 

Rival candidate Issa Tchiroma Bakary also claimed victory and urged the population to reject the official outcome.

Ekane's party said he was in poor health during detention and lacked access to vital medical equipment. According to his lawyer, Ngouana Ulrich Juvenal, Ekane was barely able to speak during a recent visit. His sister, Mariane Simon-Ekane, confirmed his death on Facebook.

On November 30, Manidem issued a statement requesting his urgent transfer to a hospital that could provide more suitable care. The party had previously reported that essential medical equipment, including Ekane’s oxygen concentrator, was locked in his impounded vehicle at a military police station in Douala. Efforts to retrieve the equipment were allegedly blocked by the station commander. 

Ekane’s detention, along with that of fellow Manidem member Florence Aimee Titcho and other Tchiroma supporters, was condemned by opposition groups. These groups had called for their immediate and unconditional release.

In its November 30 statement, Manidem warned that it "would hold the Yaoundé regime responsible for the consequences of refusing the transfer".

Cameroon’s defence ministry confirmed Ekane’s death on Monday, citing "an illness" and announcing that an investigation had been opened into the circumstances.

Ekane had been active in Cameroonian politics since the early 1990s. He initially supported Maurice Kamto, who was later banned from contesting the election, and subsequently backed Issa Tchiroma.

Tchiroma, following the unrest, has since fled to Gambia, where he is being hosted on humanitarian grounds, according to Gambian authorities.

President Paul Biya was sworn in for an eighth term on November 6 in Yaoundé. Despite the youthful population of Cameroon’s 29 million citizens, where the median age is 18, Biya—who has ruled for more than four decades—will continue in office for another seven years.

The Chairperson of the African Union Commission, H.E. Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, has strongly condemned the 26 November military coup d’État in Guinea-Bissau as the country awaited the announcement of the November 25 election results. He reaffirmed the AU’s zero-tolerance stance on unconstitutional changes of government, citing key normative instruments including the Constitutive Act, the Lomé Declaration, the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, and the Ezulwini Framework. The Chairperson also acknowledged the Joint Statement issued on the same day by the heads of the AU, ECOWAS, and West African Elders Forum election observer missions.

Claims emerge that coup may have been staged

Political tensions deepened as Senegal’s Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko and Nigeria’s former President Goodluck Jonathan publicly suggested the ousting of President Embaló may have been fabricated . The military halted the release of election results, claiming it intervened to stop a destabilisation plot — allegations Sonko and Jonathan questioned, saying no evidence had been presented. Some civil society groups and opposition figures accused Embaló of staging a “simulated coup” to block the results in case of defeat, although the former president has not responded to the claims. Embaló, who was flown to Senegal after his release, has previously been accused of using political crises to suppress dissent.

ECOWAS suspends Guinea-Bissau after military takeover

West Africa’s ECOWAS bloc suspended Guinea-Bissau from all its decision-making bodies following an emergency virtual summit on 27 November. The Mediation and Security Council, chaired by Sierra Leone’s President Julius Maada Bio, condemned the military intervention as an “illegal abortion of the democratic process” and urged coup leaders to allow the national election commission to publish the disputed presidential results. Member states from Cabo Verde, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, Benin, and others participated in the session and rejected the army’s decision to halt the vote tally.

Deposed president transported to Senegal as tensions ease

Guinea-Bissau’s deposed leader Umaro Sissoco Embaló arrived in Senegal late on 27 November after negotiations led by ECOWAS secured his release. Senegal’s foreign ministry confirmed he landed “safe and sound” aboard a military aircraft. The coup unfolded hours before provisional results from presidential and parliamentary elections were due. The junta suspended the entire electoral process, banned demonstrations, and imposed a nighttime curfew, citing an alleged plot involving unnamed politicians and a “well-known drug baron” to destabilise the country.

Military installs transitional president and outlines one-year transition

The military high command has appointed Gen Horta N’Tam (also referenced as Horta Inta-A in local reporting), previously army chief of staff and a close ally of Embaló, as transitional president for a one-year period. In a televised address, Gen N’Tam said political actors’ failure to resolve worsening tensions prompted the armed forces to intervene. He later named former finance minister Ilidio Vieira Té as the new prime minister. Opposition candidate Fernando Dias, who also claimed victory in the vote, denounced the takeover as a “fabricated coup” intended to block the release of election results, urging citizens to demand transparency. Despite the turmoil, daily activities resumed gradually on Thursday in the capital, Bissau.

Tanzania has cancelled its 9 December Independence Day celebrations following calls for nationwide protests over mass killings linked to the disputed 29 October general election. Prime Minister Mwigulu Nchemba announced the decision on 24 November, saying funds would instead be used to rebuild infrastructure damaged during last month’s unrest. Opposition parties have urged citizens to use the holiday to protest the government’s handling of the election, in which President Samia Suluhu Hassan was declared the winner with 98% of the vote — a result they dismissed as fabricated. Key opposition figures were either detained or barred from running, including Chadema leader Tundu Lissu, who has been held on treason charges since April. Thousands protested the results, with rights groups condemning the security crackdown as violent and repressive. While the government has yet to release a death toll, it has formed a commission of inquiry that opposition leaders fear lacks independence. Nchemba urged Tanzanians to avoid violence and embrace dialogue, saying the country must not “return to what we went through.”

Government accelerates mining reforms for economic transformation

The Ministry of Minerals has launched an initiative to implement directives issued by President Samia Suluhu Hassan to transform the mining sector into a driver of national economic growth and prosperity. Speaking at a management workshop in Dodoma from 24–25 November, Minister for Minerals Anthony Mavunde said the President expects Tanzania’s mineral wealth to be managed in ways that generate tangible benefits for citizens and support development priorities. The directives — drawn from national addresses, the ruling party’s 2025–2030 manifesto, and the government’s early-term commitments — focus on boosting production, increasing value addition, and improving sector efficiency. Mavunde emphasised the need for innovation, discipline, and speed across the ministry and its agencies to meet these goals.

Energy ministry calls for stronger fuel systems and youth opportunities

Deputy Minister for Energy Salome Makamba has directed the Energy and Water Utilities Regulatory Authority (EWURA) to improve the efficiency of fuel transportation networks to address recurring national fuel shortages. During a working session with EWURA officials in Dodoma, she underscored the importance of expanding fuel storage capacity to safeguard supply and encouraged the regulator to explore ways to reduce the cost of household electrical installation materials to accelerate rural electrification. Makamba also highlighted the need to create more opportunities for young people in the energy sector. EWURA Director General Dr James Andilile reaffirmed the authority’s commitment to ensuring service quality, safety, efficiency, and good governance while implementing presidential directives.

AfDB approves $24.6 million loan to boost Tanzania’s agro-industrial growth

The African Development Bank Group has approved a $24.6 million senior corporate loan to Mohammed Enterprises Tanzania Limited (MeTL) to modernise and expand the country’s agro-industrial production. The investment will rehabilitate ageing tea estates, convert more than 1,000 hectares into organic plantations, and upgrade processing factories to double production capacity. It will also establish 15,000 hectares of sisal plantations and a new 200-hectare macadamia farm, while improving rural infrastructure and strengthening value chains connecting smallholder farmers to global markets. The project is expected to create over 1,400 jobs, generate more than $10 million in new annual export earnings, and contribute approximately $36 million in fiscal revenues. AfDB officials say the initiative strengthens Tanzania’s agricultural resilience and supports inclusive growth, particularly for women farmers. The funding forms part of a broader $74.7 million programme co-financed by ILX B.V. and MeTL equity.

Construction of long-delayed Bagamoyo port to begin in December

Tanzania will begin construction of the long-awaited Bagamoyo port in December, ending more than a decade of delays caused by disputes over earlier contract terms with foreign developers. Government spokesperson Gerson Msigwa said the port — part of a larger special economic zone project that includes industrial parks and transport links — will initially begin with 14 berths, eventually expanding to 28. The deep-water port, located 75 km north of Dar es Salaam, is designed to accommodate larger vessels than any other port in East Africa, with a planned depth of 20 meters. Tanzania originally signed a framework agreement with China Merchants Holdings International and Oman’s State General Reserve Fund in 2013, but the project stalled after the government rejected unfavourable terms. President Samia Suluhu Hassan revived negotiations after taking office in 2021, positioning the $10 billion project as key to boosting trade capacity and regional maritime influence. The port’s revival comes as Tanzania faces economic pressures and strained regional trade relations following a contentious and widely criticised election period.

This concludes our live coverage of Guinea-Bissau's 2025 general elections. With fierce competition between the candidates, counting is underway to determine the country's next president. Polling stations opened at 0700 GMT and are expected to close at 1700 GMT. Provisional results are expected within 48 hours. Follow Global South World for continued updates about Guinea-Bissau post-election.

18:15 GMT: Polling stations end voting processes, counting begins

After 10 hours of voting, Guinea-Bissau has officially closed its polls, and counting is currently underway.

16:32 GMT: Mozambique's Philip Nyusi and Nigeria's Goodluck Jonathan oversee elections

As part of a measure of transparency, the African Union sent its Chief of the Mission of Election Observers, Mozambique's former President, Filipe Nyusi, along with the former President of Nigeria, Goodluck Jonathan, to monitor the ongoing elections.

Filipe's inclusion, however, is being questioned due to the belief that he ruled as Mozambique's president through fraudulent electoral means.

12:40 GMT: “Bissau-Guineans want only solutions and not slogans”

Journalist Samba M. Baldé, explains in an interview with Global South World, that, despite the many campaign messages spread by the various candidates, the citizens need practical solutions to their problems.

11:51 GMT: Voting continues in Guinea-Bissau

10:34 GMT: Incumbent President Umaro Sissoco Embalo votes

President Umaro Sissoco Embalo cast his vote this morning at a polling station in Umaro Djabula in Gabu. The president is seeking to make history as the only president to be given a second term in 3 decades.

9:47 GMT: People queue to vote in Mansôa

Bissau-Guineans in Mansôa are taking turns in casting their votes. Fernando Dias is expected to vote in this town. Citizens, however, remain committed to their desire to have a different economic climate and hope the results reflect that.

What you need to know

Candidates

Embalo is competing against 11 other candidates, including Fernando Dias, a relatively new figure in politics.

Right at his heels is 47-year-old Fernando Dias , backed by a powerful figure from the disqualified opposition leader, Domingos Simões Pereira, of PAIGC. This party led the country to independence in 1973.

Other contenders on the ballot include José Mário Vaz, who served as president from 2014 to 2020 and became the first post-independence leader to finish a full term. Baciro Dja, 52, a former defence minister who briefly occupied the prime minister’s office twice under President Vaz, first in 2015 and again in 2016.

Also in the race is 48-year-old Joao Bernardo Vieira, the namesake and nephew of Guinea-Bissau’s longest-serving president, who held power for most of the years between 1980 and 1999 and returned to office from 2005 to 2009.

The polls are expected to open at 7:00 am GMT and close at 5:00 pm GMT.

What citizens expect

During a conversation with Global South World's Abigail Johnson Boakye, a Bissau-Guinean journalist, Samba M. Baldé, shared that despite the hype around the upcoming elections, electorates seem to be less engaged as they are tired of slogans or manifestos and want real solutions.

"Engagement exists, but it's uneven because voters react to something that has certain benefits than to only promises, because for voters, when candidates fail to translate to voters their proposals into real impact or how they can really impact society , public interest quickly drops. ...But people are, for example, no longer satisfied with slogans. They want clear plans and measurable results in Guinea-Bissau," Samba said.

Following a disputed October 29 presidential election, Tanzania’s parliament has confirmed Mwigulu Nchemba, a former finance minister and close ally of President Samia Suluhu Hassan, as the new prime minister. The appointment , backed by a near-unanimous parliamentary vote, comes amid unrest and allegations of electoral irregularities that have drawn criticism from opposition groups and human rights observers. President Hassan, who won by a landslide according to official results, has dismissed claims of vote-rigging. The government projects 6% economic growth in 2025, driven by large-scale infrastructure projects, despite reduced foreign aid and political tensions.

Tanzania’s Amsons Group challenges Dangote with Kenyan cement acquisition

Tanzania’s Amsons Group has made a bold entry into Kenya’s cement market after acquiring a 29.2%  stake in East Africa Portland Cement (EAPC). The $5.6 million deal, executed through its subsidiary Kalahari Cement, involved purchasing 26.3 million shares from Associated International Cement Limited (AIC) and Cementia Holding AG. The acquisition, finalised in late July, strengthens Amsons’ position as one of the largest shareholders in the Nairobi-listed EAPC. Managing Director Edha Nahdi described the move as a strategic investment to reshape Kenya’s cement landscape through enhanced production capabilities and innovation, adding that it aligns with the company’s goal of building long-term regional value.

UN calls for probe into post-election killings in Tanzania

UN Human Rights Chief Volker Türk has urged Tanzanian authorities to investigate reports of hundreds of killings, detentions, and disappearances following the October 29 elections. The UN Human Rights Office cited credible information suggesting security forces removed bodies from streets and hospitals to undisclosed locations in what may be an attempt to conceal evidence. Türk called on the government to disclose the whereabouts of missing persons and return bodies to families for burial. He also demanded the release of opposition figures, including Chadema leader Tundu Lissu, and condemned the arbitrary detention of more than 150 people, some reportedly charged with treason.

Tanzania’s inflation hits two-year high amid unrest

Tanzania’s annual inflation rate rose to 3.5% in October 2025, the highest since June 2023, according to the National Bureau of Statistics. The rise , driven mainly by higher food and beverage prices, reflects growing economic instability following post-election unrest. Year-on-year food inflation reached 7.4%, while modest monthly price declines were observed in essentials such as poultry, bread, beans, and fuel. Despite the uptick, analysts note that the overall inflation rate remains manageable but could worsen if political instability continues to disrupt supply chains and investor confidence.

Rwanda and Tanzania advance cross-border payment integration

Rwanda and Tanzania have begun technical discussions to link their national retail payment systems — Tanzania’s Instant Payment System (TIPS) and Rwanda’s National Payment Switch (RSWITCH). The initiative, discussed during a high-level meeting in Kigali, aims to enable instant, low-cost money transfers between bank accounts and mobile wallets across the two nations. Once implemented, the system will simplify cross-border transactions for citizens and businesses, supporting trade and financial innovation in the East African region.

What they said

“The former president, who has been receiving specialised treatment in South Africa, died today on Thursday, 5th June,” the Patriotic Front’s statement on Facebook said. Noureddin Bongo described the trial as a “rubber-stamping exercise,” adding that it had been “predetermined in [Oligui Nguema’s office] a long time ago.” He told AFP, “We know full well that if we go back, we will suffer things far worse than we have already suffered... We are not opposed to the idea of being held accountable for so-called acts we may have committed, but only if it is before an independent and genuine court of law.” Prosecutor Eddy Minang told the court that evidence from witnesses revealed “a system of diverting public funds for the benefit of private interests.”

However, this analogy represents a skewed picture of the contemporary reality, which invariably downplays the roles of African elites in global politics. African decisionmakers are not just passive recipients of aid or investment but rather use the competition between non-African actors to advance their own agendas. As both the EU and China, through the European Global Gateway and the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), have pushed to become infrastructure partners of choice in Africa, we can see African states pushing their own agenda. 

First launched in 2013, the BRI is a trillion-dollar infrastructure network. It links China to the rest of the world, with Africa a major focus for its projects. The EU’s Global Gateway launched in 2021, with a comparably smaller €300bn budget, aiming to boost Europe’s role in infrastructure construction for transport, green energy and digital technology, especially in Africa.

A two-way street

Both the EU and China see these projects as a way of reinforcing their identity on the global stage. For the EU, this involves framing itself as a champion of democracy and good governance. China positions itself as an equal partner of the Global South , offering investment without political strings and within a frame of a common experience of historical colonial oppression. Both European and Chinese efforts can be understood as a search for ‘ontological security’, a term that denotes an actors’ need for a stable sense of identity and continuity in its self-perception and actions.

From the perspective of Africa’s external partners, it is this yearning to feel secure, and African actors' power to provide or deny validation that creates opportunity for the latter to push for better terms on big infrastructure deals. For example, African criticism of China’s “debt diplomacy” has pushed Beijing to tweak its BRI practices, aligning projects more closely with the AU’s development goals. Meanwhile, the EU has had to adjust too, making more effort to avoid being seen as a rebrand of old, top-down aid programmes.

This can be seen in the case of Lobito Corridor, a railway project connecting mineral-rich areas in Zambia, Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo with regional and global trade markets via the port of Lobito. Construction on the project started with significant involvement from Chinese actors in 2006, but Angolan government dissatisfaction with a series of issues prompted them to shift the next phase of development to a Western-backed consortium in 2022. In the setting of terms in both cases, Angolan policymakers leveraged the rivalry between Chinese and Western partners to attract billions of dollars in investment while keeping control over its long-term goals of industrialisation and economic diversification.

Another example is the Dakar Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system, the first fully electric bus network in sub-Saharan Africa. The project was a key element of Senegal's national development strategy, aiming to modernise infrastructure. To realise the project, Senegal combined European financing and management expertise with Chinese construction capacity and equipment. Funders of the BRT include Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs), European development finance institutions, the EU, the World Bank , and a European-led corporate consortium. Technical expertise was provided by the French national rail provider, while the core infrastructure and 121 electric buses were provided by Chinese SOEs. By mixing and matching, Senegal avoided dependency on a single partner and still aligned the project with its own national development plan.

In addition to challenging notions that a ‘new scramble’ is underway, claims of a return to Cold War patterns of rivalry and dependence are ill-fitting for the contemporary reality. Although Europe and China are rivals, African actors are not simply pawns in their power games, but are rather exploiting these dynamics, sometimes forcing both to adapt their approaches, including by working together on African projects.

Given the importance of infrastructure provision for the future of trade, jobs and connectivity on the continent, it is vital that African leaders can tap into the insecurities of international partners and promote their own interests. That they can do so does not imply that African countries have full freedom to dictate terms, given that they still operate in a global system of unequal power and financial dependency. However, the notion that Africa has little choice is misleading, given the opportunities that exist for diversifying partnerships, ‘forum shopping’ and setting their own priorities. In short, Africa isn’t just the stage for a new global rivalry. Increasingly, it’s one of the directors of the play.

This opinion piece reflects the views of its independent authors, not those of Global South World. It is based on their research paper African agency in geopolitical times: playing with EU and Chinese ontological security published in Third World Quarterly

After years of gradual decline in Africa in general, the same is now occurring in South Africa, specifically -- Western-style democracy seems to be losing its lure. The number of citizens supporting military rule has surpassed those opposing it.

Democracy: losing its allure in South Africa?

South Africans were asked the question: Is democracy the best form of government? Their response was surprising – at least to the West. Less than 50 percent said they preferred democracy to any other form. The results of the survey illustrate a growing dissatisfaction with democracy as the preferred form of government across the African continent.

The proportion of citizens supporting military rule in the country has surpassed those opposing it. For the first time in more than two decades – more support the military (rather than elected civilians) in assuming leadership of the country. 

Most South Africans, the report reveals, are dissatisfied with democracy as a form of political system. “…seven in 10 South Africans are dissatisfied with the way democracy functions in the country.”

The negative responses toward democracy are high among the middle-aged population, but even more so among the unemployed and economically disadvantaged. The common consensus within these groups was their perception that the politicians were ignoring their concerns.

Among the issues noted of concern to the respondents listed unemployment as the most serious – followed by crime, security, water, infrastructure, and corruption. The sense from the findings indicates that these seemingly intractable issues leave the population, generally, in a state of frustration. 

Not surprisingly, the report reflects concerns with the new South African administration. While 40 percent of the population believes the Government of National Unity (GNU) is effective, another 40 percent disagrees, feeling it is less than effective in solving the country’s most pressing problems.

Political analyst Stephen Friedman  described the trend as part of a broader global phenomenon. “Around the world, there is a great deal of dissatisfaction with democracy,” he explained. “It’s not that people have stopped believing in democratic values; it’s that the kind of democracy they experience no longer meets their needs.”

Friedman noted that many South Africans feel disconnected from political decision-making, with power concentrated in the hands of a few elites. “The problem with the model of democracy that has been sold to us for the past 30 years is that citizens have very little control over anything,” he said.

The growing openness to military rule -- a system once unthinkable in South Africa’s democratic landscape -- should serve as a wake-up call for leaders, and Western politicians in particular. It reflects not only a loss of confidence in political institutions but also a deep yearning for stability and effective governance.

Friedman added that voter apathy is another sign of alienation. “It’s no surprise that many South Africans are choosing not to vote,” he said. “When citizens feel their voices don’t matter, disengagement becomes inevitable.”

Democracy’s decline in Africa in general

Yet, this is neither a new phenomenon nor one limited to South Africa. According to the latest edition of the Afrobarometer report (2024), titled “African Insights: Democracy at risk – People’s perspective,” more than half of Africans (53% across 39 countries) are willing to accept a military takeover if elected leaders abuse power for their own ends.

“On average across 39 countries, support for democracy remains robust: Two-thirds (66%) of Africans say they prefer democracy to any other system of government, and large majorities reject one-man rule (80%), one-party rule (78%), and military rule (66%),” the report stated.

It noted that, “across 30 countries surveyed consistently over the past decade, support for democracy has declined by 7 percentage points, including by 29 points in South Africa and 23 points in Mali. Opposition to military rule has weakened by 11 points.

Political analyst Siyabonga Ntombela concurred with the 2024 report’s findings. The trend is not unique to South Africa. “This is happening continentally. There are a number of countries that are following Ibrahim Traore of Burkina Faso’s style of leadership. These countries appear to benefit more under the military rule than they have under years of democracy,” he said.

Ntombela explained that local politics also plays a role in this shift. “The majority of ANC faction parties (EFF and MKP) are predicated on military ideals,” he added. “They venerate leaders such as Thomas Sankara, Che Guevara, Fidel Castro and others. The material conditions have remained unchanged for the poor. Therefore, such an alternative rule promises hope for the downtrodden of the country.”

And this trend is also found among Africa’s youth . Younger Africans are more accepting of military rule, according to the Afrobarometer survey. Fifty-six percent accept a military takeover when civilian leaders abuse power. Sixty percent of youth are dissatisfied with the functionality of democracy in their respective countries. And forty percent believe their elected leaders are corrupt.

Ntombela warns that a rise in support for military-style rule could come with grave consequences. “With military rule, violence is inevitable. People like Frantz Fanon claim that violence is a necessary condition to decolonise and usher in true freedom,” he said

Across Africa, democracy is being tested – by rising authoritarianism and military coups as well as a growing disconnect between citizens and the institutions meant to represent them.

The latest flagship assessments noted above deliver a powerful warning. Over 60 percent of Africans are dissatisfied with how democracy works in their countries. Support for democracy, generally, remains not insubstantial, but belief in its effectiveness is fading, especially when citizens feel excluded from meaningful participation in decisions that affect them.

To state it succinctly: the crisis of participation results from people being absent from the room when decisions that affect them are made, and often that room is in London, Paris or Washington D.C.

The opinions and thoughts expressed in this article reflect only the author's views.

Dr. Wolf is director of The Fulcrum Institute, a new organisation of current and former scholars, which engages in research and commentary, focusing on political and cultural issues on both sides of the Atlantic. Our interest is in American foreign policy as it relates to the economic and foreign policies of the NATO countries, the SCO, the BRICS+ nation-states and the Middle East.

After service in the USAF (Lt.Col.-Intel) Dr. Wolf obtained a PhD-philosophy (University of Wales), MA-philosophy (University of S. Africa), MTh-philosophical theology (Texas Christian University-Brite Div.). He taught philosophy, humanities and theology in the US and S. Africa before retiring from university.

While some of these promises appear light-hearted, analysts suggest their prominence reflects the limited participation of major opposition figures in this year’s race.

A Crocodile pond to fight corruption

In Tanzania mainland, African Farmers Party (AAFP) presidential candidate Kunje Ngombale Mwiru captured public attention with an unusual anti-corruption proposal – the construction of a crocodile pond at the State House.

Speaking in Morogoro on 2 September 2025, Mr Mwiru declared: “If elected, I will establish a crocodile pond – yes, a crocodile pond – for corrupt individuals. Anyone found guilty of embezzlement or economic sabotage will face the consequences.”

The statement, widely circulated on both mainstream and social media, quickly became one of the campaign’s most talked-about moments.

Polygamy as policy in Zanzibar

Across the Indian Ocean in Zanzibar Island, Khamis Faki Mgau, the National Reconstruction Alliance (NRA) presidential candidate, made headlines with a promise to make polygamy mandatory for young men.

Mr Mgau argued that economic prosperity under his leadership would remove any excuse for men to remain monogamous.

“Young men, be ready. When I become president of Zanzibar, it will be illegal for a man to have only one wife. Anyone with just one will face six years in prison,” he said.

Alongside his polygamy pledge, Mr Mgau promised sweeping economic reforms, including a monthly salary for every Zanzibari aged five and above, with a minimum of Sh900,000.

Opposition candidate endorses the incumbent

In one of the campaign’s more surprising developments, Juma Ali Khatib, the Tanzania Democratic Alliance (TADEA) presidential candidate, publicly endorsed Zanzibar’s incumbent president, Hussein Ali Mwinyi of the ruling CCM.

“We are satisfied with the great work President Mwinyi has done. We want him to continue. Even if I win, I won’t remove him; I want him to remain president,” said Mr Khatib.

He cited Article 39(3)(i) of the Zanzibar Constitution, which allows for the appointment of a First Vice President from any party securing at least 10 percent of the presidential vote.

Mr Khatib said his aim was not to compete with Dr Mwinyi but to support him in accelerating development. “We are not competitors in the narrow sense. Our goal is a partnership that delivers tangible results for Zanzibar,” he said.

Banning king-size beds to boost birth rates

Another AAFP presidential candidate in Zanzibar, Said Soud Said, Said Soud Said, a presidential candidate in Zanzibar, proposed banning king-size beds , which he believes contribute to declining birth rates in the region.

“In the past, when people used 4×6 beds, families were bigger and Zanzibar’s population was growing steadily,” Said, proposing to limit bed sizes to 4×6 to encourage larger families.

“When you sleep on a 6×6 bed, the wife is on one side and the husband on the other – you don’t reproduce. Our ancestors slept on smaller beds and had many children,” he said.

A veteran of the 2010, 2015, and 2020 elections, Mr Said maintained a respectful tone towards the current leadership, saying his aim was to build on existing progress “with greater speed.”

Monthly stipends for Zanzibaris

Ameir Hassan Ameir of the Makini Party also drew attention with a pledge to provide a monthly allowance of Tanzanian shillings 500,000 (about USD 202.9) to every Zanzibari citizen.

“Immediately after being sworn in, every Zanzibari will receive 500,000 shillings each month. This is not a dream; it is a vision – but it will require hard work and collective commitment,” he said.

He argued the initiative would be feasible through major economic reforms and increased national income.

A weakened opposition field

In June, 14 smaller opposition parties whose historical data show they rarely capture more than 5% of the vote.  announced their commitment to participate fully in the 2025 polls and uphold peaceful, issue-based campaigns.

The move followed a heated national debate over electoral reforms and a boycott threat from the main opposition party, CHADEMA, which maintained the slogan “ No Reforms, No Election. ”

Ultimately, CHADEMA chose to boycott the polls, citing the need for fundamental electoral changes. Meanwhile, ACT-Wazalendo, the second-largest opposition party, saw its presidential candidate, Luhaga Mpina, disqualified by the commission.

Author's bio

Mweha Msemo is a Tanzanian freelance journalist based in Dar es Salaam. He focuses on stories of marginalised communities, social justice, and digital rights. With a passion for amplifying unheard voices, his work highlights the lives and challenges of underrepresented groups, reflecting his commitment to raising awareness and fostering understanding.

Once political identity becomes part of who we are – “I am CCM” or “I am Chadema” –  the goal shifts. People stop comparing policies and start defending their side while attacking the other. Political scientists call this affective polarisation : when people become emotionally attached to one camp and hostile toward another, no matter the issues.

Studies show that when this happens, support for equality, accountability, and the rule of law weakens .

In Tanzania, this is most visible in the long dominance of Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM). Many citizens identify with the party out of loyalty to its name rather than its performance. Wearing party colours, chanting slogans, and attending rallies become symbols of belonging, not of debate or reform.

From Citizens to Fans

Why does this happen? Because political membership increasingly looks like fandom. Fans stay loyal even when their team sucks. They love the colours, the chants, and the stars more than the results. And they rarely criticise their own side, even when things go wrong.

When politics becomes fandom, activism turns into performance. Supporters cheer louder instead of asking harder questions.

But this blind loyalty doesn’t just weaken citizens – it blinds the rulers too. In trying to maintain the illusion of mass approval, leaders begin to lose sight of the truth.

In Tanzania, we’ve seen politicians pay people to attend rallies, dress them in party regalia, and transport them in lorries and buses – sometimes even including secondary school pupils below voting age. The goal is simple: to stage a spectacle of popularity, to look powerful and loved.

Yet the reality is sobering. In a country where most people still struggle to make ends meet, many will cheer for anything that brings a free meal or a few coins. These displays are not signs of genuine support but symptoms of desperation. They show how easily loyalty can be bought and how rulers mistake performance for legitimacy.

This illusion feeds itself. Leaders surrounded by paid crowds and endless praise stop hearing reality. They listen to applause, not hunger. And when they can no longer see the truth, they lose the ability to reform. Real change requires vision – the courage to face uncomfortable facts, not the comfort of staged approval.

Party switching has become another symptom of this culture. Politicians move between parties not for ideology but for survival – chasing influence, resources, or relevance. At the same time, few parties have clear policy differences , making membership more about identity than conviction.

CCM’s dominance reinforces this trend. Although Tanzania is a multiparty state, the playing field is far from level. Some analysts describe the system as “ authoritarianism in disguise ,” where loyalty matters more than reform.

The Culture of Uchawa

Then there is uchawa – sycophancy. The term comes from the Swahili word chawa , a louse that feeds on blood. Figuratively, it describes people who feed off power through uncritical praise.

In Tanzanian politics, Uchawa is the culture of flattering leaders in exchange for favours, protection, or visibility. Musicians, businesspeople, and public figures often rush to declare support for the ruling party, not because they believe in its policies, but because loyalty pays.

It goes beyond ordinary political support. It becomes a performance of devotion – singing praise songs, wearing party colours, appearing at rallies, and posting flattering messages online. The message is clear: to survive or advance, you must be seen cheering for those in power.

The darker side of uchawa is silence. Those who depend on proximity to power often refuse to speak up against human rights abuses, corruption, or politically motivated prosecutions. They look away because the perpetrators are “on their team.” Their duty becomes defending and praising their leaders, not holding them accountable.

This mindset has spread far beyond party offices. In Tanzania, carrying a CCM membership card can feel like carrying a passport to opportunity. It signals safety, access, and belonging. Many people join the party not out of conviction, but because those connections open doors – to jobs, contracts, or local government support.

There are countless small examples: drivers flying party flags to avoid fines, shopkeepers displaying portraits of leaders to attract goodwill from officials. These gestures reveal a larger truth – political loyalty has become a survival strategy in a system where dissent is risky and power is centralised.

We have arrived at a culture where loyalty is currency and silence is self-preservation.

When blind loyalty rules

When blind loyalty replaces debate, democracy suffers. Citizens become less critical. If your identity is tied to a party or leader, it’s hard to question them, even when projects stall or money disappears.

Flexibility fades, too. Reform requires openness to new ideas and alliances, but fan-like loyalty clings to the tribe. Politics loses its results-oriented focus. Success starts to mean staying in power, not improving lives.

Parties that prize unity over honesty suppress dissent and stagnate. Politics becomes theatre – passionate, noisy, but empty of progress.

Tanzania’s risk

In Tanzania, political identity is woven into history, patronage, and regional networks. CCM’s power rests not only on ideology but also on deep institutional reach and state resources. Opposition parties face financial and legal barriers, leaving many citizens frustrated or disillusioned.

When people feel the system is predetermined, membership becomes about belonging, not changing outcomes.

One survey found that while 77 percent of Tanzanians support elections, nearly a third see political parties as divisive and irrelevant. It reflects both faith in democracy and fatigue with partisan politics.

Reclaiming change

To move from fandom to reform, both citizens and leaders must refocus on performance and accountability. Civil society and independent institutions can help separate identity from evaluation, encouraging people to judge politics by results, not rhetoric.

Coalitions built around common issues like jobs, health, housing – can bridge party divides. Within parties, internal democracy and open debate can turn supporters into active participants, not just cheerleaders.

There are reasons for hope. Research across Africa shows that while identity and loyalty remain strong, performance still matters . The challenge for Tanzania is turning that potential into real, reform-driven participation.

Conclusion

When partisan identity dominates politics, membership becomes fandom: loyalty and belonging take precedence over ideas and results. In Tanzania, decades of dominance, weak opposition, and deep loyalties have made this culture hard to shake.

But democracy depends on citizens who can see – who question, challenge, and demand better. The true measure of loyalty is not how loudly we cheer, but how firmly we hold power to account.

The opinions and thoughts expressed in this article reflect only the author's views.

Mweha Msemo is a Tanzanian freelance journalist based in Dar es Salaam. He focuses on stories of marginalised communities, social justice, and digital rights. With a passion for amplifying unheard voices, his work highlights the lives and challenges of underrepresented groups, reflecting his commitment to raising awareness and fostering understanding.

The imbalance has prompted critics to question whether the poll represents a genuine democratic contest or simply a formality to extend CCM’s near five-decade rule.

Opposition sidelined

Tanzania’s two largest opposition parties, CHADEMA and ACT-Wazalendo, are not taking part after accusing the government of orchestrating a systematic crackdown on dissent. Several of their key leaders have been barred from running, while others face ongoing court cases or arbitrary detention.

In April, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) disqualified CHADEMA’s presidential candidate on what the party described as “manufactured technicalities.” International news agency Reuters later confirmed that other opposition figures were similarly struck off ballots at local and parliamentary levels.

Human rights groups, including Amnesty International, have reported a “climate of fear”, citing arbitrary arrests, media restrictions, and enforced disappearances in the lead-up to the vote.

“Authorities have intensified repression ahead of the elections, instilling fear among activists, journalists, and ordinary citizens,” Amnesty said in an October report .

When Samia Suluhu Hassan took office in 2021 following the death of John Magufuli, she was initially praised for loosening restrictions on the opposition and reopening civic space. But over time, that image has faded.

Opposition activists say the state has perfected a softer, procedural form of authoritarianism — one that relies less on overt violence and more on bureaucratic obstacles, judicial harassment, and control of the media landscape.

Economic background

Beyond the political contest, Tanzanians continue to grapple with everyday struggles; unreliable electricity, water shortages, unemployment, and poor healthcare.

Still, many voters feel there is little space for genuine alternatives, with the ruling party dominating the political narrative and state machinery.

What’s next

Election observers from the East African Community (EAC) and the African Union have deployed missions across the country, but analysts remain skeptical about whether their presence will ensure transparency.

Over recent years, the government has steadily tightened control over what citizens can read, post, or even discuss. Key online platforms once central to public conversation — Twitter (now X), Clubhouse, Telegram, and the influential Tanzanian forum JamiiForums — have been blocked or restricted.

Many users now rely on VPNs to access these platforms. The Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority (TCRA) denies restricting the use of VPNs but requires users to notify the regulator when using such applications — a move clearly designed to monitor and discourage digital privacy.

JamiiForums, often called “Tanzania’s WikiLeaks” for its role in exposing corruption and hosting open debates, was suspended for 90 days in September after it shared statements by politician Humphrey Polepole about President Samia Suluhu Hassan’s private meetings with a Zimbabwean businessman. Officials accused the site of “misleading the public” and “undermining national unity.”

This digital crackdown has gone hand in hand with pressure on the press. Jambo TV received three separate takedown orders in a single month.

Under Section 19 of the Media Services Act (2016) and Regulations 17–19 of the Media Services Regulations (2017), all journalists must hold government-issued press cards — a system many see as turning accreditation into a tool of control. Even entertainment programs now avoid political jokes or commentary, fearful that a single remark could bring punishment.

The campaign of control has reached beyond media into religious life

When Bishop Josephat Gwajima, a CCM lawmaker, accused the government of detentions and disappearances, his Glory of Christ Church in Dar es Salaam was swiftly deregistered and sealed by police as hundreds of worshippers protested. Officials said his sermons violated the “acceptable conduct” of religious organisations — a warning that even ruling-party insiders are not safe from retribution.

Disappearances have become part of Tanzania’s political landscape

Earlier this October, Humphrey Polepole, former ambassador to Cuba and a sharp critic of the administration, was abducted by unknown assailants shortly after resigning from his post and denouncing government abuses.

According to UN experts, there have been over 200 cases of enforced disappearances since 2019, forming what they call a “pattern of intimidation” against journalists, activists, opposition members, and other dissenting voices.

At a recent discussion hosted by Tanzania’s Tech and Media Convergency (TMC), participants described the internet as a field of “ digital landmines, ” where a single post can end a career. For many Tanzanians, silence now feels safer than speech.

But silencing truth has not stopped lies

With independent journalism under siege and online spaces censored, misinformation spreads unchecked. In early 2025, fact-checking platform JamiiCheck analysed 192 political claims circulating online. Of these, 128 were false, most targeting opposition parties. 

Digital rights advocates believe that Tanzania’s Cybercrime Act and Electronic and Postal Communications Act are enforced selectively . Posts critical of the government vanish almost instantly, while pro-government falsehoods stay online — turning digital platforms into yet another instrument of political control.

As speech grows more restricted, political competition is also narrowing

The main opposition party, CHADEMA, has been disqualified from the race after refusing to sign an electoral code of conduct it called biased. Its leader, Tundu Lissu, faces treason charges widely viewed as politically motivated. He was arrested after a peaceful rally calling for electoral reform and accused of spreading false information — charges that could carry the death penalty.

Dozens of his supporters have been harassed or barred from attending his trial

Another opposition candidate, Luhaga Mpina, of the Alliance for Change and Transparency (ACT–Wazalendo), has also been banned from running . Once a senior CCM member, Mpina left the ruling party in August after being blocked from seeking re-nomination in his longtime parliamentary seat in Kisesa. His candidacy was seen as a serious challenge to President Samia — until the electoral commission disqualified him.

Many Tanzanians still remember the 2020 election, when the internet was shut down on polling day . Civil society groups warn that another blackout could leave voters, journalists, and observers in the dark — especially in rural areas. Without open communication, they say, rumours will thrive and public trust in the results will collapse.

Tanzania’s crisis reflects a wider African trend: the fusion of authoritarian control with digital technology. Across the continent, governments are using surveillance laws, internet shutdowns, and disinformation to shape public narratives and suppress dissent. But Tanzania stands out — for both its intensity and its timing — as it approaches a pivotal election where access to truth may matter as much as the vote itself.

Tanzania’s 2025 election will test more than political loyalty. It will test whether democracy can survive when speech, information, and belief are all under siege.

Restoring transparency will take more than promises. It will require protecting independent journalism, safeguarding free expression, investing in digital literacy, and dismantling the culture of fear that now grips the nation.

Until then, Tanzanians move toward the polls not only uncertain of their choices — but uncertain of what to believe.

The opinions and thoughts expressed in this article reflect only the author's views.

Mweha Msemo is a Tanzanian freelance journalist based in Dar es Salaam. He focuses on stories of marginalised communities, social justice, and digital rights. With a passion for amplifying unheard voices, his work highlights the lives and challenges of underrepresented groups, reflecting his commitment to raising awareness and fostering understanding.

This concludes our live coverage of the October 25 Côte d’Ivoire elections. Vote counting is currently in progress. Follow Global South World for further updates as we await the official results from the Independent Electoral Commission.

18:05 GMT: Polls close in Côte d'Ivoire presidential election, with Ouattara eyeing a fourth term amid global scrutiny.

17:14 GMT: Polls are expected to close at 18:00 GMT

16:40 GMT: Ballot boxes have been destroyed and electoral materials vandalized in several polling stations in the sub-prefecture of Zaguiéta, particularly in Biegon, Dianoufla, Tofla, Bounantinfla, and Banonfla.

15:42 GMT: The CEI provisionally bans polling stations from the media

15:36 GMT: Presidential Candidate and sitting president Alassane Ouattara addresses the media after casting his vote

15:30 GMT: Electoral Observers monitor the voting process across several polling stations.

14:03 GMT: Presidential candidates Jean-Louis Billon and Henriette Lagou cast their votes. 60-year-old Louis Billon served as minister under President Ouattara’s first two terms. First as Minister of Trade, Crafts and SME between 2012 and 2016 and then as Minister of Commerce from 2016 to 2017. Alongside Jacqueline-Claire Kouangoua, Lagou, 66, a well-known advocate for women's rights and a former minister under former President Gbagbo, was one of the first two women to run for president of Côte d'Ivoire in the 2015 presidential election.

13:40 GMT : At a polling station of the Lycee Saint-Marie de Cocody in Abidjan, presidential candidate Ahoua Don Mello casts his ballot

13:27 GMT: The entire country is set up to enable "voters to exercise their right to vote in complete safety," says Ivorian Minister of the Interior, Vagondo Diomande

12:40 GMT : Members of the Ivorian diaspora gathered at polling stations in Paris to vote. Footage captured officials from the Independent Electoral Commission assisting voters amid large crowds both inside and outside the venue. One voter described participating as a civic duty.

12:15 GMT :  83-year-old President Ouattara, seeking a fourth consecutive term, votes alongside his wife Dominique Ouattara at a polling station at the Lycee Saint-Marie de Cocody in Abidjan

12:07 GMT: Simone Gbagbo, candidate of the Movement of Skilled Generations and wife of former President Laurent Gbagbo, casts her vote at a polling station inside a school in Abidjan

12:00 GMT : 5 hours since polls were officially opened, although voting at most centres commenced later than the stipulated time, polls are expected to officially be closed by 18:00 GMT , according to the CEI.

11:52 GMT : Ivorian women's rights advocate Laetitia Carelle Goli urges the new administration to put women's rights first, create a framework to stop femicide, and open up public space

10:43 GMT: Will Ivorians choose continuity or change at the polls today?

10:05 GMT: 3 hours after polls opened, voting continues smoothly with no reports of violence or electoral malpractice. The first voters have already cast their ballots.

9:26 GMT: Polls open in neighbouring West African countries as Ivorian expats vote at foreign embassies

8:58 GMT: Representatives of the African Union and ECOWAS visit first polling station

8:15 GMT: The ghost of 2020: Will Ivory Coast avoid another election crisis?

Many Ivorians are haunted by memories of 2020, a year that reignited violent divisions, cost dozens of lives, and cast a long shadow over the country’s democratic future. Today, the same patterns are emerging again: disputed candidacies, allegations of a corrupted voter list, arrests of protestors and journalists, and a president pushing past term limits.

“People are supposed to be in the streets for three or four days until the guy changes position...But some people are afraid,” an Ivorian journalist told Global South World .

7:44 GMT: Ivorians in France queue in their numbers at the Embassy to cast their votes

7:11 GMT: Over 66 African Union observers have been deployed to witness the election

7:00 GMT: Polls open across various polling centres nationwide as voters line up to cast their ballots

00:22 GMT: Electoral materials at one of the polling station storage facilities a few hours prior to the opening of polling stations on election day

22:44 GMT October 24: A computer programmer responsible for managing the server for publishing Côte d'Ivoire’s presidential election results on Abidjan.net was urgently summoned by the Presidency’s communication unit after an error revealed details of a prearranged plan allegedly linked to President Alassane Dramane Ouattara. The mistake occurred when the programmer entered Friday, October 24, 2025, instead of Saturday, October 25, 2025, the official election date. Following the incident, Ouattara reportedly contacted the president of the Independent Electoral Commission (CEI) for clarification regarding the error.

19:42 GMT October 24: On the eve of the presidential election, the president of Côte d’Ivoire’s Independent Electoral Commission (CEI), Coulibaly-Kuibiert Ibrahime, addressed the nation, urging citizens to exercise their civic duty with calm, discipline, and confidence

17:55 GMT October 24: Prof. Yemi Osinbajo, former Vice-President of Nigeria and Head of the Joint ECOWAS-African Union Election Observation Mission (EOM), meets with President Ouattara.

Prof. Osinbajo also held a series of meetings from 21 to 23 October in Abidjan with key electoral stakeholders, including Ivorian officials, political party representatives, African ambassadors, and ECOWAS observers. He met with members of the Independent Electoral Commission, the Constitutional Council, and other national institutions to assess the electoral process and security preparations.

Polls are expected to open at 07:00 GMT and close at 18:00 GMT across all polling stations.

What you need to know

The vote comes at a time when the country is balancing rapid economic growth with persistent political divisions, and the outcome could redefine both its democratic trajectory and its regional role.

At the centre of this year’s race is President Alassane Ouattara, who has led the country since 2011. His  decision  to seek a fourth term has reignited debate over constitutional limits and political succession. Supporters argue that his leadership has brought stability and economic progress, while critics say his continued presence risks undermining democratic norms in a country still haunted by memories of the 2010–2011 post-electoral crisis, which left thousands dead.

Electoral system and voter roll

Under Côte d’Ivoire’s two-round electoral system, a candidate must secure more than 50% of the vote to win outright. If no one achieves that threshold, the top two contenders advance to a runoff.

Over 20,000 polling stations are expected nationwide; however, questions remain about voter registration accuracy and access for displaced or rural populations.

When will the results be announced?

The Independent Electoral Commission (CEI) is managing the process and is expected to release provisional results within five days, after which the Constitutional Council will certify the final outcome.

Who’s on the ballot — and who isn’t

The final candidate list has been sharply reduced after the electoral court validated just five contenders out of roughly sixty submissions. Among those cleared to run are Simone Ehivet Gbagbo, the former first lady, and several lesser-known opposition figures.

However, two of the most prominent figures,  Laurent Gbagbo , the former president, and  Tidjane Thiam,  ex-Credit Suisse CEO, have been barred from contesting. Authorities cited legal and nationality issues, but the disqualifications have deepened claims that the political space is being narrowed. Both men command significant popular support, and their exclusion could shape voter turnout and legitimacy perceptions.

High stakes for democracy

For many Ivorians, this election is not only about leadership but also about trust in the democratic process. The  2020 vote  was marred by boycotts and sporadic violence, and observers fear similar tensions if opposition candidates or their supporters feel sidelined. With the memory of past unrest still vivid, maintaining peace will be a critical challenge for the government and security forces.

Economic backdrop

Côte d’Ivoire’s election also matters beyond its borders. The country is a major economic hub and the  world’s top cocoa producer,  serving as a bellwether for West Africa’s political and economic health. A credible and peaceful election would reinforce investor confidence and regional stability. Conversely, a disputed process could add to the wave of uncertainty already rippling across the sub-region, where coups and contested polls have become more common.

While the government touts strong GDP growth and major infrastructure projects, many Ivorians remain frustrated by rising living costs and persistent unemployment, particularly among youth. Rural voters, especially in cocoa-producing areas, have voiced concerns about uneven development and limited access to basic services. For them, the election represents a chance to push for policies that feel more inclusive and grounded in daily realities.

These socioeconomic issues could ultimately drive voter sentiment more than partisan loyalty. Whoever wins will inherit the task of balancing investment-driven growth with equitable development, in a country where prosperity and inequality often coexist uneasily.

Ivorians are hoping this election can consolidate two decades of hard-won peace and stability.

Arrests, protests, and power struggles — Africa’s young people are once again taking to the streets, challenging systems older than their parents. Across the continent, pre-election crackdowns and generational frustration are colliding, revealing deep cracks in long-standing regimes.

Nowhere is that tension more visible than in Côte d'Ivoire, where authorities have intensified arrests of activists, journalists, and opposition figures ahead of the October 25 elections. President Alassane Ouattara, 83, is seeking another term, even as many of his rivals — including former president Laurent Gbagbo and ex–Credit Suisse CEO Tidjane Thiam — have been disqualified.

Madagascar: Gen-Z protests then the military take over

Weeks of youth-led protests in Madagascar have reshaped the country’s leadership. The military stepped in after mass demonstrations forced the government to collapse.

Over 60% of Madagascar’s population is under 25, and youth unemployment sits around 14%. This generation, frustrated by economic stagnation and corruption , coordinated their protests digitally through TikTok, WhatsApp, and Telegram.

But as in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, the promise of change may prove fleeting. Many of Africa’s Gen Z movements begin with the language of democracy, only to end under military rule.

Cameroon's election overshadowed by age and apathy

In Cameroon, the world waits for the results of a tense election. President Paul Biya, at 92, has ruled for 43 years — longer than most of his citizens have been alive. His challenger, Issa Tchiroma, 76, has already claimed victory and called on Biya to concede, before results have even been released.

Cameroon’s youth - 65% of the population, with a median age of just 18 - are largely disengaged from formal politics after decades of repression. Yet online, their voices are growing louder. Hashtags like #CameroonDecides and #TimeForChange have galvanised diaspora communities in France and Canada, creating new digital pressure on an ageing regime.

While Cameroon’s per capita GDP has risen since Biya took power, the gains have not been evenly felt. High inequality, inflation, and youth joblessness have eroded patience.

Côte d’Ivoire: a narrowing window for democracy

Despite years of peace since its 2011 civil conflict, Côte d'Ivoire’s political climate is tightening. Ouattara’s government is accused of political engineering through disqualifications and arrests.

Though the economy grows at 6% annually, youth unemployment remains high at 12%. Nearly 70% of Ivorians are under 30, yet they’re ruled by leaders from a political era that began before they were born.

Across much of Africa, that generational disconnect is stark: the median age of leaders is 63, while the median age of citizens is just 19.

Africa’s population is expected to double to 2.5 billion by 2050, with young people making up the overwhelming majority. Their demands for accountability, jobs, and representation are reshaping political discourse, often outside traditional systems.

When democratic institutions fail to evolve, the youth find new paths: protest, digital mobilisation, or even backing military “resets” that promise swift change.

Measuring fear in authoritarian states

In countries where citizens fear reprisals, measuring genuine public opinion is notoriously difficult. Researchers can use “list experiments” — indirect surveys that hide sensitive statements among innocuous ones like “I play sport weekly” or “I grow my own vegetables.” Rather than say which ones they agree with, respondents simply say how many statements are true. By establishing an average number of true statements on a control group, researchers can establish what proportion of people disagreed that "The government is doing a good job." without being able to attribute the belief to any individual.

By comparing answers between groups, analysts can estimate true support levels without forcing individuals to speak openly. After the 2021 coup in Mali, such a study revealed that while 74% publicly voiced support for the military government, real approval was closer to 63%.

From Antananarivo to Abidjan, Africa’s Gen Z is demanding something their elders rarely had, accountable leadership. Whether that results in deeper democracy or new forms of control depends on who answers their call.

Click here to watch our previous episodes

World Reframed is produced in London by  Global South  World, part of the Impactum Group. Its editors are Duncan Hooper and Ismail Akwei.

ISSN 2978-4891

Five years later, Keita was re-elected to continue his mandate in serving the people of Mali. But in the midst of a global coronavirus pandemic, sluggish reforms, a collapsing economy, deteriorating public services and schools, and a widely held belief that his government was corrupt, Keita was overthrown on August 18, 2020—the first of a wave of military coup d'états to hit the Sahel over the next three years.

Assimi Goita, Mali’s army general and president, masterminded the two coup plots that hit the nation in 9 months. In the August 2020 coup, Goita was installed as vice president of a transition government, and civilian Bah Ndaw as president, promising to hold elections in 18 months.

But soon after, a struggle for dominance broke out between the two sides as each sought to increase its influence.

Ndaw removed military leaders who had played a crucial role in the August coup when he reorganised the cabinet on May 24, 2021. He was detained by the military later that day, and a few hours later, Goita extended military rule and proclaimed himself president.

A study, which took place in Mali in July 2021, almost a year after the first military coup and only weeks after the second coup led by then Colonel Goita, found that when asked directly, 74.0% of respondents claimed to support the military regime, and only 24.7% of respondents claimed to trust the foreign armed forces.

However, using the List Experiment (LE), a different technique used to measure true opinions on sensitive topics — things they might not want to admit directly — the survey found that the support for the military regime was only 63.2%, meaning support was over-reported by 10.8 percentage points, and trust in foreign armed forces was 36%, significantly underreported by 11.6 percentage points.

People claimed support, given the politically tense and non-democratic environment of Mali, expressing support for the ruling military regime was the socially desirable and safest response, given the strong anti-foreign sentiment prevalent at the time and the fear of repression associated with criticising the government.

According to the researchers, “The opposite direction of misreporting of these two political attitudes is consistent with the military regime’s strong opposition to the international coalition led by France in Mali at the time of our survey.”

A year after Goita had overthrown Ndaw to proclaim himself leader of the West African nation, the last of the French troops stationed in Mali to fight against Islamic insurgency left the country, completing a withdrawal that ended the nine-year Operation Serval—carried out in response to an attack in the northern part of the country by the ethnic-Tuareg separatist movement that had partnered with an al-Qaeda affiliate.

In a constitutional referendum held in June 2023, 97% of voters favoured changes which granted the president the power to appoint and dismiss the prime minister and cabinet members. Out of 8.4 million registered voters, only 39.4% took part in the referendum. 

Opponents of the new constitution claimed that it would reduce the likelihood of democratic reforms and that the referendum had been tainted.

Goïta disbanded all political parties in May 2025 and indefinitely postponed the 2024 elections. The National Transitional Council granted Goita a five-year term on July 3, 2025, which can be renewed "as many times as necessary" and without an election.

In July 2022, during a state visit by French President Emmanuel Macron, Paul Biya was asked whether he would seek another term. “I still have three years…and when the time comes, I will decide whether to retire to the village or not,” he replied, brushing off the question about his political future. Three years later, his decision is clear: Instead of packing his bags and returning to his native Mvomeka’a in the South, Biya—now 92 years of age—will stay in the capital Yaoundé and seek yet another term in office. And so it happens that as the October 12 presidential vote draws near, Cameroon finds itself at a political crossroads that feels all too familiar.

As long as Biya, the world’s oldest head of state, breathes, he rules—irrespective of concerns over his health, age and legacy. Beyond Biya’s bid for another mandate that could see him in power well close to a century old, the real story lies more in the systemic dismantling of opposition forces—an orchestrated effort that has left the central African nation’s democratic institutions hollow and its political future uncertain.

43 years and still counting

Biya’s uninterrupted presidency since 1982 has largely depended on a delicate mixture of autocratic rule, patronage , tactical patience, politics of silence, as well as nepotism and  tribalism . In over four decades, he has outmanoeuvred rivals, reshaped institutions, and ensured that any path to power—legitimate or otherwise—passes through him. In 2025, the strategy appears unchanged. The recent disqualification of Maurice Kamto, Biya’s former ally, main challenger and runner-up in the contentious 2018 poll, is emblematic of a regime that has turned legal procedure into political weaponry.

Elections Cameroon, the country’s election management body—which is supposedly independent but in fact dominated by presidential appointees—blamed Kamto’s exclusion from the race on “multiple investitures” by the MANIDEM party, which nominated him. The decision drew immediate backlash, notably from Human Rights Watch, which said the decision to exclude Kamto reflects the government’s long-standing intolerance for any opposition and dissent. Just before, there was widespread fear that the electoral commission’s decision could ignite unrest in major cities like Douala and Yaoundé. But Biya’s administration responded in predictable fashion, borrowing a leave from its playbook: pre-emptive deployments of anti-riot forces, dispersing crowds with teargas and arresting suspected pro-Kamto supporters—all amid vague appeals for stability.

Crackdowns and manipulation 

But stability, in Cameroon’s current context, is a deeply misleading term. It masks the profound erosion of civil liberties, the stifling of political dissent, and the lack of political will to reform electoral norms in order to sustain one man’s grip on power. As the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) 2024 indicates , democratic statehood, political participation, rule of law, political and social integration are on the decline since 2014, putting Cameroon in the category of “hardline autocracies.”

In March 2024, the government banned two opposition coalition platforms—the Alliance Politique pour le Changement and the Alliance pour la Transition Politique—accusing them of unlawful association. By targeting coordination efforts among rival parties, the regime effectively dismantled any chance of a united opposition front, long before the first ballot could be cast.

Meanwhile, the ruling Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM) continues to dominate the political landscape, sometimes using state resources and through institutional engineering. The decision last year to postpone parliamentary and municipal elections —originally scheduled for this year before the presidential poll—until 2026 is another glaring example. The official rationale cited the need to lighten the electoral calendar. But it seemed to have been designed to prevent key opposition figure Kamto, who required local representation to qualify under electoral law, from fulfilling eligibility requirements.

Opposition is fragmented, but new players arise

Opposition parties, while numerous, remain fragmented. Political figures like Cabral Libii, Joshua Osih, Serge Espoir Matomba, Patricia Tomaïno Ndam Njoya and Akere Muna failed to unite around a single platform, though a few have now stepped down in support of others. Regional rivalries, ideological differences, and suspicions—fuelled, in some part, by regime infiltration—have made meaningful coordination almost impossible. In the absence of unity, the opposition shares the remaining votes, and its impact is diminished to symbolic protest and social media outrage.

Still, the cracks in Biya’s edifice are growing, with the recent defection of prominent northern allies. Issa Tchiroma Bakary and Bello Bouba Maigari, both former cabinet members and longstanding collaborators of the regime, announced presidential bids of their own . Their exit from an alliance with the CPDM is not just an act of defiance; it’s a signal that things may not be the same in the north, which holds a strong sway in the vote. Their candidacies may lack broad support—also due to their ages, but they reflect a growing impatience within the ruling elite, particularly among those sidelined in Biya’s long twilight.

A country in a state of uncertainty

Meanwhile, outside of Yaoundé, the government’s authoritarian playbook continues to have deadly consequences. In the English-speaking North West and South West regions, armed separatists and government forces remain locked in a brutal conflict that has killed over 6,000 and displaced nearly a million people. Thousands have died, schools remain shuttered, and humanitarian access is limited. In the Far North, Boko Haram insurgents persist in attacking civilians and security forces. These crises have not only devastated lives; they’ve also provided convenient justification for voter suppression in regions unlikely to back the ruling party at this time.

Indeed, the state of uncertainty that hangs over these regions is not just a matter of war—it could also be considered as a deliberate electoral strategy. By doing little or nothing to encourage voting in crisis zones, which are opposition strongholds, the regime strengthens its numerical advantage. 

On the economic front, Cameroonians face both external and internal shocks, especially the burden of inflation and underemployment. With youth unemployment reaching alarming levels, and roughly 40 per cent of the population living below the poverty line, disillusionment is widespread. The median age in Cameroon is just 18, yet the political class—dominated by septuagenarians and octogenarians—remains deaf to the frustrations of a generation born and raised under them.

The gate to power is shut

It’s no surprise then that home-based youth are taking their frustration online, while youth-led protests by the country’s diaspora are common. But Biya’s regime has long perfected the art of deterrence. According to Freedom House, arrests, torture, detentions, and the use of a controversial 2014 anti-terrorism law to criminalise dissent have silenced even moderate critics. The media landscape, too, has been gutted. The Committee to Protect Journalists says journalists face censorship, intimidation, and imprisonment, with Cameroon consistently ranked among the worst countries in the world for press freedom.

And yet, the international community remains largely passive. France, Cameroon’s former colonial ruler, maintains close economic and military ties, while regional institutions like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the African Union have issued little more than muted statements. Western governments, wary of jeopardising counterterrorism cooperation, have avoided direct confrontation with Yaoundé. But in doing so, they tacitly endorse a regime that flouts democratic norms while claiming the legitimacy of an electoral mandate.

Cameroon’s hollow future

What makes Biya’s grip on power so enduring is not just repression—it is the illusion of legality. Cameroon holds regular elections. It maintains a multiparty system. It boasts a constitutional council and an independent electoral body. But these structures have been hollowed out, their purpose repurposed to preserve a singular political dynasty. There is no viable path to power that doesn’t first pass through the gate Biya has locked shut.

For all his frailty, Paul Biya is not a relic of a bygone era; he is the architect of a system built to outlast him. His true legacy may not be longevity, but the institutional paralysis he will leave behind. And unless opposition leaders find a way to unify, unless citizens reclaim the democratic space stolen from them, Biya’s eighth term will not be his last. 

The opinions and thoughts expressed in this article reflect only the author's views.

Amindeh Blaise Atabong is a freelance journalist based in Cameroon’s capital, Yaounde. He covers politics, security, and society across Africa. Atabong’s work spans radio, print, and digital platforms, and he has contributed to regional and global outlets such as Reuters, Quartz, The Times UK, The Continent, Semafor, Jeune Afrique, the German Press Agency, African Arguments, and Equal Times.

“Since the removal of its troops from Niger in 2023, the government has implemented a sneaky and subversive destabilisation plan, informing, training, financing, and equipping terrorists, with unfortunate attempts to create the conditions for an inter-ethnic conflict in Niger and the Sahel,” he remarked.

Zeine accused France of running a coordinated disinformation campaign aimed at discrediting Niger’s institutions, political leaders, and army, while also trying to create permanent political tension between Niger and its neighbours.

“This is accompanied by an unprecedented economic and financial war, notably in France’s hateful intent to sabotage all our development projects by demobilising investors and systematically voting against Niger in international financial institutions such as the African Development Bank, the World Bank , and the IMF,” he said.

Since the military-led government in Niamey forced French troops to withdraw last year, relations have soured further, with Niger accusing Paris of meddling in its internal affairs and undermining its sovereignty.

Much has changed between these two films, yet their parallels reveal history’s habit of repeating itself.

T.E. Lawrence, played by Peter O’Toole, appears to fight for Arab liberation, but in doing so he cleared the way for British dominance in the Middle East. Similarly, as a People's Liberation Army soldier, Leng Feng rescues Africans from foreign mercenaries while advancing the image of China as Africa’s protector.

Both films centre on a foreign saviour, implicitly superior, whose triumph benefits his homeland as much as those he claims to help. In Lawrence of Arabia , a British officer assures King Faisal that “British and Arab interests are one and the same.” In Wolf Warrior II,  the same logic applies: Chinese and African interests supposedly align. Indeed, an illusion of benevolence is a common denominator in imperial discourse.

Lawrence echoes Rudyard Kipling’s “White Man’s Burden,” a defence of Europe an imperialism. China has yet to produce a similar literary justification but its rhetoric of “development” mirrors Europe’s “civilising mission.” Both Britain and China emerge victorious on screen. Off-screen, however, the future of China’s global role is uncertain.

From conquest to control

European empires annexed territory. China avoids this, preferring domination through economic power. Beijing insists it does not “interfere” in domestic affairs - to the point that it even shuns “constructive engagement” with African governments.

The sensitivity is rooted in its own history of Western humiliation, and yet China is hardly hands-off. Its foreign policy increasingly adapts to its rising global responsibilities. Wolf Warrior II dramatises this shift: the protagonist’s mission is not to defeat rebels but to evacuate Chinese nationals, echoing Beijing’s 2015 rescue operation in Yemen.

Another difference lies in the balance of power. European colonialism often relied on the economy of power: a minimal military presence combined with indirect rule through local institutions. China, by contrast, emphasises the power of economy—trade, loans, and investment.

Europe’s imperialism was polycentric, directed from London, Paris, Brussels, Lisbon, and Rome. China, despite its rhetoric of multipolarity, seeks a unipolar order, positioning itself at the hub of global commerce. European empires justified rule through racial hierarchies.

China, at least in official discourse, emphasises a “developmental mission.” Where Europe claimed to civilize, China promises to build. There is also the question of accountability. Formal colonialism meant direct responsibility: if a colony failed, the ruling power bore the blame. By contrast, China’s “empire of control” avoids direct governance. Beijing exerts influence but disclaims responsibility when things go wrong. Its strategy resembles what might be called a causal empire—shaping outcomes without overtly assuming ownership.

Education, infrastructure, and echoes of empire

Like Britain in India, China trains increasing numbers of African students, building cultural bonds alongside technical expertise. Graduates often return home with skills -and loyalties - shaped by their years in China. Infrastructure, too, links China with earlier empires. Railways and ports were central to European colonialism, designed to move raw materials from Africa’s interior to the coast. China’s projects follow the same logic. Sometimes exactly so: in 2017, the century-old French-built line from Addis Ababa to Djibouti was replaced with a Chinese-built electric railway. That same year, the British-built Nairobi–Mombasa railway gave way to a Chinese version. These parallels are striking: once again, Africa exports primary commodities and imports manufactured goods.

Planned empire vs. accidental empire

European colonisation of Africa was driven by expedience, competition, and greed. Slogans like “civilising mission” or “White Man’s Burden” often rationalised expansion after the fact. China’s approach seems more deliberate. The Belt and Road Initiative is a carefully designed strategy to bind Africa, Eurasia, and beyond into a Sino-centric economic system. Yet appearances deceive. China’s model may resemble less the territorial empires of nineteenth-century Europe and more the informal global empire of twentieth-century America —an empire without colonies, but with far-reaching influence through markets, institutions, and strategic control.

The cinematic shift from Lawrence of Arabia to Wolf Warrior II reflects broader transformations in global power. Britain once projected itself as the liberator of oppressed peoples, even while tightening its imperial grip. Today, China casts itself as Africa’s partner in development, while embedding itself in the continent’s economic and political life. Both narratives cloak ambition in altruism. Both equate the empire’s interests with those of the “liberated.” And both remind us that even as empires change their form—from territorial conquest to economic entanglement—the underlying patterns of domination, justification, and self-interest remain strikingly familiar.

On September 8, 2025, the Constitutional Council published the final list of five candidates for the October 25 presidential election: President Alassane Ouattara, Jean-Louis Billon, Don Mello, Simone Gbagbo, and Henriette Lagou. The candidatures of Laurent Gbagbo (PPA-CI) and Tidjane Thiam (PDCI) were rejected, citing a lack of sponsorships, among other reasons.

PPA-CI raises alarm over arrests of activists

The executive president of the African Peoples' Party-Côte d'Ivoire (PPA-CI), Dano Djédjé Sébastien, expressed concern on September 16 in Abidjan about the situation of party activists and executives reportedly arrested since August 1, 2025. According to the PPA-CI, 29 members, including Pascale Zaholy, Moïse Lida Kouassi, and Boubacar Koné, have been victims of “kidnappings or forced disappearances.” The party announced plans to meet with the Ministry of the Interior and Security for clarification, while reaffirming its commitment to peaceful political engagement. Djédjé emphasised the importance of safeguarding political freedoms and avoiding intimidation ahead of the October presidential election.

UN envoy urges peaceful and inclusive elections

Leonardo Santos Simão, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative for West Africa and the Sahel, met with Ivorian political leaders in Abidjan on September 20, 2025. He held discussions with both selected and rejected presidential candidates, stressing the need for peaceful, inclusive, and transparent elections. The mission aims to promote stability and social cohesion before and after the vote.

Opening of historic contemporary art museum

A new contemporary art museum, La Maison de l’Art, has opened in Grand-Bassam in a restored colonial-era building. The inaugural exhibition features 28 artists from nine African countries, showcasing paintings, sculptures, photography, and design. The space includes permanent and temporary exhibition halls, an artist residency, and meeting facilities. Ivorian artist Mathilde Moreau described it as a gathering place for exchange and creativity. The project was realised in partnership with the Ministry of Culture and the Société Générale Foundation.

Launch of first forensic art programme in West Africa 

The University of Bondoukou inaugurated a new programme in “Forensic Art and Facial Identification” during a seminar on September 24–25, 2025. The initiative, the first of its kind in West Africa, stems from a collaboration with the forensic science department. Authorities praised the programme as a symbol of innovation and modernity in higher education. University president Professor Ouattara Djakalia emphasised the institution’s commitment to developing training aligned with labour market needs and preparing competitive graduates.

“It is only right that I concede defeat out of respect for your will as citizens and out of respect for the constitution,” said Chakwera, 70, in a national address.

“It was clear that my rival, Peter Mutharika, has an insurmountable lead over me,” he added. “In the days that remain, I want you to know that I am committed to a peaceful transfer of power.”

The September 16 vote featured three key candidates: Chakwera, Mutharika (who led the country from 2014 to 2020), and Joyce Banda (president from 2012 to 2014). Although the Electoral Commission was expected to announce final results later on Wednesday, early figures showed Mutharika ahead.

According to Reuters, Mutharika secured around 66% of the valid votes in 24 out of the country’s 36 councils. Chakwera trailed with about 24%.

Since Chakwera took office in 2020, Malawi’s economy has struggled. Inflation rose to 33%, and prices of essentials like food, maize, and fertiliser climbed. The World Bank reports that nearly 75% of Malawians live on less than \$3 a day, and about half the population lacks adequate daily nutrition.

Chakwera ran on a promise to tackle corruption , but critics said his efforts were slow and selective.

Mutharika, a former law professor now 85 years old, was credited during his previous term with building infrastructure and controlling inflation. But his leadership also faced allegations of cronyism, which he denied.

His 2019 election win was later overturned by the courts due to irregularities, including the use of correction fluid on results sheets. Chakwera won the re-run held the following year.

Mutharika is now poised to become one of Africa's oldest presidents, only bested by Cameroon's ever-present leader, Paul Biya, at 92. Biya is also seeking reelection in Cameroon's October 12 election that could keep him in office until just months shy of a century.

As Malawians await the official results of the 16 September general election, a surge of online disinformation has sparked confusion. A fake X account impersonating presidential candidate Michael Usi falsely claimed he conceded to President Lazarus Chakwera before any official tallies were released. AFP Fact Check confirmed the account was fraudulent, and Usi’s assistant, Winnie Nyando, dismissed the concession claims. Meanwhile, the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) denied involvement in Facebook posts smearing human rights defenders. Party spokesperson Shadric Namalomba disowned the propaganda, calling it “very unfortunate and unwelcome.”

Concerns over irregularities at tally centres

Tensions flared as political parties questioned the integrity of the results verification process. Opposition representatives raised alarm over the arrival of unsealed ballot boxes and faulty electronic devices at the national tally centre in Lilongwe. Reports indicated 42 of 45 boxes from Nkhata Bay lacked security seals. After negotiations, the Malawi Electoral Commission (MEC) agreed to share hard copies of electronic results with party agents for verification. While MEC pledged to investigate, both the DPP and United Transformation Movement called the breaches a serious concern.

Election observers urge transparency amid delays

International observers have pressed the MEC to manage results openly to avoid fuelling suspicion. Lucia Annuziata, head of the EU Election Observation Mission, praised the peaceful voting but warned that secrecy around tallying could “erode trust.” Similarly, the SADC Election Observation Mission encouraged tolerance and calm while awaiting results. Civil society groups demanded full transparency, including explanations for delays and protection of election data. Seventeen presidential hopefuls, including incumbent Lazarus Chakwera and former President Peter Mutharika, are contesting what many describe as Malawi’s most consequential vote since 1993.

US cuts deepen Malawi’s struggles

Malawi’s economic and social sectors remain strained following US funding cuts and tariff hikes introduced in January under President Donald Trump. France 24 journalists reported that the suspension of aid — which once accounted for over 13% of Malawi’s national budget — has crippled health, education, and infrastructure projects. Refugee camps face collapse, LGBT clinics have shut down, and students have lost scholarships. Exporters also face tariffs that make their goods uncompetitive. As voters head to the polls, citizens expressed frustration at being left vulnerable in a suddenly self-reliant environment.

Fruit trees linked to better nutrition in Malawi

A decade-long study has found that planting fruit trees on farms significantly improves household diets in Malawi. The research, covering nearly 1,000 households between 2010 and 2020, showed that each additional tree species increased fruit consumption by 5%. Families with trees also ate more vegetables than those without. While overall fruit intake remains far below World Health Organisation recommendations, the findings highlight how small-scale agroforestry can address widespread undernutrition and vitamin deficiencies in rural communities.

The arrest comes amid weeks of protests that have shaken the West African nation. Demonstrators have called for Gnassingbé, in power since 2005 after succeeding his father’s 38-year rule, to step down. Anger intensified earlier this year after a controversial constitutional change allowed Gnassingbé to transition into a new role as President of the Council of Ministers — the most powerful office in the executive branch, with no term limits.

Gnakadé, widow of the president’s late elder brother Ernest Gnassingbé, served as defence minister between 2020 and 2022, one of the first women to hold the post. In recent months, she had published scathing articles urging the president to resign in favour of what she called a “peaceful, inclusive, and national transition.” Her outspoken stance marked a rare public break within the ruling family.

News of her detention quickly went viral on social media, with opposition parties and civil society groups denouncing what they described as a politically motivated crackdown. The coalition Touche Pas A Ma Constitution (“Don’t Touch My Constitution”) accused security forces of arresting her without a warrant. “Once again, this is an abuse of power that characterises the regime’s retrograde practices. The aim is to silence a dissenting voice,” the group said in a statement, demanding her unconditional release.

A youth-led movement known as M66 also issued a 72-hour ultimatum to the authorities, threatening nationwide demonstrations if Gnakadé is not freed.

Judiciary sources said she is being questioned over alleged ties to exiled opposition figures and claims she sought to incite disobedience within the armed forces. If convicted, she could face between 10 and 20 years in prison.

In June, civil rights groups reported at least seven deaths during a crackdown on anti-government protests, with bodies recovered from rivers in Lomé. The government denied the fatalities were linked to demonstrations.

The coming days are expected to bring clarity on the charges against Gnakadé, but her arrest has already deepened tensions in a country grappling with protests, political repression, and anger at a regime that has ruled for nearly 60 years.

El-Sisi accused Israel of brazenly violating international law, humanitarian principles, and established norms, saying its policies are destabilising and reckless. He argued that Israel’s practices risk turning the region into “a lawless arena for aggression,” with consequences not only for Palestinians but for the wider Middle East.

“This is a situation that is utterly unacceptable and cannot be tolerated,” El-Sisi said, stressing that unchecked escalation could push the region into “an uncontrollable spiral.”

In a pointed message to Israelis , the Egyptian leader warned that current events could unravel decades of peace-building efforts, including the accords Israel has signed with its Arab neighbours. He cautioned that the fallout might erode opportunities for new peace deals, damage Israel’s own security, and even invalidate existing agreements.

“The consequences will be severe, and this is a price we will all pay, without exception,” El-Sisi said. He urged Israelis not to allow “the peace efforts of your predecessors to come to nought,” warning that regret may come too late.

El-Sisi also used his speech to express Egypt’s solidarity with Qatar following reports of Israeli aggression against Qatari airspace and territory. He said Cairo rejects any violation of a nation’s sovereignty and condemned the threat to Doha’s security in “the strongest and most unequivocal terms.”

Meanwhile, a 72-page independent United Nations inquiry concluded that Israel is committing genocide in Gaza. The finding indicated that four of the five acts defined under international law have been carried out since the start of the war with Hamas.

What’s at stake?

The election schedule for September is exceptionally important. The focus is on Gabon's legislative and municipal elections on September 27 and October 11, as well as Guinea's constitutional referendum on September 21, while Malawi and Seychelles get ready for regular elections.  Both are milestones in transitions launched by coups - Guinea in 2021, Gabon in 2023 - testing whether military rulers can deliver credible civilian pathways or simply rebrand authoritarian rule.

If approved, these procedures could normalize coup-born regimes that use controlled elections to manage transitions. If they fail, they run the risk of instability, unrest, and further undermining of faith in democracy.

The background

Under General Mamady Doumbouya, Guinea has pledged a "return to constitutional order," but repression has already tainted the country's referendum.  The proposed charter establishes a Senate with elections scheduled for December 2025 and a presidential term that is renewable every seven years.  However, the junta suspended ousted leader Alpha Condé's party and several other major opposition parties in late August.  Since 2022, protests have been prohibited, dozens of parties are still suspended, and media regulators have cautioned media outlets against covering opposition activities, all of which may damage credibility and increase the likelihood of future violence.  Conakry has seen a noticeable increase in security in advance of the referendum on September 21.  Especially in opposition strongholds, police patrol roads, intersections, and marketplaces with the support of assault rifle units and armoured vehicles equipped with water cannons. The regime has deployed forces to “prevent” planned demonstrations, firing warning shots and reportedly abducting several pro-democracy activists in a chilling prelude to vote day, signalling a determination to contain dissent.

Although Gabon is further along, it is equally dominated by the military. After the Bongo dynasty was overthrown in 2023, General Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema won almost 95% of the vote to become president in April 2025.  His administration eliminated the prime minister's position, extended presidential terms, and amended the constitution to permit military candidates.  Election supervision was transferred to the Interior Ministry, and more than 200 parties were eliminated.  The first elections since the coup will take place in September and October, but expectations of competition are minimal, and discontent stirs among the dozens of candidates who have faced seemingly arbitrary rejection. 

Comment: freedom through suppression?

Guinea and Gabon show a recurring pattern: juntas turning to ballots to claim legitimacy without ceding real power. Their transitions are hailed as milestones under regional and international pressure, yet in practice rely on opposition suppression and institutional dominance. 

Guinea’s transition illustrates how elections are being leveraged less as pathways to democracy and more as instruments of regime consolidation. The junta is not only repressing domestic opposition but also aligning itself with external actors in ways that unsettle Western partners. Geographically, Conakry has become an ideal entry point into the Sahel: Russian vessels dock with minimal scrutiny, unlike in other coastal states such as Côte d’Ivoire or Cameroon, allowing sanctioned arms shipments to move into Mali and beyond. 

For Europe and the United States , these dynamics sharpen the dilemma. Supporting Guinea’s referendum risks legitimizing a transition that facilitates both authoritarian consolidation and Russian influence. Yet disengagement carries its own costs, potentially ceding more ground to Moscow in a strategically sensitive corridor.

The preservation of stability in Gabon has come at the expense of pluralism.  Hundreds of parties have been marginalized, meaningful competition has been excluded, and power has been concentrated in the military and the presidency as a result of the tightly managed transition.  Although this strategy has prevented immediate turmoil, it runs the risk of solidifying a precarious balance that might break down if the promised economic benefits and reforms don't come to pass.

The elections exacerbate a well-known conundrum for regional and global players like the African Union, ECOWAS, the EU, and the US: accept stability dressed as democracy, or demand reform and risk alienating regimes that control the levers of security.

Assessment: predictable near-term outcomes

Outcomes are predictable in the short term. Guinea's referendum will most likely pass, opening the door for elections in December, but without opposition involvement, the results will lack credibility and may incite unrest. Through loyalist assemblies, Gabon's elections will further Oligui's dominance. Votes in Malawi and Seychelles should go smoothly with minimal regional repercussions.

In the medium term, Guinea faces a realistic possibility of instability. Its history of violent contestation, combined with restricted civic space , could trigger backlash once results are imposed. Gabon is almost certain to remain outwardly stable, but if reforms stall, the exclusion of opposition and weakened checks could exacerbate unrest.

For Europe and other partners, both cases present challenges. Guinea’s volatility could affect migration and security in West Africa’s Sahel-to-coast corridor. Gabon, an oil producer with strong commercial ties to France and other European partners, raises the question of how far Europe will accommodate an entrenched military elite so long as order and resource flows are maintained.

Conclusion: a barometer for democracy

Africa's democratic struggle is brought to light by the elections in September 2025.  Guinea and Gabon are holding historic elections that should signal a shift toward civilian governance but run the risk of solidifying military rule instead.  For Africans, democratic renewal is still uncertain.  The dilemma facing Europe is whether to embrace authoritarian stability masquerading as democracy or to pursue true civilian transition, with all of the risks entailed. 

We bring you a continental breakdown of the key participants in the celebration:

Asia dominates the guest list

The strongest presence came from Asia, with Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korea’s Kim Jong Un flanking Xi on Tiananmen Gate as guests of honour. They were joined by Asian heads of state and government, including Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, and Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian, highlighting Eurasian solidarity.

Central Asia was strongly represented with Kazakhstan’s Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Kyrgyzstan’s Sadyr Japarov, Tajikistan’s Emomali Rahmon, Turkmenistan’s Serdar Berdimuhamedov, and Uzbekistan’s Shavkat Mirziyoyev.

From South and Southeast Asia came Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, Nepali Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli, Myanmar’s Acting President Min Aung Hlaing, Mongolian President Khurelsukh Ukhnaa, Maldives President Mohamed Muizzu, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto, Vietnam’s President Luong Cuong, Laos’ President Thongloun Sisoulith, and Cambodia’s King Norodom Sihamoni.

European representation

Europe was represented by only two leaders. These were the Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić and Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico. Both have been outspoken critics of sanctions on Russia and have sought closer ties with Moscow.

Africa ’s representation slashed

From Africa , the Republic of the Congo President Denis Sassou Nguesso and Zimbabwe’s President Emmerson Mnangagwa made the trip and were the only top representatives from the continent. This comes in spite of China’s increased strategic presence on the African continent. In 2015, five African countries made the guest list. Nonetheless, the participation of the two African leaders was symbolic of African partnerships.

Latin America’s sole representative

Cuba’s President Miguel Díaz-Canel was the only Latin American leader present.

Absentees and envoy-level participation

Conspicuously missing were leaders from the United States, the United Kingdom, South Korea, Poland, and the Czech Republic. While Poland and the Czech Republic had attended in 2015, they were replaced this year by Serbia and Slovakia.

Meanwhile, Brazil, Egypt, and South Korea chose to send envoys rather than heads of state, signalling more cautious engagement.

That long, narrow nation stretches into South America’s Pacific coast for 4,270 kilometres. This comparison shines a light on Chile’s extraordinary geography and the sheer variety of climates contained within its thin boundaries.

From the Atacama Desert in the north to the glaciers of Patagonia in the far south, Chile stretches over 33 degrees of latitude. It occupies a narrow strip of land between the Andes and the Pacific Ocean, measuring 4,270 kilometres from north to south while averaging only about 175 kilometres wide.

The country’s present shape emerged from a combination of rugged topography and historical events: the Andes formed a natural barrier to the east, and colonial expansion, followed by 19th‑century wars, extended Chile’s reach north and south.

Travelling the length of Chile is like journeying from London to Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso or from New York to Bogotá—it’s that long.

This extreme length produces remarkable environmental contrasts. In southern Chile, including Tierra del Fuego, a maritime climate prevails; some parts receive up to 4,000 millimetres of rain a year, though cities such as Punta Arenas get a much more modest 410 millimetres.

Central Chile around Santiago enjoys a Mediterranean climate with warm, dry summers and mild, wetter winters, averaging around 275 millimetres of annual rainfall. At the northern extreme, the Atacama Desert sees almost no rainfall because the cold Humboldt Current suppresses cloud formation.

In just a few thousand kilometres, you move from snow‑capped Andean peaks and fjords to fertile valleys and some of the driest landscapes on Earth.

Understanding the Moon’s Scale

Placing Chile and the Moon in the same sentence invites curiosity about the Moon’s true size. Astronomers describe the Moon as a mid‑sized natural satellite: Universe Today reports its diameter as approximately 3,474 kilometres.

Space.com , citing NASA data, notes that the Moon’s mean radius is 1,737.5 kilometres, giving a mean diameter of about 3,475 kilometres, and that it orbits Earth at an average distance of roughly 384,400 kilometres.

In other words, the Moon spans just over a quarter of Earth’s width and sits about thirty Earth diameters away. If our planet were scaled to the size of a nickel, the Moon would be no bigger than a coffee bean.

Constitutional Court judges openly criticised suspended Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) Hlalefang Motinyane for delaying her own legal case against Prime Minister Sam Matekane’s attempt to remove her from office. The situation has been further complicated by the Law Society of Lesotho, which filed an urgent application against her suspension.

Heated debate over parliament’s M1 billion budget bid

Lawmakers sparked controversy after proposing that Parliament receive 3% of the national budget, over M1 billion. Critics, including the Minister of Law and Justice, argued the move would be fiscally irresponsible and excessive, especially given Lesotho’s fragile public finances.

Opposition questions defence force reappointment

Opposition parties raised alarm over Prime Minister Matekane’s decision to reappoint Lieutenant General Mojalefa Letsoela as Commander of the Lesotho Defence Force. Critics argue the move reflects a lack of transparency and highlights Matekane’s close ties with the military leadership.

Lesotho–South Africa water deal under review

Lesotho and South Africa reaffirmed their commitment to Phase II of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, a key regional infrastructure initiative. Ministers from both countries discussed ways to manage cost overruns and delays, signalling a potential overhaul of project agreements.

Controversial citizenship bill sparks debate

Law and Justice Minister Lebohang Hlaele defended a proposed amendment to the Citizenship Order, which would reserve high-ranking government positions exclusively for indigenous Basotho. While supporters say it protects national identity, critics warn it risks undermining inclusivity and merit-based governance.

According to the graphic:

While these figures illustrate the incredible size of modern megacities, recent population data shows that the actual numbers are often even larger..

The global significance of megacities

Megacities are more than just population centres. They are hubs of economic power, cultural exchange, and innovation. Yet, their rapid expansion also creates pressing challenges:

Under the deal, Nairobi will pay a monthly retainer of $175,000 (Sh23–27 million), in addition to travel and related expenses.

Who is behind Continental Strategy?

Continental Strategy is led by Carlos Trujillo, who served as the U.S. Ambassador to the Organisation of American States under Donald Trump. Other signatories on behalf of the firm include senior partners Alberto Martinez, Alejandro Garcia, and John Barsa.

The firm describes itself as having “extensive knowledge of the White House, Capitol Hill, and federal agencies,” including the Departments of State, Treasury, Homeland Security, and Transportation. Its track record highlights influence in trade, security, and diplomatic relations.

What does Kenya want from the deal?

The lobbying firm is tasked with direct outreach to U.S. policymakers, government relations consulting, and the dissemination of informational materials to promote Kenya’s interests in Washington.

The agreement lists priorities such as enhancing bilateral relations between Kenya and the U.S., advocating on trade and tourism, and supporting security and diplomacy initiatives. Foreign Affairs Principal Secretary Korir Sing’oei signed on behalf of Kenya.

Meanwhile, U.S. Senator Jim Risch, a senior Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has recently pushed for a review of Kenya’s designation as a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA).

The move suggests that Nairobi’s foreign and domestic policies are under growing scrutiny in Washington, increasing the stakes of its lobbying efforts. But Prime Cabinet Secretary Musalia Mudavadi defended the agreement as a strategic investment, stressing that such contracts are “legitimate practice by governments worldwide.” In his statement on August 28, Mudavadi dismissed media reports of impropriety, saying, “This is a legitimate practice by governments worldwide. They are undertaken to advance foreign policy, trade, investment, and security interests in Washington, D.C., where competition for visibility is intense and highly structured.”

Despite the hefty price tag, Trujillo has cautioned that outcomes cannot be guaranteed. Lobbying statements, he noted, should be viewed as opinions rather than promises.

Agriculture, particularly maize, remains the backbone of Malawi’s economy, with 80% of citizens depending on it directly. The El Niño-induced drought in 2024 crystallised the issue, reducing harvests and exacerbating food insecurity for millions. Today, over 20% of the population faces high levels of food insecurity, according to the IMF .

Inflation consistently ranks above 25%, with February 2024 rates hitting 30.7% year-on-year and easing slightly to 27.7% by May 2025 . By June 2025, food inflation stood at an eye-watering 31.6%, down only slightly from 32.7% in May. The Reserve Bank of Malawi revised its 2025 forecast upward, now expecting inflation to close at 32.4%. Overall, 2024 ended with average inflation of 32.2%, while food prices surged 40.2% making essentials increasingly unaffordable.

Growth projections are weak. Real GDP grew just 1.8% in 2024 amid drought and foreign exchange shortages, with the government trimming its 2025 forecast from 4.0% to 3.2% due to mounting price pressures and widespread protests.

Debt trap

Malawi’s public debt is unsustainable, estimated at 86–88% of GDP by late 2024. The IMF’s $175 million Extended Credit Facility (ECF) was terminated in May 2025 after only $35 million was disbursed, undermining hopes for macroeconomic stabilisation.

A joint World Bank–IMF assessment classifies the public debt as “in distress.” The interest bill is nearing 8% of GDP and is projected to exceed 40% of government revenue by 2026.

Aid cuts

The suspension of over $350 million in U.S. aid, equivalent to more than 13% of Malawi’s budget, further destabilised the economy. Critical sectors like healthcare, education, and infrastructure were hit hard, worsening the plight of vulnerable populations.

The IMF predicts growth of 3.4% by 2029 and a gradual drop in inflation to around 15%, assuming structural reforms, fiscal discipline, and a more unified exchange rate system.

Without such changes, inflation and food insecurity are expected to remain central concerns. For voters, the focus is, who can provide economic relief, price stability, and transparent debt management? Leadership is being judged not on slogans, but on the ability to restore livelihoods.

Three prominent political figures are competing:

The agricultural sector, which employs the vast majority of Malawians, was particularly affected, leaving households struggling to put food on the table. Food price inflation has soared to over 20 percent, and almost one in four citizens, about 6 million people, are now experiencing acute food insecurity.

Against this backdrop, citizens are entering the campaign season with urgent demands for reform, accountability, and leadership that can steer the country away from crisis.

At the centre of the electoral contest is a striking dynamic: three former or current presidents are vying for power. Incumbent President Lazarus Chakwera, who came to office in 2020 following the landmark annulment of the previous election, is seeking re-election.

He faces stiff competition from two former leaders, Peter Mutharika, who held office from 2014 to 2020, and Joyce Banda, who governed between 2012 and 2014. All three candidates bring extensive political experience, yet they also carry heavy political baggage from their time in office, ranging from corruption allegations to economic mismanagement.

Chakwera, who ascended to power via a historic court-ordered rerun in 2020, now faces lingering criticisms over unfulfilled promises of economic reform. Mutharika re-enters the fray, vowing to "rescue" the country’s economy , addressing shortages in fuel and medicines, riding on his earlier promises of infrastructure improvements and tempered inflation, though corruption allegations from his previous tenure remain unresolved.

For many Malawians, the race represents less a question of personalities and more a referendum on whether old political hands can deliver real reform.

Coalition politics and the 50%+1 rule

No genocide, no refugee claim

Lamola stressed that the Afrikaner community does not face persecution that would qualify them for refugee status under the 1951 UN Refugee Convention.

“We don’t agree that this is a refugee programme, because there’s no genocide in South Africa,” he said. “Afrikaners do not fit the definition of refugees under the UN Convention. This is, in reality, a fast-tracking process of immigration by the US.”

The United States has framed the programme as a humanitarian measure, citing concerns over crime and economic insecurity in South Africa. But Pretoria sees the move as politically charged and unjustified.

Preferential treatment?

South Africa argues that by creating a pathway only for Afrikaners, the US is engaging in preferential treatment that recalls the racial hierarchies of the apartheid system.

“With our history as a country, a preferential treatment of Afrikaners who are not fleeing genocide amounts to Apartheid 2.0,” Lamola said.

South Africa thus maintains it has no duty to assist with the programme, since it does not constitute a legitimate refugee initiative.

In May, the first group of about 50 Afrikaners - descendants of South Africa’s first European settlers - were flown to the US on a chartered flight after former President Donald Trump authorised the move, Viory reports.