“I’m paying for my council house myself,” she told the BBC, adding that her children are British citizens.

The controversy has drawn attention because council housing in Britain is intended for people who cannot afford rising private rents. In Southwark alone, more than 18,000 people are currently waiting for social housing, with some facing waits of more than five years.

Jabbe-Bio and her husband have lived in Sierra Leone’s presidential lodge since he won office in 2018. The residence, located in the capital Freetown, includes amenities such as a swimming pool, tennis courts and a helipad.

Southwark council rules state tenants must use council properties as their “only or principal home”. Tenants are also required to notify authorities if they are away for more than 42 consecutive days.

The local authority declined to comment directly on Jabbe-Bio’s case but said investigations are carried out if there are concerns that tenancy conditions are being breached.

Born in Sierra Leone, Jabbe-Bio moved to Britain as a teenager after fleeing an arranged marriage.

She later worked as an actress and model and reportedly moved into the Southwark property in 2007.

At the center of the upheaval was Senator Ronald “Bato” dela Rosa, former Philippine National Police chief and chief implementor of former president Rodrigo Duterte’s bloody drug war.

Dela Rosa resurfaced publicly after months out of the spotlight, reportedly to secure votes for the leadership change.

His appearance triggered further drama after reports emerged that authorities attempted to serve him an International Criminal Court arrest warrant tied to crimes against humanity allegations linked to the anti-drug campaign. The ICC later confirmed that a warrant had been issued against dela Rosa.

Amid the Senate turmoil, the House of Representatives voted overwhelmingly to impeach Vice President Duterte for a second time over allegations that included misuse of public funds , unexplained wealth, and threats against President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. and his allies. Duterte has denied wrongdoing.

The events highlighted the deepening political rupture between the Marcos and Duterte camps — and raised fresh questions over whether the Senate, now under new leadership, can impartially handle the vice president’s looming impeachment trial.

The venue had undergone years of rehabilitation after it was struck by mortar fire in 2015, an attack that killed a child and damaged the indoor court at the height of fighting in the Syrian civil war.

Speaking at the event, al-Sharaa described basketball as “one of the games closest to our hearts,” but said it had been abandoned during years of conflict . The reopening, he suggested, was part of a broader return to normal life in the capital.

On the court, the president drew cheers from the crowd as he stepped to the free-throw line before finishing with a layup, with several cabinet ministers in attendance.

Al Sharaa’s appearance also builds on a growing public image that blends politics with informal outreach. In November 2025, ahead of a landmark visit to the United States , he was filmed playing basketball with senior American military officials, including commanders from the U.S. Central Command.

The video, shared online by Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani, showed al-Sharaa running plays alongside U.S. officers as Damascus and Washington explored closer coordination, including potential cooperation against the Islamic State group.

Structurally, China is a unified multi-ethnic country. China officially recognizes 56 ethnic groups, with Han people constituting 91% of the population and the rest representing the minorities. This demographic composition has heavily influenced Beijing’s approach to governance, where unity is not merely ideological but administrative.

On March 12, 2026, China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) adopted the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress (中华人民共和国民族团结进步促进法), to promote ethnic unity and progress. Adopted at the closing meeting of the fourth session of the 14th National People's Congress (NPC), it will come into effect from July 1, 2026.

The legislation aims at legally "fostering a strong sense of community for the Chinese nation" and advancing a law-based governance of ethnic affairs. It is viewed as a transition from earlier policies of limited autonomy towards a more assimilation-driven framework. The government projects this change as a key element for advancing common prosperity and development among all ethnic groups.

The official rhetoric of cohesion and modernization is not restricted to the legal and policy realm, but it extends to the classrooms and personal choices to strengthen the “Chinese” identity.  For example, the law on ethnic unity emphasizes studying Mandarin in pre-schools and directs all the national and local government authorities and private firms to prioritize the display of Chinese characters over minority languages in public settings. The law considers this an important instrument for forging a shared national identity. 

CPC’s understanding of minorities is widely shaped by its priority on national security and stability. From that perspective, the new law appears to be a pragmatic step for achieving standardization across language, administration, and ideology. A strong, shared identity acts as an anchor of society, mitigating friction, providing social cohesion, and strengthening state capacity. By invoking the sense of shared identity, the new law tries to align the ethnic groups with the centralized national narrative and resist separatism in any form.

But instead of social cohesion, this engineered standardization of identity intensifies the hierarchies, conferring privileges to some over the others. This hierarchy is iterated in President Xi Jinping’s new model of governance—a “unified multiethnic state." The new system imagined the Han culture as the trunk of the tree, and the remaining 56 ethnic groups as the branches and leaves.

This metaphor of the trunk and the branches, seemingly benign, is laden with the power asymmetries and a sense of subordination of minorities in the name of nation-building rather than co-existence. Under President Xi, minorities are encouraged to bring colors to the geography of China through their culture, festivals, costumes, songs, etc., but any other identity forged through language or ideas is systematically sinicized. The new law seamlessly merges this Han-centric party ideology into the legal framework. 

In the context of this centralization project, regions like Xinjiang and Tibet lie at the intersection of minority identity and geopolitical priorities of China. While the whole world is saturated with the documented reports on “re-education” centers for the Uyghur Muslims and the associated human rights violations, laws like this raise suspicions about the Party’s intentions. The extensive surveillance and cultural and religious restrictions corroborate the sense of suspicion on the minorities and, hence, Beijing’s drive towards "de-ethnicization" and enforced assimilation.

Similarly, in Inner Mongolia, the centralized implementation of Mandarin in the education system is symbolic of minority identity being re-scripted. Starting from the classrooms, laws like the Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law aggressively articulate the state-sponsored singular civilizational narrative of Zhonghua, or Chinese civilization, that is predominantly Han.

Compared to democratic countries like the USA and India, China’s approach stands apart. While both the USA and India have historically embraced plurality and multiculturalism, China is experimenting differently with its minorities. Through instruments like the Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law, China is redesigning unity that does not exactly emerge from diversity. This law might redefine the nationhood for Xi’s China in the 21st century, but it has not evolved organically.

Where social cohesion is perceived as synonymous with national security,   ethnic identity becomes increasingly ornamental and performative. Unified national identity is not simply a byproduct of national policies; it is bigger than that. National identity is composed of various ethnic, religious, and language groups that live, negotiate, and thrive together. Whether the Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law can manufacture this national identity and cohesion, however, remains an open question.

The article solely represents the views of Dr. Ila Joshi, an Assistant Professor of International Studies in the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences at Jaypee Institute of Information Technology, Noida, India.

The silence contrasts with BRICS’ frequent calls for a more “multipolar” world order and its ambition to amplify the political influence of developing nations in global affairs.

Several member states have responded individually. China and Russia condemned the strikes and warned they violated international law, while South Africa called for a ceasefire and warned the conflict risked spreading beyond the Middle East.

But the organisation itself — which now includes Iran — has not taken a collective position.

This reflects growing divisions within the bloc, particularly after its rapid expansion.

Fractures within BRICS

Originally formed in 2009 by Brazil, Russia, India and China, with South Africa joining the following year, BRICS began primarily as an economic partnership among emerging economies. In 2024, the group expanded to include Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Ethiopia and Indonesia.

Supporters hailed the enlargement as a milestone for a rising coalition of Global South powers seeking greater influence in international institutions traditionally dominated by the West.

However, the Iran war has highlighted the challenges of maintaining unity among members with competing strategic interests.

Iran, under attack from the U.S. and Israel, has launched retaliatory strikes against American assets across the region, including in Saudi Arabia and the UAE — both fellow BRICS members. The attacks marked the first time one member of the organisation has fired missiles at another, underscoring internal tensions within the bloc.

India’s position has drawn particular attention. As the current BRICS chair, New Delhi has limited its response to calls for dialogue and de-escalation, avoiding direct criticism of Washington or Tel Aviv.

This cautious approach comes as India strengthens ties with both countries. Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Israel weeks before the war began, announcing a “special strategic partnership” that includes defence and technology cooperation.

At the same time, India has sought to stabilise trade relations with the U.S. following tariff disputes with the Trump administration.

Those overlapping relationships have complicated efforts for BRICS to adopt a unified position on the conflict.

While BRICS leaders frequently emphasise their role as a voice for the Global South, the differing responses to the Iran war suggest the alliance still struggles to coordinate on major security crises — even when one of its own members is directly involved.

In a social media post, she said she had hoped the gifts would be “beneficial” to lawmakers. 

“We thought of items that would be useful for activities as members of parliament, but with no time to select appropriate items for each individual…we decided to provide catalog gifts so that each member could choose items beneficial to their political activities,” Takaichi said.

Speaking in the upper chamber of the Diet, Japan’s parliament, Takaichi insisted there was “no legal problem” with the distribution. 

She said the catalogues were funded not by state subsidies but by the LDP branch in Nara Prefecture’s No. 2 constituency, which she heads. According to her explanation, the total cost amounted to roughly ¥9.45 million ($60,700), including tax and delivery fees.

This row erupted after opposition lawmaker Masayo Tanabu of the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan questioned the value of the gifts, their funding source and their purpose. 

Against the law?

Japan’s Political Funds Control Act prohibits donations connected to the political activities of candidates and bars contributions to individual politicians. 

Although, Takaichi maintained that the catalogues constituted permissible political spending by a local party branch, rather than personal donations. 

She also said she had considered hosting celebratory dinners but opted for catalogues due to scheduling pressures, including preparations for a policy speech and diplomatic engagements.

However, the episode has revived broader concerns about money and politics within the LDP. 

A series of past disclosures involving gift vouchers and opaque funding practices under previous administrations has already fuelled public scepticism about the party’s financial culture.

Tanabu drew comparisons with a controversy last year, when former prime minister Shigeru Ishiba apologised for distributing gift vouchers worth ¥100,000 ($640) each to 15 LDP lawmakers.

Additionally, former prime minister Fumio Kishida reportedly distributed gift vouchers worth ¥100,000 yen ($640) each at a gathering with parliamentary vice-ministers while he was in office.

Yet on Monday in The Hague, that record of statements was cited back to Duterte.

Duterte faces charges of crimes against humanity at the  International Criminal Court (ICC) linked to his anti-drug campaign. During the confirmation of charges hearing, prosecutors outlined a series of public remarks they said demonstrated his knowledge of, and intent behind, a campaign that resulted in thousands of deaths.

In his opening statement, Deputy Prosecutor Mame Mandiaye Niang argued that Duterte’s own speeches showed awareness of the scale of the killings and the assurances extended to police officers and alleged vigilantes.

“Duterte's criminal plan and his intent were no secret,” Niang said. “He not only shared them with his co-perpetrators and members of the death squad (Davao Death Squad) but also made them abundantly clear to the general public in the numerous public statements that he made time and again.”

These are some of Duterte’s statements cited by the ICC prosecution:

“ The shoot-to-kill order is a legitimate tool of the government to combat lawlessness.”

The ICC said evidence indicated “the Davao City Mayor’s Office provided some members of the DDS with regular salaries. Financial rewards were also given to direct perpetrators in the form of cash per killing.”

“ For as long as there is the power to pardon in the Constitution, that’s my weapon against crime. If you massacre a hundred people, and there are a hundred of you, then I’ll pardon all of you. You’ll be restored to full political and civil rights, plus a promotion on top of that. That’s how it is — especially for high-profile cases.”

Niang said such statements “reassured the physical perpetrators,” citing an insider witness who said he felt confident killing under Duterte because he expected immunity. “Direct perpetrators were further emboldened to commit crime by Mr. Duterte's repeated promises of immunity,” he added.

“ Those of you who are still sober, those who haven't tried illegal drugs, if you don't want to die or get hurt, don't rely on the priest, including human rights advocates. They won't be able to prevent death, so don't do it. And then there you are, sprawled on the ground, and you are portrayed in a broad sheet like Mother Mary cradling the dead cadaver of Jesus Christ. That's how they are creating dramas here.”

The statement referenced a widely circulated photograph by Filipino photographer Raffy Lerma showing a woman cradling her partner’s body with a placard reading, “Pusher ako (I’m a drug pusher).”

Though not a primary focus of the hearing, Duterte also made statements during the COVID-19 lockdowns that prosecutors described as potentially threatening, including instructions to shoot violators if their lives were in danger. 

The Philippines implemented one of the world’s longest pandemic lockdowns, which had significant social and economic impacts.

“ If there is any trouble, or occasions when there’s violence and your lives are in danger, shoot them dead!”

Duterte faces three counts of murder and attempted murder spanning his mayoral and presidential terms. The ICC links him to 78 killings and attempted killings, which prosecutors argue were neither “random” nor “isolated.”

“They were part of a widespread and systematic attack directed against the civilian population of the Philippines,” Niang said. “The murders and attempted murders were carried out across the Philippines and over a substantial period of time.”

Yet even without citing his statements, the ICC prosecution maintains it has enough evidence to proceed.

“For purposes of this confirmation hearing, disregard every speech ever made by Mr. Duterte. Throw them all out,” said senior trial lawyer Julian Nicholls. “There is still ample evidence of substantial ground based on the other evidence which we have put on our list."

“For over 20 years, Brazil, India, Japan and Germany have defended the increase of the UN Security Council,” Lula said, referring to the G4 bloc. “The UN needs more representation.”

The G4 proposal calls for expanding the 15-member Council to 25 seats, adding six permanent and four non-permanent members to better reflect contemporary geopolitical realities.

Lula argued that expanding both permanent and non-permanent categories of membership is necessary for a more credible multilateral system, adding that Brazil and India should be part of any reconfigured Council. 

Framing the bilateral meeting as more than routine diplomacy, Lula described India and Brazil as the two largest democracies in the Global South and as emerging superpowers in their respective domains.

“This is a meeting of superlatives,” Lula said. “We are both mega diverse countries and hubs of the cultural industry and we both defend multilateralism and peace.”

He said closer coordination between New Delhi and Brasília would not only strengthen bilateral ties but also amplify the voice of developing nations in global forums, including the UN, the World Trade Organization and the G20.

Lula also emphasized a shared commitment to multilateralism, dialogue and peace, warning that sustainable development cannot be achieved in a conflict-ridden world.

By elevating their partnership and pressing for Security Council reform, Lula signaled efforts to consolidate India and Brazil’s roles as leading voices for a more assertive Global South.

"India and Brazil's partnership on the global stage has been strong and influential,” he said. “As democratic nations, we will continue to advance the priorities and aspirations of the Global South.” 

“When India and Brazil work together, the voice of the Global South becomes stronger and more confident,” he added. 

Resource control is central to this rise as these countries hold most of the world ’s key minerals, oil, gas, and agricultural output, vital for electric vehicles, AI, energy systems, and food supply. Recognising this dominance, many Global South countries now focus on local processing, industrial diversification, South–South trade and reforms in global institutions.

Demographics, resources and growth increasingly favor the Global South, while advanced economies expand slowly. Thus, the key question now is not whether the shift is happening, but how traditional powers will respond to a world where influence is more shared than dictated.

“I was very excited about today’s voting,” Sazzad, a journalist, told Global South World shortly after polls closed on Thursday. “It was like a new experience for us. After so many years, we finally had the chance.”

This year’s election marked Bangladesh’s first since the 2024 youth-led uprising that ended Hasina’s 17-year rule and forced the longtime premier into exile in India.

More than 127 million voters were registered for the parliamentary contest and a simultaneous referendum on constitutional reforms.

For many in Generation Z — those who came of age politically during Hasina’s tenure — the vote represented more than a routine democratic exercise. 

It was, in Sazzad’s words, an opportunity to help shape a “new Bangladesh.”

“They are the future of our country,” Sazzad said of the Bangladeshi youth. “They want to see some pragmatic changes in the future in Bangladesh. They never want to see any corruption. They never want to see any disruption to living their life.”

Polling centres in the capital were calm and heavily secured, with the military and other law enforcement agencies deployed nationwide, Sazzad said. 

Yet beneath the order, Bangladeshis were elated at the chance to witness a new political landscape, one they largely see as shaping their future.

“They are very happy and they were feeling like it's like Eid for us,” Sazzad said, referring to the Islamic holiday featuring feasts and prayers. “It was a sunny day in our country. The situation was very good.”

BNP win

The Bangladesh Nationalist Party secured a decisive parliamentary majority, winning 209 of 300 seats, giving the party a two-thirds mandate to form the next government .

For Samiur Rahman Sazzad, the outcome signals both continuity and opportunity. 

“BNP now has the chance to prove themselves,” he said, noting the party’s “very talented” leadership under Tarique Rahman, son of BNP founder Ziaur Rahman. 

Tarique, who returned from nearly two decades abroad, is seen as a charismatic figure capable of implementing the BNP’s 31-point election platform, including initiatives aimed at reducing social inequality, expanding access to food and education , and widening the tax base.

Sazzad emphasised that while the Awami League was barred from contesting, voter turnout — estimated at around 65% — reflects strong public engagement. 

“The people of Bangladesh accept the result,” he said, dismissing criticisms from Hasina and her party in exile that the elections were a “well-planned farce” and was not inclusive, considering Awami League was excluded.

Opposition voices, including Jamaat-e-Islami, have also largely signalled acceptance.

Gen Z future

While BNP claims power, Sazzad sees the next chapter of Bangladesh’s politics as still deeply influenced by Generation Z. 

Young voters, he said, remain committed to pragmatic reform and anti-corruption priorities, even as new actors like the student-led National Citizen Party (NCP) begin to emerge.

“The NCP is like an infant baby,” Sazzad explained. “They won five seats, but they have potential.” 

He predicts the party could capture dozens of constituencies in future elections, reflecting a generation eager for leaders who actively participated in the 2024 uprising that ousted Hasina.

For many young Bangladeshis, including first-time voters like Sazzad, the election is a first step toward what they hope will be a more transparent, equitable, and forward-looking Bangladesh.

The so-called “Epstein files” include millions of pages of emails and records detailing his social and professional contacts.

Speaking to reporters hours after Gandhi’s address, Puri said he encountered Epstein “three or four times at most” while serving with the New York-based International Peace Institute (IPI), where his then-supervisor knew the financier. 

“Our interactions had nothing to do with the crimes he is accused of,” Puri said, adding that references to him in the documents were limited.

He said one email exchange, in which Epstein was copied, related to discussions about India’s digital economy and outreach to technology investors, including LinkedIn co-founder Reid Hoffman. 

Puri said the correspondence focused on India’s internet growth and investment opportunities and did not concern Epstein’s personal activities. In another exchange from 2014, Puri said, Epstein referred to him as “two-faced,” which the minister cited to argue that he was not part of Epstein’s inner circle.

Gandhi’s remarks are part of a broader political offensive by India’s main opposition party, which has sought to question the government over references to Indian public figures in the US disclosures. 

The government has dismissed such references as irrelevant or misleading. 

Last month, India’s foreign ministry rejected as “trashy ruminations” an email mentioning Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s 2017 visit to Israel, stressing that official travel details were publicly known and unrelated to any wrongdoing.

The US Justice Department last month released a new tranche of records under transparency rules aimed at shedding light on what authorities knew about Epstein’s abuse of underage girls and his connections with influential figures. 

While the documents list a wide range of global business leaders and politicians, inclusion in the records does not in itself imply criminal conduct.

Unlike previous elections , the appointed Senate will no longer participate in selecting the prime minister. A candidate for premier needs at least 251 votes in the House to assume office. 

Voters will also cast a referendum ballot on whether to rewrite the 2017 constitution.

What are the main parties?

How will the elections be conducted?

While voting occurs on February 8, the prime minister will not be elected immediately. 

Results must first be certified by the Election Commission, which has up to 60 days to confirm at least 95% of MPs — 475 of 500 — before Parliament can convene. This step is expected by April 9.

The first parliamentary session will follow, likely after the Songkran Festival, to elect the Speaker and Deputy Speakers. The Speaker plays a key role in controlling proceedings, setting agendas, and formally proposing the prime minister to the King.

The prime minister’s election in early May 2026 will reflect the outcome of coalition negotiations. A party or alliance must secure at least 251 votes in the House. Forming a stable government may be difficult, as no single party is expected to win a majority.

Once the prime minister is elected, the Cabinet will be formed and ministers appointed by royal decree. 

The new government must present its policy statement to Parliament within 15 days, after which it can fully exercise authority. If the process proceeds smoothly, Thailand should have a fully functioning government by mid-June 2026.

What are the pressing issues?

What’s next?

Thailand’s election is widely viewed as a test of whether the country can break its cycle of political instability, coups, and judicial interventions. However, even with high voter turnout, analysts have cautioned that forming a stable government will be challenging unless a party achieves a convincing majority.

Thus, February 8 vote marks the start of a complex transition of state power. 

Over the next four months, the certification of results, parliamentary convening, prime minister selection, and Cabinet formation will determine whether Thailand can achieve political stability or continue its pattern of turbulence.

Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez met US Chargé d’Affaires Laura Dogu at the Miraflores Presidential Palace on the afternoon of  Monday, February 2, in what Communications Minister Miguel Pérez Pirela described as part of a “working agenda” between Caracas and Washington. National Assembly President Jorge Rodríguez also attended. Dogu confirmed the meeting on social media, saying she reiterated US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s proposed “three-phase plan” for Venezuela: “stabilisation, economic recovery and reconciliation, and transition.” Dogu arrived in Caracas on Saturday, January 31, pledging her team was “ready to work,” as US officials continue assessing conditions for reopening the US embassy. Foreign Minister Yván Gil said Venezuela seeks cooperation on “issues of bilateral interest,” and announced that Félix Plasencia will serve as Venezuela’s diplomatic representative in the United States and will travel to Washington soon.

US issues OFAC license delaying Citgo debt actions

The US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued a new license on Monday, February 2, allowing holders of Petróleos de Venezuela SA (PDVSA) bonds maturing in 2020 to conduct certain transactions beginning March 20, while keeping the Citgo auction blocked. The measure effectively delays creditors from invoking US courts to collect debts against Citgo Petroleum Corporation. The Venezuelan government has condemned the process authorising the auction as “fraudulent,” arguing the country was excluded from legal proceedings and denied the right to defend itself. Caracas has also warned that the “illegal sale” of its main foreign asset is in its “final phase,” and maintains the US judicial process violates international law.

Delcy Rodríguez proposes mass amnesty and justice reforms

Acting President Delcy Rodríguez announced on Friday, January 30, a proposal for a broad amnesty law covering “the entire period of political violence from 1999 to the present.” Speaking at the Venezuelan supreme court before top officials, Rodríguez said the measure aims to “heal the wounds left by political confrontation, fuelled by violence and extremism,” while also launching a “major national consultation for a new judicial system.” She further announced plans to close El Helicoide prison in Caracas—long criticised by rights groups—and convert the facility into a sports, cultural, and commercial centre for police families and surrounding communities.

Brazilian labour leader warns US aims to dominate Venezuelan oil

A senior Brazilian labour leader accused Washington of targeting Venezuela’s energy sector to gain control over its oil resources, warning that US actions mirror strategies used to reshape Brazil’s own industry. Deyvid Bacelar, general coordinator of Brazil’s Unified Federation of Oil Workers (FUP), told Xinhua that US pressure “has nothing to do with defending democracy or combating drug trafficking,” but instead seeks “imperial domination and the appropriation of natural wealth.” He argued weakening PDVSA would open the door for US firms, and compared the situation to Brazil’s Operation Car Wash (Lava Jato), which he claimed facilitated foreign access to Petrobras-linked deep-water reserves.

Chinese refiners shift to Iranian crude as Venezuelan shipments stall

Chinese independent refiners are reportedly purchasing discounted Iranian heavy crude to replace Venezuelan shipments that have slowed sharply after the US claimed control of Venezuela’s oil sales last month. Sources said the drawdown of Iranian oil stored in China and on ships is helping cover the drop in Venezuelan supply. Venezuelan shipments to China reportedly fell significantly after mid-December following a US blockade on sanctioned vessels, amid a broader campaign that culminated in Nicolás Maduro’s capture by US forces on January 3. Washington has reportedly assigned trading firms Vitol and Trafigura to market Venezuelan crude, but China’s “teapot” refiners in Shandong have prioritised heavily discounted sanctioned grades over Venezuelan cargoes and other alternatives.

“China always and will continue to oppose using any arts award for political agenda against China,” the post continued.

The remarks followed news that the Dalai Lama, 90, won the Grammy for Best Audio Book, Narration and Storytelling Recording for “Meditations: The Reflections Of His Holiness The Dalai Lama” at the 68th Grammy Awards on February 1.

The Tibetan leader beat several high-profile contenders in the category, including Grammys host Trevor Noah, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, and musician Fab Morvan of Milli Vanilli. 

The Dalai Lama later acknowledged the win in a statement posted on his official Instagram account, saying he accepted the award “with gratitude and humility” and viewed it not as a personal accolade, but as recognition of shared global responsibility.

Why China is critical of the Dalai Lama

Beijing’s sharp reaction underscores how sensitive China remains to the Dalai Lama’s international profile.

As the spiritual leader of Tibetan Buddhists — around six million people worldwide — the Dalai Lama embodies a cultural and religious identity Beijing has struggled to fully control since occupying Tibet in the early 1950s.

China maintains it “liberated” Tibet from feudal rule and brought development to the region. Many Tibetans, however, continue to cling to their language, culture and religious traditions, with the Dalai Lama at the centre of one of the world’s longest-running nonviolent political struggles.

After a failed uprising against Chinese rule in 1959, the Dalai Lama fled to India, where he established a government in exile in Dharamshala. 

While he later relinquished his political role to focus on spiritual leadership, Beijing has continued to label him a separatist and pressures governments to avoid official contact with him.

This sensitivity has only grown as questions loom over the Dalai Lama’s eventual succession. 

In August 2025, Chinese President Xi Jinping made a rare visit to Tibet, stressing “political stability, national unity and religious harmony,” and reiterating Beijing’s push to “sinicize” religion.

This shift, AMTI noted, came “after years of consistency in patrolling all corners of Beijing’s nine-dash line claim” and demonstrated a “clear reallocation of CCG resources toward flashpoints between China and the Philippines.”

Using vessel tracking data, AMTI found that Chinese patrols were no longer spread evenly across Beijing’s nine-dash line claim. Instead, resources were concentrated on flashpoints involving Philippine vessels, while activity declined at several other disputed areas.

Total coast guard patrols across six monitored locations increased to 2,183 ship days in 2025, up from 1,939 the year before. But patrols fell at Luconia Shoals, Second Thomas Shoal, Thitu Island and parts of the southwestern South China Sea, signalling a clear reallocation of effort.

Scarborough Shoal saw the sharpest increase. Chinese coast guard vessels were present there for 1,099 ship days in 2025, more than double the figure recorded in 2024, with patrols detected on almost every day of the year.

AMTI said Chinese ships also operated over a wider area around the shoal, including waters east of Scarborough that Philippine vessels use to access the feature.

Patrols near Sabina Shoal also expanded significantly, nearly tripling compared with the previous year. Chinese vessels ranged beyond the immediate area of the shoal, extending operations towards nearby unoccupied features such as Half Moon Shoal.

The report said the shift marks the biggest change in China Coast Guard patrol patterns since regular monitoring began in 2019, highlighting Beijing’s growing focus on maritime areas where its claims most directly clash with those of the Philippines.

Under prison regulations, inmates serving one-year sentences become eligible for parole after completing eight months, provided they meet basic conduct requirements.

The source said Thaksin is expected to qualify during the May review cycle, despite his inmate classification not yet being upgraded due to timing constraints in earlier assessments.

Classification reviews are conducted four times a year and consider behaviour, participation in activities, sentence length and time already served.

Thaksin, 76, was taken into custody on September 9 last year after the Supreme Court ordered him to serve a one-year term for abuse of authority and conflicts of interest while in office.

During the prison visit, Thaksin’s son-in-law Pidok Sooksawas told reporters the former premier was in good spirits and following political developments closely from inside prison.

Thaksin also conveyed support for Pheu Thai Party candidates ahead of the February general election and expressed condolences over a deadly crane accident in northeastern Thailand.

Supporters from the red-shirt movement gathered outside the prison.

Jailed after years in exile

Thaksin returned to Thailand in August 2023 after more than 15 years in self-imposed exile and was immediately sentenced to eight years in prison, later reduced to one year by royal clemency.

Although he spent much of that period in a police hospital, the Supreme Court later ruled the hospital stay did not count as prison time, forcing him to serve his sentence at Klongprem.

If granted parole in May, Thaksin’s release would mark another pivotal moment in Thailand’s long-running political saga , which has seen him jailed and his daughter, Paetongtarn, win and lose the premiership. 

Iran International said it delayed publishing casualty estimates until it had assessed what it described as converging and credible evidence, citing the risks of releasing incomplete figures in a country where access to information is tightly controlled.

The outlet said its assessment was based on a multi-stage review of information from sources it described as close to Iran’s Supreme National Security Council and presidential office, as well as accounts from within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, medical staff, eyewitnesses and families of those killed.

According to its findings, the deaths occurred largely over two nights, on January 8 and 9, during a nationwide crackdown on protests, and involved coordinated use of lethal force rather than isolated or spontaneous clashes.

Iran International said those killed were mainly shot by members of the Revolutionary Guard and the Basij militia, and that many of the victims were under the age of 30.

The outlet alleged that the operation was ordered at the highest levels of the state, claiming the decision to use live fire was taken with the knowledge and approval of Iran’s top political and security leadership. These claims could not be independently verified.

Iranian authorities have rejected such accounts, putting the death toll at around 2,000. An official told Reuters that those killed were victims of violence by “terrorists” and vandals, not the security forces.

Human rights groups and international media have reported confirmed deaths in the hundreds, while stressing that independent verification remains extremely difficult because of severe restrictions on reporting and communications inside Iran.

The stark disparity between official figures and the claims by Iran International underscores the challenge of assessing the true human cost of Iran’s unrest, as information controls and competing narratives continue to obscure events on the ground.

Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. is prepared for any impeachment complaint that may be filed against him, Malacañang said on Monday, amid reports that some lawmakers are planning to pursue charges. Palace Press Officer Claire Castro said Marcos respects the Constitution and due process and remains confident that Congress continues to trust him. She rejected claims of a breach of public trust, saying the president had not stolen public funds and had ordered investigations into allegedly anomalous flood control projects. Her remarks followed comments by opposition lawmaker Edgar Erice, who said an impeachment complaint was being considered.

Authorities stop suspected Russia-bound human trafficking victims 

Philippine immigration authorities intercepted two Filipino men at Manila’s main international airport, preventing them from becoming victims of a suspected human trafficking scheme to Russia. The Bureau of Immigration said the men, aged 48 and 52, were stopped on January 2 at Ninoy Aquino International Airport before boarding a flight to Hong Kong. Officers found inconsistencies in their travel accounts and determined they were being recruited for illegal overseas work. The men said they were promised high-paying jobs in Russia after being recruited via social media. They were handed over to anti-trafficking authorities as the investigation continues.

Marcos heads to UAE for trade, defence deals 

Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. left Manila on Monday for a three-day visit to the United Arab Emirates , where he is expected to witness the signing of trade and defence agreements and attend a sustainability summit in Abu Dhabi. Malacañang said Marcos will oversee the signing of a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, aimed at boosting trade, services and investment and widening Philippine access to Gulf markets. A defence cooperation memorandum covering joint training and information sharing is also due to be signed. Marcos said the visit would benefit both Filipinos at home and the nearly 900,000 living in the UAE.

Philippines probes Nestlé infant formula recall over safety concerns

The Philippines’ Food and Drug Administration said on Monday it is investigating the voluntary recall by Nestlé Philippines of selected batches of Nan Optipro and Nankid Optipro infant formula to determine its scope and any safety implications. The FDA said the recall was initiated as a precaution after a reported issue involving a raw material supplied to Nestlé, though no regulatory safety limits have been breached. No illnesses or adverse events have been reported. The agency is coordinating with Nestlé to verify affected batches and ensure their removal from stores and online platforms, urging consumers to check batch numbers and follow recall instructions.

Philippines shuts Cebu landfill after deadly landslide

Environmental authorities in the central Philippines have ordered the immediate shutdown of the Binaliw sanitary landfill in Cebu City after a landslide killed at least 10 workers and left 26 missing. The Department of Environment and Natural Resources said it issued a cease-and-desist order against operator Prime Integrated Waste Solutions Inc. following a site inspection on January 9. All landfill operations have been suspended, except for rescue, retrieval and clean-up activities. The agency said a thorough investigation is underway to determine responsibility. At least 18 people were injured and are being treated in the hospital.

Together, these crisis zones will shape migration flows, global security , trade routes, and diplomatic alignments well beyond their borders.

Sudan

Sudan remains the most severe humanitarian emergency globally. The civil war that erupted in April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces has devastated the country, displacing millions and pushing large populations toward famine. In the last year, the conflict showed little sign of resolution, with fighting increasingly fragmented and spilling into neighbouring states such as Chad, South Sudan, and Ethiopia. This year, the country could risk sliding further toward de facto partition, a scenario that would entrench instability across the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea corridor.

Yemen

In Yemen, the conflict is evolving rather than ending. While large-scale fighting has reduced in some areas, the country is increasingly divided between Houthi-controlled territories in the north and rival factions in the south backed by regional powers. This fragmentation weakens prospects for national reconciliation and carries global implications due to Yemen’s proximity to vital Red Sea shipping lanes. As maritime security concerns grow, Yemen’s instability in 2026 will remain tightly linked to regional geopolitics and global trade.

Myanmar

Myanmar enters 2026 locked in a protracted civil war following the 2021 military coup. Armed resistance groups now control significant territory, while the junta struggles to govern beyond major urban centres. Planned or proposed elections under these conditions risk deepening Myanmar’s legitimacy crisis rather than resolving it. The humanitarian toll continues to rise, with millions displaced and neighbouring countries such as Thailand, China, and Bangladesh absorbing the spillover effects.

DR Congo

In eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, violence persists despite diplomatic efforts to stabilise the region. Armed groups, including M23, continue to challenge state authority, exploiting ethnic tensions, especially in Goma and competition over mineral resources. Peace agreements reached last year still face serious implementation challenges , and failure to consolidate them in 2026 could destabilise the wider Great Lakes region, where conflict has long crossed borders and drawn in neighbouring states.

Nigeria

Nigeria’s crisis heading into 2026 is defined by overlapping insurgency, criminal violence, and worsening economic pressure, with jihadist groups such as Boko Haram and ISWAP continuing attacks across the northeast and northwest. In the Middle Belt and parts of the north, violence has increasingly targeted Christian communities, with deadly attacks in late 2025 killing dozens of civilians in Benue and Plateau states, particularly around the Christmas period.

The situation escalated internationally when the United States carried out airstrikes on December 24–25, 2025, hitting ISIS-linked camps in northwest Nigeria at the request of the Nigerian government. While the strikes disrupted militant operations, analysts warn that without addressing governance failures, poverty, and local grievances, Nigeria’s insecurity is likely to persist and deepen in 2026.

Taiwan vs. China

Beyond active war zones, strategic flashpoints are also reshaping risk in the Global South. Rising tensions between China and Taiwan, while centred in East Asia, carry global consequences that will be felt acutely across developing economies. Any escalation would disrupt trade , shipping routes, and semiconductor supply chains, forcing many Global South countries, deeply tied to both Chinese and Western economic systems, to navigate difficult diplomatic and economic choices.

Bangladesh — February 12

Bangladesh’s 2026 national election is one of the most significant tests of democratic resilience in South Asia. After mass student protests in 2024 toppled long-time leader Sheikh Hasina, the country has been governed by an interim administration led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus.

Scheduled for February 12, the election will determine all 300 seats in the Jatiya Sangsad (national parliament) and will be accompanied by a constitutional referendum. Over 127 million voters are registered, making it one of the largest electorates in the world.

With the ruling Awami League previously barred from contesting and major opposition parties such as the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) re-entering the fray, this election represents a dramatic realignment of political forces.

At stake are fundamental questions about civil liberties, judicial independence, and the role of the military in governance, issues highlighted by analysts who note deep public mistrust and the need for credible electoral processes to prevent renewed instability.

Nepal — March 5

Nepal is preparing for one of the most consequential elections against the backdrop of major political unrest. In September 2025, Gen Z-led protests spread nationwide, driven by discontent with corruption, authoritarian governance, and a controversial social media ban. The protests became the most intense political movement in years, leading to violent clashes and dozens of deaths.

Following the unrest, Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli resigned, and the federal Parliament was dissolved. In response, President Ram Chandra Paudel appointed former Chief Justice Sushila Karki as interim prime minister, making her Nepal’s first female head of government. The interim government’s primary task is to oversee a stable transition toward the March elections.

Republic of the Congo — March 22

The Republic of the Congo will hold its presidential election on March 22, 2026, with long-time incumbent Denis Sassou Nguesso seeking another term after decades in power.

Nguesso, who has governed since 1997 and previously served from 1979 to 1992, remains a polarising figure. Critics argue his extended rule has eroded democratic norms, and freedom indices rate the polity among the lowest in political rights.

The election is significant for domestic governance, but also because Congo holds key natural resources and strategic importance in Central Africa. Opposition coalitions are attempting to unify against Nguesso’s longstanding rule, and the 2026 vote could signal either continuity or a breakthrough for alternative leadership.

Colombia — May 31

Colombia will hold its presidential election on May 31 , following parliamentary elections earlier in March. The contest comes at a critical juncture for the Andean nation as it tackles issues like narcotics-driven violence, economic inequality, and peace process implementation.

The 2026 vote will test the durability of reforms initiated under previous administrations and will shape Bogotá’s diplomatic posture toward neighbouring Venezuela and broader Western Hemisphere cooperation on security and migration challenges.

The country is also expected to elect a new leader as the incumbent President Gustavo Petro has been banned from recontesting.

Ethiopian General Election — June 1

Scheduled for June 1, 2026, Ethiopia’s general election will be the first major vote since ongoing internal conflicts deeply disrupted the nation’s political landscape.

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s Prosperity Party will seek to extend its hold on power in a country still grappling with security challenges, a fragile economy, and questions about electoral credibility.

As East Africa’s second-largest country by population, Ethiopia’s political direction will resonate across the region, particularly in how it handles ethnic tensions, federal governance, and economic reform been high in recent years.

Brazil — October 4

Brazil’s general election, set for October 4, will be closely watched across Latin America and beyond.

Brazil’s election will determine the presidency as well as the composition of both chambers of Congress. With Brazil being the largest democracy in Latin America, influential in regional trade, climate policy, and global diplomatic forums, political shifts here could affect Mercosur, climate cooperation (especially Amazon preservation), and relations with major powers such as the United States, China, and the EU.

Sitting President Lula da Silva is seeking a second term and will be going head-to-head with the son of jailed former President Jair Bolsonaro, Flavio Bolsonaro.

Before launching a campaign that would go on to capture the imagination of many New Yorkers, Mamdani was a little-known state assemblyman. For many voters, 2025 was the first time they had even heard of his name. 

Yet the core message of his campaign — affordability — resonated in one of the most expensive cities in the world and its de facto financial capital. On November 4, Mamdani won 50.74 percent of the vote, enough to defy expectations and overcome attacks that often went for his African, Asian and Muslim identity. 

But what does a Mamdani-run New York mean for the Global South, if anything at all?

Representation and access

Mamdani is among a small number of senior elected officials in the United States whose personal background is rooted in the developing world. For officials and observers in Africa, Asia and the Middle East , that has drawn attention, even as expectations remain limited.

To be clear, his election does not alter Washington’s stance on trade, security or development assistance. New York’s mayor does not set US foreign policy. But it does place a Global South-born leader at the helm of a city where embassies, consulates and multilateral missions are densely concentrated, and where access to local political leadership often shapes day-to-day diplomatic and economic engagement.

Global South leader for Global South communities

More than one in three New York residents were born outside the United States, according to census data, with large communities originating from Latin America, South Asia, Africa and the Caribbean. The city’s economy depends heavily on migrant labour and transnational business networks, while remittances sent from New York sustain households across the developing world.

In that context, Mamdani’s background is not merely symbolic. It intersects directly with the lived realities of a significant share of the city’s population, many of whom navigate the same pressures of cost, precarity and access that shape urban politics across the Global South.

Policy and stance

Affordability sat at the centre of Mamdani’s campaign, reflecting mounting pressure from housing costs, transport fares and basic living expenses. In key respects, the challenges facing New York increasingly mirror those long familiar to major cities in the Global South — rapid growth, entrenched inequality and infrastructure stretched beyond capacity.

Mamdani has also signalled an awareness of struggles that resonate across the Global South. He has been outspoken on the war in Gaza, a stance that has drawn criticism — particularly over his past refusal to condemn the phrase “globalise the intifada”. He later said he would discourage the term’s use.

Migration has been another central theme. In his victory speech, Mamdani declared: “New York will remain a city of immigrants — a city built by immigrants, powered by immigrants and, as of tonight, led by an immigrant.”

He later underscored that position during a meeting with US President Donald Trump, a leading proponent of hardline immigration policies, where the newly elected mayor sought to press New York’s case directly at the White House.

A model

For many in the Global South, Mamdani’s rise carries a quieter implication. Sure, his story is not a conventional rags-to-riches narrative. He was born into privilege, the son of an Oscar-nominated filmmaker and a Columbia University professor.

Yet his ascent to power, despite persistent scrutiny of his Global South roots, suggests that individuals born outside the traditional centres of power can still reach the highest levels of political authority in the Global North. 

Whether his tenure ultimately succeeds or falters, his election alone stands as evidence that pathways into Western power structures, while narrow, are not entirely closed.

Here is a rundown of elections that made a difference in 2025:

Sri Lanka

One of the most consequential elections was Sri Lanka ’s parliamentary transition in early 2025, which followed the 2024 presidential election won by Anura Kumara Dissanayake after the country’s worst economic crisis since independence. Voters decisively rejected the long-dominant Rajapaksa and Wickremesinghe political establishments, widely blamed for the 2022 debt default, instead backing parties and candidates associated with fiscal discipline, anti-corruption reforms, and continued engagement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) recovery programme.

Crucially, the mass youth-led protest movement known as the “Aragalaya,” which had forced former president Gotabaya Rajapaksa to flee in 2022, evolved into sustained electoral pressure in 2025.

Cameroon

In the October 12, 2025, presidential election, Cameroon’ s long-serving President Paul Biya, aged 92, was declared the winner with approximately 53.7% of the vote, extending his rule that began in 1982 into an unprecedented eighth term. The result sparked widespread protests in major cities such as Douala and Yaoundé, with opposition supporters rejecting the official outcome and accusing the government of electoral fraud and repression. The election and its aftermath underscored deep social tensions between entrenched political authority and a growing demand for democratic accountability among citizens and civil society groups.

Tanzania

Tanzania’s 29 October 2025 general election faced criticism over the exclusion of major opposition candidates and claims of suppressed dissent, fuelling public dissatisfaction with the electoral process and governance. Following the government’s declared victory, protests erupted in major cities, driven largely by young people contesting the outcome and broader political restrictions. Opposition groups and civil society alleged that thousands were killed during the unrest, with some estimates as high as 10,000. These claims have not been independently verified and were dismissed by the government as exaggerated. Prime Minister Mwigulu Nchemba’s administration described the figures as misinformation and announced investigations into the protests and any confirmed deaths. A presidential commission was subsequently established, though no official death toll has been released.

Chile

In the December 2025 presidential election in Chile , José Antonio Kast of the conservative Christian Social Front was elected president, defeating left-of-centre candidate Gabriel Boric and signalling a sharp political shift after years of social unrest and economic uncertainty. Kast’s victory reflected widespread voter concern over crime, public security, and economic challenges, with his campaign promising tougher law-and-order policies and market-oriented fiscal reforms. The result marked a substantive rightward turn in Chilean politics, underscoring a broader social realignment in Latin America as citizens adjusted priorities away from progressive agendas toward stability, security, and economic pragmatism in the aftermath of mass protests and constitutional debates.

Bolivia

In the 2025 Bolivian presidential runoff, Rodrigo Paz —a centrist and former mayor of La Paz— defeated his main rival to secure the presidency with a clear lead in the early official count, ending nearly two decades of dominance by the Movement for Socialism (MAS) party. Paz’s campaign focused on economic stability, reducing political polarisation, combating corruption, and restoring investor confidence after years of tension between MAS supporters and opposition groups, appealing to voters across the political spectrum. The election marked a significant social and political shift in Bolivia, reflecting widespread public desire for consensus leadership and pragmatic governance following periods of protests, contested elections, and economic uncertainty under previous administrations.

What began as tactical responses to pressure increasingly took institutional form, as blocs such as BRICS+ and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) moved beyond political signalling to more structured cooperation.

US sanctions and rising non-Western alliances emerged as defining forces this year. 

US pressure

One of the year’s most visible sanctions flashpoints remained Venezuela. After limited relief in earlier years, the US reimposed tighter restrictions on Caracas’s oil sector as negotiations over political reforms stalled.

The measures complicated crude exports by targeting licensing, shipping and insurance channels, further constraining one of Venezuela’s few remaining sources of hard currency. Authorities in Caracas accused Washington of economic coercion, while Russia and China reiterated diplomatic support and criticised the use of unilateral sanctions.

Global South World tracked the standoff closely throughout the year, including an exclusive interview with Rollie Flynn, chief executive of the Arkin Group and a former CIA officer, who warned that the confrontation carried risks beyond counter-narcotics work.

With Western sanctions on Russia still in place and restrictions on Iran largely intact, 2025 underscored a wider reality: energy producers operating outside the US-led system increasingly faced fragmented trade rules, rerouted supply chains and parallel payment arrangements. 

For oil-importing developing economies, the impact was indirect but tangible, adding volatility to prices and procurement even when they were not direct targets.

BRICS+ rising

Against this backdrop, non-Western groupings sought to tighten coordination .

At the BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro in July, leaders of the expanded bloc reaffirmed cooperation on development finance, trade and global governance reform. 

While the group stopped short of unveiling a common currency or alternative payment system, the summit reinforced political alignment among members that now include major energy exporters in the Middle East and Africa — significantly expanding BRICS’ economic weight and diplomatic reach.

In response, US President Donald Trump warned that countries aligning with what he described as BRICS’ “anti-American policies” could face additional tariffs, a statement that underscored how sanctions and trade pressure have become increasingly intertwined.

SCO hardening

Momentum was more institutional at the SCO summit in Tianjin in late August. The organisation adopted a Development Strategy extending to 2035 and approved new permanent centres focused on security threats, transnational crime, information security and narcotics control.

Leaders also signed the Tianjin Declaration, which explicitly opposed unilateral sanctions and protectionism — language widely interpreted as a direct response to US and European coercive measures.

Taken together, the developments highlighted a paradox of US foreign policy under Trump. While sanctions and tariffs were intended to weaken rivals, analysts say they have instead nudged competitors — and even uneasy neighbours — toward closer cooperation.

“This is a strange time when unlikely bedfellows like India and China are now overtly comfortable with each other, which was not the scene until three or four months ago,” said Dr Pooja Bhatt, director of the Jindal School of International Affairs in India, in an interview with Global South World this year .

“This shows how the U.S.’s excessive use of force — through policy and diplomacy — can push even the most unlikely countries to come together,” she said.

All things considered, the Global South does not seem to move toward a complete realignment, but rather toward steady repositioning. 

US sanctions remained powerful, particularly for countries dependent on Western finance and technology. At the same time, forums such as BRICS+ and the SCO increasingly offered diplomatic backing, coordination platforms and limited institutional alternatives.

Argentine President Javier Milei released a Christmas message on Wednesday, December 24, reviewing his administration’s first year in office, highlighting the elimination of the fiscal deficit, a drop in inflation, the lifting of currency controls and recent electoral gains by La Libertad Avanza (LLA). In a video shared on Instagram, Milei said the consolidated deficit had been reduced from 15% of GDP to zero and claimed that inflation had been brought under control, lifting 12 million people out of poverty. He also praised Security Minister Patricia Bullrich for ending roadblocks, tightening crime policy and creating a Federal Directorate of Investigations. Milei celebrated the adoption of the Single Paper Ballot and LLA’s performance in the legislative elections, which made the party the largest minority in the Chamber of Deputies and secured 20 Senate seats. He closed the message by urging Argentines to “fasten your seatbelts,” signalling further reforms as Congress prepares to debate the 2026 Budget.

Government pushes for Senate approval of 2026 Budget

President Javier Milei’s La Libertad Avanza gained backing from four senators in the Convicción Federal caucus, boosting government confidence that the 2026 Budget bill will pass its first reading in the Senate. If approved, it would be the first budget sanctioned under Milei since he took office in December 2023. The main uncertainty centres on Article 30, which proposes repealing laws that earmark funding for education, science and technical schools. While the government expects broad support for the overall bill, several Peronist senators backing the budget have said they will not vote for that article. The Casa Rosada is seeking to secure more than 40 votes and avoid reopening debate after setbacks in the Chamber of Deputies, where lawmakers failed to repeal university funding and disability emergency laws.

Economy minister signals shift away from Wall Street debt

Economy Minister Luis Caputo said the government will try to avoid issuing new debt under New York law in January, as part of a strategy to reduce Argentina’s reliance on U.S. financial markets. Writing on X, Caputo said the aim is to make Wall Street only a marginal source of financing. His comments followed a recent US$1 billion bond auction that drew higher yields and weaker demand than expected. Caputo said Argentina’s market debt is equivalent to about 25% of GDP, with Wall Street exposure accounting for less than five points. He added that proposed labour reforms include a severance assistance fund that could help develop a domestic capital market of around US$4 billion per year.

San Juan launches Argentina’s first solar highway

The province of San Juan inaugurated Argentina’s first solar highway on the Avenida Circunvalación, integrating photovoltaic generation into road infrastructure. The project includes 36 solar systems mounted on metal monopoles that feed electricity into the grid during the day and power road lighting at night. Developed entirely with local labour and expertise, the initiative aims to optimise existing infrastructure without using additional land. Provincial authorities say the project reduces emissions, cuts long-term energy costs and positions San Juan as a national leader in renewable energy and sustainable urban development.

Report shows sharp rise in security incidents

A national report by private security firm Verisure recorded a 20% year-on-year increase in security incidents across Argentina, highlighting a fragmented and regionalised crime pattern. Tucumán topped the ranking with a 65% rise, followed by Córdoba at 50% and Mendoza at 40%. The Atlantic coast saw a 30% increase, while Buenos Aires Province registered a 15% rise overall, masking a sharp increase in violent robberies in the Greater Buenos Aires area over the past decade. Despite the rise in robberies and violent incidents, Argentina’s homicide rate stood at 3.8 per 100,000 inhabitants, the lowest in two decades. According to the report, 74% of Argentines now cite insecurity as their main concern, pointing to public safety as a key social and political challenge.

Mongolia Prime Minister Zandanshatar Gombojav has directed a government working group to accelerate the implementation of Mongolia’s National Anti-Corruption Program, first approved by parliament in May 2023. The directive was issued during a meeting held on December 9, 2025, at the State Palace. Chaired by First Deputy Chief of Cabinet Secretariat Munkh-Erdene Dembereltseren, the group includes state secretaries from all ministries. Discussions focused on progress in combating corruption, addressing root causes of graft, preventing conflicts of interest, and strengthening the justice system. The Prime Minister stressed leadership, transparency, and integrity across all levels of public service and announced that 2026 will be designated the “Year of Strengthening Discipline and Accountability in the Civil Service,” amid concerns over Mongolia’s declining ranking in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index.

Parliamentary inquiry intensifies scrutiny of Oyu Tolgoi mining project

A high-profile parliamentary inquiry into the Oyu Tolgoi mining project continued last week, led by MP O. Batnairamdal. More than 300 current and former officials and company representatives have been summoned to testify over three days. The hearings are examining Mongolia’s ownership of natural resources, benefit-sharing arrangements, and the possibility of renegotiating the investment agreement. Witnesses included former presidents, senior government officials, and Oyu Tolgoi executives, who addressed issues such as classified documents, loan interest negotiations, and governance decisions. Several testimonies and statements drew public attention, and the inquiry is expected to continue with further evidence review.

Mongolia and UN discuss SDGs and desertification conference

Prime Minister Zandanshatar met with UN Resident Coordinator Jaap van Hierden on December 10, 2025, to discuss accelerating the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals and preparations for hosting the 17th Conference of the Parties to the UN Convention to Combat Desertification in August 2026. The Prime Minister reaffirmed Mongolia’s commitment to cooperation with the UN and highlighted draft reforms aimed at increasing transparency in political and election financing under the UN Convention against Corruption. The UN reiterated its support for addressing Mongolia’s social and economic challenges, reducing inequality, creating jobs, and advancing energy and digital transitions.

Mongolia recovers smuggled dinosaur fossils from France

Mongolia has successfully repatriated 29 sets of dinosaur fossils that were illegally smuggled out of the country and seized by French authorities in 2013 and 2015. The official handover ceremony took place in Paris on December 11, 2025, following a confirmed investigation establishing the fossils’ origin in the Mongolian Gobi Desert. The collection includes remains of Tarbosaurus, Theropods, Ornithomimosaurs, and Hadrosaurs, dating back 65 to 70 million years. Officials said the return concludes nearly a decade of cooperation between Mongolian and French authorities.

Mongolia participates in IOM Council session in Geneva

The Mongolian delegation took part in the 116th Session of the International Organisation for Migration Council, held from December 8 to 10, 2025, in Geneva. Led by Permanent Representative Gerelmaa Davaasuren, the delegation engaged in discussions with representatives from 175 member states and other stakeholders on global migration challenges. Mongolia highlighted cooperation with IOM on safe, orderly, and humane migration, while IOM Director General Amy Pope thanked Mongolia for its continued support and announced plans to launch an IOM Country Office in the nation’s capital, Ulaanbaatar.

Former presidential spokesperson Harry Roque, now facing a potential Interpol red notice request, has claimed that the ICC has issued a war rant for Senator Ronald “Bato” Dela Rosa over his role in former president Rodrigo Duterte’s deadly drug war. Roque offered no source for his information.

“Sen. Bato, your warrant of arrest is out! Don’t let yourself be kidnapped!” Roque said in a Facebook post, urging the senator to insist on being brought before a Philippine court first. His warning also echoed the “kidnapping” narrative that supporters tried to frame Duterte’s arrest in.

The Department of Justice has yet to confirm the claim. Ombudsman Jesus Crispin Remulla disclosed in November that an ICC warrant already existed, though the document has never been made public. Since then, Dela Rosa has stopped attending Senate sessions.

Dela Rosa asked the Supreme Court to compel the Ombudsman to release the supposed warrant, but the high court rejected his petition. The Office of the Solicitor General maintains there is no official basis for fears of an ICC arrest.

Dela Rosa, Duterte’s former police chief, is considered one of the architects of Oplan Tokhang , the anti-drug campaign that killed at least 6,000 people according to government data. Human rights groups estimate the death toll at up to 30,000.

On Monday, Dela Rosa’s lawyer, Atty. Israelito Torreon, said the senator is simply waiting for official procedure before facing any ICC order — if it exists. He said neither Dela Rosa nor his legal team has seen an actual warrant.

“We should have clear-cut implementing rules,” Torreon said, adding that cooperation with the ICC must follow both the Rome Statute and Philippine law . He said he believes a warrant may already have been issued but cannot confirm it.

Torreon also defended Dela Rosa’s continued absence from the Senate, saying it stemmed from legitimate concerns for the senator’s safety. He warned that Dela Rosa could be picked up and taken to the ICC without legal safeguards, which he called unacceptable.

Despite criticism, Torreon said they welcome public scrutiny: “It means they are really keeping an eye on Sen. Bato.”

President Mahama, who secured his long-awaited second coming after previously serving from 2012 to 2017, in an exclusive days before the December 7 vote, told Global South World that Ghana’s economy was in crisis and needed urgent fiscal reforms, and if voted to power,  he planned a “total reset” to get a fresh start.

A year on after the vote, where the then former president secured a landslide 56.42% victory against Dr Bawumia’s 41.75%, is he delivering on his promise?

At its peak it employed more than 10,000 workers. Until its closure on November 28, around 1,600 remained.

The company blamed “mounting cost pressures” and fast-changing market conditions for the closure. Production had already halted on November 21 as managers and labour representatives negotiated severance terms. 

Canon pledged to meet all legal compensation obligations and offer additional payments, but the speed of the shutdown has amplified speculation that geopolitics, not just economics, played a role.

The announcement came during a sharp downturn in Sino-Japanese relations. Tensions escalated after Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi remarked on 7 November that armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait could pose a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan, potentially triggering Self-Defense Forces mobilisation. 

While Tokyo has avoided escalating the row publicly, Japanese companies in China appear to be quietly reassessing their exposure. Planned business exchanges have been abruptly cancelled. 

A delegation of senior executives from major firms — including Toyota and Sony — called off a scheduled November 25 trip to China, stalling what was expected to be an important round of commercial discussions. A 3,000-person friendship event was also scrapped.

Analysts in Chinese media say Japanese firms are pulling back at a notable pace. Commentators cite rising departures in Shandong and Shanghai and describe an emerging “exodus” of manufacturers seeking alternatives in Southeast Asia. 

Some argue this trend is influencing other foreign investors from the US, UK and Singapore, who are reportedly accelerating moves to places such as Indonesia, Vietnam, the Philippines and Bangladesh. Even Chinese suppliers, they note, are following clients abroad.

Others caution that widespread foreign withdrawals could strain China’s job market, particularly in sectors that have long been supported by international manufacturers. Canon’s closure alone has left more than a thousand workers seeking new employment in a region where factory work is no longer as plentiful as it once was.

The Chairperson of the African Union Commission, H.E. Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, has strongly condemned the 26 November military coup d’État in Guinea-Bissau as the country awaited the announcement of the November 25 election results. He reaffirmed the AU’s zero-tolerance stance on unconstitutional changes of government, citing key normative instruments including the Constitutive Act, the Lomé Declaration, the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, and the Ezulwini Framework. The Chairperson also acknowledged the Joint Statement issued on the same day by the heads of the AU, ECOWAS, and West African Elders Forum election observer missions.

Claims emerge that coup may have been staged

Political tensions deepened as Senegal’s Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko and Nigeria’s former President Goodluck Jonathan publicly suggested the ousting of President Embaló may have been fabricated . The military halted the release of election results, claiming it intervened to stop a destabilisation plot — allegations Sonko and Jonathan questioned, saying no evidence had been presented. Some civil society groups and opposition figures accused Embaló of staging a “simulated coup” to block the results in case of defeat, although the former president has not responded to the claims. Embaló, who was flown to Senegal after his release, has previously been accused of using political crises to suppress dissent.

ECOWAS suspends Guinea-Bissau after military takeover

West Africa’s ECOWAS bloc suspended Guinea-Bissau from all its decision-making bodies following an emergency virtual summit on 27 November. The Mediation and Security Council, chaired by Sierra Leone’s President Julius Maada Bio, condemned the military intervention as an “illegal abortion of the democratic process” and urged coup leaders to allow the national election commission to publish the disputed presidential results. Member states from Cabo Verde, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, Benin, and others participated in the session and rejected the army’s decision to halt the vote tally.

Deposed president transported to Senegal as tensions ease

Guinea-Bissau’s deposed leader Umaro Sissoco Embaló arrived in Senegal late on 27 November after negotiations led by ECOWAS secured his release. Senegal’s foreign ministry confirmed he landed “safe and sound” aboard a military aircraft. The coup unfolded hours before provisional results from presidential and parliamentary elections were due. The junta suspended the entire electoral process, banned demonstrations, and imposed a nighttime curfew, citing an alleged plot involving unnamed politicians and a “well-known drug baron” to destabilise the country.

Military installs transitional president and outlines one-year transition

The military high command has appointed Gen Horta N’Tam (also referenced as Horta Inta-A in local reporting), previously army chief of staff and a close ally of Embaló, as transitional president for a one-year period. In a televised address, Gen N’Tam said political actors’ failure to resolve worsening tensions prompted the armed forces to intervene. He later named former finance minister Ilidio Vieira Té as the new prime minister. Opposition candidate Fernando Dias, who also claimed victory in the vote, denounced the takeover as a “fabricated coup” intended to block the release of election results, urging citizens to demand transparency. Despite the turmoil, daily activities resumed gradually on Thursday in the capital, Bissau.

“Well, it's very interesting because the current US administration, President Trump, has talked openly about having a covert action plan to stem the flow of drugs to the United States,” Flynn said. 

She noted the unusual decision to speak publicly about such plans, given that “normally in the past, covert action means it's covert, and we don't talk about it.”

Flynn cautioned that the implications could extend well beyond counter-narcotics work. 

“If the US administration is thinking of this covert action as doing something beyond stemming the flow of drugs, but are also thinking of regime change, that's something that I think that you have to think long and hard about,” she said, adding that such efforts require “sufficient domestic support, including the military .”

She argued that analysts were wrong to treat US interference as unprecedented, pointing to both the Bay of Pigs fiasco and anti-drug operations in South America . 

“A lot of the commentators have said … nothing like this has ever happened. And yet there was a Peruvian shoot-down programme in Peru that ran in the nineties and through the early, very early two thousands,” she said.

On whether Nicolás Maduro’s government could be toppled, Flynn was sceptical. 

“It would take a lot. And simply because the military seems to support him,” she said. Foreign backers such as Iran and Russia were weakened, she noted, but “the bottom line is regime change is really hard,” requiring “a mass uprising supported by the military and the security services” to succeed.

Watch the full interview:

“I think the Maduro government is more viable than people think, even though, of course, the winner of the last election was not Maduro and the winner, Machado, has just been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize,” she said. 

Her remarks come as international pressure on Caracas continues. Flynn argued that assessments of Venezuela’s political future must focus on what keeps Maduro in place. 

“When you look at a government, you have to look at the institutions and the sources of support that Maduro does have,” she said. 

Chief among these, she noted, is the armed forces. “The military is a key. And as far as we can tell, the military still supports him,” Flynn added. 

She said Maduro has maintained that loyalty through careful patronage. “And he’s, you know, like all good dictators, is very careful to make sure the military gets paid regularly.”

For now, Flynn believes those dynamics make any sudden collapse unlikely. While the opposition and much of the international community insist political change is necessary, the pillars of state power appear to remain aligned behind Maduro — at least for the moment.

Watch the full interview:

The remark spread rapidly online and was met with widespread anger.

For many Sabahans, the comment reinforced perceptions that West Malaysian politicians view East Malaysians as unsophisticated and easily drawn in by handouts.

While travellers frequently carry Gardenia loaves home from Kuala Lumpur, viewing the brand as superior to local bread, many say the issue now goes far beyond food.

What began as a throwaway line about bread has become a symbol of calls for respect.

The episode has also sparked conversation about long-standing grievances on autonomy, resource control and federal oversight dating back to Sabah’s entry into Malaysia in 1963.

Sabah Barisan Nasional chief Bung Moktar Radin condemned the remark as insulting and divisive, calling on voters to reject parties that “cause inter-state racial disunity”. 

He described the episode as “deeply embarrassing” and “unforgivable”.

Mansor has apologised, but the backlash threatens to undermine Perikatan Nasional’s campaign. The coalition is contesting 42 of the state’s 73 seats, with six of these being contested by PAS.

This concludes our live coverage of Guinea-Bissau's 2025 general elections. With fierce competition between the candidates, counting is underway to determine the country's next president. Polling stations opened at 0700 GMT and are expected to close at 1700 GMT. Provisional results are expected within 48 hours. Follow Global South World for continued updates about Guinea-Bissau post-election.

18:15 GMT: Polling stations end voting processes, counting begins

After 10 hours of voting, Guinea-Bissau has officially closed its polls, and counting is currently underway.

16:32 GMT: Mozambique's Philip Nyusi and Nigeria's Goodluck Jonathan oversee elections

As part of a measure of transparency, the African Union sent its Chief of the Mission of Election Observers, Mozambique's former President, Filipe Nyusi, along with the former President of Nigeria, Goodluck Jonathan, to monitor the ongoing elections.

Filipe's inclusion, however, is being questioned due to the belief that he ruled as Mozambique's president through fraudulent electoral means.

12:40 GMT: “Bissau-Guineans want only solutions and not slogans”

Journalist Samba M. Baldé, explains in an interview with Global South World, that, despite the many campaign messages spread by the various candidates, the citizens need practical solutions to their problems.

11:51 GMT: Voting continues in Guinea-Bissau

10:34 GMT: Incumbent President Umaro Sissoco Embalo votes

President Umaro Sissoco Embalo cast his vote this morning at a polling station in Umaro Djabula in Gabu. The president is seeking to make history as the only president to be given a second term in 3 decades.

9:47 GMT: People queue to vote in Mansôa

Bissau-Guineans in Mansôa are taking turns in casting their votes. Fernando Dias is expected to vote in this town. Citizens, however, remain committed to their desire to have a different economic climate and hope the results reflect that.

What you need to know

Candidates

Embalo is competing against 11 other candidates, including Fernando Dias, a relatively new figure in politics.

Right at his heels is 47-year-old Fernando Dias , backed by a powerful figure from the disqualified opposition leader, Domingos Simões Pereira, of PAIGC. This party led the country to independence in 1973.

Other contenders on the ballot include José Mário Vaz, who served as president from 2014 to 2020 and became the first post-independence leader to finish a full term. Baciro Dja, 52, a former defence minister who briefly occupied the prime minister’s office twice under President Vaz, first in 2015 and again in 2016.

Also in the race is 48-year-old Joao Bernardo Vieira, the namesake and nephew of Guinea-Bissau’s longest-serving president, who held power for most of the years between 1980 and 1999 and returned to office from 2005 to 2009.

The polls are expected to open at 7:00 am GMT and close at 5:00 pm GMT.

What citizens expect

During a conversation with Global South World's Abigail Johnson Boakye, a Bissau-Guinean journalist, Samba M. Baldé, shared that despite the hype around the upcoming elections, electorates seem to be less engaged as they are tired of slogans or manifestos and want real solutions.

"Engagement exists, but it's uneven because voters react to something that has certain benefits than to only promises, because for voters, when candidates fail to translate to voters their proposals into real impact or how they can really impact society , public interest quickly drops. ...But people are, for example, no longer satisfied with slogans. They want clear plans and measurable results in Guinea-Bissau," Samba said.

However, 47-year-old Fernando Dias also seems to be in a comfortable lead.

After being disqualified from standing as a candidate, opposition leader Domingos Simões Pereira has thrown his weight and support behind the Party for Social Renewal (PRS), a party headed by political newcomer Fernando Dias.

Expectations of the citizenry

During a conversation with Abigail Johnson Boakye, a journalist with Global South World, Samba M. Baldé, a Bissau-Guinean journalist, shared that despite the hype surrounding the upcoming elections, electorates seem to be less engaged, as they are tired of slogans and manifestos and want real solutions.

"Engagement exists, but it's uneven because voters react to something that has certain benefits than to only promises because for voters, when candidates fail to translate their proposals into real impact or how they can really impact society, public interest quickly drops. ...But people are, for example, no longer satisfied with slogans. They want clear plans and measurable results in Guinea-Bissau," Samba said.

On November 23, 860,000 voters head to the polls to decide whether their country can finally break free from decades of political turbulence.

Who is Fernando Dias?

Although new to the political spotlight, Dias is not entirely new to public life. His journey reflects a careful mix of academic training, political apprenticeship and a recent surge in national prominence.

He is a trained lawyer, holding both a Bachelor's degree in Law and a postgraduate qualification in Criminal Law from the Bissau Faculty of Law.

Before emerging as a presidential contender, he had built a steady career within state institutions, serving as the first Vice-President of the National People’s Assembly during the 11th legislature.

His roots in party politics run deeper than his “newcomer” label suggests.

He once served as Secretary-General of the youth wing of the Party for Social Renewal (PRS), eventually becoming its interim leader following a leadership vacancy. In June 2024, he was elected as president of the PRS.

He promises security for the people and desires to ensure the military does not interfere in the West African country's politics again.

"Our mission is clear: free Guinea-Bissau from the shackles of dictatorship and return power to the people. With faith, unity and courage, we will win the polls and build a new time for our nation," he wrote on his Facebook wall.

Background

Guinea-Bissau’s presidential and legislative races come at a moment when institutions are strained, and trust is fragile.

Umaro Sissoco Embaló's bid is seen as controversial because he has strategically reshaped the political arena through sudden dismissals and the appointment of a new prime minister ahead of the vote.

Heavyweight Domingos Simões Pereira and the historic PAIGC party-led coalition, PAI-Terra Ranka, were barred from contesting after the Supreme Court ruled their paperwork incomplete in October. This marks the first time the PAIGC party will be absent on a ballot paper.

Coups d'états, dissolved parliaments, and stalled reforms have marked Guinea-Bissau’s history. Embaló dissolved the National Assembly in December 2023, claiming an attempted coup, and left the country with no operational parliament for nearly two years.

Although his tenure ended in February 2025, Embaló stayed in the seat of power.

At least two shows in Beijing, three in Shanghai and two in Guangzhou have been called off, according to organisers. A Guangzhou event featuring members of the Japanese group JO1 was cancelled on Monday, citing “force majeure.”

Shanghai also scrapped a three-day comedy festival involving a dozen Japanese performers two days before its scheduled opening. The reasons given matched those used for other cancellations.

Two Japanese film releases have been postponed. The comedy “Cells at Work!” will no longer debut on Saturday as planned, and “Crayon Shinchan the Movie: Super Hot! The Spicy Kasukabe Dancers” has been delayed from its early December release.

The disruptions come despite the strong following for Japanese animation, comics, films and drama among Chinese audiences. 

The cancellations began after Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi suggested Japan could deploy its military in the event of a Taiwan Strait conflict. Beijing condemned the remarks as “a blatant interference in China’s internal affairs.”

Diplomatic dialogue has also been affected. The annual Beijing-Tokyo Forum, set for this weekend in Beijing, has been postponed, with China saying Takaichi’s comments had “poisoned public opinion.”

Uncertainty has now spread among consumers, with some worried that more upcoming events and releases could be withdrawn. Fans say the climate has become tense, even as others argue cultural exchanges should remain separate from politics .

In his message, Tchiroma alleged that security forces loyal to what he called an “illegitimate regime” used lethal force against demonstrators who took to the streets after the vote. He said the victims were ordinary citizens defending their ballots. 

“They fell so that the truth may live. They were Cameroonians. They were our martyrs,” he said.

The opposition leader outlined a series of directives for the day of mourning, urging the complete suspension of commercial activity, government services, and public operations nationwide. 

According to him, the shutdown is meant to create a unified moment of reflection across the country.

Tchiroma also appealed to religious communities, requesting that Christians, Muslims, and people of other faiths gather in places of worship for collective prayer. 

A central part of Friday’s planned observance is a minute of silence scheduled for noon. Tchiroma called on Cameroonians living abroad to join the moment as well, saying the diaspora remains an integral part of the movement challenging the disputed election results.

“This will not be an ordinary day … It will be a day of silence, remembrance, reflection — and resistance,” he said, arguing that public participation would demonstrate continued opposition to the government.

During his address, Tchiroma announced the creation of a victims’ support fund intended to assist families of those killed or detained during the post-election crackdown. 

The call for a national observance comes days after Tchiroma issued a 48-hour ultimatum demanding the release of all detained protesters. Authorities freed a small number of minors during that period, but he dismissed the move as a “masquerade,” insisting that many more remain in custody and alleging that arrests are ongoing.

Tchiroma also delivered a forceful rejection of any attempt at political compromise. 

“I will not back down. I will not negotiate. I will never capitulate,” he declared, accusing the administration of President Paul Biya of violating its oath of office and “stealing” the election.

Tchiroma reiterated that he considers his claim to the presidency non-negotiable, saying his “mandate” would be defended “at any cost,” in the name of “justice, dignity, and the future of Cameroon.” 

The report triggered a wave of messages and speculation online — enough for the billionaire to break his usual silence.

“I have been getting many messages today, and I also saw the story that has been circulating. Let me put things to rest: I am not entering politics,” Ang said in a statement on Thursday.

Ang has an estimated net worth of $3.75 billion, making him the fourth richest man in the Philippines. He has built his war chest primarily through San Miguel Corp., the largest conglomerate in the country, which has made a mark in the brewery, infrastructure , and many other ventures.

Ang stressed that he prefers to remain focused on business and public service through private-sector initiatives. 

“Most people know me as someone who works quietly in business, building projects, fixing what I can, and supporting government and communities. That is where I believe I can contribute the most, and that is where I intend to stay,” he said.

Politiko had earlier reported that “the name of bilyonaryo Ramon Ang is reportedly being floated in business circles as a potential ‘consensus caretaker’ as the Marcos administration grapples with an escalating corruption scandal and deepening political fractures.” 

Citing unnamed “scoopers,” the site said some of the country’s wealthiest tycoons were entertaining a scenario where Ang could serve as a stabilizing force in the event of political paralysis.

The article also claimed that Manila’s elite were discussing the possibility of a military-backed “reset” to restore order and calm investor panic, instead of a traditional coup — an idea that has gained attention as corruption allegations and Cabinet exits have shaken the administration. 

Politiko pointed to a worsening economic backdrop marked by plunging investor sentiment, a battered peso, and one of the world’s poorest-performing stock markets.

The situation further deteriorated after Sen. Imee Marcos publicly accused her brother, the President, of long-time drug use, raising doubts about his ability to remain in office. The allegations helped fuel a large anti-corruption protest in Metro Manila this November.

Against this backdrop, Politiko reported that some tycoons now believe the crisis has reached a point where “normal politics can no longer fix” the country’s problems. 

Amid the swirl of rumors, Ang sought to redirect attention away from palace intrigue and toward national cooperation. 

He emphasized that his role will remain outside electoral politics.

“Our country is facing many challenges, and it is understandable that people want things resolved quickly. But moving forward will never depend on one individual. It will take government , private sector, and the public all moving in the same direction,” he said.

Two senior Philippine officials have resigned after being linked to a major corruption probe into missing infrastructure funds, escalating the crisis facing President Ferdinand Marcos Jr’s administration. Executive Secretary Lucas Bersamin and Budget Secretary Amenah Pangandaman stepped down as investigations widened into billions allegedly diverted from anti-flood projects. The scandal has triggered mass protests, with hundreds of thousands rallying in Manila. Politician Zaldy Co, now abroad, has accused Marcos of pushing for suspicious budget increases, though the claims remain unverified. Several officials have already been charged as inquiries continue into “ghost” public works and substandard or non-existent flood control projects.

Agri exports seen to gain from latest US tariff exemptions

Philippine agricultural exports are expected to gain a boost after the United States removed its 19 percent tariff on a range of products under an executive order issued on November 14. Coconut-based goods, tropical fruit juices, cocoa, bananas, oranges, spices and some semiconductor items are now exempt, covering an estimated $1 billion worth of Philippine agri-exports in 2024. The Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry said the move will strengthen export competitiveness, protect jobs and enhance economic stability, adding that a large share of shipments to the US is now free of reciprocal tariffs.

President Marcos declares $6.5 million in wealth

The declared wealth of President Ferdinand Marcos Jr and First Lady Liza Araneta-Marcos has risen steadily since he took office, according to their 2022–2024 SALNs obtained by local paper The STAR. Their net worth increased from P329.23 million upon assuming the presidency to P389.36 million by end-2024. The latest filing shows P247.33 million in real properties and P42.03 million in personal assets. The growth was driven by higher cash holdings, expanded money market investments, and new property acquisitions, including two houses in La Union worth a combined P86.5 million and several agricultural lots in Ilocos Norte. Jewellery, vehicles and paintings also increased in value. The couple declared zero liabilities throughout the three-year period. 

Philippines falls in climate policy, mitigation rankings

The Philippines has dropped from 7th to 19th in the latest Climate Change Performance Index , slipping from a high to a medium performer. It remains the only Southeast Asian country in the top 20, ranking above the EU, France, Germany and India. The fall is largely due to weak climate policy, slow progress on renewable energy, and the government’s failure to submit updated climate targets ahead of COP30 in Brazil. Civil society groups say the delay reflects political shortcomings, while experts warn Manila still lacks a net-zero pathway and a plan to phase out fossil fuels. The index notes continued reliance on liquefied natural gas despite signs of coal decline. Critics add that corruption and frequent disasters hinder more ambitious climate action.

President Marcos denies sister’s accusation of drug use fanning family feud

Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has rejected fresh accusations by his sister, Senator Imee Marcos, that he has a long-term cocaine habit. The claims emerged as the country faces mass protests over corruption. Speaking at a Manila rally, the senator alleged his supposed drug use dated back to their father’s rule and had fuelled poor governance, but provided no evidence. The presidential palace dismissed the remarks as unfounded and previously disproven, citing past negative drug tests. Imee also accused the president’s family of drug use, while the palace criticised her for overlooking similar controversies involving the Dutertes, who deny wrongdoing.

However, the most recent controversy does not concern small-time users or street-level peddlers. Instead, it erupted at the highest levels of government and within the Marcos family itself.

On Monday, Senator Imee Marcos publicly accused her brother, President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr., First Lady Liza Araneta Marcos, and their children of being drug addicts. 

“Ever since Bongbong and I were kids, the family already knew about him,” she said at a rally organized by the religious group Iglesia ni Cristo.

“I knew that he was using drugs,” she added, claiming the President’s alleged addiction worsened after marrying Liza, whom she also accused of drug use.

Imee further alleged that the First Family encouraged her own children and other relatives to take illegal drugs. 

She said she had kept her distance from the First Family since 2022 due to what she described as “blatant drinking and use of cocaine and other illegal drugs.”

Malacañang was quick to refute the allegations. 

Citing the President’s negative drug tests, Palace undersecretary Claire Castro said Imee was only “tarnishing” her brother’s name and questioned her motives.

Representative Sandro Marcos also rejected the claims as “not only false, but dangerously irresponsible,” accusing his aunt of spreading a “web of lies” for political gain.

The allegations follow earlier attempts by pro-Duterte groups to link Marcos to illegal drugs, including a fake viral video in July 2024 and Duterte’s own accusations in a January rally.

The protests capped a tumultuous day in Manila politics: two Cabinet secretaries resigned, replacements were named, and the President’s own sister accused him and the First Family of using illicit drugs.

How influential is the INC? And why is it entangling itself in Philippine politics ?

Strength in numbers?

INC is a nontrinitarian Christian denomination founded in Manila in 1914. 

Over the decades, it has expanded globally, establishing congregations in cities across the United States, Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.

While not the largest religious group in the predominantly Catholic Philippines, INC is widely considered one of the most politically influential.

A significant portion of its 2.8 million members vote as a bloc, typically backing candidates endorsed by church leadership, a coveted advantage for any political campaign.

Politicians have long courted INC’s “blessing.”

One of the most formidable and remarkable endorsements the group made was for Marcos and his former running mate, Vice President Sara Duterte, back in the consequential 2022 national elections.

The endorsement delivered. Marcos secured 31 million votes, twice that of his closest rival, while Duterte won an even larger tally of 32 million.

INC’s top minister now even holds a seat in the Marcos administration as special envoy for overseas Filipino concerns.

Why the break?

The deteriorating alliance between the Marcos and Duterte camps appears to be the most immediate trigger for INC’s rupture with the administration.

Relations soured after budget controversies hit Duterte’s office, prompting Marcos to remove her as Education Secretary. Tensions deepened when Duterte faced impeachment complaints, cases analysts say now increasingly expose Marcos himself, given the widening corruption scandal implicating the President and key aides.

INC had already shown signs of discontent. In January, thousands of members gathered for a “National Rally for Peace.”

But the latest protests took a sharper political turn after Sen. Imee Marcos, the President’s estranged sister, used the rally to level explosive drug-use allegations against him.

And while the demonstration has ended, Philippine politics remain unsettled.

The government has yet to prosecute anyone over the alleged diversion of flood-control funds . Two senior officials have resigned under the banner of delicadeza. And the administration has now virtually lost the support of one of the country’s most politically active religious blocs.

Here’s what you should know about Hasina:

Beginnings

Political career

Struggles and exile

Sentenced to death

The ruling marks a dramatic turn in Bangladesh’s politics. Hasina, a three-time prime minister and daughter of the country’s founding father, has been a central figure in Bangladesh for decades, credited with major economic and social reforms. 

The tribunal’s decision fulfills a promise by interim Prime Minister Muhammad Yunus to hold former leaders accountable for the “July Revolution,” which began peacefully but turned violent after government suppression.

Following a disputed October 29 presidential election, Tanzania’s parliament has confirmed Mwigulu Nchemba, a former finance minister and close ally of President Samia Suluhu Hassan, as the new prime minister. The appointment , backed by a near-unanimous parliamentary vote, comes amid unrest and allegations of electoral irregularities that have drawn criticism from opposition groups and human rights observers. President Hassan, who won by a landslide according to official results, has dismissed claims of vote-rigging. The government projects 6% economic growth in 2025, driven by large-scale infrastructure projects, despite reduced foreign aid and political tensions.

Tanzania’s Amsons Group challenges Dangote with Kenyan cement acquisition

Tanzania’s Amsons Group has made a bold entry into Kenya’s cement market after acquiring a 29.2%  stake in East Africa Portland Cement (EAPC). The $5.6 million deal, executed through its subsidiary Kalahari Cement, involved purchasing 26.3 million shares from Associated International Cement Limited (AIC) and Cementia Holding AG. The acquisition, finalised in late July, strengthens Amsons’ position as one of the largest shareholders in the Nairobi-listed EAPC. Managing Director Edha Nahdi described the move as a strategic investment to reshape Kenya’s cement landscape through enhanced production capabilities and innovation, adding that it aligns with the company’s goal of building long-term regional value.

UN calls for probe into post-election killings in Tanzania

UN Human Rights Chief Volker Türk has urged Tanzanian authorities to investigate reports of hundreds of killings, detentions, and disappearances following the October 29 elections. The UN Human Rights Office cited credible information suggesting security forces removed bodies from streets and hospitals to undisclosed locations in what may be an attempt to conceal evidence. Türk called on the government to disclose the whereabouts of missing persons and return bodies to families for burial. He also demanded the release of opposition figures, including Chadema leader Tundu Lissu, and condemned the arbitrary detention of more than 150 people, some reportedly charged with treason.

Tanzania’s inflation hits two-year high amid unrest

Tanzania’s annual inflation rate rose to 3.5% in October 2025, the highest since June 2023, according to the National Bureau of Statistics. The rise , driven mainly by higher food and beverage prices, reflects growing economic instability following post-election unrest. Year-on-year food inflation reached 7.4%, while modest monthly price declines were observed in essentials such as poultry, bread, beans, and fuel. Despite the uptick, analysts note that the overall inflation rate remains manageable but could worsen if political instability continues to disrupt supply chains and investor confidence.

Rwanda and Tanzania advance cross-border payment integration

Rwanda and Tanzania have begun technical discussions to link their national retail payment systems — Tanzania’s Instant Payment System (TIPS) and Rwanda’s National Payment Switch (RSWITCH). The initiative, discussed during a high-level meeting in Kigali, aims to enable instant, low-cost money transfers between bank accounts and mobile wallets across the two nations. Once implemented, the system will simplify cross-border transactions for citizens and businesses, supporting trade and financial innovation in the East African region.

What to know:

Why it matters:

What they said:

He confirmed the measure would take immediate effect but stressed that single-entry visas would not be affected. 

"What I'm saying today is about a multiple-entry visa. That means a single-entry visa remains possible. There's stronger scrutiny, but I'm not going to speculate about any future actions," he added.

The move marks a tightening of EU travel restrictions on Russian citizens amid continuing tensions over the war in Ukraine . 

On Thursday, the Commission said it could not prevent Russians from obtaining single-entry visas, as decisions on those applications rest with individual member states.

Multiple-entry Schengen visas allow holders to travel freely between countries in the Schengen zone, while single-entry visas limit travellers to one entry.

Moscow had not issued an official response at the time of publication.

“China is committed to peaceful development, follows a policy of 'no first use' of nuclear weapons and a nuclear strategy that focuses on self-defence, and adheres to its nuclear testing moratorium,” Mao said.

Trump had claimed China, Russia , North Korea and Pakistan were all secretly testing nuclear weapons underground. 

He used this claim to preface the resumption of the US’ own tests — the first conducted in more than 30 years. 

“It's hoped that the US will earnestly abide by its obligations under the Treaty and its commitment to a moratorium on nuclear testing, and take concrete actions to uphold the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, as well as global strategic balance and stability,” Mao said.

Beijing’s defence spokesman, Zhang Xiaogang, had issued a sharp warning to the Philippines over the South China Sea dispute, accusing Manila of “blackmailing the big by the small.”

“Would you offer to talk to somebody who slammed your country that way? Of course not,” Teodoro told reporters, as shown by state-run media PTV. “I would be willing to talk if there was a semblance of good faith.” 

Teodoro described Zhang’s remarks as a “slap to the face.”

The two countries have long been at odds over sections of the South China Sea that China claims under its “nine-dash line” but which international law recognises as within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone. 

Despite a 2016 arbitral tribunal ruling in Manila’s favour, Beijing continues to reject the decision, and the contested waters remain flashpoints between their coast guards.

Zhang accused the Philippines of provoking China and “making waves at sea by soliciting external support,” but insisted Beijing would continue to defend its maritime rights through “legitimate, legal, professional and prudent actions.”

"For a period of time, the Philippine side has launched frequent infringements and provocations against China, stirring up troubles at sea," he said, further accusing Manila of trying to "make waves at sea by soliciting external support, blackmailing and pressuring China through bluffing acts that resemble the fox borrowing the tiger's terror."

"We would never allow any provocations and trouble-making to work, nor would we leave any room for blackmailing the big by the small," he continued.

Chinese President Xi Jinping did not attend the ASEAN Summit, though he and Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. later met briefly at the APEC Summit in South Korea. 

There, Marcos — who is preparing to host the ASEAN Summit next year — congratulated Xi on receiving the torch to host the next APEC Summit.

Yet, behind these displays of its military muscle, Xi Jinping’s China is waging an equally strategic campaign to dominate through something far less tangible —and also far more innocuous —soft power.

From the viral success of the Labubu blind box dolls to the global reach of video-sharing app TikTok, Chinese-originated cultural exports are reshaping global tastes and narratives, bolstering Beijing’s status as the world’s No. 2 soft power nation, second only to the US.

And while these seemingly harmless tools of power contrast sharply with China’s tormentor image in Asia, in reality, the two work hand in hand, according to Dylan Loh, an associate professor at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore who specialises in Chinese foreign policy.

“China's attempt to cultivate or build an image of a peace-loving, open country sometimes rubs up against the fact that it pursues more assertive actions on the ground,” Loh told Global South World.

“But I stress again that the fact that using soft power doesn't mean that countries give up more blunt tools of foreign policy,” he added. “Using soft power does not preclude using coercive measures.”

Among China’s most successful recent cultural exports are the Labubu dolls, a pop culture phenomenon that sent sales of their creator, Pop Mart, soaring by over 100% in 2024, thanks in part to their growing popularity in Western markets.

Their rise has been fuelled by TikTok, the video app built by Beijing-based ByteDance and now used by more than one billion people, including almost half the population of the United States.

TikTok’s rise is peculiar as the app is banned in China, a country known for blocking popular social media platforms like Facebook, Instagram and X. 

As well, this app’s global dominance has demonstrated how lines between soft power and geopolitics intersect. Recently, the US and China reportedly reached an agreement to transfer TikTok’s U.S. operations to American investors, ending years of speculation that the platform could be used by Beijing to spread propaganda through its algorithm.

The agreement even became one of the most-discussed outcomes of Presidents Xi Jinping and Donald Trump’s meeting at the APEC summit in South Korea in October.

For Loh, the Labubu craze represented a more organic way of harnessing soft power for China — one detached from the ruling Communist Party’s influence, and therefore less prone to Western suspicion. 

“Labubus have underlined the potential of private industry, of society , of apolitical elements of soft power and how it can go global pretty quickly with very little intervention from the state,” he said. 

“In many ways, these are the most authentic kinds of soft power because you see the absence largely of the state,” he added. “It's done almost on a purely commercial basis. People do not think that it is threatening or suspicious.”

With or without Xi’s direction, China is rapidly emerging as a formidable challenger to the Western-dominated cultural landscape. Whether this ascent — like the Labubu dolls and TikTok themselves — will prove a passing fad or a lasting trend remains to be seen.

“It shows that Chinese-created cultural products can have global aesthetic appeal,” Loh said. “It shows that cultural products from the West do not have a complete monopoly or dominance over media , cultural entertainment, or sporting domains.” 

“Whether or not this represents a longer-term shift into the acceptance of Chinese products or Chinese cultural products, we will have to wait and see for a bit longer. 

“It was very certain that Biya was going to clinch another victory,” said Amindeh Blaise Atabong, a Yaounde-based journalist who covers politics and society. “He has the apparatus.”

At 92, Biya is one of Africa’s longest-serving leaders and the world’s oldest head of state. Over 42 years in power, he has built a vast political machinery that critics say extends well beyond the bounds of legality — and deep into the electoral process itself.

Atabong said many Cameroonians have lost faith in the ballot box entirely. The International Foundation for Electoral Systems has described the country as an “electoral autocracy,” one that holds regular votes but fails to meet basic democratic standards.

Protests erupted even before the official proclamation of results, triggering violent clashes in Douala, Cameroon’s commercial capital, that left at least four people dead. 

There were even reports from opposition candidate Issa Tchiroma Bakary, who finished second with 35.2% of the vote, of civilians outside his home being shot at hours before the announcement.

“It was very, very tense, and it has only gotten worse since then, especially after the proclamation of the results,” Atabong told Global South World. 

Biya has acknowledged the post-election violence in a brief statement released online shortly after being declared the winner, in what was his first and only public comment since re-election.

As protests swell across the country, uncertainty now hangs over Biya’s new seven-year term — including whether he will even be able to see it through, which would leave him in office until just shy of his 100th birthday.

“It's possible,” Atabong said when asked if Biya could step down before the term ends. “We've seen that in other places in Africa, with the most recent example being Madagascar, where the president had to flee because of popular protests.”

“So, everything is possible. We can’t rule that out.”

Change or nothing

Biya is set to be inaugurated on November 6 in Cameroon’s capital, Yaoundé. 

Atabong said the president returns to power over a country increasingly weary of the same leadership, with frustration especially high among the youth, a generation that feels locked out of opportunity and excluded from decision-making.

“The youth are really frustrated. Most of them are trying to leave the country. They are fed up with the system, which is mostly owned by octogenarians,” he said. 

Now entering his eighth term, Biya faces a Cameroon under growing strain, from global shocks such as the wars in Ukraine and Gaza to domestic challenges including the long-running Boko Haram insurgency and deep linguistic divisions between the country’s English- and French-speaking regions.

With a 92-year-old president who frequently disappears from public view, questions are mounting over whether Biya remains fit to govern.

“Economically, the country is shrinking, there is bad governance , there is corruption, there is high level of unemployment, the cost of living is high, and we have not really capitalised on the transformation of most of our local resources,” Atabong said. 

“All of that put together, it's a cocktail that can easily degenerate.”

Ruling for more than four decades has left Cameroon deeply dependent on Biya’s grip. Still, Atabong said many citizens are bracing for the inevitable instability that will follow his eventual exit, whenever that comes.

“There is no indication that he is ready to step down because after he modified the constitution in 2008, striking off the term limit, he is still free constitutionally to go in for another mandate after this current one, which he just won,” he said.

“People just want change, even if it means moving from bad to worse.”

What now?

For now, as Biya remains out of public view, opposition figures continue to contest the results of the October 12 election.

Tchiroma had called for a three-day national lockdown, urging Cameroonians to “let the entire country come to a standstill,” to show the world that “we are resisting and that we will not yield” and to remind the Biya government that “the strength of an economy is its people.”

However, following violent clashes outside his Garoua home, Tchiroma was reportedly forced to flee with the help of “loyalist army” members, a move that, if confirmed, could signal growing cracks within Biya’s own ranks.

“The way going forward, I think it will depend on a couple of factors. First of all, it depends on within the rank of the security forces,” Atabong said. “If that doesn't happen, then I think not long from now, the riots will grow. So, it all depends on the days ahead, how it's going to play out.”

Atabong also noted the muted reaction abroad. The African Union even congratulated the longtime Cameroonian president in a statement that also expressed concern over the post-election unrest in the country.

“Since Cameroon, and largely Africa, has been a diplomatic battlefield, most of the foreign powers are very cautious on how they go about relations with the incoming government,” he said.

“Big countries like the US, maybe Russia, maybe China, they will more or less end up at lip service and be more cautious about how they comment on the developments in Cameroon because they have their interest in the country,” he added. “For now, the international community is failing Cameroon.”

With just days to go before Biya’s November 6 inauguration, unrest continues to define the political climate. What unfolds in the coming days could determine not only the next seven years of Biya’s rule, but also whether Cameroon’s fragile calm can hold at all.

After years of gradual decline in Africa in general, the same is now occurring in South Africa, specifically -- Western-style democracy seems to be losing its lure. The number of citizens supporting military rule has surpassed those opposing it.

Democracy: losing its allure in South Africa?

South Africans were asked the question: Is democracy the best form of government? Their response was surprising – at least to the West. Less than 50 percent said they preferred democracy to any other form. The results of the survey illustrate a growing dissatisfaction with democracy as the preferred form of government across the African continent.

The proportion of citizens supporting military rule in the country has surpassed those opposing it. For the first time in more than two decades – more support the military (rather than elected civilians) in assuming leadership of the country. 

Most South Africans, the report reveals, are dissatisfied with democracy as a form of political system. “…seven in 10 South Africans are dissatisfied with the way democracy functions in the country.”

The negative responses toward democracy are high among the middle-aged population, but even more so among the unemployed and economically disadvantaged. The common consensus within these groups was their perception that the politicians were ignoring their concerns.

Among the issues noted of concern to the respondents listed unemployment as the most serious – followed by crime, security, water, infrastructure, and corruption. The sense from the findings indicates that these seemingly intractable issues leave the population, generally, in a state of frustration. 

Not surprisingly, the report reflects concerns with the new South African administration. While 40 percent of the population believes the Government of National Unity (GNU) is effective, another 40 percent disagrees, feeling it is less than effective in solving the country’s most pressing problems.

Political analyst Stephen Friedman  described the trend as part of a broader global phenomenon. “Around the world, there is a great deal of dissatisfaction with democracy,” he explained. “It’s not that people have stopped believing in democratic values; it’s that the kind of democracy they experience no longer meets their needs.”

Friedman noted that many South Africans feel disconnected from political decision-making, with power concentrated in the hands of a few elites. “The problem with the model of democracy that has been sold to us for the past 30 years is that citizens have very little control over anything,” he said.

The growing openness to military rule -- a system once unthinkable in South Africa’s democratic landscape -- should serve as a wake-up call for leaders, and Western politicians in particular. It reflects not only a loss of confidence in political institutions but also a deep yearning for stability and effective governance.

Friedman added that voter apathy is another sign of alienation. “It’s no surprise that many South Africans are choosing not to vote,” he said. “When citizens feel their voices don’t matter, disengagement becomes inevitable.”

Democracy’s decline in Africa in general

Yet, this is neither a new phenomenon nor one limited to South Africa. According to the latest edition of the Afrobarometer report (2024), titled “African Insights: Democracy at risk – People’s perspective,” more than half of Africans (53% across 39 countries) are willing to accept a military takeover if elected leaders abuse power for their own ends.

“On average across 39 countries, support for democracy remains robust: Two-thirds (66%) of Africans say they prefer democracy to any other system of government, and large majorities reject one-man rule (80%), one-party rule (78%), and military rule (66%),” the report stated.

It noted that, “across 30 countries surveyed consistently over the past decade, support for democracy has declined by 7 percentage points, including by 29 points in South Africa and 23 points in Mali. Opposition to military rule has weakened by 11 points.

Political analyst Siyabonga Ntombela concurred with the 2024 report’s findings. The trend is not unique to South Africa. “This is happening continentally. There are a number of countries that are following Ibrahim Traore of Burkina Faso’s style of leadership. These countries appear to benefit more under the military rule than they have under years of democracy,” he said.

Ntombela explained that local politics also plays a role in this shift. “The majority of ANC faction parties (EFF and MKP) are predicated on military ideals,” he added. “They venerate leaders such as Thomas Sankara, Che Guevara, Fidel Castro and others. The material conditions have remained unchanged for the poor. Therefore, such an alternative rule promises hope for the downtrodden of the country.”

And this trend is also found among Africa’s youth . Younger Africans are more accepting of military rule, according to the Afrobarometer survey. Fifty-six percent accept a military takeover when civilian leaders abuse power. Sixty percent of youth are dissatisfied with the functionality of democracy in their respective countries. And forty percent believe their elected leaders are corrupt.

Ntombela warns that a rise in support for military-style rule could come with grave consequences. “With military rule, violence is inevitable. People like Frantz Fanon claim that violence is a necessary condition to decolonise and usher in true freedom,” he said

Across Africa, democracy is being tested – by rising authoritarianism and military coups as well as a growing disconnect between citizens and the institutions meant to represent them.

The latest flagship assessments noted above deliver a powerful warning. Over 60 percent of Africans are dissatisfied with how democracy works in their countries. Support for democracy, generally, remains not insubstantial, but belief in its effectiveness is fading, especially when citizens feel excluded from meaningful participation in decisions that affect them.

To state it succinctly: the crisis of participation results from people being absent from the room when decisions that affect them are made, and often that room is in London, Paris or Washington D.C.

The opinions and thoughts expressed in this article reflect only the author's views.

Dr. Wolf is director of The Fulcrum Institute, a new organisation of current and former scholars, which engages in research and commentary, focusing on political and cultural issues on both sides of the Atlantic. Our interest is in American foreign policy as it relates to the economic and foreign policies of the NATO countries, the SCO, the BRICS+ nation-states and the Middle East.

After service in the USAF (Lt.Col.-Intel) Dr. Wolf obtained a PhD-philosophy (University of Wales), MA-philosophy (University of S. Africa), MTh-philosophical theology (Texas Christian University-Brite Div.). He taught philosophy, humanities and theology in the US and S. Africa before retiring from university.

Takaichi’s decision to nominate Trump was revealed by White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt.

During Trump’s visit to Japan, it was clear that, at least in front of the cameras, he and Takaichi met eye to eye on a lot of things. Parallels have been drawn between the two as conservative firebrands and formidable right-wing politicians.

Takaichi herself heaped high praises on Trump, commending his efforts to broker peace in Japan’s Asian neighbours, Thailand and Cambodia, and in Gaza, where a fragile ceasefire was effectively broken when Israel launched another deadly strike on the Strip while Trump was in Tokyo.

"In such a short period of time the world started to enjoy more peace," Takaichi said on Tuesday "I myself was so impressed and inspired by you, Mr. President.”

Since returning to the White House, Trump has been relentless in his talk of winning the Nobel, claiming to have ended eight wars — including the “unendable” one in Gaza — an achievement he believes could also bring him to heaven.

According to the White House, seven countries had nominated Trump before Japan: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Gabon, Israel, Pakistan and Rwanda.

The irony in Takaichi’s endorsement is not lost, given that during the Second World War , the United States and Japan were among the fiercest of adversaries — their clashes epitomised by the attack on Pearl Harbor and the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Now, under Takaichi, Japan appears to be charting a different course. The country’s first female prime minister has vowed to usher in a “new golden age” in relations with Washington, even as tensions rise in the region amid Chinese provocations.

That goal may not be far-fetched. Trump has already had high praise for Takaichi despite her being only a week into the job, touting her potential to be “one of the greatest prime ministers.”