In Nigeria, fuel prices have climbed by about 65%, one of the sharpest increases among major African economies, despite the start-up of the Dangote refinery. The surge has raised transport fares, driven up food prices and squeezed businesses that rely on petrol and diesel generators because of unstable electricity supply.

The Nigerian government has not restored fuel subsidies, choosing instead to stick with market reforms and limited relief measures. That means businesses and households could face more strain if oil prices remain elevated and the regional conflict drags on.

"Ghana strongly condemns this attack and has further demanded that those responsible be identified and held accountable, as the attack constitutes a grave violation of international law, amounts to war crime and affronts the protections afforded to United Nations peacekeeping personnel," Ablakwa wrote.

Further arguing that the strike was a “grave violation of international law,” amounts to a “war crime,” and violates protections afforded to UN peacekeepers.

The government also urged the UN to take “all necessary measures” to ensure the safety and security of Ghana’s contingent in Lebanon and other UNIFIL personnel, noting that peacekeepers operate “at great personal risk” in the service of international peace and security.

Ablakwa said Ghana would pursue justice for the injured soldiers and reaffirmed the country’s commitment to UN peacekeeping operations, adding that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will continue monitoring developments and engaging UN authorities on the matter.

A third soldier was “traumatised”, according to the statement. The Ghana Armed Forces said the battalion’s Officers’ Mess was also hit and “burnt down completely”.

The injured soldiers are being treated at a Level One Medical Bunker and were reported to be stable, with arrangements underway to evacuate them to the UNIFIL Headquarters Referral Hospital, the statement said.

The Ghana Armed Forces urged the public to remain calm, adding that troops are currently safe in underground bunkers amid what it described as a fragile security situation.

It said the Government of Ghana, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has protested the incident at the United Nations headquarters in New York , and called on parties to the conflict to uphold their responsibilities to protect peacekeepers deployed in the area.

Why the Strait of Hormuz is the big pressure point

Oil prices have climbed sharply as tankers and insurers reassess the risks of moving through the Strait of Hormuz , the narrow waterway linking the Gulf to global markets. Roughly a fifth of global oil supply depends on the route, making any sustained disruption a global price shock.

Shipping has also taken a major hit. Danish container giant Maersk has suspended services on routes affected by the security situation, one sign that supply-chain disruption is spreading beyond the energy market.

Silent evacuations

Commercial aviation has also been hammered by airspace closures and security restrictions. 

Governments are also evacuating people out of harm’s way. The Financial Times reported that Dubai International has been operating at a fraction of normal capacity under military-controlled corridors, while Emirates said it aims to restore its Dubai routes within days as air travel begins to recover. The US State Department has been offering assistance, including charter flights and ground transport, and US officials say tens of thousands of Americans have left the region as commercial travel remains patchy.

"It is being done quietly, but seamlessly," Trump said in a social media post. "Several flights have safely returned hundreds of Americans to the United States with additional flights scheduled to take place over the coming days, as security conditions allow," Assistant Secretary of State for Global Public Affairs Dylan Johnson said

Germany has also been adjusting its posture in the region as Berlin previously moved some troops out of Erbil in northern Iraq, citing the rising tensions.

A new ripple effect in other sectors

The economic fallout is being felt far from the Gulf. In Sri Lanka, tea exporters have warned that the Middle East conflict is disrupting shipments and payment channels, putting pressure on one of the country’s key export earners and an already-fragile recovery. At this rate, could lose at least $10 to $15 million a week in the tea industry.

Sri Lanka has also been pulled into the conflict’s maritime shadow after reports that the Iranian frigate IRIS Dena sank following a US submarine strike off the island’s southern coast, an incident that has heightened regional anxiety along Indian Ocean shipping lanes.

What next?

With oil and shipping costs rising, the next signals investors and governments are watching include whether Gulf export routes stay disrupted, whether major carriers restore normal schedules, and whether diplomatic efforts, including via intermediaries, can slow the fight before energy and trade shocks worsen.

Iran has launched missile and drone attacks across parts of the Gulf, while Israel has continued strikes in Iran and intensified operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon, according to the Associated Press.

“Another area where progress has been made is South Africa’s ambition to return to the Formula One calendar. We have now secured the necessary government guarantee, which represents a major milestone,” McKenzie said .

He added that discussions are focused on “aligning the commercial and promotional aspects required to host a race,” and thanked private companies backing the push.

“I would like to thank the companies that have stepped forward to support this vision, especially Betway, Discovery, MTN, Canal Plus and SuperSport. Their willingness to invest in Formula One in South Africa shows that the private sector believes in South Africa’s ability to host world-class events,” he said.

McKenzie suggested Middle East instability could create an opening for new hosts, saying there have been questions about what would happen to races in Bahrain, Abu Dhabi and Qatar.

Red Bull has also requested a meeting to support South Africa’s bid, a sign of growing momentum behind the campaign to return F1 to South African soil.

In the same briefing, McKenzie also addressed calls for African countries to boycott the 2026 FIFA World Cup in the United States , saying South Africa does not support a boycott and that football “should not become a casualty of geopolitics.”

In South Africa, markets have already shifted as traders are now pricing no chance of a rate cut at the central bank’s March 26 meeting, after a cut was still being seen as possible just days earlier.

“Until the outlook in the Iran war becomes clearer, significant policy rate decisions by African central banks may be deferred,” said Hasnain Malik, a strategist at research firm Tellimer. He said countries such as Egypt, Kenya and Morocco could be more exposed to disruption than commodity producers like Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa.

Oil has jumped as traders worry about supply and shipping risks linked to Iran and the Strait of Hormuz, a key route for global energy flows. Higher fuel costs could quickly feed into transport and food prices across the continent.

African markets have also been unsettled by investors pulling money from riskier assets and moving into the US dollar, weakening local currencies . “Borrowing and raising capital just got harder,” said Charlie Robertson, author of The Time Travelling Economist. Chatham House’s Tighisti Amare warned African economies “simply do not have the buffers for another prolonged global shock.”

Ramaphosa said South Africa stood ready to support international efforts to resolve global crises. “We are a global citizen and we therefore can play whatever role the UN would like us to play,” he said. “And if a gap opens or if we are asked, we always live up to obligations.”

Asked whether he would engage Trump, Ramaphosa said the US president was currently preoccupied by the conflict. “Donald Trump is very busy right now. He’s got a war on his hands, and obviously, if the opportunity were to open, we would talk and say there must be a ceasefire,” he said.

Ramaphosa also said the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (Dirco) was working to identify South Africans stranded in the Middle East as airspace closures disrupt travel.

“Dirco is on the ground, working a lot in trying to identify the number of people who are in the Middle East who require help, and we are going to make an effort to bring them back home,” he said. “It will definitely require periods when the airspaces are open for safe travel.”

His remarks come as tensions around the Strait of Hormuz continue to rise, with Iran’s Revolutionary Guards saying Iranian forces had “complete control” of the key shipping route for global oil and gas supplies. Trump said the US Navy was ready to escort oil tankers through the corridor, as several global shipping firms reroute cargo around the Cape of Good Hope to avoid risk.

Business Day reported that brent crude, the global benchmark, rose about 10% to above $82 a barrel after attacks on vessels near the Strait of Hormuz, a narrow shipping lane that carries a huge share of global energy trade.

Why the Strait of Hormuz matters to Africa

The Strait of Hormuz is one of the world’s most important oil chokepoints. The US Energy Information Administration estimates that oil flows through the strait averaged about 20 million barrels a day in 2024, roughly 20% of global petroleum liquids consumption. It also handles around one-fifth of global LNG trade, much of it from Qatar.

That is why any sustained disruption can ripple quickly into pump prices far from the Gulf, including across Africa, where many economies rely on imported refined fuel.

Short-term upside for African crude producers

Higher crude prices can offer temporary fiscal breathing room for African producers such as Nigeria, Angola and Equatorial Guinea, many of which are managing tight budgets and heavy debt loads. A longer disruption to shipping could push prices into triple digits; JPMorgan analysts have warned that a severe Hormuz shock could send oil sharply higher, with some scenarios well above $100 a barrel.

For exporters, that can translate into stronger dollar inflows, improved reserves and higher government revenue, at least on paper.

Why higher oil prices can still hurt African consumers

Clementine Wallop, an analyst at Horizon Engage, warned that higher crude prices feed straight into household costs: “Higher crude prices mean higher fuel prices, and several of these countries have worked or are working hard to stop subsidy programs.”

Countries such as Nigeria and Angola have scrapped or scaled back fuel subsidies, exposing consumers more directly to global price swings. Where local refining capacity is limited, tighter supplies of imported petrol and diesel can quickly raise pump prices, pushing up transport and food costs.

Natural gas shock adds another layer

Energy markets beyond oil are also reacting as gas prices spiked nearly 50% after QatarEnergy halted production following reported strikes on its facilities. For African countries that import LNG  or rely on global gas benchmarks for power and industrial costs, the gas surge could add to inflation pressures.

Meanwhile, the African Union Commission has cautioned that further escalation could have “serious implications for energy markets, food security, and economic resilience, particularly in Africa,” urging restraint and diplomacy.

“These developments pose a serious threat to regional and international peace and security, with far-reaching humanitarian, diplomatic and economic consequences,” the statement read in part.

Ramaphosa urged “all parties to exercise maximum restraint” and to act in line with international law, international humanitarian law and the UN Charter. The statement also stressed that UN Charter provisions on self-defence apply when a state has been subjected to an armed invasion, adding that “anticipatory self-defence is not permitted under international law.”

The warning comes as the US-Israel operation triggered Iranian retaliation, with missile and drone attacks reported against targets linked to the US and Israel across parts of the Middle East, raising fears of a wider regional war.

The fighting has also disrupted air travel, with multiple countries closing or restricting their airspace and major hubs suspending flights, stranding travellers and forcing airlines to reroute services .

The South African government said the decision followed what it described as a “series of unacceptable violations of diplomatic norms and practice.”

Among the main concerns were claims that official Israeli social media platforms had been used to launch insulting attacks against President Cyril Ramaphosa. DIRCO said such actions represented a gross abuse of diplomatic privilege and undermined trust between the two countries.

The department also accused Israel of failing to inform South Africa about visits by senior Israeli officials, which it said violated established diplomatic protocol.

Breach of the Vienna Convention

South Africa argued that these actions amounted to a “fundamental breach” of the Vienna Convention, the international framework that governs diplomatic conduct and relations between states. “They have systematically undermined the trust and protocols essential for bilateral relations,” DIRCO said.

The government stressed that South Africa’s sovereignty and the dignity of its institutions are “inviolable.”

South Africa urged the Israeli government to ensure that future diplomatic engagement respects the Republic’s laws and international principles.

Israel has not yet publicly responded to the decision.

The policy would impose a heavy tax on imports from nations with active trade ties to Iran, although the US government has not formally published the full details and legal framework of the measure.

Zimbabwe has signed 12 memoranda of understanding (MoUs) with Iran covering key sectors such as agriculture, mining , pharmaceuticals, and tourism, and officials had hoped to boost bilateral trade substantially, from around US$30 million to US$500 million, through joint ventures and investment partnerships.

“The 25% tariff essentially acts as a massive transaction tax on any country maintaining these ties,” a Zimbabwean trade expert told the Zimbabwe Independent, warning that deals signed in late 2023 are now at risk.

For Zimbabwean companies, the tariff poses a new and difficult economic choice as to whether to continue pursuing trade goals with Iran and face higher costs imposed by the United States, or scale back ties to avoid potentially losing competitiveness in the US and global markets.

Under the new rules, any country trading with Tehran could see its goods face higher duties when entering the US market, even where those countries have limited or regional trade volumes with Iran.

Why did Somalia expel the UAE?

According to Somali officials , the UAE had been using military bases in Bosaso and Berbera, strategically important coastal cities as logistics hubs to support military operations in Sudan’s ongoing conflict. In addition, Mogadishu accuses Abu Dhabi of backing Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, the semi-autonomous northern region seeking independence from Somalia.

“Unfortunately, the UAE failed to respect those ties within the framework of a united, sovereign and independent Somali state. We did not rush this decision. We gave ample time and repeatedly demanded that the UAE respect Somalia’s sovereignty and independence,” Somalia President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud explained in a televised address.

He added that the decision followed “extensive and careful consultations” after repeated actions by the UAE that were “unknown to and unwelcome by the Federal Government .”

The Israel-Somaliland link

The fallout comes just weeks after Israel became the first country to officially recognise Somaliland, a move which has been condemned across Africa and the Arab world . Somali authorities believe the UAE played a behind-the-scenes role in facilitating this recognition.

The designation follows an executive order issued by President Donald Trump several weeks ago, directing his administration to begin the process of blacklisting the groups. The move allows the US government to impose sanctions, freeze assets under US jurisdiction and criminalise material support linked to the named organisations.

The Muslim Brotherhood has strongly rejected the decision. Salah Abdel Haq, the acting general guide of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, said the group “categorically rejects this designation” and would pursue legal action to challenge it.

“This decision harms millions of Muslims worldwide,” Abdel Haq said in a statement to Al Jazeera. He denied any involvement in terrorism, insisting the organisation had not directed, funded or carried out violent acts. “We deny all allegations that the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has directed, funded, provided material support for or engaged in terrorism,” he said .

Abdel Haq also suggested that external pressure influenced Washington’s move, pointing to Israel and the United Arab Emirates as key drivers behind the decision.

The Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt in 1928, is a transnational Islamist movement with branches and affiliated groups across the Middle East and beyond.

The decision triggered what local media described as the largest protests in Mogadishu in recent years, with demonstrators burning Israeli flags and accusing Israel of attempting to divide the country.

Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud addressed an emergency parliamentary session, calling Israel’s recognition of Somaliland “a blunt aggression” against Somalia’s sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity. He warned that the move threatened not only Somalia but the stability of the wider region, local news Hiiraan reports .

Regional security fears

The issue has quickly taken on a regional dimension as Yemen’s Houthi leader, Abdulmalik al-Houthi, warned that any Israeli military presence in Somaliland would be considered a legitimate military target, describing it as a threat to Somalia, Yemen and Red Sea security.

Further, there are concerns over Somaliland’s strategic location along the Gulf of Aden, which is a vital global shipping route. This has raised fears that the dispute could spiral beyond diplomacy into a regional confrontation.

Palestinian response

Palestinian State has also condemned Israel’s move, rejecting any suggestion that Somaliland could be linked to proposals to relocate Palestinians from Gaza. They said neither Palestinian self-determination nor Somali sovereignty could be used as bargaining chips, accusing Israel of exporting instability into the Horn of Africa. “Neither the future of the Palestinian people nor the territorial sovereignty of Somalia can be used as a bargaining chip…Unequivocally rejects any steps aimed at advancing this objective, including any attempt by Israel to relocate the Palestinian population from Gaza into Northwestern Somalia…Will neither accept nor condone the illegal use of any territory, let alone that of a sovereign State which is a Member of the United Nations, to deny the right to self-determination to a people who have been subjected to crimes against humanity for many years…,” a post on the official Palestinian State account on X read in part.

United Nations reaction

At an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council in New York , 14 of the council’s 15 members criticised Israel’s decision, warning it could destabilise Somalia and set a dangerous precedent.

Somalia’s ambassador to the UN urged the council to reject what he called an act of external interference, saying the recognition risked undermining peace in the Horn of Africa. The United States was the only council member that did not condemn the move, although it said its own policy on Somaliland remains unchanged.

African states push back

Several African governments have also spoken out against the decision by Israel. South Africa warned that Israel’s recognition of Somaliland posed a “direct threat” to peace in the Horn of Africa and violated Somalia’s territorial integrity.

Pretoria stressed the African Union’s long-standing principle of uti possidetis, which upholds borders inherited at independence to prevent conflict , and cautioned that recognising breakaway regions could encourage instability and embolden secessionist movements on the continent.

The increase in bilateral trade, growing Emirati investments in sectors such as energy, transport, and manufacturing, and the establishment of new institutional linkages—such as business councils—underscore that this partnership extends beyond traditional bilateral relations; it represents the emergence of a collaborative growth corridor. By aligning Tanzania’s ambitions for industrialisation and economic integration with the UAE’s vision to broaden its influence across Africa, both countries are constructing not only stronger bilateral ties but also a strategic route that connects markets, creates opportunities, and anchors prosperity across regions. Notably, this corridor—one of the oldest in the region—is re-emerging with renewed strength and significance, set to play a pivotal role in global trade flows.

BACKGROUND 

During the 7th century, the Indian Ocean trade expanded significantly following the spread of Islam. Experienced Arab seafarers from Oman, Yemen, and the Persian Gulf efficiently utilised the predictable monsoon winds to establish regular maritime routes to the East African coast.

The northeast monsoon (December–March) enabled ships to travel from Arabia to East Africa, while the southwest monsoon (April–September) facilitated their return. This reliable wind pattern supported consistent, biannual maritime commerce.

Consequently, Tanzania’s coastline—including Zanzibar and the key ports of Kilwa, Mafia, and Bagamoyo—became a central hub for trade in commodities such as ivory, tortoise shell, and rhinoceros horn. Many Arab traders established permanent settlements, founding trading towns that contributed to the region’s commercial development.

Archaeological evidence, such as mosques and stone structures in locations like Shanga on the Lamu archipelago, attests to the presence of established trading communities as early as the 8th century, underscoring the historical depth of regional commerce.

These coastal settlements evolved into cosmopolitan centres where Arab, Persian, Indian, and African traders interacted extensively. Intermarriage between Arab merchants and Bantu-speaking communities facilitated cultural integration, laying the foundation for the development of Swahili identity.

By the 10th century, a distinct society had emerged, Muslim in religion, commercially oriented, and closely connected to the coastal environment.

The Swahili language developed during this period, combining a Bantu linguistic structure with significant Arabic vocabulary, particularly in the domains of religion, commerce, and governance. The adoption of Islam began gradually, initially among coastal elites and traders.

By the 9th century, mosques were established along the Tanzanian coast, signifying both a permanent Arab presence and the increasing adoption of Islamic practices.

Conversion to Islam enabled local rulers to form strategic alliances with Arab and Persian merchants. By the 10th century, East Africa, including Tanzania, was firmly integrated into the broader Islamic world economy.

Arab geographers, such as Al-Masudi in the 10th century and Al-Idrisi in the 12th century, documented the East African coast, which they referred to as the Zanj Coast. Commodities from Tanzania were exported to distant markets in Baghdad, Cairo, and other regions, while Arabian textiles, glassware, and ceramics were imported into East Africa.

U.A.E

Situated at the intersection of Asia, Europe, and Africa, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) possesses a significant geographic advantage, which facilitates its emergence as a major hub for transhipment and global connectivity. ( Middle East Briefing )

A substantial proportion of the global population is accessible within a short flight from UAE transport hubs, further reinforcing the nation’s role as a critical transit node. 

Recognising logistics, shipping, and aviation as foundational pillars of its post-oil diversification strategy, the UAE views investment in ports and airports not merely as infrastructure development, but as a strategic means to capture value throughout international supply chains. 

Through active participation and control in overseas port and airport operations, UAE-based companies can extend their influence, secure critical trade routes, and generate returns that transcend domestic boundaries. Some analysts have described this expansion, particularly in Africa and other regions, as a form of 'sub-imperial' outreach. 

Major port operators include DP World, AD Ports Group, and other key stakeholders.

DP World, headquartered in Dubai, is recognised as a global leader in port and terminal operations, managing facilities in numerous countries and handling a significant proportion of global container traffic. AD Ports Group, based in Abu Dhabi, oversees a diverse portfolio of ports, maritime and logistics services, free zones, and industrial parks. Its expanding network includes Khalifa Port and overseas operations such as concessions in Pointe Noire and Luanda, Angola. 

These state-backed or state-affiliated entities function as extensions of the UAE’s infrastructure diplomacy and commercial influence. 

The UAE is making substantial investments in domestic airport infrastructure, exemplified by the development of Al Maktoum International Airport (DWC)—a $35 billion project aimed at establishing the airport as a premier global aviation hub. 

Sharjah International Airport has similarly undergone terminal expansions to support increased capacity and connectivity. 

In April 2024, approval was granted for a major terminal expansion at Al Maktoum International Airport, featuring 400 gates and multiple runways, with the long-term objective of consolidating all of Dubai’s air traffic at this site. 

These targeted investments are designed to enhance capacity, increase connectivity, and reinforce the UAE’s position as a leading global transit and logistics hub. 

The UAE offers a stable and predictable legal and regulatory framework, which fosters investor confidence and facilitates international business operations. 

Numerous free zones across the UAE offer favourable conditions, including full foreign ownership, tax incentives, exemption from customs duties for specific trade activities, and streamlined capital repatriation processes. 

To strengthen legal protections and facilitate cross-border investment, the UAE has entered into multiple Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements (DTAs), Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), and Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreements (CEPAs). 

The UAE integrated ports, airports, logistics zones, free zones, industrial parks, digital platforms, and customs systems to form a cohesive logistics ecosystem. For example, AD Ports utilises advanced digital platforms such as Maqta Gateway and ATLP to synchronise trade and logistics flows across maritime, land, air, and free zone domains. 

Continuous investment in digital infrastructure, innovative technologies, and trade facilitation measures enables the UAE to reduce operational friction and handling times. 

Many organisations benefit from tax exemptions or reductions, particularly within free zones, as well as the absence of personal income tax factors which increases the attractiveness of business operations and profitability. 

The government also offers favourable concessions and tenders for the development and management of strategic assets, such as ports and terminals, often through long-term agreements with international partners. 

These investments yield direct returns through fees, tariffs, and handling services, while also capturing value across the supply chain—including logistics, warehousing, and trade-related services.

Such activities contribute to the growth of non-oil sectors, thereby supporting the UAE’s broader economic diversification objectives.

Ownership or operation of key overseas infrastructure enables the UAE to strengthen trade corridors, forge strategic alliances, and enhance its leverage in partner nations. 

The UAE’s presence in Africa is particularly notable, with UAE-linked operators managing ports and airports across East, West, and Central Africa, thereby expanding the country’s strategic footprint. 

The UAE’s logistics hubs have become increasingly attractive to airlines, shipping companies, logistics providers, and trade flows, fostering a virtuous cycle of connectivity, traffic growth, and further investment.

As infrastructure capacity expands, the marginal cost associated with additional traffic declines, thereby improving the efficiency of transit through the UAE. Overcapacity risk arises if projected traffic and usage levels do not materialise, potentially resulting in the underutilization of costly infrastructure assets.

Geopolitical and sovereignty challenges are inherent in operating infrastructure within foreign jurisdictions, as these activities may be affected by policy shifts, local political dynamics, or disputes regarding operational control.

Regulatory complexity and coordination challenges arise from the need to operate across multiple jurisdictions, free zones, regulatory regimes, customs systems, and legal frameworks, thereby increasing administrative friction and risk.

Competition remains strong, as other global logistics hubs—including Singapore, Rotterdam, and Malaysia—are also actively enhancing their infrastructure and capabilities.

The UAE is expected to further expand its global infrastructure portfolio, particularly across Africa, to support emerging trade corridors and logistics networks.

Greater integration with emerging trade corridors—such as those linking Africa and Asia will further enhance the UAE’s status as a global logistics hub.

Sustainability and green logistics are expected to become increasingly central, with a focus on reducing emissions, adopting smart port technologies, electrification, and utilising clean energy in operations.

Ongoing digital transformation—incorporating automation, blockchain, artificial intelligence, and the Internet of Things—will continue to drive efficiency gains and cost reductions.

TANZANIA

Tanzania shares borders with several landlocked countries, including Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zambia, and Malawi. By improving its infrastructure, Tanzania can facilitate the movement of goods to and from these neighbouring markets, enhancing regional trade integration. Additionally, Tanzania’s Indian Ocean coastline provides inland nations with essential maritime access to global trade networks.

If effectively leveraged, Tanzania could serve as a vital transit corridor for a substantial regional market. Analysts often cite a catchment area exceeding 200 million people in East and Central Africa as an immediate opportunity. With successful regional integration, Tanzania has the potential to function as a primary entry point to a combined market of 300–500 million people across East, Central, and Southern Africa.

Tanzania is assuming a central role in facilitating intraregional trade, with Dar es Salaam surpassing Nairobi in trade volume among East African Community (EAC) countries.

Furthermore, the country continues to improve its macroeconomic stability and business environment , making it increasingly attractive to foreign exporters and investors. Consequently, Tanzania’s geographic position, combined with progressive policy measures, provides a robust foundation for its aspirations to become a regional trade hub.

The Port of Dar es Salaam handles approximately 95% of Tanzania’s international trade and provides services to neighbouring landlocked countries.

Plans are underway to modernise the port by deepening berths, expanding terminals, upgrading cargo handling processes, and implementing advanced digital systems.

The long-anticipated Bagamoyo Port project aims to alleviate congestion in Dar es Salaam and establish a significant new logistics hub, complete with a planned industrial zone. Bagamoyo Port is projected to handle up to 20 million TEUs by 2045, positioning it as a significant regional logistics centre. 

Enhancing maritime connectivity will be essential for accommodating larger container vessels, improving turnaround times, and reducing operational costs.

Corridor development initiatives are underway to integrate mines with rail networks, rail with ports, and ports with international shipping routes.

The effectiveness of the rail system will depend on the development of feeder networks, efficient intermodal transfer points, and harmonised customs and cargo handling procedures.

Tanzania boasts one of the most extensive road networks in East Africa, comprising trunk and regional roads that total approximately 86,472 kilometres.  The construction and improvement of road infrastructure can facilitate the integration of rural and interior regions with coastal and cross-border trade nodes. The Kigongo–Busisi Bridge, spanning the Gulf of Mwanza and measuring approximately 3.2 kilometres in length, represents a significant infrastructure development that has substantially reduced ferry crossing times.

Several border regions, such as Mbeya and Songwe, are emerging as critical trade hubs facilitating integration with the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and neighbouring countries.

Nonetheless, challenges persist, including road maintenance, capacity limitations, weighbridge bottlenecks, customs delays, and inefficient inspection processes.

Customs and trade facilitation processes must be enhanced and harmonised with neighbouring states to reduce delays and promote efficient cross-border trade.

Robust legal and regulatory frameworks, transparent contracting, effective public-private partnerships (PPPs), comprehensive risk mitigation, and sustained political stability are essential for successful infrastructure development. The government has explicitly prioritised infrastructure support in its national investment and development plans.

Successful implementation of these infrastructure and institutional reforms could yield transformative impacts for Tanzania:

Lower Logistics Costs: Enhanced infrastructure can significantly decrease transport and trade costs, positioning Tanzanian routes as more cost-effective alternatives within the region.

Economic Diversification: Improved access will enable the scaling of agricultural zones, mining operations, and manufacturing, fostering value addition beyond the export of raw materials.

Regional Integration and Dominance: Tanzania can establish itself as the backbone of trade for East, Central, and Southern Africa, extending its influence beyond local markets.

Current U.A.E-Tanzania 

Tanzania and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) formally established a diplomatic relationship. Since then, the UAE has maintained an embassy in Dar es Salaam (since around 2011), while Tanzania opened its embassy in Abu Dhabi in 2002.

Over the decades, bilateral relations have remained cordial, steadily progressing from basic diplomatic engagement to more robust economic and sectoral cooperation. 

In December 2024, the two countries marked 50 years of diplomatic ties and held their first high-level political and diplomatic consultations to review past cooperation and set new priorities 

These longstanding foundations provide both political legitimacy and continuity for the evolving partnership.

Trade between Tanzania and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has shown consistent and robust growth, highlighting the significance of economic ties between the two nations. In 2022, non-oil trade exchanges reached approximately USD 2.5 billion, reflecting an expanding commercial partnership. By 2023, Tanzania’s imports from the UAE totalled around USD 1.42 billion, with mineral fuels and oils (about USD 1.08 billion) leading the import categories, followed by plastics, machinery, electronics, and vehicle parts. On the export side, Tanzania supplied goods valued at approximately USD 686.4 million to the UAE in 2023.

A notable subset of this relationship is the trade between Dubai and Tanzania, which grew by about 9% year-on-year in 2023, reaching AED 9.8 billion. By September 2024, around 274 Tanzanian companies were registered with the Dubai Chamber of Commerce, indicating deepening business ties. To further strengthen cooperation, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed between Dubai Chambers and the Tanzania Chamber of Commerce, Industry & Agriculture, aimed at promoting collaboration through trade missions, information exchange, and private-sector linkages.

These developments underscore that trade remains a cornerstone of the bilateral relationship, positioning the UAE as a key trading partner for Tanzania.

Trade between Tanzania and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has shown consistent and robust growth, highlighting the significance of economic ties between the two nations. In 2022, non-oil trade exchanges reached approximately USD 2.5 billion, reflecting an expanding commercial partnership. By 2023, Tanzania’s imports from the UAE totalled around USD 1.42 billion, with mineral fuels and oils (about USD 1.08 billion) leading the import categories, followed by plastics, machinery, electronics, and vehicle parts. On the export side, Tanzania supplied goods valued at approximately USD 686.4 million to the UAE in 2023.

A notable subset of this relationship is the trade between Dubai and Tanzania, which grew by about 9% year-on-year in 2023, reaching AED 9.8 billion. By September 2024, around 274 Tanzanian companies were registered with the Dubai Chamber of Commerce, indicating deepening business ties. To further strengthen cooperation, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed between Dubai Chambers and the Tanzania Chamber of Commerce, Industry & Agriculture, aimed at promoting collaboration through trade missions, information exchange, and private-sector linkages.

These developments underscore that trade remains a cornerstone of the bilateral relationship, positioning the UAE as a key trading partner for Tanzania.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has emerged as a significant investor in Tanzania, with a particular focus on sectors including mining, energy, logistics, manufacturing, and infrastructure. 

A notable example is the high-profile port management agreement with DP World, a Dubai-based company. In 2023, the Tanzanian parliament approved a 30-year contract for DP World to manage four berths at the Port of Dar es Salaam, with performance reviews scheduled every five years.

The Tanzanian government initiated the deal as a strategic initiative to enhance port efficiency, increase throughput, and strengthen connections to regional trade corridors.

 In 2024, GSG Energies, a UAE-based firm, announced a planned investment of USD 500 million in Tanzania across sectors such as transport, mining, manufacturing, and petroleum distribution. This investment is projected to generate over 3,000 jobs over a five-year period. The UAE and Tanzania have also formalised their partnership through cooperation agreements in customs, mining investment, and the establishment of a joint UAE–Tanzania Business Council aimed at deepening private sector collaboration.

In 2022, both countries signed an Agreement on the Avoidance of Double Taxation (ADT), designed to facilitate cross-border investment, reduce tax uncertainty, and prevent double taxation of income in both jurisdictions.

Collectively, these agreements and investments reflect a clear intent to institutionalise and expand investment flows beyond isolated projects.

In addition to formal agreements, trade missions are regularly organised to foster business linkages. For instance, in December 2024, the Dubai International Chamber conducted a trade mission to Dar es Salaam, facilitating 408 business meetings between Dubai and Tanzanian firms. The DUBUY digital platform, launched by DP World in the UAE, further supports commercial engagement by facilitating connections between businesses in the UAE and Africa, including Tanzania.

Reflecting this evolving partnership, Tanzania’s economic diplomacy under President Samia Suluhu Hassan has prioritised opening trade with new partners and leveraging international collaborations, with the UAE frequently identified as a central pillar of this strategy. The Tanzanian Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture (TCCIA) has also signed memoranda of understanding with UAE counterparts to establish frameworks for collaboration, business councils, and joint ventures.

High-level political gestures have further reinforced the bilateral relationship. In 2025, President Samia Suluhu Hassan of Tanzania was awarded the UAE’s Order of the Mother of the Nation by the UAE President, symbolising diplomatic goodwill and alignment between the two nations.

During high-level visits, both countries have emphasised their ambitions to expand cooperation in diverse areas such as trade, investment, energy, logistics, infrastructure, agriculture, and climate response. Both countries have reaffirmed their commitment to broadening bilateral cooperation and strengthening engagement in multilateral forums. On regional and continental issues, Tanzania and the UAE occasionally coordinate or support shared frameworks addressing climate change, trade blocs, and infrastructure connectivity. 

In essence, the political relationship between Tanzania and the UAE remains largely amicable and cooperative, with intermittent friction arising from significant agreements.

Future of U.A.E- Tanzania 

For the UAE–Tanzania corridor to operate effectively, Tanzania is actively upgrading its infrastructure—including railways, roads, and ports—to accommodate increased throughput and support deeper integration.

In 2024, Tanzania inaugurated a USD 3.1 billion standard gauge railway spanning 541 kilometres between Dar es Salaam, the commercial capital, and Dodoma, the administrative capital. This initiative strengthens internal logistics and enhances connectivity between inland regions and the coast. Ongoing and planned expansions of internal railway lines—including connections to Mwanza and Kigoma—aim to link mineral-rich regions and landlocked neighbouring countries with Tanzania’s coastal ports. Regional rail link initiatives, such as the proposed Tanzania–Burundi standard gauge line, are expected to further extend Tanzania’s rail network, providing inland regions with direct access to the country’s ports.

The Mtwara Development Corridor project seeks to connect southern Tanzania with adjacent regions through integrated road, rail, and waterway access originating from Mtwara Port. The planned expansion of Bagamoyo Port aspires to establish it as a major new regional port in East Africa, with a projected capacity of 20 million TEUs by 2045.

These infrastructure developments are essential for the corridor’s effectiveness, creating reliable and efficient routes from production areas in the interior to export gateways along the coast.

Beyond economic considerations, the UAE–Tanzania corridor is shaped by strategic, political, and regional competitive dynamics. The UAE’s East Africa strategy encompasses a geopolitical dimension, seeking to strengthen influence along the Red Sea and Indian Ocean flanks, counterbalance other global powers, secure critical maritime routes, and more closely integrate Africa with Gulf-based logistics networks. More broadly, the UAE aims to position itself as a primary interface between African markets and global supply chains, leveraging its advanced logistics, port operations, and financial hubs. The UAE’s increasing involvement in Africa’s infrastructure sector—including ports, railways, and logistics—is integral to its broader foreign direct investment and influence strategy. The conferral of the “Mother of the Nation Order” by the UAE to Tanzanian President Samia Suluhu Hassan in 2025 underscores symbolic ties and high-level recognition between the two countries. Additionally, the Tanzanian Prime Minister’s visit to Abu Dhabi in mid-2025 served to deepen diplomatic, trade, and bilateral cooperation ties.

Consequently, the process of corridor development is not merely transactional; it carries substantial political significance and is informed by long-term strategic considerations.

While the vision for the corridor is promising, several significant challenges must be addressed:

Return on Investment and Commercial Viability: Large-scale infrastructure projects necessitate sustained demand, meticulous planning, and robust governance, as corridor investments often entail significant capital risk.

Coordination and Institutional Capacity: Successful corridor development requires effective alignment among multiple agencies—such as ports, customs authorities, railways, and local governments—as operational bottlenecks may impede progress.

Competition and Regional Alternatives: Competing corridors, such as those via Kenya, Uganda, and Ethiopia, also vie for trade flows. The UAE–Tanzania corridor must deliver superior efficiency, reliability, and cost competitiveness to attract and retain traffic.

Sustainability and Social Impact: It is critical to ensure that corridor growth benefits local communities, prevents displacement, and aligns with established environmental and social safeguards to maintain legitimacy.

Taken together, these elements reveal a transformative trajectory:

1. Anchor relationships & trust

The diplomatic and institutional foundations established between the UAE and Tanzania provide legitimacy and continuity to the corridor’s development.

2. Trade and investment deepening

Increasing trade volumes, memoranda of understanding, business councils, and direct investments by UAE firms in Tanzania indicate a shift from a traditional supplier–consumer dynamic to one of co-development and co-investment.

3. Infrastructure & logistics integration

Ports, logistics hubs, and internal connectivity infrastructure are being constructed or expanded, with UAE logistics companies positioning themselves as key operators within this growing network.

4. Regional reach

Tanzania’s role extends beyond bilateral trade with the UAE; it is positioned to serve as a gateway to East and Central Africa. The corridor concept envisions Tanzania’s interior and neighbouring markets integrating with the UAE through maritime, air, and rail connections.

5. Strategic positioning

The corridor is both economic and geopolitical in nature, as the UAE views Tanzania as a stable node at the Indian Ocean–East Africa interface, anchoring its strategy as a bridge between Africa, the Gulf, and the wider Indian Ocean region.

6. Growth trajectory ahead

If current momentum is sustained—with infrastructure projects completed, regulatory frameworks streamlined, and investments maintained—the UAE–Tanzania corridor could emerge as one of the most prominent trade and investment axes linking the Gulf and East Africa.

The opinions and thoughts expressed in this article reflect only the author's views.

Dean Tavakoli is an analyst and a senior executive who possesses over a decade of extensive global quantitative investment experience. He is the CEO of Sea Enerji, a petrochemical trading company based in Turkey and has also served as a strategic advisor for the Middle East Oil and Gas.

Here are the key reasons behind the move:

1. Concerns over immigration abuse

UAE officials say the decision is aimed at curbing the number of Ugandans and other nationalities who overstay their visas after entering the country. Overstaying has become a persistent problem, leading to undocumented workers and pressure on immigration systems.

2. Rising criminal activities

Authorities also cited concerns about unlawful activities linked to a small number of Ugandan travellers. While details were not made public, the UAE has increasingly flagged risks around fraud, illegal employment, and organised networks using lax visa policies to their advantage.

3. Targeting high-risk categories

Rather than banning all Ugandans, the restrictions focus on “high-risk” categories of individuals considered most likely to violate visa terms. This means some travellers will still be able to visit, but under tighter scrutiny and mostly on short-term visas.

4. Not a blanket ban

Uganda ’s foreign ministry stressed that the new policy does not amount to a total prohibition. “Some people will still go, but it will be based on the risk of a person overstaying their visa or failing to respect the laws and culture of the UAE,” Oryem clarified.

5. Policy shift in the UAE

The UAE’s 2026 visa ban applies to several African and European countries. Officials say the restrictions are part of a regional immigration strategy to protect the labour market and maintain social order as inbound migration grows.

“Gaza’s health system continues to be overwhelmed by the influx of mass casualties, limited medical stocks and supplies, and the shortage of medical equipment and blood units,” WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus told reporters in Geneva on Thursday.

He said the escalation has left traumatised families “forced into an ever-shrinking area as famine persists,” with medical workers struggling to keep hospitals running.

According to Ghebreyesus, the Al-Rantisi Hospital — the only remaining paediatric facility in the enclave — was struck on Wednesday while 80 children were inside. The incident, he said, underscored how escalating violence

El-Sisi accused Israel of brazenly violating international law, humanitarian principles, and established norms, saying its policies are destabilising and reckless. He argued that Israel’s practices risk turning the region into “a lawless arena for aggression,” with consequences not only for Palestinians but for the wider Middle East.

“This is a situation that is utterly unacceptable and cannot be tolerated,” El-Sisi said, stressing that unchecked escalation could push the region into “an uncontrollable spiral.”

In a pointed message to Israelis , the Egyptian leader warned that current events could unravel decades of peace-building efforts, including the accords Israel has signed with its Arab neighbours. He cautioned that the fallout might erode opportunities for new peace deals, damage Israel’s own security, and even invalidate existing agreements.

“The consequences will be severe, and this is a price we will all pay, without exception,” El-Sisi said. He urged Israelis not to allow “the peace efforts of your predecessors to come to nought,” warning that regret may come too late.

El-Sisi also used his speech to express Egypt’s solidarity with Qatar following reports of Israeli aggression against Qatari airspace and territory. He said Cairo rejects any violation of a nation’s sovereignty and condemned the threat to Doha’s security in “the strongest and most unequivocal terms.”

Meanwhile, a 72-page independent United Nations inquiry concluded that Israel is committing genocide in Gaza. The finding indicated that four of the five acts defined under international law have been carried out since the start of the war with Hamas.

The GSF, consisting of dozens of boats and hundreds of activists from 44 countries, departed from Barcelona, Spain, on September 1 and is expected to reach Gaza in mid-September. Organisers say the effort is aimed at breaking Israel’s blockade of the Gaza Strip to deliver food, medicine, and other aid.

The joint statement called on all parties to respect international law and refrain from any unlawful or violent acts against the flotilla. It warned that violations, including attacks in international waters or illegal detentions, would be met with accountability.

“Both objectives, peace and humanitarian aid delivery, together with the respect of international law, including humanitarian law, are shared by our governments,” the statement read.

The Global Sumud Flotilla is a coordinated, nonviolent fleet of small vessels sailing from Mediterranean ports in a bid to challenge Israel’s blockade of Gaza. It unites a diverse coalition of international activists, including participants from earlier land and sea initiatives such as the Maghreb Sumud Flotilla, the Freedom Flotilla Coalition, and the Global Movement to Gaza.