China is shown as the largest single destination, taking roughly 23% of flows, followed by India at 13%, with Japan, South Korea and Southeast Asia also accounting for significant shares.

According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration , around 84% of crude oil and condensate shipped through the Strait of Hormuz in 2024 was destined for Asian countries.

China, India, Japan and South Korea alone accounted for roughly 69% of total flows, making them the most exposed to any disruption.

The International Energy Agency estimates that nearly a third of globally traded crude oil passes through the strait, with China and India together receiving about 44% of these exports.

The Strait of Hormuz handles around 20 million barrels of oil per day, roughly a fifth of global petroleum consumption, making it the most important oil transit chokepoint in the world.

It also carries a significant share of global liquefied natural gas, particularly exports from Qatar, one of the world’s largest LNG suppliers.

Despite its importance, alternatives remain limited. Pipelines in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates can bypass part of the route, but cannot fully replace their capacity in the event of a disruption.

By contrast to Asia, Western economies account for a much smaller share of direct imports.

The United States and Europe together receive less than 10% of oil flows through the strait, reflecting increased domestic production in the U.S. and diversified supply chains in Europe.

In 2024, the U.S. imported only about 7% of its crude oil from Persian Gulf countries via the strait, highlighting its reduced dependence compared with previous decades.

The Strait’s strategic importance has made it a recurring focal point of geopolitical tension.

Recent conflicts involving Iran, Israel, and the USA have once again highlighted the vulnerability of global energy supply chains, with shipping disruptions triggering price volatility and raising fears of broader economic fallout.

Data from World Visualized places the Norwegian capital at the top, with 48.9% of cars being electric, followed by Bergen at 38.9%, highlighting the country’s clear advantage in adoption rates.

This position reflects a sustained national strategy. Electric cars make up r oughly 82% of new vehicle sales in Norway , a figure that continues to edge higher, supported by tax reliefs, lower road charges and an extensive charging network, according to the Norwegian Road Federation.

Buyers benefit from exemptions on purchase taxes and VAT, often making electric models more affordable than petrol alternatives. Additional advantages, including access to bus lanes and reduced parking and toll costs, further strengthen their appeal.

Chinese cities are also making significant strides, though with a different model focused on scale and public transport.

Shenzhen, with roughly 33.5% of cars electric, has electrified its entire bus fleet and taxi system, more than 16,000 buses and over 20,000 taxis, making it the first city in the world to do so, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA).

Shanghai follows with around 28%, supported by strong subsidies and a policy that prioritises EV buyers through easier access to licence plates, which are otherwise costly and restricted.

China is now the world’s largest EV market, accounting for nearly 60% of global electric car sales in 2023, the IEA said.

Elsewhere in Europe, Amsterdam stands out with about 22% EV share, supported by one of the densest charging networks globally and strict low-emission zones that discourage petrol and diesel vehicles.

The Netherlands has consistently ranked among the top countries for EV infrastructure , with more than 100,000 public charging points nationwide, according to government data.

In the United States, San Francisco leads major cities with roughly 18.5% of cars being electric, reflecting California’s aggressive climate policies and high consumer purchasing power.

California alone accounts for nearly 40% of all EV sales in the U.S., driven by state mandates requiring a transition to zero-emission vehicles by 2035, according to the California Energy Commission.

However, nationwide adoption remains uneven due to infrastructure gaps and varying state-level policies.

On the other hand, Jakarta’s EV share remains low at around 2.4%, highlighting the challenges faced by emerging economies.

Indonesia has introduced incentives, including reduced value-added tax and regulatory support for domestic EV production, as part of a broader strategy to build a regional electric vehicle hub.

President Prabowo Subianto has signalled ambitions to accelerate the transition, though analysts say infrastructure and affordability remain key barriers.

Roughly a fifth of the world’s oil consumption passes through the narrow waterway between Iran and Oman, making it a critical artery for global markets and a persistent geopolitical flashpoint.

Recent breakdowns of oil and gas shipments through the strait show Saudi Arabia accounting for the largest share at approximately 28%, followed by Iraq at 18%. The United Arab Emirates and Qatar each contribute about 14%, while Iran and Kuwait supply around 11% each. Bahrain accounts for a smaller share at roughly 6%.

The distribution reflects the concentration of hydrocarbon production in the Gulf region, where some of the world’s largest proven oil reserves are located.

According to The New York Times, disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz have long been viewed as a worst-case scenario for energy markets, with even minor incidents capable of triggering price spikes and supply fears.

At its narrowest point, the strait is just 21 miles (34 km) wide , with shipping lanes only a few miles across in each direction. This physical constraint leaves little margin for error in the event of military escalation, accidents or blockades.

The waterway serves as the primary export route for oil producers in the Persian Gulf, particularly for countries whose infrastructure is heavily oriented towards maritime transport.

The New York Times has reported that tensions involving Iran, including threats to restrict passage, have repeatedly raised alarms among Western governments and energy traders.

Efforts to diversify export routes, including pipelines that bypass the strait, have expanded in recent years. However, The New York Times notes that these alternatives still account for only a fraction of total export capacity, leaving the majority of flows dependent on the chokepoint.

A visual analysis of issue-specific net approval ratings from January 2025 through April 2026 indicates that Trump remains underwater on every major policy front, with particularly steep losses tied to cost-of-living pressures.

Among the issues tracked, inflation stands out as the president’s most significant vulnerability. Net approval on inflation has fallen to roughly -34 percentage points, the lowest among all categories, reflecting persistent voter dissatisfaction over prices and tariffs .

This aligns with broader polling trends. A Washington Post-ABC-Ipsos survey found that inflation received Trump’s worst approval ratings among key issues, with only about one-third of Americans supporting his handling of it.

Economists and political analysts say this reflects the political sensitivity of consumer prices, especially amid tariff-driven cost pressures that have fed into household budgets.

Trump’s economic approval, once considered a relative strength, has also weakened. Net approval on the economy now sits near -22 points , while trade policy trails slightly worse at -24 points , according to the Silver Bulletin aggregation.

Polling data suggests that tariffs and market volatility have contributed to the decline. Nate Silver noted that economic disruptions and policy shocks have led to “permanent damage” in approval ratings even after temporary rebounds.

Earlier in 2025, Trump’s net approval on the economy was already negative, around -15 to -16 points, highlighting a steady erosion rather than a sudden collapse.

Immigration continues to be Trump’s strongest issue, though it too is now in negative territory. Net approval on immigration stands at approximately -11 points , significantly better than other policy areas but still below zero.

Silver’s analysis indicates immigration is “just about the only issue” where Trump’s ratings approach parity, even as overall approval declines.

However, even this relative strength has weakened over time, with polling showing declines following controversial enforcement actions and domestic incidents.

The deterioration across issues mirrors Trump’s broader approval trajectory. Silver Bulletin’s aggregate shows Trump with about 39.7% approval and a net rating near -17 points, marking a new low for his second term.

Other polling averages reinforce the trend. As of early April 2026, national aggregators place Trump’s approval around 39–41%, with disapproval nearing 57–60%, yielding a net deficit of roughly -16 to -20 points.

Analysts attribute the decline to a combination of economic anxiety, foreign policy tensions, and polarisation among independent voters, whose support has softened significantly.

His dominance is backed by the ruling party, the People’s Rally for Progress (RPP), which leads the broader governing coalition, the Union for the Presidential Majority (UMP).

A 2010 constitutional amendment removed presidential term limits, allowing Guelleh to run indefinitely. More recently, in 2025, Djibouti’s parliament eliminated the 75-year age cap for presidential candidates, a move widely interpreted as designed to ensure Guelleh, now 78, could stand again.

The electoral field itself underscores the imbalance. In previous elections, Guelleh has secured overwhelming victories, including 87% of the vote in 2016 and over 97% in 2021, figures that international observers and opposition groups have questioned.

Who is contesting IOG?

Mohamed Farah Samatar stands as the sole challenger to President Guelleh, though his candidacy carries its own complexities. A former insider of the ruling establishment, he is now contesting the presidency under the banner of the Unified Democratic Centre (CDU).

During the lead-up to the votes, Samatar took his campaign to the Tadjourah and Obock regions, where he addressed supporters and attempted to project an alternative vision for the country, insisting that “another Djibouti is possible”.

Even so, analysts remain sceptical about the broader significance of the race. Sonia Le Gouriellec, a specialist on the Horn of Africa at Lille Catholic University, told AFP: “There’s not much at stake. It’s just a token competition.”

Criticism has been sharper from civil society. Omar Ali Ewado, who leads the Djibouti League of Human Rights (LDDH), dismissed the process outright, describing the vote as a “masquerade” and a “foregone conclusion”.

This context shapes the core issue about how the election is unlikely to produce political change, but it may intensify uncertainty about what comes next.

Who can vote?

Roughly 243,000 voters are registered for Djibouti’s 2026 presidential election , according to data from the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, out of a national population estimated at just over one million.

That marks a modest increase from the around 215,000 registered voters in 2021, pointing to a gradual expansion in the electoral roll, though still representing only about a quarter of the population.

Historically, turnout has been relatively strong on paper, averaging close to 67%, though critics argue these figures should be viewed in the context of limited political competition.

Polling stations are expected to open in the morning and close later in the day, after which counting is expected to begin.

Despite being labelled an “electoral autocracy” by international monitors, Djibouti is hosting a regional observer mission from the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), with 17 observers from Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan and Uganda deployed nationwide.

The bloc is expected to release its initial assessment after the vote, followed by a formal statement on 12 April.

What is at stake?

Djibouti’s location along the Bab el-Mandeb Strait places it at the crossroads of global commerce. Estimates suggest that around 12–15% of global trade and a significant share of oil shipments pass through this narrow waterway connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden. The country has leveraged this position to build an economy centred on logistics, ports, and foreign military partnerships.

The Port of Doraleh, one of the most important infrastructure assets in the region, serves as a critical hub for shipping and for landlocked Ethiopia, which relies on Djibouti for roughly 90–95% of its imports and exports. Revenues from port operations, logistics services, and foreign base leases form a substantial part of Djibouti’s national income.

This strategic value has attracted a concentration of global military presence rarely seen in such a small state.

Djibouti hosts:

Additionally, although Djibouti has invested heavily in infrastructure, including rail links and port expansion projects often financed through external borrowing, concerns persist about public debt levels, which have at times exceeded 70% of GDP, much of it linked to Chinese-funded projects.

Youth unemployment remains high, and the benefits of growth have not been evenly distributed, contributing to underlying social discontent.

China is projected to remain the world ’s largest cotton producer, accounting for 29% of global output, or around 7.7 million tonnes, according to USDA Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) estimates for the 2025/26 marketing year.

The country’s dominance is driven by highly mechanised production in regions such as Xinjiang, which has become the centre of China’s cotton industry. USDA data shows China consistently ranks as both the top producer and consumer of cotton globally, reflecting strong domestic demand from its textile sector.

India is expected to produce 5.1 million tonnes, representing 19% of global supply, maintaining its position as the second-largest producer. However, yields remain sensitive to monsoon variability, a factor that continues to shape output volatility, according to Trading Economics agricultural data trends.

Brazil, now firmly established as a global agricultural powerhouse, is projected to contribute 4.2 million tonnes (16%), benefitting from large-scale, export-oriented farming and rising productivity. USDA data indicates Brazil has steadily increased its share of global cotton exports over the past decade.

The United States is forecast to produce 3.0 million tonnes (12%), ranking fourth globally. While not the largest producer, the US remains the world’s leading cotton exporter, supplying key markets in Asia, particularly China, Vietnam and Bangladesh.

Trading Economics data highlights that US cotton production is influenced by weather patterns, especially drought conditions in major producing states such as Texas.

Beyond the top four, several countries contribute smaller but still significant shares:

These producers play important roles in regional supply chains, particularly in Asia and Europe .

Figures drawn from multiple media and defence sources indicate that more than 1,300 ballistic missiles and nearly 3,900 drones were deployed by Iran in roughly the first five weeks of the conflict, underscoring the scale of its initial offensive.

The bulk of Iran’s launches occurred in the opening phase of the conflict . In the first week alone, hundreds of missiles and over a thousand drones were reportedly fired, reflecting what analysts describe as a “shock-and-saturation” strategy aimed at overwhelming air defence systems.

Data compiled by Al Jazeera shows that in the first 24 hours, Iran fired 167 missiles and over 500 drones at targets in the region, including the United Arab Emirates.

This intensity was consistent with broader patterns observed in the early days of the conflict, when large salvos were used to expand the battlefield and test defensive systems across multiple countries.

However, the pace of launches dropped significantly in subsequent weeks.

Sustained U.S. and Israeli airstrikes targeting missile infrastructure and launch sites led to a dramatic reduction in Iran’s firing rate , in some cases by up to 90% compared with the early days of the war.

By mid-conflict, Iran was launching roughly 20 to 30 missiles per day on average, alongside continued drone attacks, according to defence analysts tracking the war.

Despite the reduction, attacks continued across the region, with Gulf states reporting interceptions of missiles and drones targeting energy infrastructure and military bases.

One of the most notable trends has been the scale of drone warfare. Drones accounted for the majority of Iran’s launches during the first five weeks, reflecting their lower cost and ability to evade defences when used in large numbers.

Even as launch rates declined, Western intelligence assessments suggest Iran retained a significant portion of its arsenal and operational capacity.

Recent reporting indicates that only part of Iran’s missile and drone inventory has been destroyed, with mobile launch systems and underground storage allowing continued attacks despite heavy bombardment.

The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), India’s ruling party, stands as the largest political organisation globally by membership, with around 180 million registered members. The figure places it far ahead of its closest rival, China’s Communist Party, which reports roughly 98 million members.

The scale of these numbers reflects not just population size, but increasingly sophisticated political outreach strategies, digital enrolment systems, and grassroots expansion efforts.

India also accounts for four of the ten largest political parties worldwide. The Indian National Congress, once the dominant force in Indian politics, remains third globally with about 50 million members. Regional and newer parties are also prominent: the AIADMK is estimated at 16 million members, while the Aam Aadmi Party has crossed the 10 million mark.

In the United States, where party membership is less formally structured, estimates place the Democratic Party at just over 47 million members and the Republican Party at around 36 million. These figures are typically derived from voter registration data rather than formal enrolment, making direct comparisons more complex.

Outside Asia and North America, Turkey’s AK Party holds approximately 11.24 million members, while Ethiopia’s Prosperity Party is close behind with 11 million. Pakistan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf rounds out the top ten with roughly 10 million members.

In India, political membership drives have become highly organised operations, often linked to election cycles, welfare outreach, and ideological campaigns. Mobile technology and social media have further lowered the barrier to entry, enabling parties to scale rapidly.

The data also highlights the growing institutional strength of ruling or dominant parties in several countries, raising questions about political competition, internal party democracy, and the evolving nature of civic participation.

The figures, reflected in recent diaspora estimates, underscore a sustained wave of outward migration driven by economic volatility, political uncertainty and shifting labour opportunities, analysts say.

The United States remains by far the leading destination for Brazilians, with an estimated over 2 million residents, accounting for the largest share of the diaspora globally.

Migration to the U.S. has historically surged during periods of economic instability in Brazil, particularly during the hyperinflation era of the late 1980s and more recent economic downturns.

Large Brazilian communities are concentrated in states such as Florida, Massachusetts and New York, where service-sector employment and established migrant networks continue to attract new arrivals.

Portugal hosts the second-largest Brazilian population abroad, with more than 500,000 residents, benefiting from shared language and historical ties.

Across Europe more broadly, over 1.6 million Brazilians are estimated to reside in the region, reflecting strong migration flows into countries such as the United Kingdom, Spain, Germany and Italy.

Experts point to easier integration, cultural familiarity and expanding job markets as key pull factors.

Neighbouring Paraguay ranks among the top destinations, hosting more than 260,000 Brazilians, driven largely by cross-border economic activity and agricultural opportunities.

Regional migration within South America accounts for a significant share of the diaspora, with many Brazilians relocating for land access, trade and lower living costs.

The United Kingdom has become a major European destination, with around 230,000 Brazilians, supported by opportunities in hospitality, construction and professional services .

In contrast, Brazil’s migration to Japan reflects historical ties, with many migrants of Japanese descent taking advantage of labour policies that facilitate work permits. Japan hosts more than 210,000 Brazilians, particularly in industrial regions.

Data compiled from energy agencies and industry analyses, including the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), show the U.S. has held the top spot since 2023 , overtaking long-time leader Qatar and reshaping global gas supply dynamics.

The LNG industry has undergone several distinct phases over the past three decades, driven by infrastructure investment, resource discoveries and changing demand patterns.

In the early years, Algeria led global LNG exports between 1990 and 1994, leveraging its pioneering facilities at Arzew. According to Britannica, Algeria was among the first countries to commercialise LNG exports, giving it an early strategic advantage.

That lead faded as newer producers scaled faster. By the mid-1990s, Indonesia took over (1995–2005), supported by large export terminals such as Bontang and Arun, and long-term contracts with Asian buyers, particularly Japan. Industry analyses from Incorrys note that this period coincided with a surge in LNG demand across the Asia-Pacific region.

From 2006 to 2021, Qatar dominated the global LNG market, setting a new benchmark for scale and efficiency.

Backed by the massive North Field, the world ’s largest natural gas reservoir, Qatar expanded production through its Ras Laffan industrial complex. According to industry data and EIA assessments, Qatar at times accounted for over 30% of global LNG supply, cementing its role as the central player in international gas markets.

Its success was built on long-term contracts, cost advantages and the ability to deliver large, consistent volumes to Europe and Asia.

The balance shifted again in 2022, when Australia briefly became the top exporter, driven by major offshore LNG projects including Gorgon, Wheatstone and Ichthys.

However, analysts note that Australia’s lead was short-lived, as production growth plateaued and operational constraints limited further expansion.

Since 2023, the United States has taken the lead, powered by the shale gas revolution and the rapid expansion of LNG export terminals along the Gulf Coast.

According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, the country’s export capacity has grown sharply in recent years, supported by facilities in Texas and Louisiana. The U.S. model differs from traditional exporters, offering flexible contracts and destination-free cargoes, making it particularly attractive to buyers.

Strong demand from Europe — especially following efforts to reduce reliance on Russian pipeline gas — and continued growth in Asian markets have accelerated U.S. exports.

Geopolitics and demand reshape the market

The shift in LNG leadership reflects broader geopolitical and economic changes.

Britannica notes that LNG plays a critical role in global energy systems by enabling natural gas to be transported across oceans, linking producers and consumers that are not connected by pipelines.

Africa’s exposure to global disruptions is closely tied to its reliance on imports and limited intra-continental trade, Kuagbedzi said, arguing that recent crises have underscored the urgency of reducing that dependence.

“Well, I think that we have to deepen African trade,” he said, referencing the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which was created to boost trade among African countries but has yet to reach its full potential.

He warned that continued reliance on external suppliers for essential goods leaves African economies vulnerable when global supply chains are disrupted.

“We cannot continue as a continent to depend on, you know, others for our, you know, supplies in terms of crude oil, in terms of our cereals, in terms of sugar, in terms of everything that we actually import into this country.”

Economists have long argued that such dependence amplifies the impact of global shocks. Analysts, including Dani Rodrik, have pointed to the need for diversification and stronger domestic industries.

"Economic growth and development are possible only through the accumulation of capabilities over time, in areas ranging from skills and technologies to public institutions," wrote in his book, " The Globalisation Paradox ".

Nelson, during the discussion with Abigail Johnson Boakye, intimated that Africa must move beyond exporting raw materials and instead invest in value addition. “I think that we need to diversify our economic basis by adding more value to the raw materials,” he said, pointing to Ghana’s plan to stop exporting raw gold by 2030 as an example of policy direction.

He added that heavy reliance on imports has implications for employment and economic growth. “Once you continue to import, you are creating unemployment in your country, and you are creating a corresponding employment in that country.”

For Nelson, strengthening intra-African trade is central to reducing vulnerability.

“We should try as much as possible to trade within ourselves. We should try as much as possible to deepen our economic and financial relations. And we should also try as much as possible to build our economies based on African solutions that can solve African problems.”

Watch the full interview attached above.

The findings highlight the continued strength of pickup trucks in the American auto market, where large vehicles remain the top choice for consumers in both rural and urban regions.

The map visualisation illustrating the state-by-state breakdown was produced by The World in Maps with support from Mavin Mapping, using national vehicle sales data and industry reports.

Industry data from GoodCarBadCar and Statista shows the F-Series consistently selling hundreds of thousands of units annually, with more than 750,000 units sold in the United States in 2023 alone, far ahead of competing models.

The vehicle leads sales across large parts of the South, Midwest and Western United States, reflecting the strong popularity of trucks for work, transportation and lifestyle use.

While Ford dominates nationally, several other automakers lead sales in specific regions.

The data shows:

Tesla’s rise reflects broader trends in EV adoption. According to BloombergNEF and the U.S. Department of Energy , electric vehicle sales in the U.S. have surged in recent years, with models such as the Tesla Model Y and Model 3 becoming some of the best-selling electric cars nationwide.

Despite the rise of electric vehicles and compact SUVs, pickup trucks remain deeply embedded in American car culture .

Research from Edmunds and Kelley Blue Book shows trucks consistently account for several of the top-selling vehicles in the U.S. each year, driven by demand from construction, agriculture and outdoor lifestyle markets.

The F-Series in particular has become a symbol of the American automotive industry, combining work capability with consumer appeal.

The United States spent an estimated $4.7 trillion (inflation-adjusted) on World War II between 1941 and 1945, making it the most expensive war in American history.

According to historical cost estimates analysed by Norwich University and U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command, the spending surge was driven by massive industrial mobilisation, troop deployments across multiple continents and large-scale wartime production.

The conflict required the United States to convert large parts of its economy to wartime manufacturing, producing ships, aircraft, tanks and weapons on an unprecedented scale.

The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, launched after the September 11 attacks, rank as the second most expensive U.S. conflicts, with total costs estimated at around $4 trillion.

Research from the Costs of War Project at Brown University’s Watson Institute shows that the total financial burden includes military operations, reconstruction, veterans’ healthcare and long-term interest payments on war borrowing.

The study notes that these wars became some of the longest military engagements in modern U.S. history.

The Vietnam War ranks third in inflation-adjusted costs at roughly $843 billion, according to historical analyses cited by Norwich University and U.S. government sources.

The conflict , which lasted from the mid-1950s to 1975, required sustained troop deployments and extensive air and naval operations.

Other major conflicts include:

Both wars required large-scale mobilisation and had significant long-term economic impacts on the United States.

Additionally, the 1990–1991 Gulf War cost about $102 billion, though a large portion of that expense was offset by financial contributions from U.S. allies, according to reports summarised by the U.S. Congress and historical defence spending analyses.

More limited conflicts or short military operations tend to cost far less, though they can still involve billions in military expenditures.

For example, a brief six-day military campaign against Iran since February 28, 2026, is calculated at roughly $11 billion, reflecting the high cost of modern precision warfare and advanced weapon systems even during short engagements.

The enormous financial burden of large-scale wars has shaped U.S. foreign policy and defence strategy over time.

Despite advances in military technology and changes in warfare, the historical data show that major conflicts remain among the most expensive undertakings any nation can face.

Major General Samir Farag told Global South Voices’ Kadria Kassem that the current fighting cannot end regional tensions and that a coordinated approach would be necessary.

“We hope the Arab states will heed the advice of President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi and form an Arab Army with real military capabilities,” he said in an interview.

Wealthy Arab nations could fund a regional defence industry with the ability to bind their militaries together temporarily in times of war, Farag said.

He pointed out that Washington’s military involvement in the region would fluctuate, but the underlying problems would remain, especially after Tehran’s policy of retaliating against its neighbours.

“The war might end, but the conflict will persist,” he warns.

Egypt’s three demands

Farag, who has held a range of positions in the military at home and abroad and is a former governor of Luxor, set out Egypt's position on the conflict:

That Iran should not have nuclear weapons

That Iran should not attack the Gulf states

That Iran’s government should not fall.

The latter, according to Farag, would create a vacuum and disrupt the regional balance between Turkey, Egypt, Iran and Israel. “Iran’s exit would be harmful to the strategic balance in the Middle East,” he said

Strategic regional balance

Historically, Egypt’s policy has swung from close links with the Soviets under President Abdel Nasser to tight ties with America. Today, according to Farag, President Sisi is seeking a strategic balance, building relationships with Russia, China, the European Union and the USA as well as regional partnerships.

A key part of this careful navigation is a desire to avoid conflict.

It would have been easy, Farag notes, for his country to have been drawn into the conflict in Gaza.

“We in the military know the cost of war, its problems, the various dimensions and dangers. We know what problems can occur. That is why we are careful,” he says.

Nevertheless, despite avoiding conflict itself, Egypt is profoundly impacted by wars elsewhere. As the largest importer of wheat from Russia and Ukraine, it has been hard hit by price rises and disruptions from the fighting there. And the turmoil in the Gulf has had a profound impact on shipping, hammering important revenues from the Suez Canal.

Farag points out that Egypt has taken in 10 million refugees – he calls them guests – far more than any of its neighbours. And those displaced peoples have found a home in the country that means they are not trying to move on towards Europe, he observes: “Egypt always offers help to every country.”

Oil prices have surged above $100 per barrel as military strikes, tanker attacks and the disruption of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz rattle global markets.

Global energy watchdog, the International Energy Agency (IEA), said on Thursday, March 12, the conflict has created the "largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market", removing millions of barrels a day from the market.

The Strait of Hormuz alone normally carries about one-fifth of the world’s oil supply. With shipping traffic collapsing after Iranian retaliation and US-Israeli strikes, global energy markets have entered a period of extreme volatility.

For Africa, the consequences could be severe.

According to a Ghanaian financial analyst, Nelson Cudjoe Kuagbedzi, the biggest risk for African economies lies in the disruption of international supply chains.

“Okay, so I think the biggest risk has to do basically with the disruption in the international supply chains,” he told Global South  World. “Most of the goods and products that we use in Africa are imported, most especially petroleum products.”

That vulnerability is rooted in the structure of Africa’s energy sector. Despite producing crude oil, the continent lacks sufficient refining capacity and therefore imports much of the fuel it consumes.

In fact, Africa imports more than 70% of its refined petroleum products, leaving economies highly exposed to fluctuations in global oil markets.

Nelson says the continent’s limited production also makes it impossible to cushion the impact of a prolonged conflict.

“It is also important to know that the total crude output in Africa represents less than 10% of global crude output,” he explained.

The crisis also exposes another longstanding economic challenge of how Africa exports raw materials but imports many finished products.

“We haven't also developed our economies enough to the extent that we will use homegrown solutions to solve homegrown policies,” Kuagbedzi said.

“I mean, raw cocoa, raw gold, raw coffee, raw timber.”

For him, the war should serve as a wake-up call.

However, the Middle East remains the backbone of global oil supply. Many members of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) are located in the region, producing a significant share of the petroleum used worldwide.

According to Nelson, that concentration makes Africa particularly vulnerable.

“Most of the OPEC members that produce the chunk of the petroleum products, whether crude or refined, that we use in Africa, most of those OPEC members are in the Middle East,” he said.

With tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz disrupted and oil shipments stalled, markets are already reacting. Brent crude surged past $100 per barrel for the first time since the Ukraine war's energy shock.

If the crisis deepens, some analysts warn prices could climb much higher, intensifying inflation worldwide.

Figures compiled by World Population Review show that Australia ranks first globally for average home size, followed closely by the United States and New Zealand.

Australia's residential properties average about 2,303 square feet (214 square metres).

The large average reflects Australia’s suburban development patterns, relatively lower population density and a long-standing cultural preference for detached houses.

Many Australian homes include large outdoor spaces, multiple bedrooms and expansive living areas, features common in suburban developments across cities such as Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane.

The United States ranks second globally, with the average new single-family home measuring roughly 2,299 square feet, according to data from the U.S. Census Bureau.

American housing has historically grown larger over the decades, driven by suburban expansion and consumer demand for bigger living spaces.

U.S. housing statistics show that new homes often include features such as large kitchens, garages and open-plan layouts, contributing to the country’s high average residential floor area.

New Zealand follows closely with an average home size of about 2,174 square feet (202 square metres).

Canada ranks fourth, with average homes around 1,948 square feet (181 square metres), reflecting similar suburban development trends seen in North America and parts of Oceania.

Both countries have relatively low population densities compared with many European nations, allowing for larger residential developments.

European countries generally have smaller homes on average, largely due to higher population density, historic urban design and different housing traditions.

Norway ranks fifth globally with homes averaging 1,496 square feet, followed by Greece at 1,356 square feet and Belgium at 1,293 square feet.

The Netherlands and France also appear in the top ten, with average homes measuring around 1,261 square feet and 1,206 square feet, respectively.

Spain rounds out the list with an average home size of 1,044 square feet, reflecting the country’s high proportion of apartment living in urban areas.

These installations serve as logistical hubs, training grounds and command centres for American and allied forces, forming the backbone of NATO’s deterrence posture in the region.

U.S. military installations are located in several European countries, including Germany, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom, Poland, Romania, Greece, Portugal, Belgium, the Netherlands, Turkey, Norway, and Kosovo.

Germany hosts one of the largest concentrations of American military facilities in Europe. Among the most prominent is Ramstein Air Base, a major command centre for U.S. Air Forces in Europe and NATO Allied Air Command.

Ramstein plays a central role in coordinating air operations and logistics for missions across Europe, Africa and the Middle East . The base alone hosts more than 16,000 military personnel and civilian staff, making it one of the largest U.S. military communities outside the United States.

Other key hubs include:

U.S. European Command (EUCOM), headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany, oversees American forces across the region. Estimates suggest more than 65,000 active-duty U.S. troops are stationed within the EUCOM area, according to Department of Defence data cited by Newsweek.

These troops are supported by thousands of civilian employees, contractors and family members living near bases throughout Europe.

The network of bases is believed to allow the United States to maintain a rapid response capability and reassure NATO allies, particularly following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Forward-deployed forces help Washington project power, conduct joint exercises, and support allied operations, while also signalling the United States' commitment to European security.

Many bases date back to the early Cold War era but have since evolved into modern logistical and command centres integrated into NATO’s collective defence structure.

Despite their strategic role, the scale of the American presence has become a subject of debate in recent years.

Recent discussions about possible troop reductions in Eastern Europe have heightened concerns among NATO allies about maintaining deterrence near the alliance’s eastern flank.

Available data shows the aviation crisis was particularly severe in Iran, where multiple airports experienced near-total shutdowns.

The worst-affected airports were concentrated in Iran, where cancellations reached unprecedented levels.

According to Cirium’s flight schedule analysis:

Aerospace Global News reports that the cancellations stem largely from temporary airspace closures, security concerns, and operational restrictions affecting airline scheduling.

Cirium analysts noted that a cancellation rate above 50% is already considered severe disruption, making the near-total shutdown seen in Iranian airports particularly striking.

While Iran recorded the highest cancellation rates, several airports in neighbouring countries also experienced significant operational disruptions.

Key airports impacted include:

Despite being one of the region’s largest global transit hubs, Hamad International Airport in Qatar still recorded over 2,000 flight cancellations, highlighting how even major aviation centres were not immune to the disruptions.

The Middle East sits on one of the busiest aviation corridors in the world , linking Europe, Asia, and Africa through major hubs including Doha, Dubai, and Kuwait.

When large-scale disruptions happen in the region, the impact spreads quickly across global aviation. It affects long-haul international flights, cargo operations, aircraft scheduling, and airline crew movements.

Airlines are often forced to reroute flights to avoid restricted airspace. That means longer routes, higher fuel consumption, increased operating costs, and extended travel times for passengers.

Nevertheless, reports in the US suggest that Russia is using its satellite and intelligence capabilities to keep its ally up to date on US and Israeli movements.

Donald Trump has brushed off questions about the cooperation, saying he is dealing with bigger problems. Amid a surge in global energy prices caused by the conflict, the US has also temporarily suspended its demands that India should refrain from buying Russian oil.

This gives Russia an interest in ensuring Iran can continue to disrupt neighbouring supply routes, according to security consultancy Eigenrac .

“We assess it as likely that Russia may continue providing Iran with intelligence or targeting support on US and allied assets in the region. Beyond strategic alignment against the United States , Moscow also has an economic incentive to sustain pressure on Gulf energy routes. Prolonged disruption or effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz would tighten global supply and could extend preferential arrangements such as India’s current 30-day window to purchase discounted Russian oil,” Eigenrac said in a briefing.

However, the analysts noted that with large investments and an expatriate community in the UAE, Russia may choose to discourage Iran from targeting cities there.

Given the desperation of the Iranian government in its fight for survival, “the impact of such dissuasion may be comparatively low, however,” Eigenrac noted.

According to The Times of Israel , Iran has launched about 810 ballistic missiles and roughly 1,245 drones during the opening phase of the war, one of the largest sustained missile and drone campaigns seen in the Middle East in years.

The data illustrates the scale of Iran’s retaliatory strategy after U.S. strikes targeted Iranian military and nuclear facilities, triggering the 2026 regional conflict.

The largest wave of attacks came during the first two days of the war.

On Day 1 (Feb 28), Iran launched approximately 350 ballistic missiles alongside 294 drones , according to figures reported by the IDF and defence researchers tracking the conflict.

The barrage intensified on Day 2 (March 1), when Iran deployed around 175 missiles and 541 drones, marking the highest number of drones launched in a single day during the first week.

Security analysts say the opening salvo reflected Iran’s attempt to overwhelm air-defence systems through a strategy combining ballistic missiles with large numbers of drones.

After the initial surge, the number of launches began to decline as the conflict progressed.

Missile launches fell to 120 on Day 3 and 50 on Day 4, before dropping further to 40, 32, 28 and 15 missiles over the following days.

Drone activity showed a similar trend. After peaking on Day 2, launches fell to 200 drones on Day 3, then 85 on Day 4, followed by 45, 38, 30 and 12 drones over the next four days.

Iran’s heavy use of drones reflects a broader military doctrine that emphasises relatively low-cost unmanned systems to complement missile forces.

Iran has spent years developing drones such as the Shahed-series loitering munitions, which have been deployed in conflicts across the Middle East and beyond.

According to the 2026 Global Navy Index , the United States Navy remains the most capable naval force in the world, even as China commands the largest fleet by ship count.

The Global Navy Index evaluates naval strength on a 0–100 scale, measuring overall combat capability rather than simply the number of vessels. The ranking considers factors such as fleet composition, advanced technology and combat effectiveness.

The United States Navy ranks first with a score of 100, reflecting its unmatched ability to operate across multiple oceans simultaneously. While the U.S. does not possess the largest fleet in raw numbers, it maintains a powerful combination of aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines and advanced destroyers that allow it to project power globally.

The American fleet included 20 capital ships and 146 major combatants in 2026, with 241 ships counted in the core fleet measured by the index. Carrier strike groups, supported by long-range missiles and sophisticated surveillance systems, give the U.S. Navy a level of operational reach no other maritime force currently matches.

China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) ranks second in overall capability with an index score of 94, but it stands out as the largest navy in the world by number of vessels.

China’s fleet includes 157 major combatants and more than 1,000 vessels in total, a dramatic expansion driven by the country’s rapid shipbuilding programme over the past two decades.

Beijing has invested heavily in modern destroyers, submarines and aircraft carriers as part of a strategy to secure maritime trade routes and strengthen its influence in the South China Sea and the wider Indo-Pacific region.

Russia occupies third place in the ranking with a score of 75. The Russian Navy operates 79 major combatants and nearly 480 vessels overall, supported by a significant submarine fleet.

Although Russia retains formidable capabilities, particularly in nuclear-powered submarines and missile systems, analysts note that parts of its surface fleet are ageing and undergoing gradual modernisation. Moscow continues to focus its naval strategy on areas such as the Arctic, the North Atlantic and the Black Sea, where it seeks to maintain strategic influence.

North Korea’s navy ranks fourth in the index with a score of 72, largely due to the size of its fleet. The Korean People ’s Army Naval Force operates around 385 vessels, including 75 major combatants, though it lacks large capital ships.

Most of these vessels are smaller patrol ships, submarines and coastal defence craft designed for regional operations rather than long-distance power projection.

Several Asian powers are strengthening their maritime forces as strategic competition intensifies in the Indo-Pacific.

Japan’s Maritime Self-Defence Force ranks fifth, with an index score of 60. The Japanese fleet includes 75 major combatants and around 154 ships, with a strong emphasis on advanced destroyers, missile defence systems and submarine warfare. Japan’s naval strategy focuses heavily on safeguarding vital sea lanes and maintaining stability in East Asia.

India follows in sixth place with a score of 51. The Indian Navy operates two capital ships, 41 major combatants and roughly 290 vessels in total. India has been steadily expanding its naval capabilities to secure the Indian Ocean region, which carries a large portion of the world’s maritime trade.

Other countries appearing in the ranking include South Korea, Turkey, Indonesia and Finland, each maintaining naval forces designed primarily for regional defence and maritime security.

South Korea’s navy operates 52 major combatants and around 155 ships, while Turkey maintains 191 vessels and 30 major combatants, reflecting its strategic position between the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

Indonesia fields a large fleet of 326 vessels, emphasising maritime patrol across its vast archipelago, while Finland maintains a coastal defence navy of around 200 vessels focused on Baltic security.

Washington hopes to use Kurdish fighters based along the western border with Iraq as a proxy force to support opposition movements to overthrow the Islamic ruling structures.

With this in mind, US and Israeli attacks have targeted police stations and border infrastructure. However, the Kurds are traditionally lightly armed and would lack the firepower to take on the Iranian army without support from foreign militaries. Additionally, their geographic presence is limited, so other ethnic groups would need to be involved to achieve national impact.

According to estimated figures cited by the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Kuwait have faced the highest number of Iranian missile or drone targets, followed by Qatar, Bahrain and Israel. The data reflects how the regional conflict increasingly involves countries hosting foreign military bases or strategic infrastructure.

The INSS estimates suggest that the UAE has been the most targeted country, with around 863 incidents, followed by Kuwait with 562.

Both countries host major US military facilities and play critical roles in regional logistics and defence cooperation. The UAE is home to Al Dhafra Air Base, which hosts US and allied forces, while Kuwait serves as a key staging hub for US operations in the Middle East.

According to The Guardian, Iran and its allies have increasingly relied on drones and ballistic missiles in recent years because they are cheaper, harder to intercept and capable of reaching targets across the region.

The INSS data also indicates that Qatar and Bahrain have experienced significant numbers of missile and drone targets, with 162 and 129 incidents, respectively.

Both countries host major US military installations. Qatar’s Al Udeid Air Base is the largest US military base in the Middle East, while Bahrain hosts the headquarters of the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet.

Because of their strategic importance, these locations are often viewed as potential targets during periods of regional escalation.

Israel is also listed among the countries affected, with an estimated 113 missile and drone targets.

The country has long been a central actor in regional tensions involving Iran and Iranian-backed groups. Iran has repeatedly denied directly targeting Israel in some incidents, while Israel has accused Tehran of orchestrating attacks through allied groups across the region.

Other neighbouring countries, including Jordan, Cyprus, Oman and Saudi Arabia, appear in the data with lower numbers of incidents.

Experts say unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have become a defining feature of modern Middle Eastern conflicts .

According to Al Jazeera, Iran has significantly expanded its drone programme in recent years, developing systems capable of long-range strikes and supplying similar technology to allied groups across the region.

“Iran’s military strategy is derived from its political structure. Their political aim is to safeguard their own territorial integrity and stop foreign intervention targeted at overthrowing their rule,” a military specialist and former defence official, speaking to Al Jazeera on condition of anonymity, said .

These drones, including models such as the Shahed series, have been used in conflicts across the Middle East and beyond.

Analysts say the relatively low cost of drones compared with conventional missiles makes them attractive for asymmetric warfare.

In contrast, Latin America, Central America and large parts of Africa remained more focused on football-related searches, underscoring the sport’s deep cultural influence in these regions.

The data comes from Google Trends, which tracks the relative popularity of search terms rather than the total number of searches. Countries on the map are coloured according to which term generated greater interest, while colour intensity reflects the proportion of searches for the most popular term within each location during the selected time period.

Spikes in search interest often occur when major international events dominate headlines. As geopolitical tensions rise or diplomatic developments unfold, news coverage and social media discussions tend to drive audiences online in search of context and updates.

Tensions between Iran and the United States escalated sharply at the end of February 2026 after a series of military strikes that pushed the long-running rivalry into open conflict.

On 28 February 2026, the United States and Israel launched coordinated air and missile strikes targeting Iranian nuclear facilities , military infrastructure and senior leadership in what Washington described as a campaign to neutralise Iran’s missile capabilities and prevent it from developing nuclear weapons.

The attacks triggered an immediate response from Tehran. Iran launched missile and drone strikes against Israel and several US military installations across the Middle East, including bases in Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates.

The operation marked a dramatic escalation of a dispute that had been building for weeks during tense nuclear negotiations between Washington and Tehran.

In the days following the initial strikes, the confrontation widened into a broader regional conflict. US and Israeli airstrikes continued to hit Iranian targets, while Iran and its allied groups retaliated with attacks across the Middle East.

Missile strikes and drone attacks have targeted energy infrastructure, embassies and military bases, raising fears that the conflict could disrupt global oil supplies and destabilise the region further. Iran currently reports a death toll of over 1000 people from the strikes.

Still, football continues to dominate searches across many regions. In countries such as Brazil , Argentina and several African nations, the sport regularly drives online traffic during domestic leagues, international tournaments and major transfer periods. With billions of fans worldwide, football remains the most widely followed sport on the planet.

Some analysts have even drawn comparisons with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The comparison should be treated with caution. Iran is not a superpower on the scale of the former USSR. It does not command a formal bloc of allied states comparable to the Warsaw Pact, nor does it possess the same global military reach.

Yet the Islamic Republic is more than simply a state. Since the revolution of 1979, it has represented an ideological project supported by a network of regional allies and non-state actors. If that system were to collapse, the geopolitical map surrounding Iran would inevitably change.

The collapse of a regional influence network

For decades, Tehran has projected influence across the Middle East through a network of partners and proxy forces. These include Hezbollah in Lebanon, militias in Iraq and Syria, the Houthis in Yemen and various political and religious networks throughout the Gulf region.

This model of indirect influence has allowed Iran to exert pressure on adversaries while avoiding direct confrontation. It has also created a complex web of regional dependencies.

Should the Iranian regime lose the capacity or the will to sustain these networks, a significant portion of the region’s existing power structure could weaken. Hezbollah would face reduced support. The Houthis would become more isolated. Iran-aligned militias in Iraq and Syria could lose their central sponsor.

In such a scenario, the immediate geopolitical beneficiaries would likely be the United States and Israel.

Implications for Arab–Israeli relations

A weakening of Iran’s regional influence could also reshape relations between Israel and several Arab states.

The Abraham Accords - which normalised relations between Israel and a number of Arab countries - might expand if Iran’s perceived threat diminished. For several governments in the region, opposition to Iran has been a major factor shaping their strategic calculations.

If that pressure were removed, further diplomatic normalisation with Israel could become more politically feasible.

The emergence of new regional alignments

However, the regional balance of power would not simply shift in Israel’s favour.

Another potential consequence would be the emergence of new alignments among Sunni powers. Saudi Arabia could move beyond its traditional role as an energy power and become a central geopolitical actor shaping regional alliances.

One possibility often discussed by analysts is the formation of a strategic partnership linking Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan.

Each of these states possesses different forms of influence. Saudi Arabia offers financial resources and investment power. Turkey brings industrial capacity and an increasingly sophisticated defence sector. Pakistan provides nuclear expertise and extensive military experience.

Taken together, such a combination could form a powerful regional bloc capable of reshaping Middle Eastern geopolitics.

Why Iran is not the Soviet Union

Despite occasional comparisons, the collapse of the Islamic Republic would not replicate the fall of the Soviet Union.

The USSR possessed a vast military machine, a global ideological movement and a network of formal alliances. Iran’s influence, by contrast, is largely informal and regional.

Its military capabilities remain limited compared with those of major powers, and much of its defence industry relies on adapting or reproducing foreign technologies.

The end of the Islamic Republic would therefore not lead to the sudden fragmentation of a global superpower. Iran itself would likely remain territorially intact.

Yet the comparison with the Soviet collapse remains relevant in one important sense - the collapse of an ideological symbol.

The end of a revolutionary myth

For many political movements around the world , particularly those defined by anti-imperialist narratives, the Iranian revolution has long served as a symbolic example of resistance to Western power.

In this narrative, the Islamic Republic demonstrated that a state could confront the United States and survive outside the orbit of either Washington or Moscow.

If the regime were to fall, that symbolic role would be deeply weakened. It would also prompt uncomfortable questions among those who viewed Tehran primarily through the lens of its opposition to Western influence while overlooking the realities experienced by many Iranians themselves.

These include decades of political repression, economic hardship and strict social controls.

The role of Russia and China

The consequences would also extend to Iran’s relationships with major powers such as Russia and China.

Despite frequent references to a strategic axis linking the three countries, Iran remains the weakest member of this informal grouping.

Russia’s reliance on Iranian support has already diminished as Moscow expands its own military production. China’s relationship with Tehran is largely economic, focused on energy supplies and trade rather than deep strategic alignment.

Neither power is likely to intervene directly to preserve Iran’s leadership. If the Islamic Republic were to collapse, the broader alignment between Moscow, Beijing and Tehran would not necessarily collapse with it. Instead, it would simply lose one of its more fragile elements.

The uncertainty of what comes next

Perhaps the most unpredictable question concerns Iran itself.

A power struggle within the country is not hypothetical. It is embedded in the structure of the state.

The Revolutionary Guards hold immense political and economic power and control a parallel military structure. The regular army represents a separate institutional tradition. Meanwhile, significant parts of Iranian society - including commercial networks and urban populations - have repeatedly demonstrated dissatisfaction with the current political system.

If the regime were to weaken or collapse, several outcomes would be possible.

Iran could experience a military consolidation of power. It could face a turbulent and chaotic transition. Or it could move towards a more secular and democratic political order.

A transformation with global implications

The stakes extend far beyond Iran itself.

A transition towards a secular democratic system in a large Muslim-majority country would challenge long-standing assumptions about governance and political development in the region. It could reshape the political imagination of neighbouring societies.

For this reason, the potential collapse of the Islamic Republic would represent more than the fall of a single regime.

It would weaken a decades-old network of proxy influence, alter regional alliances, disrupt ideological narratives and force global powers to adjust to a new strategic environment .

Iran would not become the next Soviet Union.

Yet the end of the Islamic Republic could still mark the end of an era - and the beginning of a new geopolitical chapter.

But step back for a moment. What is unfolding now is not simply another Middle Eastern crisis. It is a moment of strategic realignment - one that many observers miss because they interpret events through narrow political loyalties or ideological reflexes.

Recent strikes and retaliatory attacks have transformed what was once largely a shadow conflict into open confrontation, reshaping the region’s security landscape and potentially altering global power dynamics.

Seen from a broader perspective, at least six geopolitical lessons are emerging.

1) Iran’s restraint reveals its limits

Iran has launched strikes across much of the Gulf region in retaliation for attacks on its territory and military infrastructure.

Yet the pattern of targets is telling. Tehran has struck several states hosting American military facilities, but it has avoided two particularly sensitive neighbours: Turkey and Azerbaijan.

This restraint is not accidental. Turkey is a member of NATO, and any direct attack on its territory could potentially trigger Article 5, the alliance’s collective defence clause. Such a move would dramatically widen the conflict and place Iran in direct confrontation with the world’s most powerful military alliance.

Azerbaijan presents a different risk. Iran hosts a large ethnic Azerbaijani population, estimated to exceed the population of Azerbaijan itself. A military strike could inflame separatist tensions inside Iran while also jeopardising a key regional transit corridor.

In other words, Iran’s selective targeting reflects strategic constraint rather than confidence.

2) Hezbollah’s autonomy is shrinking

Another shift concerns Iran’s network of regional proxies.

For decades, Tehran projected influence indirectly through organisations such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, militias in Iraq and Syria, and the Houthis in Yemen. This system allowed Iran to challenge adversaries while avoiding direct confrontation.

However, recent developments suggest tighter Iranian control over these groups. At the same time, Israel appears increasingly determined to dismantle that network entirely.

If successful, this would mark a structural change in the region’s balance of power, weakening one of Iran’s most important instruments of influence.

3) A quiet Arab–Israeli alignment is emerging

Perhaps the most striking consequence of Iran’s actions is the reaction of several Arab states.

Historically, many Gulf governments avoided overt security cooperation with Israel. Yet the perception of a growing Iranian threat has pushed some of them closer to Israel in practice, if not always formally.

In effect, a de facto security alignment appears to be forming between Israel and several Arab states that share a common concern about Iran’s regional ambitions. Analysts have already noted that the conflict is accelerating the emergence of a new regional security architecture centred on US-aligned powers.

This shift would have been difficult to imagine only a decade ago.

4) Moscow's interests exposed

Another widely discussed narrative is the supposed strategic axis linking Russia and Iran.

In reality, the relationship has always been more limited than often portrayed. Moscow may condemn Western military actions against Tehran, but its willingness to intervene directly remains uncertain. ( AP News )

Russia’s strategic interests do not perfectly align with Iran’s. While both countries oppose American influence, their regional priorities differ, and Moscow maintains pragmatic relations with Israel as well.

The current crisis highlights the limits of that partnership.

5) Ukraine ’s battlefield experience is becoming valuable

One unexpected geopolitical development lies far from the Middle East.

After years of large-scale warfare, Ukraine has become one of the most experienced militaries in the world in areas such as drone warfare and missile interception.

As unmanned systems proliferate across the Middle East, this expertise is becoming increasingly relevant. Countries with sophisticated air defence systems often discover that technology alone is not enough. Operational experience matters.

Ukraine’s battlefield knowledge may therefore become an exportable strategic asset.

6) The deeper contest is about China

Finally, the most consequential lesson may have little to do with Iran itself.

Look at the broader pattern of American strategy: pressure on Iran, sanctions on Venezuela, and growing competition across energy markets and maritime chokepoints.

The Strait of Hormuz alone carries roughly one fifth of global oil supply, making it one of the most critical energy corridors in the world.

Many of the economies most dependent on this flow are in Asia , particularly China. Any disruption to Gulf energy exports therefore carries profound implications for Beijing’s economic security.

Viewed through this lens, pressure on Iran is not only about nuclear weapons or regional security. It may also form part of a broader geo-economic competition with China.

A preview of a new geopolitical era

The irony, however, is that such pressure carries risks for Washington as well. Sharp increases in oil prices would affect the global economy, including American consumers.

Managing this balance requires careful calibration.

Yet one conclusion already seems clear. The current confrontation is not simply another regional conflict.

It may represent the early phase of a wider geopolitical shift - one that redraws Middle Eastern alliances, tests Russia’s strategic credibility, elevates Ukraine’s military expertise and forms part of a long-term strategic competition between the United States and China.

Seen from that perspective, the crisis unfolding today is less about a single war than about the shape of the next international order.

This article is based on an interview with Dov Zerah , Viatcheslav Avioutskii et Jean-Pierre Favennec in Atlantico.fr .

The United States carried out extensive bombing of Japan and Germany in 1945 during World War Two, including the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

During the Korean War from 1950 to 1953 , U.S.-led forces conducted sustained air operations over North Korea. In Southeast Asia, U.S. aircraft bombed Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia between the mid-1960s and early 1970s. U.S. government figures show that more than two million tonnes of ordnance were dropped on Laos alone during that period.

In 1991, the Gulf War marked a major air campaign against Iraq following its invasion of Kuwait. Reuters archives show that coalition forces led by Washington launched thousands of air sorties during the conflict.

Subsequent U.S. air operations in Iraq occurred in 1993, 1996 and 1998, and again on a larger scale in 2003 during the U.S.-led invasion. Airstrikes continued in Iraq in later years as part of operations against the Islamic State.

After the September 11 attacks in 2001, the United States launched airstrikes in Afghanistan, beginning a conflict that lasted until 2021. According to data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) project, U.S. air and drone strikes continued in Afghanistan for nearly two decades.

Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia are also countries where U.S. forces have conducted drone strikes targeting militant groups.

Drone operations intensified in the 2000s and 2010s, with successive U.S. administrations expanding targeted strike programmes. ACLED data for 2025 indicates that U.S. air operations remain active in parts of Somalia and Syria.

Latest strike action

The most recent U.S. military strike activity is part of a large-scale joint US–Israeli offensive against Iran, launched on February 28, 2026. The campaign has involved coordinated air and missile strikes across multiple Iranian cities and military targets, including air defence systems, missile launchers and key leadership facilities.

U.S. Central Command has confirmed combat fatalities among American forces in the ongoing conflict zone, marking one of the first acknowledged deaths of U.S. service members in direct engagements with Iranian missiles or rockets.

Six U.S. service members were killed when Iranian forces launched missiles targeting a fortified U.S. tactical operations centre in Kuwait.

The above map displays individual guesses as yellow dots scattered across the globe, while correct answers are marked in green. The results reveal widespread confusion, with many respondents placing Iran in regions as varied as Europe, North Africa, Central Asia and even Australia.

Iran is located in Western Asia, bordered by Iraq, Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan, with coastlines along the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea. It plays a central role in Middle Eastern politics and global energy markets .

The findings came at a time of heightened tensions between the United States and Iran in early 2020, following military escalations that brought the two countries to the brink of broader conflict.

It is 2026, and the US-Iran tensions are still blazing hot.

On Feb. 28, 2026, the United States and Israel carried out coordinated strikes across Iran . The operation, referred to by Washington as Operation Epic Fury and by Israel as Operation Lion’s Roar, targeted military infrastructure, command centres and missile installations.

Blasts were reported in Tehran and several other cities, with Iranian air defence systems and missile launchers among the sites hit. U.S. and Israeli officials described the action as pre-emptive, aimed at weakening Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities following stalled negotiations over its nuclear programme.

Iranian state media reported that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was killed in the initial wave of attacks, a claim later confirmed by multiple outlets, making it one of the most consequential moments in the conflict.

The comparative assessment, compiled by Military Power Rankings 2025 and cited by defence analysts, measures manpower, land, naval, air and nuclear capabilities.

The United States fields approximately 2.18 million military personnel, compared with 1 million for Iran and 643,000 for Israel. The figures include active-duty forces and reserve components.

In land forces, the United States deploys around 534,000 personnel, ahead of Iran’s 354,000 and Israel’s 145,000. While the U.S. Army remains the largest and most technologically advanced of the three, analysts say Iran’s ground doctrine emphasises missile units and asymmetric operations rather than conventional manoeuvre warfare.

Naval strength shows the widest gap. The United States Navy accounts for roughly 532,000 personnel and operates the world’s largest fleet, including 11 nuclear-powered aircraft carriers .

Iran’s naval forces total about 18,000 personnel, with a focus on fast-attack craft and anti-ship missile systems designed for operations in the Strait of Hormuz, Iranian state media, including Fars News Agency, have reported. Israel’s navy comprises approximately 10,000 personnel and centres on coastal defence and submarine-based deterrence in the Mediterranean.

The United States Air Force also includes around 339,000 personnel and operates advanced fifth-generation aircraft such as the F-22 and F-35. Iran’s air force numbers about 31,000 personnel and relies largely on ageing aircraft, though Tehran has invested heavily in drone and missile capabilities. Israel’s air force, with roughly 28,000 personnel, is widely regarded as one of the most technologically capable in the region and operates F-35 stealth fighters.

In nuclear capabilities, the United States is estimated to possess around 5,000 nuclear warheads. Israel is widely believed to maintain an undeclared arsenal of approximately 80 to 90 warheads, although it neither confirms nor denies possession . Iran does not possess nuclear weapons, though its nuclear programme remains under international scrutiny amid ongoing diplomatic tensions.

On Feb. 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched coordinated military strikes against targets across Iran in a major escalation of regional tensions. The offensive, variously referred to as Operation Epic Fury by the U.S. and Operation Lion’s Roar by Israel, targeted Iranian military infrastructure, command and control facilities and missile sites.

Explosions were widely reported in Tehran and other cities, and Iranian air defences and missile launchers were struck. The strikes were described by both governments as pre-emptive and aimed at degrading Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities, amid stalled diplomatic negotiations over Tehran’s nuclear programme.

Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was reported killed in the initial attack by Iranian state media and later confirmed by multiple outlets, marking one of the most significant developments in the conflict.

The offensive sparked immediate retaliation from Iran, including missile and drone strikes against Israeli territory and U.S. military bases in the region, leading to a wider conflict.

Explosions were reported overnight in Tehran and the nearby city of Karaj, with Iranian media saying airstrikes also hit Isfahan, Yazd and Khuzestan on Monday, March 2.

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz bent down to take a closer look. The scene was rich in symbolism: more than 30 years ago, German experts came to China with blueprints and Siemens machine tools, teaching local factories how to achieve precision manufacturing. Today, the German chancellor has come in person, seeking a new support point for German industry at the intersection of artificial intelligence and humanoid robotics.

This shift in vantage point reflects a profound adjustment in Berlin’s China policy . If the defining theme of the Olaf Scholz era was the defensively framed notion of “de-risking,” then Merz’s first visit to China in the Year of the Horse signals that Germany is moving into a more pragmatic and bold phase - a phase of “re-calibration.”

Farewell to the “De-risking” Illusion

When the idea of “de-risking” first emerged, it was seen as a way for Europe to maintain a “middle ground” and save face amid the strategic rivalry between China and the United States. But as a new wave of tariffs rolls in with the “Trump 2.0” era, Berlin has come to realise that if it were to sever its ties with the world’s largest market, German industry would not truly “de-risk.” Instead, stripped of scale effects and innovation sources, it would face the risk of functional decline.

Merz’s itinerary in China - from Hangzhou to Beijing - is a concrete enactment of this “re-calibration.” “Calibration” here no longer means simply reducing dependence, but achieving a defensive form of symbiosis through “deep embedding.” His appearance at Siemens Energy’s plant in Hangzhou sent a clear signal: rather than pacing anxiously outside the walls, Germany would do better to become an indispensable technological node in China’s forthcoming “15th Five-Year Plan.”

Xi Jinping’s “Three Points” and Strategic Steadiness

At the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse in Beijing, Chinese President Xi Jinping put forward “three points” to Merz, providing a Chinese frame of reference for this “re-calibration” of China–Germany relations.

Reliable partners : Against the backdrop of growing scepticism in Washington toward the multilateral trading system, Beijing has stressed “mutual support,” hoping Germany will continue to play the role of a stable “guardian of order.”

Innovation partners : This cuts right to Germany’s core position. Whether it is BMW integrating DeepSeek’s reasoning capabilities, or Siemens collaborating with Shanghai Electric to advance the green and digital transformation of power grids, China and Germany are trying to build a new industrial standard of “German precision plus Chinese algorithms.”

People-to-people partners: This is aimed at repairing the social and cognitive rifts widened by ideological narratives.

Embedded within these “three points” is a core logic: in a geopolitical landscape marked by overlapping turbulence, the stability of China–Germany ties is itself a strategic asset that can hedge against external uncertainties.

Joint Statement: Growing Up in Competition

The “China–Germany Joint News Statement” issued during the visit charted the course for this round of policy re-calibration.

First, the statement defines bilateral ties as an “all-around strategic partnership,” emphasising that their economic and trade relations should be long-term, balanced, reliable and sustainable. For Germany, this is a defensive framework designed to buffer the shocks of Trump-style unilateralism.

Second, the two sides explicitly wrote their respective concerns into the joint document, no longer sidestepping problems in the relationship. In other words, China–Germany ties are entering a more mature stage in which competition and cooperation co-exist: the goal is no longer to avoid friction, but to “manage competition” through institutionalised consultation mechanisms.

“German Hardware, Chinese Soul”

Merz did not just bring home an order for up to 120 Airbus planes. A deeper shift is unfolding at the technological foundations. BMW is leveraging Alibaba’s ecosystem and DeepSeek’s algorithms to redefine “driving pleasure,” while at Siemens Energy’s plant in Hangzhou, the German chancellor saw a complete local value chain that spans R&D, engineering design, manufacturing, testing and validation, project execution, and operations and maintenance.

China is no longer just an important market for German companies; it has become a pillar of their global supply chains, and of their innovation and manufacturing systems. Siemens Energy is working with Chinese partners to tap markets in the Middle East, Central Asia, the Asia-Pacific and Latin America . German firms once embraced the motto “In China, for China,” but a more accurate description today would be “In China, for the world.”

When Merz watched the humanoid robot in Hangzhou write that character “Fu,” the scrutinizing look in his eyes may well have captured Germany’s current state of mind: a mix of urgency about China’s technological surge, and anticipation for a new order of future cooperation.

Du Yubin is a reporter and chief editor at China Global Television Network (CGTN). He previously served two six-year postings in Washington D.C. and London, focusing on coverage of China–US and China–Europe relations, and has worked in international communication and digital media for over 15 years. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author

The United States and the European Union have, however, provided billions of dollars in military and economic aid, including advanced air defence systems and artillery. Aid debates in Western capitals continue to shape Kyiv’s battlefield capacity.

Russia, meanwhile, faces sweeping economic sanctions targeting its banking, energy and defence sectors. While sanctions have strained parts of the economy, Moscow has redirected trade and increased domestic arms production.

Despite a call for a ceasefire, Ukraine insists on full territorial restoration and security guarantees, while Russia maintains claims over annexed regions. The United Nations continues to call for a negotiated settlement, but no ceasefire agreement has been reached.

In all of these, the humanitarian toll remains severe, with millions displaced and infrastructure heavily damaged. The conflict continues to affect global food and energy markets .

Watch the full video above as voices from the Global South dish out what's next for both parties to save themselves and avert the deadly cost.

For international audiences, the message was clear. America First remains firmly in place.

Back to Plan A

Trump not only defended the use of import duties after the Supreme Court ruled that he had exceeded his authority in imposing sweeping across-the-board raises, he promised more.

"So despite the disappointing ruling, it's saving our country ... many of the wars I've settled was because of the threat of tariffs , I wouldn't have been able to settle them without. [They] will remain in place under fully approved and tested alternative legal statutes."

Although the ruling insisted that revenue-raising was a matter for Congress, Trump told the chamber he wouldn't be needing their consent for the new measures.

For trading partners, this was intended to be a clear signal that legal obstacles at home will not soften Washington’s trade stance. Trump went further, reviving a long-held claim that tariffs could replace income tax revenue altogether. "I believe the tariffs paid for by foreign countries will, like in the past, substantially replace the modern-day system of income tax."

Economists dispute that foreign countries bear the full cost of tariffs, but the political message was blunt: the era of predictable US trade policy is not returning any time soon.

Iran and the magic words

The sharpest foreign policy focus was Iran. The United States has built up its largest regional military presence since the Iraq war, amid rising tensions over Tehran’s nuclear programme and missile development.

Trump framed Iran as an existential threat. "For decades, it had been the policy of the United States never to allow Iran to obtain a nuclear weapon. Many decades. Since they seized control of that proud nation 47 years ago, the regime and its murderous proxies have spread nothing but terrorism and death and hate. They've killed and maimed thousands of American service members and hundreds of thousands and even millions of people… this is some terrible people. They've already developed missiles that can threaten Europe and our bases overseas, and they're working to build missiles that will soon reach the United States of America."

While expressing a preference for diplomacy, he drew a firm red line. "My preference is to solve this problem through diplomacy. But one thing is certain, I will never allow the world's number one sponsor of terror, which they are by far, to have a nuclear weapon."

Immigration and crime

Immigration remains central to Trump’s domestic and international messaging. He declared: "After four years in which millions and millions of illegal aliens poured across our borders totally unvetted and unchecked, we now have the strongest and most secure border in American history by far. In the past nine months, zero illegal aliens have been admitted to the United States. But we will always allow people to come in legally, people that will love our country and will work hard to maintain our country."

He also linked immigration to crime and social disorder, inviting into the chamber families who had become victims.

And he didn't forget to mention his favourite theme, frauds perpetrated by some members of the Somali community: "The Somali pirates who ransacked Minnesota remind us that there are large parts of the world where bribery, corruption, and lawlessness are the norm, not the exception."

For many countries, particularly in Africa and Latin America , such rhetoric reinforces the perception of a United States that sees migration primarily through a lens of threat rather than opportunity. Trump insisted that he was ready to welcome in people who love the US, although in the past he has indicated that the ones he would like to see coming are from Norway, Sweden or white South Africans.

Military prowess

Trump balanced his hard-line positions with repeated praise for the armed forces. "Our military and police are stacked." "We have the most powerful military on Earth." "we love our military."

At the same time, he renewed sweeping claims about his role as a peacemaker. "In my first 10 months, I ended eight wars, including Cambodia and Thailand; Pakistan and India - would have been a nuclear war - 35 million people, said the Prime Minister of Pakistan, would have died if it were not for my involvement; Kosovo and Serbia; Israel and Iran; Egypt and Ethiopia; Armenia and Azerbaijan; the Congo and Rwanda; and of course the war in Gaza which proceeds at a very low level."

Some of those conflicts - Serbia and Kosovo, Ethiopia and Egypt - were either long-running diplomatic tensions or disputes that had not escalated into full-scale wars. For Trump, it didn't matter. He was the bringer or war or peace.

The broader message

Taken together, the speech offered a message of continuity rather than change. Whether that will be enough to revive the president's flagging approval ratings remains to be seen. And if it doesn't, the world may experience a new phase of America First.

World Reframed is produced in London by Global South World, part of the Impactum Group. Its editors are Duncan Hooper and Ismail Akwei.

ISSN 2978-4891

While air and maritime trafficking still play roles, land routes through Mexico dominate the final stage of the journey.

Here’s how the flow typically works.

The land route: Mexico as the gateway

The map above highlights a green land corridor running from Colombia northward through Panama and Central America, into Mexico and across major U.S. border cities such as El Paso, Laredo and Mexicali.

This aligns with findings from the DEA’s National Drug Threat Assessment, which consistently reports that Mexican transnational criminal organisations control most wholesale drug distribution in the United States. After cocaine leaves South America, it is transported through countries including Panama, Costa Rica, Honduras and Guatemala before entering Mexico.

From there, it moves overland across the U.S.–Mexico border, often concealed in vehicles, commercial shipments or through smuggling tunnels. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) seizure data regularly shows large quantities of cocaine, methamphetamine, heroin and fentanyl intercepted at southwest border ports of entry.

The land route remains dominant because it allows traffickers to move bulk quantities with established logistics networks and corruption infrastructure already in place, according to the DEA.

The Sea route: Caribbean and Pacific maritime corridors

The map’s blue arrows illustrate maritime trafficking through both the Pacific Ocean and the Caribbean Sea.

UNODC reports that traffickers frequently use “go-fast” boats , fishing vessels, semi-submersibles and container shipping to move cocaine from Colombia’s Pacific coast and Caribbean ports. From there, shipments pass through Central American coastal states or Caribbean islands before continuing north.

The U.S. Coast Guard plays a central role in maritime interdictions. In recent years, it has announced record cocaine seizures in the eastern Pacific, underscoring how significant the sea route remains. However, despite substantial seizures, maritime trafficking persists due to the vast expanse of open water and limited enforcement capacity relative to the scale of operations.

The air route

The map also shows air corridors from northern South America into Central America.

While less common for bulk shipments today than in the 1980s and 1990s, air trafficking still occurs. According to UNODC, traffickers use small aircraft to land in remote airstrips in countries such as Honduras and Nicaragua. From there, shipments are transferred to land vehicles for overland transport north.

Air routes are typically used for high-value loads that require speed and reduced exposure time.

While cocaine routes remain critical, the DEA notes that synthetic drugs such as fentanyl increasingly dominate the U.S. overdose crisis. Unlike cocaine, fentanyl is often manufactured in Mexico using precursor chemicals sourced from Asia and then trafficked across the land border.

This shift has further established Mexico’s role as the primary entry point for illicit drugs into the United States.

At a recent African Union summit, reparations for the mass human trafficking, colonialism and apartheid were designated as a flagship priority of the Union. The move marks a significant moment in a long-running effort to coordinate Africa’s position on one of the gravest chapters in global history.

Ghana has been tasked with leading the development of a unified proposal. Situated on the West African coast, Ghana - like several neighbouring countries - became a major hub in the trafficking of enslaved Africans. Hundreds of thousands of men, women and children were forcibly taken from its shores and transported across the Atlantic in appalling conditions.

For decades, there was little international consensus about how to address this history. Many of the countries responsible sought to frame slavery as a closed chapter. Some African states prioritised other urgent post-independence challenges. Caribbean nations, whose populations include many descendants of enslaved Africans, developed their own approaches shaped by different political and economic realities.

Now, however, the African Union is attempting to bring together African states and the wider diaspora behind a common position.

The gravest crime

At the heart of the new initiative is a draft declaration that characterises the trafficking and enslavement of Africans as the gravest crime against humanity.

Slavery is already prohibited under international law as a peremptory norm - a jus cogens principle from which no derogation is permitted. The proposed resolution builds on this legal foundation and rests on three pillars - historical accuracy, legal defensibility and continental and diaspora alignment.

The language has been deliberately refined. The draft title reads: Declaration of the Trafficking in Enslaved Africans and Racialised Chattel Enslavement of Africans as the Gravest Crime Against Humanity . Supporters argue that such precision matters. It recognises the systematic trafficking of millions of Africans, the racialised and institutional nature of chattel enslavement, and the unprecedented scale and enduring consequences of these crimes.

The emphasis on describing slavery as a crime - rather than merely a trade or an economic system - reflects a broader shift in tone. For many African leaders, justice begins with acknowledgement: first, that a crime occurred, and second, an understanding of its nature and consequences.

A 15-point plan

Although the full text of the new declaration has yet to be published, its direction is informed by the 2023 Accra Proclamation on Reparations.

That proclamation sets out a 15-point plan. It includes the creation of a reparations fund, but extends far beyond financial compensation. It calls for reform of international financial institutions to produce a fairer global system for countries subjected to slavery and colonial exploitation. It demands the return of cultural artefacts removed during periods of enslavement and colonial rule. It urges the formation of a joint front across nations and peoples who suffered as a result of these systems.

The proclamation also links historical injustice to contemporary global inequalities. It highlights the disproportionate impact of climate change on the Global South and argues that patterns of extraction and dependency established during colonialism continue today through economic and cultural dependence on former colonial powers.

In this framing, reparations are not simply about calculating a monetary sum for historical suffering. They are about restructuring relationships and correcting systemic imbalances that trace their origins to slavery and colonial rule.

It's not (only) about the money

African leaders have been clear that the issue of reparations and restitutive justice goes beyond money.

Setting the historical record straight is seen as a central objective. Around 12 million Africans were forcibly transported across the Atlantic. An estimated 2 million died during the Middle Passage - some from disease and brutality, others thrown overboard, and some choosing death over a life in bondage.

The argument is that this historical reality must be formally recognised at the highest international level. Supporters stress that no single payment or lump sum could meaningfully account for the scale of suffering or the generational harm inflicted. The damage extended far beyond those who were taken. Entire societies were destabilised. Generations of descendants across Africa and the diaspora continue to live with the social and economic consequences.

Questions of financial quantum are still under research, and leaders suggest that any eventual settlement would not simply involve distributing money to governments. Instead, they envision a broader programme of transformation - returning stolen artefacts, addressing structural inequities, and restoring opportunity to affected communities.

A Changing Global Context

The renewed push comes at a time of uncertainty in the international system. The multilateral order established after the Second World War is under strain. Nations increasingly act unilaterally and prioritise domestic interests. Humanitarian assistance and overseas development funding to Africa and other parts of the Global South are declining.

In this context, African leaders argue that the continent cannot remain a passive actor, appealing for aid while global priorities shift. Instead, they say Africa must take its destiny into its own hands and assert its moral and legal claims on the world stage.

The past cannot be undone. But it can be acknowledged. For those leading this initiative, acknowledgement is the first step towards justice.

After centuries in which the suffering of enslaved Africans was minimised, reframed or ignored, many across the continent believe the moment has come to secure formal recognition - and to begin reshaping the systems that grew out of that injustice.

World Reframed is produced in London by Global South World, part of the Impactum Group. Its editors are Duncan Hooper and Ismail Akwei.

ISSN 2978-4891

For thousands of years, Indigenous nations lived in every region of the continent, from the forests of the Northeast to the plains, deserts, mountains, and Arctic coastlines. These were not scattered groups, but organised societies with distinct languages, governance systems, spiritual traditions, and deep connections to place.

Then came a new age of upheaval.

With European colonisation, Native communities faced centuries of displacement, forced removal, disease, violence, and assimilation policies. Entire nations were pushed from ancestral lands, while others were confined to reservations or relocated across vast distances. Despite this, Indigenous peoples endured, and Native nations remain very much alive today.

A new map from The World in Maps echoes this reality.

The image, titled Percentage of Native Americans by U.S. State, highlights where Native Americans made up the largest share of each state’s population based on 2010-era data.

The map was shared via Reddit by the account u/ImOkNotANoob , whose credit appears directly on the graphic.

It uses colour shading to show the percentage of Native Americans in each state:

According to the map, the highest proportions of Native Americans were concentrated in:

These patterns align closely with what the U.S. Census Bureau has reported historically, particularly Alaska’s position as the state with the highest share of Native people, including Alaska Native groups such as the Yupik, Iñupiat, and Aleut communities.

States like Oklahoma rank highly for reasons rooted in forced history. The relocation of tribes during the 19th century, including the Trail of Tears, reshaped Indigenous geography in lasting ways.

In the Southwest, tribal nations such as the Navajo Nation, Hopi, Zuni, and Apache communities remain central to the region’s cultural and political landscape.

The annual competition, overseen by the Mondial du Fromage et des Produits Laitiers , brings together expert judges from around the world to assess texture, flavour complexity and innovation in cheese.

The leading cheese overall was Gruyère AOP Vorderfultigen Spezial (over 18 months old) from Switzerland, which earned a score of 85 in the competition. Aged cheeses like this one are prized for deep, nutty flavours and a firm yet creamy mouthfeel, traits long associated with Swiss alpine cheesemaking.

Other Swiss standouts included:

Cheese experts say this cluster of high scores spells Switzerland’s balance of tradition and consistency. Alpine cheeses from this region often benefit from long ageing and rich pastures that influence milk quality.

France holds strong

France maintained its reputation as a cheesemaker to watch, with Crémeux des Aldudes aux fleurs by Etxaldia earning a score of 84 and Ossau-Iraty AOP (pasteurised sheep milk) scoring 78.

French entries are typically noted for their diversity and terroir-driven character, and this year’s results reflect that range, from rich, floral rind cheeses to nuanced sheep milk classics.

The 2025 awards also highlighted quality cheeses from outside traditional European strongholds:

What this means

The World Cheese Awards remain one of the most influential and internationally respected competitions in the culinary world, drawing thousands of entries across dozens of categories every year. Winning here is a signal to retailers, chefs and consumers that a product stands out not just locally but on a global stage.

According to the Mondial du Fromage et des Produits Laitiers , judges evaluate each cheese blind, scoring based on taste balance, texture and aroma. That approach helps ensure winners are selected for quality above branding or origin alone.

The crux of the tension lies in Tokyo’s recent strategic pivot. The Takaichi administration in Japan has been increasingly vocal about its “survivability” in a Taiwan conflict, effectively linking the security of the Taiwan Strait to Japan’s own sovereign defence. Wang Yi didn’t just rebut this; he weaponised the venue itself. Standing on German soil - a nation that has spent eighty years performing the arduous work of historical “liquidation”. Wang drew a stinging parallel. He lauded Germany for its moral clarity while accusing Japan of harbouring “unabandoned colonial ambitions” and allowing the “ghost of militarism” to dictate its modern defence posture.

His warning was devoid of typical diplomatic ambiguity:  “If Japan seeks to gamble once more, it will face a swifter defeat and a more disastrous loss.”  This was a calculated move to frame Japan as the “Revisionist Power” in the eyes of the West, using the memory of World War II to invalidate Japan’s current push for security “normalisation.”

A House Divided: The Transactional West

While Beijing was drawing red lines in Asia, the “Western” front showed deep fissures. The discourse from Washington has shifted from “leadership” to “leverage.”

Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s presence in Munich was less about reassuring allies and more about setting the terms of a new, transactional contract. The message to Berlin and Paris was clear: the American security umbrella is no longer a public good: it is a conditional service. This has forced Germany into a state of “Anxious Realism.” Chancellor Merz’s government is now walking a razor’s edge, scrambling to build a “European pillar” of defence to appease Washington, while simultaneously resisting “de-coupling” from China to save its struggling industrial heartland.

Meanwhile, France continues to play the “Strategic Autonomist.” The French delegation’s rhetoric suggests they have already mourned the death of the old transatlantic order. For Paris, the instability is an opportunity to forge a “Third Pole,” seeking a pragmatic, if tense, coexistence with Beijing to offset the “Wrecking-ball Politics” coming out of a polarised Washington.

The article solely represents the views of Yubin Du, a journalist for Chinese broadcaster CGTN who was based in Washington DC and London between 2012 and 2025.

New language patterns are particularly visible when looking at the most commonly spoken languages after English across different regions. In the United States, Spanish has become the clear second language in much of the country. In Canada, French continues to play a central role beyond Quebec, maintaining its influence in several provinces and territories.

According to the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey , more than one in five Americans aged five or older speak a language other than English at home. Spanish is by far the most widely spoken of these, used by tens of millions of residents nationwide.

The Census Bureau reports that Spanish remains the leading non-English language in American households, particularly across the South, Southwest, and large parts of the East Coast.

These trends reflect both long-established Hispanic communities and more recent immigration patterns, making Spanish a defining feature of the country’s modern linguistic identity.

Canada’s language story differs significantly due to its official bilingual framework. French is not only widely spoken in Quebec but also holds a strong presence in provinces such as New Brunswick and parts of Ontario.

Statistics from the Canadian government show that French continues to shape public life, education, and cultural policy across multiple regions.

The endurance of French reflects Canada’s historical foundations as well as ongoing efforts to support official language communities.

Beyond Spanish and French, smaller language communities remain significant in certain areas. In Alaska, for example, Indigenous languages such as Yupik still play an important role, reflecting the resilience of Native communities and their linguistic heritage.

These patterns highlight that language use is often tied not just to immigration, but to local history and identity. Indigenous languages, though spoken by smaller populations, remain central in specific regions and are increasingly recognised in cultural preservation efforts.

For more than a century, economic power meant industrial power. The battle was over manufacturing. But that battle is largely settled. Supply chains have been redrawn, factories relocated, and the geography of production transformed. A new contest is under way.

It is the battle for power. Not political power, but electrical power.

Electricity is the enabling force behind everything else. It runs factories, data centres, transport systems and defence networks. It is what allows countries to manufacture, to digitise, to modernise and to fight. Energy is not just another sector of the economy. It is the fuel of the economy.

And at this moment in history, one country has placed itself at the centre of that system. First through trade. Then through renewables. Now, potentially, through the most transformative technology of all: nuclear fusion.

1. Trade wars

The China US trade conflict of 2025 will likely be remembered as a decisive moment in the global balance of power.

Donald Trump imposed sweeping tariffs on allies and adversaries alike, threatening to restrict access to the world’s largest consumer market. The UK, Europe, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and others made concessions in return for slightly lower duties. They did not reverse the policy. They negotiated for marginally better terms.

One country did not give way. China.

Tariffs escalated in stages. Ten percent. Twenty percent. Fifty four percent. One hundred and four percent. Eventually more than one hundred and twenty five percent on some goods. The pressure was intense.

Beijing responded in kind, but more importantly it deployed a weapon decades in the making: control of critical minerals.

In April, China signalled it could restrict exports of rare earth elements such as samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium and yttrium. These are not household names. Yet they are essential to the production of high performance magnets used in electric motors, wind turbines, defence systems and advanced electronics.

China produces up to 90 percent of global supply in several of these materials. Cutting off access would not simply raise prices. It would stall entire industries.

That leverage mattered. Tariffs were eventually wound back after high level talks, without Beijing making equivalent structural concessions. Whatever one thinks of the politics, the economic lesson was stark. Through long term planning, subsidies, environmental trade offs and export controls, China had embedded itself so deeply in strategic supply chains that it could exert systemic pressure.

This was not an isolated case. During the pandemic, China demonstrated overwhelming dominance in the production of personal protective equipment. In consumer electronics, seven of the top nine phone manufacturers are Chinese. Even devices branded in the United States or South Korea are largely assembled in Chinese factories.

Over three decades, China moved from low cost goods to advanced manufacturing and then to strategic inputs. It did not simply compete in markets. It positioned itself at choke points.

The trade war did not create that reality. It revealed it.

2. The green transition

The next stage of the power shift is already visible in the energy transition.

The world is undergoing the most significant transformation in electricity generation since the first mass power plants came online in the nineteenth century. Wind and solar capacity have surged globally. But one country stands apart.

China has multiplied its wind capacity several times over since the early 2010s and expanded its solar capacity at extraordinary speed. It accounts for close to half of global installed solar capacity and is still growing faster than any other major economy.

At the same time, China continues to build coal plants. Critics point to this as evidence of contradiction. In reality, it reflects scale. China is not simply replacing old capacity. It is expanding total energy production on a vast scale, ensuring reliability while renewables ramp up.

Crucially, China does not only install renewables. It manufactures them.

It produces more than 80 percent of the world’s solar panels and around 60 percent of wind turbines. Six of the top ten global manufacturers in these sectors are Chinese. The same pattern is visible in lithium batteries and electric vehicles. In 2010, battery technology was led by firms in Japan and South Korea. Within a decade, China controlled roughly three quarters of global production, supported by a vertically integrated domestic supply chain and strong state backing.

Rare earths tell a similar story. The United States once dominated production. By 2020, China controlled the overwhelming majority of global processing capacity.

For developing countries, cheap Chinese solar panels and batteries have been transformative. They have enabled electrification at lower cost and accelerated economic development. For advanced economies, affordable electric vehicles have made net zero targets more attainable.

Yet from a strategic perspective, the pattern is clear. The first phase of the clean energy transition has been shaped and largely controlled by China. The technologies that will replace fossil fuels are, to a significant extent, designed, manufactured and refined within its borders.

Energy is becoming the central arena of geopolitical competition. And China has already secured commanding positions.

3. Energy upscaling

The next challenge is more speculative, but potentially far more consequential. Nuclear fusion.

Unlike nuclear fission, which splits heavy atoms to release energy, fusion forces light atoms together. It is the process that powers the sun. Fusion promises enormous advantages. It carries no risk of meltdown in the conventional sense. It produces far less long lived radioactive waste. It requires small quantities of fuel, much of it derived from hydrogen that is widely available.

There are currently no commercial fusion reactors. Most experimental designs rely on containing plasma heated to around 100 million degrees Celsius using extremely powerful magnets. Other approaches use high energy lasers to compress fuel to fusion conditions.

Both pathways depend on advanced materials and components.

High performance magnets require rare earth elements. High temperature superconducting tape is essential for efficient magnetic confinement. China controls the majority of global production in several of these inputs and is expanding capacity rapidly. Laser systems depend on laser diodes, of which around 70 percent are manufactured in China. Tungsten, vanadium, barium titanate and graphene, all relevant to advanced energy systems, are also heavily concentrated in Chinese supply chains.

Private investment in fusion is growing worldwide. In recent years, funding from China has surged from negligible levels to several billion dollars annually, outpacing much of the rest of the world combined.

None of this guarantees technological supremacy. Fusion remains uncertain. Breakthroughs could emerge from the United States, Europe or collaborative international projects. But the early signs echo previous patterns. Identify a strategic technology. Secure the materials. Scale manufacturing. Invest heavily. Build domestic demand. Then dominate global supply.

The stakes are enormous. Electricity demand in developed economies was broadly flat for much of the early twenty first century. That era is ending. Artificial intelligence, electrified transport, heat pumps and industrial decarbonisation are driving a structural increase in demand. Energy systems are not merely being cleaned. They are being expanded.

With sufficient energy, societies can desalinate seawater, irrigate deserts, power vertical farms, heat cold climates and cool hot ones. Energy abundance changes what is economically possible.

Whoever controls the infrastructure of that abundance will shape the terms on which the future is built.

Conclusion

Over the past two decades, China has executed a coherent long term strategy. It entrenched itself in manufacturing. It secured control over critical minerals. It scaled renewable energy production to unprecedented levels. In key areas of the green transition, it has already won the first round.

Now the focus shifts to the next frontier: energy upscaling through technologies such as nuclear fusion. This is not simply about climate policy or industrial policy. It is about the foundations of economic and geopolitical power in the twenty first century.

Trade shaped the past. Renewables define the present. But the ultimate contest is over who will generate, store and control the energy that powers everything else.

In that contest, the outcome may determine not just which country is great, but which country sets the rules for the century ahead.

Most of the data in this article is sourced from a report circulated in the US government. Its authors operate within the industry but wish to remain anonymous. 

Click here to watch our previous episodes

World Reframed is produced in London by Global South World, part of the Impactum Group. Its editors are Duncan Hooper and Ismail Akwei.

ISSN 2978-4891

These figures reflect holdings by foreign governments, banks and institutional investors, and they provide a window into global economic ties with the world ’s largest debtor nation.

Here’s the breakdown of the top 10 foreign holders of U.S. debt (in billion US dollars):

U.S. Treasury securities are widely viewed as safe , liquid assets. Governments and investors around the world buy them to store foreign exchange reserves, manage currency stability and diversify portfolios. Foreign purchases help keep U.S. borrowing costs lower by ensuring steady demand for government debt.

Yet these foreign holdings have not grown as fast as the overall U.S. debt stack. Congressional Research Service reports show that although total foreign ownership in dollar terms has increased over recent years, it now represents a smaller percentage of overall U.S. debt than it did a decade ago.

Federal investigators and journalists combing through the material have found that being named in the files does not in itself suggest guilt. The documents encompass schedules, contact lists, emails, photos and flight logs that map Epstein’s social circle, a network that spanned continents and decades.

According to multiple reviews of the Justice Department release, the files include references to prominent political figures and public leaders:

The release has also ignited political controversy in the United States and abroad. On Capitol Hill, lawmakers have accused the Justice Department of redacting names of influential individuals without clear justification, intensifying calls for full disclosure.

"Trump's FBI scrubbed these files in March. The documents Justice had the redactions that the FBI made back then. They need to unscrub the FBI files, so we know who the rich and powerful men are who raped underage girls," Democratic congressman Ro Khanna wrote on Facebook.

The department has responded by saying redactions protect victim privacy and comply with legal requirements, although all non-victims' names have been unredacted .

Data from the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) show that the global nuclear arsenal remains dominated by the United States and Russia, with steady expansion elsewhere.

Russia remains the world’s largest nuclear power, with an estimated 6,200 to 6,300 nuclear warheads, according to FAS . The United States follows closely with roughly 5,500 warheads.

With New START set to expire in 2026, Moscow warns that the absence of a replacement treaty could remove the last formal limits on US and Russian strategic nuclear forces, increasing the risk of renewed arms racing and reduced transparency. This warning comes after Russia called for the agreement to be extended by a year, with no response.

"In just a few days, the world will be in a more dangerous position than it has ever been before," spokesman Dmitry Peskov told journalists on Tuesday, February 3.

China also emerges as the fastest-growing nuclear power. According to SIPRI and FAS, Beijing’s arsenal reached approximately 600 warheads by early 2026, up from just a few hundred a decade earlier. Satellite imagery analysed by independent researchers and cited by Reuters showed the construction of hundreds of new missile silos, signalling a shift away from China’s historically minimal deterrence posture.

Arms control experts cautioned that China’s expansion, combined with the potential collapse of US-Russia limits, could push the global system toward a three-way nuclear competition for the first time.

Beyond the major powers, several countries maintained smaller but strategically significant nuclear forces. France held about 290 warheads, while the United Kingdom possessed roughly 225, according to SIPRI. In South Asia, Pakistan (around 180 warheads) and India (about 170) continued gradual expansion amid ongoing regional tensions.

Israel, which does not officially acknowledge its nuclear arsenal, was estimated by FAS to have around 90 warheads, while North Korea was believed to possess roughly 50, with continued missile and warhead development reported by Reuters.

Though smaller in number, these arsenals carry outsized risk due to regional rivalries, limited communication channels, and shorter missile flight times.

What is the New START agreement?

New START (the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) is a nuclear arms control agreement between the United States and Russia. It was signed in 2010 by then-presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev and entered into force in 2011.

Its purpose is to limit and monitor the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals.

Under New START, both countries agreed to caps on:

The treaty also includes on-site inspections, data exchanges, and verification measures, which allow both sides to check that the other is complying. This transparency is widely seen by arms-control experts as one of the treaty’s most important features.

However, New START expires on February 5, 2026. It was originally set to last 10 years, with the option of a single five-year extension. That extension was agreed in 2021, making 2026 the final expiration date. The treaty cannot be extended again under its current terms.

If New START expires without a replacement:

The assessment, dated 29 January, identifies the deployment of the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group and supporting assets as having "removed a key constraint that previously limited Washington's ability to act", making the threat of intervention "materially more credible" than earlier in the month.

Any strikes would likely target military and nuclear facilities rather than attempt to overthrow the Iranian government, with probable targets including Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps installations, missile and drone infrastructure, air defence systems, command centres, and potentially nuclear-linked facilities.

The warning comes as Iran faces what the assessment describes as "its most serious internal security crisis in several years", following nationwide protests that erupted on 28 December in response to severe economic deterioration. What began as demonstrations over economic grievances rapidly escalated into direct challenges to government authority.

Ending the blackout

The most violent phase of the crackdown occurred on 8-9 January during a nationwide internet shutdown, when security forces used live ammunition in multiple cities. Whilst exact death tolls remain impossible to verify independently, activist networks, medical sources and diaspora groups commonly cite figures ranging from several thousand to tens of thousands killed, with some estimates exceeding 30,000 deaths nationwide during January.

The assessment notes these figures should be treated cautiously but states there is "broad agreement that casualty levels are significantly higher than in recent protest cycles and that lethal force was used systematically".

A critical factor in the intervention timeline is Iran's partial restoration of internet connectivity, which began on 28 January. Intelligence analysts expect this will result in the rapid release of previously suppressed footage and testimony documenting the killings, particularly from the deadliest period.

"Once this material circulates, it is likely to intensify international outrage and domestic political pressure on the US administration, narrowing the space for continued restraint," the assessment states.

US options narrow

US President Donald Trump issued a public warning on 2 January that the United States would intervene if Iranian authorities killed protesters, introducing explicit external pressure into the crisis. The assessment suggests this has created "a difficult strategic corner" for the president.

"He has publicly framed the crisis as one involving mass repression and has repeatedly signalled that the United States would not stand by if protesters were killed," the document notes. "Earlier arguments for caution, notably limited US assets in the region, no longer apply."

The assessment warns that symbolic measures alone, such as statements, condemnations or incremental sanctions , are "unlikely to be viewed as sufficient", significantly raising the probability that Washington will demonstrate resolve through action.

Iran's deterrence strategy

Iran is expected to emphasise deterrence whilst attempting to avoid moves that would immediately justify a large-scale American strike. This includes heightened rhetoric, internal hardening and proxy signalling designed to widen the perceived cost of intervention.

However, the assessment warns that if Iran is struck first or judges an attack is underway, direct responses including missile or drone strikes on American bases, naval assets or regional partners "become much more likely, not just plausible".

Most likely Iranian retaliation targets include US military bases across the Gulf, particularly Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar and facilities in Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain and potentially the UAE and Turkey. Direct retaliation against Israel is also considered a realistic possibility if Tehran perceives Israeli involvement.

Senior Iranian clerics have warned that American-linked investments in the region could become targets, signalling a willingness to expand beyond purely military objectives to economic pressure points.

The Houthis in Yemen remain one of Iran's most effective tools for applying pressure, with their ability to threaten maritime traffic in the Red Sea allowing Tehran to impose economic disruption without direct confrontation. The assessment notes that even the threat of renewed Houthi activity can disrupt shipping routes, raise insurance premiums and affect global supply chains.

Regional implications

The document warns that Iran-aligned militias in Iraq represent "Tehran's most flexible and immediately usable response option", having already issued warnings they would act if Iran is attacked. However, even limited attacks on American facilities could prompt swift retaliation, potentially drawing Iraq into wider confrontation.

Hezbollah in Lebanon has publicly aligned itself with Tehran but appears constrained by Lebanon's economic struggles and the risk of overwhelming Israeli retaliation. The assessment notes that Hezbollah's involvement "would mark a sharp transition from contained escalation to regional conflict ".

Gulf Cooperation Council states are expected to seek to avoid involvement or visible enablement of American strikes, though heightened force protection measures, airspace restrictions and operational disruption are likely. The assessment references strikes last year involving both Israel and Iran on Qatari territory as having demonstrated that Gulf states are not insulated from escalation.

Cities Under Siege

Inside Iran, Tehran remains the centre of gravity for both political control and security operations, with checkpoints, patrols and rapid-response units highly visible throughout the capital. Mashhad, Iran's second-largest city and a key religious and transport hub, has emerged as a major pressure point, with protests met with firm enforcement even in this traditionally conservative area.

Western Kurdish-majority regions, including Sanandaj and surrounding areas, remain among the most volatile, with security operations particularly heavy and marked by frequent confrontations and heavier weapons use.

The assessment concludes that the risk of miscalculation is elevated, noting that proxy activity, maritime disruption or incidents involving American forces "could quickly escalate beyond Tehran's intended thresholds, particularly once US assets are forward-positioned and operating at high readiness".

According to ICE’s data , 56 people died in ICE custody between 2009 and 2017, during the Obama administration. From 2017 to 2020, under the first Trump administration, the number was 52. Between 2021 and 2024, during the Biden administration, ICE reported 26 deaths.

What emerges from ICE records and independent investigations is a pattern of medical vulnerability. Many of those who died had chronic illnesses, mental health conditions , or were recovering from trauma linked to migration and detention.

Causes of death listed by ICE include heart attacks, suicide, COVID-19 complications, dehydration, and other untreated or poorly managed medical conditions. Reviews cited by NPR and the American Immigration Lawyers Association have repeatedly found delays in care, ignored complaints, and failures to transfer detainees to hospitals in time.

What is obvious is how little this pattern changes with political leadership. Every administration has pledged improvements to detention standards, yet deaths continue to occur.

Immigration lawyers argue that detention itself is the central risk factor. Facilities are not designed to provide long-term or complex medical care, yet they routinely hold people with serious health needs.

The American Immigration Lawyers Association and other advocacy groups continue to push for alternatives to detention, particularly for asylum seekers and medically vulnerable individuals. They point to evidence that community-based supervision is not only safer but also more cost-effective and humane.

The record shows that deaths in ICE custody are not isolated incidents tied to a single president or policy shift. They are a recurring outcome of a detention system with longstanding medical failures and weak accountability.

The most pressing question now is no longer how the numbers compare across administrations, but why preventable deaths continue to happen in the first place..

The United States

The United States Navy is the dominant force in this specialised arena. It operates 11 nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, including both the classic Nimitz class and the newest Gerald R. Ford class. These vessels form the backbone of US power projection at sea, able to launch fighter jets, early-warning aircraft and support missions wherever needed in the world.

Ship names like USS Ronald Reagan, USS Dwight D. Eisenhower and USS George Washington are part of this group. They routinely deploy across oceans as part of carrier strike groups, acting as floating bases with global reach and endurance.

This fleet isn’t just powerful but also huge. Nuclear propulsion lets these carriers remain at sea for extended periods, limited only by food and crew endurance rather than fuel. That’s a strategic advantage no other navy currently matches.

France

France stands alone in Europe with a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier in active service: Charles de Gaulle . Commissioned in 2001, it’s Europe’s only carrier of this kind, helping Paris maintain an expeditionary naval presence from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean.

French defence officials have recently approved plans for a next-generation nuclear carrier to succeed Charles de Gaulle by the late 2030s. This new ship will be bigger and more capable, showing France’s continued commitment to carrier-based power projection.

A nuclear-powered aircraft carrier can operate for 20 to 25 years without refuelling its reactors. Conventional carriers, by contrast, need to refuel every few days or weeks. That difference is enormous.

It allows nuclear carriers to cross oceans, loiter in crisis zones, and respond instantly without depending on fuel tankers. What this really means is freedom of movement. No fuel lines to protect. No ports required.

The Board of Peace, announced by Trump as part of his renewed foreign policy agenda, is framed as an alternative diplomatic mechanism aimed at resolving major international conflicts, including the war in Gaza and broader Middle East tensions.

According to reporting by Al Jazeera, participation in the board is by invitation, with countries free to accept or reject based on their political alignment and strategic interests.

Who has joined

The map shows a mixed response across regions. Several countries in the Middle East, parts of Asia, and Latin America have accepted invitations , viewing the board as a potential channel for influence or de-escalation:

Morocco, Argentina, Hungary and Belarus have also agreed to join, raising the number of countries that have confirmed participation to at least 24.

Countries that have rejected

In contrast, several prominent European and North American allies have explicitly declined the invitation, underlining scepticism about the initiative’s structure and neutrality. Countries that have rejected participation include:

In the same way, several other countries, including the UK, Italy, Japan, China and Russia, have been invited but have yet to take a stand on participation.

The Board of Peace gained prominence after Trump publicly linked it to efforts to end the war in Gaza, alongside Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

According to the figures shown on the above map, Portuguese respondents top the list at roughly 70% in favour of a common European army, while only Finland appears below the 50 % mark.

Countries across central and southern Europe also show solid majorities supporting an EU-wide defence force. What this really means is a growing appetite among citizens for greater strategic autonomy rather than outsourcing security entirely to external allies.

These trends reflect broader debates in European capitals about defence cooperation and self-reliance. A 2025 poll showed widespread support for deeper EU-level defence cooperation and increased defence spending, with some surveys reporting that more than three-quarters of EU citizens favour stronger joint defence initiatives.

The shift in opinion comes at a time of heightened geopolitical tension. Russia ’s war in Ukraine continues to shape attitudes toward security in Europe, and leaders from several EU states have publicly discussed the idea that the bloc should be able to defend itself independently if necessary.

That debate has taken on new urgency in light of recent friction between Europe and the United States over Greenland, the world’s largest island, controlled by Denmark but strategically located between North America and Europe.

U.S. President Donald Trump reignited discussion about acquiring Greenland, arguing the island’s location is vital to U.S. security interests in the Arctic and North Atlantic. Analysts note that Greenland sits astride key missile defence and early warning routes, making it a flashpoint in great-power competition.

Greenland’s government and Denmark have firmly rejected any takeover, and large “Hands off Greenland” protests erupted in Nuuk and Copenhagen in early 2026 in defence of the island’s sovereignty.

Donald Trump, on the other hand, has announced that eight European countries will face new import tariffs of 10% starting in February and to rise to 25% by June unless Denmark agrees to sell Greenland to the United States, a move he argues is critical for American national security.

The threatened tariffs target Denmark, Norway, Sweden, France, Germany, the UK, the Netherlands and Finland, and come amid Trump’s broader push to gain control or influence over the strategically important Arctic territory.

The EU is yet to convene to plan a countermeasure.

Here’s what that story looks like:

Louisiana Purchase (1803): The deal that doubled a nation

The biggest land deal in U.S. history began in the wake of Napoleon’s setbacks in Europe. President Thomas Jefferson agreed to pay France $15 million for the vast territory of Louisiana in 1803, nearly doubling the size of the young republic and laying the groundwork for expansion across the continent. The purchase, which stretched from the Mississippi River to the Rocky Mountains, later became all or part of 15 modern states.

Florida Purchase Treaty (1819)

Just over a decade later, the United States turned its attention south. Through the Adams-Onís Treaty , Spain ceded Florida to the U.S., and the government agreed to assume roughly $5 million in claims by American citizens against Spain. That deal didn’t just secure strategic territory; it also clarified borders and eased tensions between two former colonial powers.

Mexican Cession (1848)

The Mexican-American War concluded with the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848. Mexico ceded an enormous swath of territory, including present-day California, Nevada, Utah, Arizona and parts of Colorado, Wyoming and New Mexico. While not a “purchase” in the classic sense, the U.S. paid $15 million and assumed certain claims as part of the deal, and its scale made it one of the biggest expansions in history.

Gadsden Purchase (1854)

Looking to build a southern transcontinental railroad and settle lingering border disputes with Mexico, U.S. diplomats negotiated the 1854 Gadsden Purchase. For $10 million, the United States acquired nearly 30,000 square miles of what is now southern Arizona and New Mexico, finalising the contiguous continental border.

Alaska Purchase (1867)

Perhaps the most infamous bargain was the Alaska Purchase . In 1867, the U.S. bought more than half a million square miles from Russia for just $7.2 million, about two cents per acre. Critics at the time mocked it as “Seward’s Folly,” but the territory proved rich in resources and strategic value, eventually becoming the 49th state.

U.S. Virgin Islands (1917)

Not all American purchases were on the mainland. In 1917, during World War I, the United States bought the Danish West Indies , now the U.S. Virgin Islands, from Denmark for $25 million in gold. The acquisition secured a key naval position in the Caribbean and remains the most recent major land purchase for the country.

According to data compiled from Kpler, The National News, Investopedia, and CBC, Venezuela’s crude oil production fell from around 2.7 million barrels per day in 2015 to a low of roughly 569,000 barrels per day in 2020.

This collapse was driven by years of underinvestment, mismanagement at state oil company PDVSA, the loss of skilled labour, and increasingly strict US sanctions. Investopedia notes that sanctions restricted exports, access to finance, and the import of diluents needed to process Venezuela’s heavy crude.

From 2021, production began to edge upwards. Output rose to around 636,000 barrels per day in 2021 and 716,000 in 2022, signalling the end of the industry’s free fall.

The rebound continued in 2023, with production nearing 783,000 barrels per day, before climbing further to roughly 921,000 barrels per day in 2024. Kpler tracking shows improved operational stability and higher export volumes, particularly to Asia and the United States.

A key factor behind the recovery has been limited sanctions relief. US licences allowing companies such as Chevron to operate in Venezuela have helped stabilise fields and boost exports altough the company is seeking an expanded operating licence in Venezuela now.

Even so, Venezuela’s output remains less than half of what it was a decade ago. Infrastructure decay and lack of investment continue to cap growth, despite the country holding the world ’s largest proven oil reserves.

Venezuela is projected to boost oil production toward roughly 1.2 million barrels per day by 2026 if US sanctions are significantly eased, but that projection now sits against a backdrop of heightened US involvement following the capture of President Nicolás Maduro and escalating oversight of Venezuela’s oil exports and industry.

In the week since Maduro’s arrest during a US operation, Washington has asserted influence over the country’s crude sector, including seizing sanctioned tankers and controlling oil sales and revenues, part of a broader effort to reshape Caracas’s governance and energy policy while maintaining sanctions until conditions such as democratic reforms are met.

The deployment of small numbers of troops and reconnaissance teams from Sweden, Norway, France , the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, and Finland forms part of Operation Arctic Endurance, a Danish-led military exercise in Greenland aimed at strengthening defence cooperation within NATO’s northern flank.

Greenland is a self-governing territory within the Kingdom of Denmark, with long-standing strategic importance due to its location above the Arctic Circle and its role in North Atlantic security. The island sits along key air and sea routes and hosts the United States' Thule Air Base, part of early warning and space surveillance systems dating back to World War II and the Cold War.

Tension intensified after U.S. President Donald Trump reiterated his belief that Greenland is essential to U.S. national security — an argument he has publicly used to justify efforts to obtain control over the island, including through economic or even military means. Trump’s comments have drawn sharp rebukes from Danish and Greenlandic leaders, as well as from European capitals.

Copenhagen and Nuuk have made it clear that Greenland “is not for sale” and that the island’s future is for its people to decide. Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen has called the defence of Greenland a “common concern” for all NATO allies, and emphasised that any notion of unilateral control is incompatible with international law and alliance unity.

“If the United States chooses to attack another NATO country militarily, then everything stops. That is, including our NATO and thus the security that has been provided since the end of the Second World War,” Frederiksen told Danish broadcaster TV2 .

The European troop contributions are symbolic more than combat-ready: they number in the dozens, not hundreds, and are focused on exercises, reconnaissance, and interoperability rather than establishing a large standing force. France has sent mountain infantry units, Germany a reconnaissance detachment, and other allies are participating in logistical and planning roles as part of Operation Arctic Endurance.

Denmark’s Defence Minister has also confirmed plans for a more permanent allied presence on Greenland, with rotating forces under NATO auspices, a step seen as both a deterrent and a reassurance to smaller member states concerned about great-power competition in the High North.

“The intention is to create a more permanent military presence,” Denmark’s Defence Minister Troels Lund Poulsen told Danish public broadcaster DR on Thursday, January 15.

Analysts say the Arctic’s importance is rising as climate change alters sea routes and exposes new natural resources. The region is increasingly viewed through a strategic lens, with Russia’s northern capabilities and China’s polar interests informing Western defence planning. However, Greenland’s sovereignty remains a red line for European leaders, who argue territorial acquisition by force would undermine NATO’s foundational principles.