Speakers said Africa has made progress on lowering trade barriers under AfCFTA, but restrictive visa rules still block the flow of people needed for services trade, investment, tourism and cross-border work.

“The evidence is clear. The economics support openness. The human story demands it,” said Alex Mubiru, AfDB’s Director General for Eastern Africa, urging countries to move beyond gradual reforms to “transformative change.”

Amma A. Twum-Amoah, the AU Commission’s Commissioner for Health, Humanitarian Affairs and Social Development, called for faster implementation of existing continental frameworks, describing visa openness as a practical tool for expanding regional markets and improving responses to economic and humanitarian shocks.

Former AU Commission chairperson Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma said free movement is central to the AU’s long-term development vision, Agenda 2063. “If we accept that we are Africans, then we must be able to move freely across our continent,” she said, urging states to implement the African Passport and the Free Movement of Persons Protocol.

Ghana ’s Trade and Industry Minister Elizabeth Ofosu-Adjare said her country’s open visa approach for African travellers has already supported business travel and tourism, and helped attract investors.

Participants also pointed to new data from the Africa Visa Openness Index showing that more than half of intra-African trips still require visas before departure, which they said continues to slow down trade and integration.

Mesfin Bekele, chief executive of Ethiopian Airlines, said visa liberalisation should move alongside efforts to improve aviation connectivity, including full implementation of the Single African Air Transport Market (SAATM).

Organisers said progress toward a visa-free Africa will require political will and practical steps such as aligning migration policies , improving border infrastructure and building interoperable digital identity and information-sharing systems. 

Xi announced that from May 1, 2026, China will fully implement zero-tariff treatment for 53 African countries with which it has diplomatic relations. He said the move would expand high-level opening-up and create new opportunities for African exports to enter the Chinese market.

In addition to tariff removal, China will promote the signing of a common economic partnership agreement for development and further expand market access for African goods. This includes upgrading so-called “green channels” to speed up customs clearance and facilitate trade.

“The world is undergoing profound changes unseen in a century,” he said, noting the growing influence of the Global South and the African Union’s role in advancing continental integration and defending Africa’s interests.

The announcement comes as China and Africa mark 70 years of diplomatic relations. Over the decades, China has become one of Africa’s largest trading partners and a major source of infrastructure financing.

Xi said China is ready to work with African nations to deepen mutually beneficial cooperation, strengthen people-to-people ties and build what he described as an “all-weather China-Africa community with a shared future.”

The policy would impose a heavy tax on imports from nations with active trade ties to Iran, although the US government has not formally published the full details and legal framework of the measure.

Zimbabwe has signed 12 memoranda of understanding (MoUs) with Iran covering key sectors such as agriculture, mining , pharmaceuticals, and tourism, and officials had hoped to boost bilateral trade substantially, from around US$30 million to US$500 million, through joint ventures and investment partnerships.

“The 25% tariff essentially acts as a massive transaction tax on any country maintaining these ties,” a Zimbabwean trade expert told the Zimbabwe Independent, warning that deals signed in late 2023 are now at risk.

For Zimbabwean companies, the tariff poses a new and difficult economic choice as to whether to continue pursuing trade goals with Iran and face higher costs imposed by the United States, or scale back ties to avoid potentially losing competitiveness in the US and global markets.

Under the new rules, any country trading with Tehran could see its goods face higher duties when entering the US market, even where those countries have limited or regional trade volumes with Iran.

In January 2025, Trump signed a sweeping executive order (“Putting America First in International Environmental Agreements”) instructing the U.S. to withdraw immediately from the Paris Climate Agreement and rescind all U.S. pledges under UN climate accords. In practice, this meant cancelling tens of millions in promised climate finance. By March 2025, the administration also pulled U.S. funding out of multilateral “Just Energy Transition” partnerships with emerging economies (e.g. South Africa, Vietnam, Indonesia). Analysts note this created a funding gap – South Africa, for example, lost about $56 million in grants and $1 billion in planned investments as its total international climate pledge fell from $13.8B to $12.8B. These moves undermined Global South clean-energy projects (even large renewables like South Africa’s Selemela solar plant) and forced poorer countries to seek new funding sources.

Trade and tariff measures

Trump dramatically expanded U.S. trade barriers in 2025. Using Section 232 authority , he hiked tariffs on steel, aluminium and copper imports to 50 % (and 25% on foreign autos). In April 2025, he also invoked emergency powers to impose a 10% “reciprocal” tariff on all imports not already covered by other sanctions. Critically, in July 2025, he signed an order suspending the longstanding “de minimis” duty exemption (which had let packages under $800 enter the U.S. duty-free). After August 2025, nearly all low‑value shipments (including small shipments of goods from China, Africa, or Latin America) began incurring duties. Economists warn these sweeping tariffs hurt exporters in the Global South (tariff conflicts even flared with neighbours like Canada and Mexico, raising costs on developing‑country goods and disrupting trade.

Cuts to foreign aid and development assistance

On Day 1 of his second term (Jan. 20, 2025), Trump ordered a 90‑day “realignment” of all U.S. foreign aid. In practice, this effectively dismantled USAID : many aid programs were merged into the State Dept or terminated, and the independent USAID agency was slated for elimination. By mid‑2025, the administration’s rescission budget proposal sought to claw back over $8 billion from foreign assistance (targeting global health, humanitarian, and development programs). The cuts hit Global South recipients hard: Africa alone had received roughly $12 billion in U.S. aid in FY2024. Loss of U.S. funding has forced many countries (e.g. in sub‑Saharan Africa and South Asia) to scramble for substitutes; public health campaigns, vaccine programs, and infrastructure projects previously backed by USAID are now under threat.

Migration and immigration restrictions

Trump tightened immigration rules affecting many in the Global South. In January 2025, he issued an order suspending the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program indefinitely, halting refugee resettlement from regions like Africa, Asia and Latin America. Later in 2025 (via proclamations in June and December), he expanded travel bans on foreign nationals from numerous developing countries. For example, a Dec. 16, 2025, proclamation extended full entry bans to countries including Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, South Sudan, Laos and Sierra Leone, and imposed new restrictions on citizens from Angola, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe and others. These measures blocked many migrants and visitors from the Global South. Also in 2025, Reuters reported that the U.S. Supreme Court allowed the Trump administration to remove Temporary Protected Status (TPS) from Venezuelan migrants.

Military and diplomatic initiatives in the Global South

Trump also pursued new security ties in Latin America. In December 2025, the administration announced it would designate Peru as a major Non‑NATO Ally . This special status grants Peru expanded privileges (easier purchase of U.S. military equipment and joint training programs) intended to strengthen counternarcotics cooperation. More broadly, a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine was unveiled in the 2025 National Security Strategy, declaring that “the American people – not foreign nations nor globalist institutions – will always control their own destiny in our hemisphere”. In practice, this has meant deeper U.S. military engagement in the Caribbean and Latin America (e.g. U.S. access to bases in the Dominican Republic, new Caribbean radar installations) to counter perceived threats. These moves signalled a reassertion of U.S. influence over Western Hemisphere nations.