Afghanistan remains the most authoritarian country globally, with one of the lowest recorded democracy scores, followed closely by Myanmar and North Korea, based on recent index comparisons.

The EIU Democracy Index, which evaluates 167 countries on a scale from 0 to 10 across electoral processes, civil liberties, governance, political participation and political culture, classifies these nations firmly within the “authoritarian regime” category.

Visualised rankings show Afghanistan, Myanmar, North Korea, the Central African Republic and Syria among the countries with the weakest democratic performance, each scoring well below 2 out of 10.

They are followed by Sudan, Turkmenistan, Laos, Tajikistan and Chad, nations where political power is highly centralised and electoral processes are either limited or tightly controlled.

Further down the list, countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Yemen, Iran and Eritrea also register extremely low scores, reinforcing a pattern of restricted civil liberties and limited political pluralism.

World Population Review data confirms that Afghanistan has consistently ranked at the bottom of global democracy metrics in recent years, with little change in governance structures since 2021.

The EIU’s latest assessments indicate that roughly 60 countries worldwide fall into the authoritarian category, representing a significant portion of the global population.

In fact, more than one-third of people globally live under authoritarian rule, highlighting the scale of democratic decline.

Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East and North Africa remain the regions with the highest concentration of such regimes, according to comparative index data.

Despite years of decline, the EIU reported in its 2025 index that global democracy scores have begun to stabilise, with the average inching up slightly to 5.19 after hitting historic lows.

Persistently low scores in the most authoritarian countries are attributed to a mix of prolonged conflict, military control, weak institutions and restrictions on political freedoms.

In several cases, including Afghanistan, Syria and Yemen, ongoing instability and war have severely limited democratic processes. In others, such as North Korea and Turkmenistan, entrenched leadership structures and limited political competition continue to define governance .

With 98.89% of the vote counted, TISZA won 138 seats, Fidesz-KDNP secured 55 seats, and Mi Hazánk obtained 6 seats.

The outcome marks a major political shift in Hungary, where Orbán had been one of Europe’s most controversial leaders. He was widely seen as the European Union’s most autocratic leader and maintained close ties with U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin. His removal is expected to ease tensions within the EU, where officials have long accused him of undermining democratic systems and taking advantage of institutional weaknesses.

Orbán also faced criticism over his stance on Ukraine. He was accused of supporting actions that helped block €90 billion in European support to Ukraine, raising concerns among European leaders about Hungary’s role in the bloc.

Despite endorsements from Trump and campaign support that included visits from U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Vice President JD Vance, the vote appeared to be driven mainly by domestic issues.

Voters were reported to be concerned about Hungary’s economic challenges, as well as allegations of corruption and cronyism linked to Orbán’s administration. The scale of the defeat indicated widespread dissatisfaction, as TISZA was projected to dominate both the national party-list vote and many individual constituencies.

In his speech to supporters, Magyar promised to return Hungary to the main fold of European politics , pledging a pro-European Union and pro-NATO direction for the country.

“My fellow citizens, Hungary will once again be a strong ally in the European Union and NATO. Hungary will once again be a strong ally representing Hungarian interests, because our country's place for a thousand years in Europe was, is, and will be. We will rebuild and strengthen, we will place it on new foundations and expand the cooperation of the Visegrad Four wherever possible,” he said.

The result sparked celebrations in Budapest, where tens of thousands of people took to the streets.

With a projected majority above the threshold required to govern alone, Magyar is expected to form the next government , ending Orbán’s long hold on power and signalling a shift in Hungary’s position within Europe.

His dominance is backed by the ruling party, the People’s Rally for Progress (RPP), which leads the broader governing coalition, the Union for the Presidential Majority (UMP).

A 2010 constitutional amendment removed presidential term limits, allowing Guelleh to run indefinitely. More recently, in 2025, Djibouti’s parliament eliminated the 75-year age cap for presidential candidates, a move widely interpreted as designed to ensure Guelleh, now 78, could stand again.

The electoral field itself underscores the imbalance. In previous elections, Guelleh has secured overwhelming victories, including 87% of the vote in 2016 and over 97% in 2021, figures that international observers and opposition groups have questioned.

Who is contesting IOG?

Mohamed Farah Samatar stands as the sole challenger to President Guelleh, though his candidacy carries its own complexities. A former insider of the ruling establishment, he is now contesting the presidency under the banner of the Unified Democratic Centre (CDU).

During the lead-up to the votes, Samatar took his campaign to the Tadjourah and Obock regions, where he addressed supporters and attempted to project an alternative vision for the country, insisting that “another Djibouti is possible”.

Even so, analysts remain sceptical about the broader significance of the race. Sonia Le Gouriellec, a specialist on the Horn of Africa at Lille Catholic University, told AFP: “There’s not much at stake. It’s just a token competition.”

Criticism has been sharper from civil society. Omar Ali Ewado, who leads the Djibouti League of Human Rights (LDDH), dismissed the process outright, describing the vote as a “masquerade” and a “foregone conclusion”.

This context shapes the core issue about how the election is unlikely to produce political change, but it may intensify uncertainty about what comes next.

Who can vote?

Roughly 243,000 voters are registered for Djibouti’s 2026 presidential election , according to data from the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, out of a national population estimated at just over one million.

That marks a modest increase from the around 215,000 registered voters in 2021, pointing to a gradual expansion in the electoral roll, though still representing only about a quarter of the population.

Historically, turnout has been relatively strong on paper, averaging close to 67%, though critics argue these figures should be viewed in the context of limited political competition.

Polling stations are expected to open in the morning and close later in the day, after which counting is expected to begin.

Despite being labelled an “electoral autocracy” by international monitors, Djibouti is hosting a regional observer mission from the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), with 17 observers from Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan and Uganda deployed nationwide.

The bloc is expected to release its initial assessment after the vote, followed by a formal statement on 12 April.

What is at stake?

Djibouti’s location along the Bab el-Mandeb Strait places it at the crossroads of global commerce. Estimates suggest that around 12–15% of global trade and a significant share of oil shipments pass through this narrow waterway connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden. The country has leveraged this position to build an economy centred on logistics, ports, and foreign military partnerships.

The Port of Doraleh, one of the most important infrastructure assets in the region, serves as a critical hub for shipping and for landlocked Ethiopia, which relies on Djibouti for roughly 90–95% of its imports and exports. Revenues from port operations, logistics services, and foreign base leases form a substantial part of Djibouti’s national income.

This strategic value has attracted a concentration of global military presence rarely seen in such a small state.

Djibouti hosts:

Additionally, although Djibouti has invested heavily in infrastructure, including rail links and port expansion projects often financed through external borrowing, concerns persist about public debt levels, which have at times exceeded 70% of GDP, much of it linked to Chinese-funded projects.

Youth unemployment remains high, and the benefits of growth have not been evenly distributed, contributing to underlying social discontent.

The main opposition parties did not field candidates, citing a lack of transparency. Two prominent opposition figures, General Jean-Marie Michel Mokoko and Andre Okombi Salissa, have been in jail for nearly a decade.

Ahead of the vote, human rights activists were arrested, several opposition parties were suspended, and public gatherings were closely monitored, according to Congolese human rights activist Joe Washington Ebina. Sunday's voting was also affected by late openings at some polling stations and a nationwide internet blackout.

More than 3.2 million Congolese were registered to vote. State television reported on Tuesday, March 17, a turnout of 84.65%, higher than the nearly 68% recorded in 2021, when Sassou won his previous five-year term with 88.4% of the vote.

Sassou's closest challenger, Mabio Mavoungou Zinga, a 69-year-old retired customs inspector and former member of parliament, secured 1.48% of the vote.

Defeated candidates have five days to file a challenge, while the Constitutional Court has 15 days to review them before announcing final results.

Sassou, a former paratrooper, first took power in 1979. He lost the country’s first multi-party elections in 1992 but returned to power in 1997 after a civil war. A constitutional change in 2015 removed term limits and the presidential age cap, allowing him to run for an additional five-year term. This latest term is expected to be his last, placing attention on succession within the ruling party.

The country’s economy, which depends heavily on oil, has stabilised in recent years after a prolonged downturn. Congo completed a three-year International Monetary Fund programme last year. However, over half of the population lives in poverty, and many lack reliable access to electricity, running water, and basic healthcare, according to the World Bank.

Congo has also faced ongoing allegations of corruption, with French and U.S. prosecutors investigating assets held abroad by members of Sassou’s close family. Rights groups state that political space has narrowed in recent years, pointing to arrests of activists and the suspension of political parties.

His rise marks a striking generational shift in a nation where political leadership has long been dominated by veteran figures from the same established parties.

He was a rapper

Long before entering politics, Balen Shah was known in Nepal’s music scene.

His rap songs often focused on corruption, inequality and frustrations with the country’s political system. The music helped him build a large following, particularly among younger audiences.

During last year’s protests, one of his songs — Nepal Haseko, Nepal Smiling — gained more than 10 million views on YouTube and became associated with the wider movement demanding political change.

Supporters later turned his image and lyrics into campaign symbols, with crowds chanting his name at rallies and singing campaign songs generated for social media.

He was an engineer

Before music and politics, Shah trained as a civil engineer.

After studying engineering in Kathmandu, he pursued a master’s degree in structural engineering at Visvesvaraya Technological University in Karnataka, India.

His professional background helped shape his political messaging. Throughout the campaign, he emphasised practical solutions to economic stagnation, highlighting issues such as job creation, education and healthcare for poorer Nepalis.

Nepal remains one of the poorer countries in the world, with limited job opportunities at home. Many young people leave the country each year to seek work abroad, often in difficult conditions.

He was Kathmandu’s mayor

Shah’s political breakthrough came in 2022, when he ran as an independent candidate for mayor of Kathmandu.

His victory shocked Nepal’s political establishment, defeating candidates from the country’s traditional parties.

As mayor, he became known for visible urban reforms in the capital. His administration launched clean-up drives, removed illegal structures and pushed programmes aimed at developing skills among young people.

However, his approach also drew criticism from rights groups, particularly over the use of police against street vendors as the city sought to clear roads and regulate informal businesses.

He became the face of a generational revolt

Shah’s rise to national prominence followed a wave of youth-led protests in September that toppled the government of veteran leader KP Sharma Oli.

The demonstrations began after the government imposed a ban on social media platforms but quickly expanded into wider protests against corruption and economic stagnation. At least 77 people were killed during the unrest.

In the election that followed, Shah’s Rastriya Swatantra Party rode a wave of anger towards the traditional political class.

Early results showed the party winning a majority of direct parliamentary seats, while Shah himself defeated the 74-year-old Oli in his own constituency.

Despite the right to protest existing on paper, demonstrators in many democracies face violence or internet shutdowns. Harsch observed that the democratic story across Africa is not uniform. According to him, some countries have managed to institutionalise competitive politics in meaningful ways.

"Some democracies in Africa are functioning quite well. Your own country [Ghana] for the past thirty-odd years has had regular turnovers between ruling party and opposition. That’s not a small achievement. Senegal, until recently, had pretty free and fair elections. South Africa has gone so far that even the ruling party lost its majority in Parliament, and they allowed it to happen. They stuck to the Constitution. Botswana and a handful of others have also maintained stable electoral systems," he told Ismail Akwei on Global South Conversations.

Harsch reiterated that Africa does not lack democratic success stories, and the crises coexist with a broader continental pattern he describes as "electoralism". Referencing Cameroonian political thinker Achille Mbembe, he draws on the phrase “administrative multi-partyism.”

“What you have in many places is an administration that runs elections with multiple parties, but there’s no real choice for ordinary citizens. You can’t get genuine opposition voices in. Alternative visions are systematically squeezed out. The rituals of democracy are there, ballots, campaigns, observers, but the substance is limited,” he explained.

One of the structural problems, he argues, dates back to the 1990s when “elections became tied to neoliberal economic policies . People could occasionally change who was in office, but they couldn’t budge on the economic front. That disjuncture between political choice and economic immobility is at the heart of the frustration.”

Watch the full interview attached to the story above. 

According to the Election Commission of Bangladesh (ECB), over 127 million voters will cast their votes across 42,761 polling centres in 64 districts for 300 parliamentary constituencies. 

These included India (39), Indonesia (34) and Bangladesh (24). Singapore led the region with 84 points, ranking third globally, followed by New Zealand (81) and Australia (76). Bhutan (71) and Brunei (63) were also among the stronger performers.

“In many countries across Asia Pacific, good governance is being undermined by weak law enforcement, unaccountable leadership and opacity in political funding,” said Ilham Mohamed, adviser for Asia Pacific at Transparency International.

“With young people demanding better, leaders must act now to curb corruption and strengthen democracy. Meaningful reforms can rebuild public trust and show those in power are finally listening,” Mohamed added.

At the lower end, Afghanistan (16), Myanmar (16) and North Korea (15) remained among the world’s most corrupt in perception terms, reflecting fragile institutions, opaque governance and limited democratic checks.

Corruption more prevalent in Central Asia

In Central Asia , scores were generally weaker, underscoring concerns about repression and limited oversight. 

Kazakhstan scored 38, Uzbekistan 31 and Kyrgyzstan 26. Tajikistan (19) and Turkmenistan (17) were among the lowest in the broader Europe and Central Asia grouping, reflecting entrenched corruption risks and restricted civic space.

Transparency International said weak law enforcement, concentrated political power and pressure on civil society continue to undermine anti-corruption efforts in parts of Central Asia, while rushed or poorly implemented reforms limit progress. 

In Kazakhstan, concerns have mounted over the restructuring of anti-corruption bodies, while in Uzbekistan journalists and bloggers exposing graft still face harassment despite formal reforms.

Public frustration has been evident across parts of Asia. Protests in the Philippines (32), Indonesia and Nepal (34) in 2025 were driven in part by allegations of misuse of public funds and broader concerns over accountability.

The CPI ranks 182 countries and territories on a scale from zero, considered highly corrupt, to 100, seen as very clean. 

General N’Tam had previously held the rank of brigadier general. With the new designation, he now bears four stars instead of two. His promotion comes two months after the military seized power on November 26, one day before the electoral commission was scheduled to announce the results of the presidential election.

The coup led to the ousting of former president Umaro Sissoco Embalo and the suspension of the electoral process. The military announced that it would govern for one year and named N’Tam, who has been described as a close associate of Embalo, as the transitional president.

Presidential and legislative elections have been scheduled for December 6, 2026, to restore civilian leadership.

According to the military, the takeover was intended to prevent violence between supporters of rival candidates. Both Embalo and opposition contender Fernando Dias had declared victory before the release of official results. 

Embalo was aiming to become the first incumbent to secure a second term in 30 years in the West African nation.

The electoral commission later stated that it was unable to complete the vote tally after armed men seized ballot materials and destroyed servers containing the results.

The coup was part of a cycle of instability in Guinea-Bissau, which has had multiple coups and attempted uprisings since gaining independence from Portugal in 1974. It was the ninth in West and Central Africa in five years.

What they said

The United Nations described the election period as being marred by “widespread repression and intimidation.” Bobi Wine claimed “massive ballot stuffing” was taking place and later said, “Currently, I am not at home, although my wife and other family members remain under house arrest. I know that these criminals are looking for me everywhere, and I am trying my best to keep safe.” His party rejected the outcome, calling it “a sham.” Election observers flagged concerns about “intimidation, arrest and abductions,” and Goodluck Jonathan said the incidents undermined confidence in the process, adding the internet shutdown “disrupted effective observation” and “increased suspicion,” even though voting day was described as “peaceful.”

In September 2021, elite forces led by General Mamady Doumbouya stormed the presidential palace and removed President Alpha Condé, ending a turbulent period marked by protests, a disputed third term, and deadly crackdowns.

Standing before cameras, Doumbouya vowed to restore democracy, fight corruption, and organise credible elections. He also pledged that neither he nor other junta members would seek elected office.

That promise no longer stands.

A constitution that changed the rules

The turning point came with a constitutional referendum held in September this year. Approved by an overwhelming majority in a vote boycotted by much of the opposition, the new constitution introduced sweeping changes. It extended presidential terms from five to seven years, created a new senate with a third of its members appointed by the president, and, crucially, removed barriers preventing military leaders from running for office.

For the ruling authorities, the referendum was a legal reset, a way to close the chapter on military transition and reopen the political system under new rules. For opponents, it was a carefully managed process that rewrote the rules mid‑game and paved the way for Doumbouya to convert de facto power into electoral legitimacy.

From junta leader to candidate

Doumbouya now appears on the ballot not as a transitional figure, but as a civilian candidate. His campaign messaging leans heavily on stability, infrastructure gains, and economic promise, particularly around mining and large-scale projects such as the Simandou iron ore development.

Supporters argue that the election represents progress: a coup leader submitting himself to the will of voters rather than ruling indefinitely by decree. They point to roads built, schools renovated, hospitals opened, and long‑delayed mining exports finally leaving Guinea’s ports.

Opponents counter that the transition has been tightly controlled. Public demonstrations have been banned for much of the past three years. Independent media outlets face restrictions. Social media platforms were temporarily blocked ahead of the vote. Several prominent opposition figures were disqualified on legal and residency grounds, leaving the race without its strongest challengers .

The question of legitimacy

At the heart of the election lies a deeper question: does legality equal legitimacy?

Guinea’s history weighs heavily on the moment. Since independence from France in 1958, the country has experienced repeated coups, authoritarian rule, and aborted democratic experiments. It was only in 2010 that Guineans voted in elections widely considered free and fair. The 2021 coup interrupted that trajectory.

For many voters, the issue is not simply who wins, but whether the process allows for genuine choice. An election conducted under a new constitution, with high turnout but limited competition, raises concerns that democracy may exist more on paper than in practice.

A transition concluded or rebranded?

If Doumbouya wins as expected, Guinea will formally return to civilian rule, but under leadership forged in a military takeover and reinforced by constitutional change. Supporters will hail the outcome as the completion of a transition. Critics will describe it as a rebranding exercise that entrenches power rather than disperses it.

For Guineans, the election represents a choice shaped as much by what came before as by what lies ahead. The journey from coup to constitution may be nearing its institutional conclusion, but the broader test, whether democratic norms, accountability, and political freedoms truly take root, will extend well beyond election day.

President Mahama, who secured his long-awaited second coming after previously serving from 2012 to 2017, in an exclusive days before the December 7 vote, told Global South World that Ghana’s economy was in crisis and needed urgent fiscal reforms, and if voted to power,  he planned a “total reset” to get a fresh start.

A year on after the vote, where the then former president secured a landslide 56.42% victory against Dr Bawumia’s 41.75%, is he delivering on his promise?

Ekane was arrested on October 24 in Douala following the post-election protest and was detained at a military garrison in Yaoundé on charges of hostility against the state, incitement to revolt, and calls for insurrection. Ekane denied all accusations.

The arrest came after the contested presidential election on October 12, in which President Paul Biya, aged 92, was declared the winner. Ekane, along with other opposition figures, rejected the results. 

Rival candidate Issa Tchiroma Bakary also claimed victory and urged the population to reject the official outcome.

Ekane's party said he was in poor health during detention and lacked access to vital medical equipment. According to his lawyer, Ngouana Ulrich Juvenal, Ekane was barely able to speak during a recent visit. His sister, Mariane Simon-Ekane, confirmed his death on Facebook.

On November 30, Manidem issued a statement requesting his urgent transfer to a hospital that could provide more suitable care. The party had previously reported that essential medical equipment, including Ekane’s oxygen concentrator, was locked in his impounded vehicle at a military police station in Douala. Efforts to retrieve the equipment were allegedly blocked by the station commander. 

Ekane’s detention, along with that of fellow Manidem member Florence Aimee Titcho and other Tchiroma supporters, was condemned by opposition groups. These groups had called for their immediate and unconditional release.

In its November 30 statement, Manidem warned that it "would hold the Yaoundé regime responsible for the consequences of refusing the transfer".

Cameroon’s defence ministry confirmed Ekane’s death on Monday, citing "an illness" and announcing that an investigation had been opened into the circumstances.

Ekane had been active in Cameroonian politics since the early 1990s. He initially supported Maurice Kamto, who was later banned from contesting the election, and subsequently backed Issa Tchiroma.

Tchiroma, following the unrest, has since fled to Gambia, where he is being hosted on humanitarian grounds, according to Gambian authorities.

President Paul Biya was sworn in for an eighth term on November 6 in Yaoundé. Despite the youthful population of Cameroon’s 29 million citizens, where the median age is 18, Biya—who has ruled for more than four decades—will continue in office for another seven years.

“Yesterday, this country gave the world a lesson in democracy,” he said, praising Brazil’s judiciary for demonstrating its “strength” without “any fanfare.”

Lula also claimed Brazil faced significant commercial pressure from the United States during the proceedings but “did not allow itself to be intimidated by external threats,” insisting that the trial was conducted “impeccably.”

This concludes our live coverage of Guinea-Bissau's 2025 general elections. With fierce competition between the candidates, counting is underway to determine the country's next president. Polling stations opened at 0700 GMT and are expected to close at 1700 GMT. Provisional results are expected within 48 hours. Follow Global South World for continued updates about Guinea-Bissau post-election.

18:15 GMT: Polling stations end voting processes, counting begins

After 10 hours of voting, Guinea-Bissau has officially closed its polls, and counting is currently underway.

16:32 GMT: Mozambique's Philip Nyusi and Nigeria's Goodluck Jonathan oversee elections

As part of a measure of transparency, the African Union sent its Chief of the Mission of Election Observers, Mozambique's former President, Filipe Nyusi, along with the former President of Nigeria, Goodluck Jonathan, to monitor the ongoing elections.

Filipe's inclusion, however, is being questioned due to the belief that he ruled as Mozambique's president through fraudulent electoral means.

12:40 GMT: “Bissau-Guineans want only solutions and not slogans”

Journalist Samba M. Baldé, explains in an interview with Global South World, that, despite the many campaign messages spread by the various candidates, the citizens need practical solutions to their problems.

11:51 GMT: Voting continues in Guinea-Bissau

10:34 GMT: Incumbent President Umaro Sissoco Embalo votes

President Umaro Sissoco Embalo cast his vote this morning at a polling station in Umaro Djabula in Gabu. The president is seeking to make history as the only president to be given a second term in 3 decades.

9:47 GMT: People queue to vote in Mansôa

Bissau-Guineans in Mansôa are taking turns in casting their votes. Fernando Dias is expected to vote in this town. Citizens, however, remain committed to their desire to have a different economic climate and hope the results reflect that.

What you need to know

Candidates

Embalo is competing against 11 other candidates, including Fernando Dias, a relatively new figure in politics.

Right at his heels is 47-year-old Fernando Dias , backed by a powerful figure from the disqualified opposition leader, Domingos Simões Pereira, of PAIGC. This party led the country to independence in 1973.

Other contenders on the ballot include José Mário Vaz, who served as president from 2014 to 2020 and became the first post-independence leader to finish a full term. Baciro Dja, 52, a former defence minister who briefly occupied the prime minister’s office twice under President Vaz, first in 2015 and again in 2016.

Also in the race is 48-year-old Joao Bernardo Vieira, the namesake and nephew of Guinea-Bissau’s longest-serving president, who held power for most of the years between 1980 and 1999 and returned to office from 2005 to 2009.

The polls are expected to open at 7:00 am GMT and close at 5:00 pm GMT.

What citizens expect

During a conversation with Global South World's Abigail Johnson Boakye, a Bissau-Guinean journalist, Samba M. Baldé, shared that despite the hype around the upcoming elections, electorates seem to be less engaged as they are tired of slogans or manifestos and want real solutions.

"Engagement exists, but it's uneven because voters react to something that has certain benefits than to only promises, because for voters, when candidates fail to translate to voters their proposals into real impact or how they can really impact society , public interest quickly drops. ...But people are, for example, no longer satisfied with slogans. They want clear plans and measurable results in Guinea-Bissau," Samba said.

What they said

“This sad episode, which involves some general and senior officers of our Armed Forces, jeopardises the peace and stability so desired for socio-economic development and the attraction of foreign investment,” the armed forces said in a statement after announcing the latest coup plot. Deputy chief of staff General Mamadu Ture Kuruma told journalists: “This is indeed a new attempt to subvert the constitutional order, on the eve of the start of the election campaign for the legislative and presidential elections on November 23.” 

This concludes our live coverage of Chile’s 2025 general elections. With a highly competitive first round and no candidate securing the majority needed for an outright victory, the country now moves toward a runoff that will determine its next president. Follow Global South World for continued updates as Chile heads into a decisive second round.

23:30 GMT: Early results show tight race between Jara and Kast with 52% of votes counted

With 52% of the first-round ballots tallied, Jeannette Jara leads with 26% while José Antonio Kast follows closely with 24%. As no candidate reached the 50% threshold, Chile is headed toward a second-round showdown next month between two sharply contrasting political projects, one on the left and one on the right, if these results hold.

21:40 GMT: Vote counting begins across Chile.

Polling stations have started opening ballot boxes and tallying votes, kicking off the official counting process after the close of Chile’s election day.

21:20 GMT: Poll workers begin preparing ballot materials for the count.

21:00 GMT: Polling stations begin closing across Chile.

19:20 GMT: Former Interior Minister Carolina Tohá arrives at Estación Mapocho to cast her vote.

17:29 GMT: All eight presidential candidates have now cast their votes.

16:10 GMT: Jeannette Jara casts her vote as supporters celebrate outside the polling station.

Jeannette Jara, presidential candidate of the ruling left-wing coalition and member of the Communist Party, has cast her vote, drawing cheers and reactions from supporters gathered outside the polling station during Chile’s general election.

15:54 GMT: Candidate Jeannette Jara arrives to vote, greeted by supporters.

Presidential candidate Jeannette Jara has just arrived at her polling station, accompanied by supporters who gathered to back her as she casts her vote. Her arrival adds to the busy electoral atmosphere as Chile’s voting day continues.

14:50 GMT: Candidate Franco Parisi casts his vote, comments on Chile’s political divide.

After voting, presidential candidate Franco Parisi expressed his view on the election dynamics, stating: “The Communist candidate should be going through, and we to a second round, because of the division. At the last moment, people will realize that the far right harms Chile.” His remarks underline the tension and polarization present in today’s electoral process.

14:40 GMT: Jeannette Jara steps into election day with her dog and a suitcase in hand.

Seen leaving home accompanied by her dog and carrying a small suitcase, Jeannette Jara prepared for a long election day ahead. The moment added a casual, human touch to the political morning, drawing attention as candidates and officials begin to move across the country.

13:40 GMT: Candidate Evelyn Matthei emphasizes her record of cross-party teamwork.

After casting her vote, presidential candidate Evelyn Matthei highlighted her experience working across political lines, noting: “I have a long trajectory of working with all teams. When I was mayor, there were many people from the left with whom we worked very well.” Her message seeks to project cooperation and stability as key pillars of her candidacy.

13:30 GMT: Former President Bachelet urges unity: “May the next government build on all that came before”.

After casting her vote, ex-President Michelle Bachelet called for continuity and collaboration, urging the incoming administration to construct its legacy on the foundations laid by all previous governments. Her message resonates as a plea for unity amid a deeply polarized political environment.

13:10 GMT: Jose Antonio Kast, presidential candidate of the far-right Republican Party, votes in the presidential election.

He said that if he does not reach the second round, he will support a candidate who is not from the current government. He also added that if he does not win in the runoff, this will be the last election he takes part in.

13:00 GMT: Boric calls on Chileans to shape the country’s future through their vote.

After casting his ballot, President Gabriel Boric reminded voters of the profound meaning of democracy: “It is you, Chilean men and women, who determine the future of Chile. Each of you has the same right to choose, regardless of birthplace, wealth, or political idea — that is the essence of democracy expressed today.”

12:50 GMT: Johannes Kaiser, presidential candidate of the far-right National Libertarian Party, votes in the presidential election.

12:30 GMT: Global South Election Live

12:00 GMT: Boric arrives at the polls accompanied by his daughter

President Gabriel Boric has just shown up to cast his vote, walking into the polling station alongside his daughter — a symbolic moment that underscores both his personal commitment to the democratic process and the familial legacy at stake in today’s election.

11:30 GMT: Early turnout builds as Chileans head to the polls under mandatory voting rules

As voting gets underway across the country, Chileans are already arriving steadily at polling stations, driven in part by the country's mandatory voting system. In Chile's 2025 elections, all Chilean citizens are required to vote or face a financial penalty. The rule is designed to increase participation and ensure results that better reflect the full electorate. Exceptions apply for people who are ill, far from their polling place, abroad, or have a certified disability and foreign residents with voting rights are not subject to mandatory voting.

11:00 GMT: Chile’s polls open as voters begin a decisive day for the country’s political future.

09:35 GMT : What is at stake for Chile’s democracy

The 2025 election will determine whether Chile moves toward a renewed social-democratic model or shifts to a more conservative and security-driven agenda. The outcome will influence major policy debates: the role of the state in pensions and healthcare, the country’s response to inequality, its migration strategy and its long-term energy transition. With economic uncertainty and public dissatisfaction still high, voters are evaluating not only policies but also trust in political institutions.

Chile’s democratic resilience is also being tested. A fragmented Congress will likely force the next president—regardless of ideology—to negotiate complex alliances, raising concerns about governability. The election is therefore not only about leadership but about defining the country’s political direction after years of instability. Whichever candidate wins, they will face the challenge of restoring confidence in institutions and delivering credible reforms in a divided nation.

You can read more about the current state of its democracy here.

November 15, 19:13 GMT: Preparations and inspections are made for the election

Polls are expected to open at 8 am local time (11 am GMT) and close at 6 pm local time (9 pm GMT).

What to know

Overview of the eight candidates

The race features eight key contenders: Jeannette Jara, José Antonio Kast, Carolina Tohá, Evelyn Matthei, Franco Parisi, Ximena Rincón, Marco Enríquez-Ominami, and Rodolfo Carter. They present sharply different visions for Chile’s economic and political future.

On the left, Jeannette Jara proposes expanding social welfare, strengthening public healthcare and promoting labour rights. Carolina Tohá and Marco Enríquez-Ominami also support progressive taxation, gender equality initiatives and environmental transitions, aiming to respond to the social demands that emerged after the 2019 unrest.

On the right, José Antonio Kast leads a bloc prioritising security, strict immigration control and market-friendly reforms. Evelyn Matthei and Rodolfo Carter emphasise institutional modernisation, police reinforcement and incentives for private investment.

Meanwhile, centrist candidates such as Ximena Rincón and Franco Parisi promote technocratic reforms, public-private partnerships and economic stability. Together, the eight contenders reflect a fragmented electorate seeking both stability and significant political change.

Among the eight contenders, José Antonio Kast and Jeannette Jara have emerged as the leading candidates, representing the clearest ideological contrast in the race. Current polling and expert analysis suggest that neither is likely to secure an outright majority in the first round, making a second-round runoff the most probable scenario. You can see more about these candidates here.

Key issues in the election

Crime and immigration dominate voter concerns. According to an October poll by Activa, these issues rank highest among the electorate, followed by unemployment and healthcare. Although Chile has traditionally experienced lower violent crime rates than other countries in the region, recent increases in organised crime, theft, and corruption have shifted public perception.

“I had to install remote surveillance cameras [and] chain the tables, and on weekends I hired a security guard to help keep watch,” Leidy Paredes, a nightclub owner in Santiago, told The Associated Press.

In response to public pressure, all major candidates have proposed tough-on-crime policies. Kast and Kaiser have focused on punitive measures, while Jara has advocated expanding the prison system and improving border security using advanced technology.

The issue of immigration has also taken centre stage. Between 2018 and 2024, migration to Chile increased by 46.8%. Although the rate slowed between 2022 and 2024, candidates across the spectrum have addressed the topic. While Kast supports mass deportations, Jara has proposed a temporary registration system for undocumented migrants.

Chile's economic challenges are another significant issue. The country is experiencing an economic slowdown, with unemployment at approximately 9%—among the highest in Latin America. Candidates have presented various strategies to address affordability, with Jara focusing on wage increases and housing, and Kast proposing business incentives.

Voting and electoral context

Voter turnout is expected to be higher than in 2021, when only 47% of eligible voters participated. As of 2024, there are 15,450,377 registered voters in Chile.

The November 16 vote will also determine the composition of the legislature, with all 155 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 23 out of 50 Senate seats up for election.

Jeannette Jara is currently projected to win the first round by a narrow margin. However, if she proceeds to the runoff, she may face a consolidated right-wing challenge.

Historical background

Chile enters the 2025 presidential election after a turbulent political decade marked by social unrest, constitutional debates and growing public frustration with inequality and insecurity. The 2019 protests revealed deep structural tensions, pushing issues such as pensions, healthcare, wages and public services to the centre of national debate. Although the constitutional reform process ultimately failed twice, it changed the political landscape and intensified demands for long-term reforms.

At the same time, crime and migration have become top voter concerns, reshaping political narratives across the spectrum. The return to mandatory voting is expected to bring millions of additional voters to the polls, potentially altering traditional turnout patterns. With eight candidates and no clear majority, analysts widely expect the election to move into a second round, where alliances and negotiation will become decisive. You can read more about Chile’s historical political context here .

Police officers continued security operations on public transport in Tegucigalpa on Thursday, November 13, even as campaign materials from presidential contenders filled the capital ahead of the 30 November 2025 elections. The timing of the renewed emergency decree has sparked criticism, with residents arguing that it restricts constitutional freedoms, including movement, assembly, and association, at a crucial moment in the electoral calendar.

“People won’t be able to go out and protest or anything. They won’t be able to do many things at night. It benefits them, not us,” said merchant César Molina, reflecting widespread unease among voters. Others voiced deeper distrust of the authorities. “Security in this country is useless because they are the ones playing tricks. That’s why we are the way we are,” said taxi driver César García.

The government defends the extension, pointing to reductions in crime as evidence that the security strategy is working. For its part, the National Electoral Council (CNE), the body responsible for overseeing and ensuring the transparency of Honduran elections , insists it is guaranteeing a fair process in the upcoming vote.

In October 2019, long-standing frustrations erupted into mass demonstrations. What began as a protest over a metro fare hike quickly grew into the country’s largest social mobilisation since the return of democracy.

At the time, President Sebastián Piñera, leading a centre-right government, initially responded with fare freezes and limited concessions, but as protests escalated, he declared a state of emergency and deployed the military to the streets. In response, political parties across the spectrum agreed to launch a constitutional process to address public discontent.

Gabriel Boric, then a young MP and former student leader, emerged as one of the key figures associated with this moment of political renewal. He supported the constitutional process and criticised the government ’s handling of the protests, arguing for deeper social reforms within a democratic framework.

In the 2021 presidential election, Boric faced José Antonio Kast, a conservative candidate who campaigned on security and a more traditional economic model. Boric won the run-off with just over 55%, becoming Chile’s youngest president and symbolising a generational shift in national politics.

This recent history continues to shape Chilean politics today. The experience of social mobilisation, constitutional debates, and shifting priorities has influenced voter expectations ahead of the upcoming election. Some Chileans still seek the transformative agenda associated with the post-2019 period, while others prioritise stability, security, and gradual reforms.

Chile is a presidential democracy. Every four years, citizens elect a president and members of Congress, the full Chamber of Deputies and half of the Senate. The president governs for a single four-year term and cannot run for immediate re-election, which is why Gabriel Boric, elected in 2021, will not appear on the ballot this time.

Elections take place in two rounds: if no candidate secures more than 50% of the vote, the top two contenders face each other in a runoff. Since 2022, voting has been compulsory, turning participation into both a right and a civic duty. Congress, elected through a proportional system, holds significant power, shaping laws, negotiating coalitions, and often determining how much a president can actually achieve.

This balance of power defines Chile’s democracy: stable, institutional, and built on negotiation. The system has helped preserve democratic norms and prevent political dominance, though it can also slow major reforms — a challenge that has become evident since the 2019 protests and the unsuccessful attempt to draft a new constitution.

As Chile heads to the polls, key issues such as security , the cost of living, and trust in institutions shape the national debate. Voters will not only choose a new president but also signal the priorities and expectations for the next stage of Chile’s democratic path.

Dr. Patrick Herminie of the United Seychelles (US) party has been elected as the nation’s sixth Presiden t, defeating incumbent Wavel Ramkalawan of the Linyon Demokratik Seselwa (LDS) in a closely contested runoff election. The outcome marks a significant political shift, as Herminie’s victory signals renewed confidence in the US party’s agenda for national unity and economic revitalisation. The election was widely watched as a key test for Seychelles’ democratic maturity and voter confidence in leadership renewal.

Election observers commend transparency and calm

The Citizens Democracy Watch Seychelles (CDWS) has lauded the election process, praising its peaceful and transparent conduct. In its post-election statement, CDWS underscored that the vote reflected the strength of Seychelles’ democratic institutions. However, the watchdog recommended stronger voter education to ensure broader civic engagement and understanding of electoral processes across the islands.

Electoral Commission declares readiness for upcoming general elections

The Electoral Commission of Seychelles has confirmed its readiness for the upcoming general elections, highlighting efforts to streamline logistics and improve accessibility. Special polling stations have been set up for eligible travellers, allowing Seychellois citizens abroad or in remote locations to cast their votes more easily. The move is seen as a step toward greater electoral inclusivity and modernisation.

National Assembly concludes induction programme for new members

Following the presidential elections, the National Assembly of Seychelles has wrapped up an induction programme for newly elected members, focusing on democratic values, transparency, and governance. The initiative aims to strengthen legislative integrity and accountability as new lawmakers prepare to address pressing national priorities, including economic diversification and social welfare.

Final presidential debate underscores democratic openness

The second and final presidential debate for the 2025 elections featured seven of the eight candidates, reflecting Seychelles’ vibrant multi-party democracy. The debate provided a national platform for candidates to outline their visions on economic reform, sustainability, and social inclusion. Analysts viewed it as a milestone in consolidating open political dialogue since the return of multi-party democracy, reaffirming the country’s reputation as one of Africa’s most stable democracies.

Commerce Minister Chipoka Mulenga has criticised Makebi Zulu’s growing political influence, arguing that it stems from his perceived loyalty to the late former President Edgar Lungu. Mulenga’s remarks suggest that Zulu’s prominence is less about policy and more about symbolic continuity, positioning himself as the guardian of Lungu’s legacy. This dynamic of sympathy politics is reshaping Zambia’s political arena, especially as the country heads toward the 2026 elections.

PF base readjusts as Mudolo loses grip, Mundubile rises

Within the Patriotic Front (PF), the power base appears to be realigning . Key members have shifted their support from Willah Joseph Mudolo to Brian Mundubile, signalling a significant recalibration in the party’s leadership hierarchy. The shift could reshape the PF’s internal strategy as it prepares to challenge the ruling United Party for National Development (UPND) in the upcoming elections.

Makebi Zulu’s presidential bid shocks nation, sparks public debate

Makebi Zulu’s formal announcement that he will run for the 2026 Republican Presidency has set off a wave of political discussion across Zambia. The move surprised both allies and critics, sparking scrutiny of his motives and ambitions. His declaration is seen as a bold challenge to the PF’s establishment, raising questions about unity within the opposition and the viability of his campaign.

PF’s 2026 puzzle: Can the party unite behind one presidential candidate?

The Patriotic Front continues to struggle with internal divisions as multiple figures, including Makebi Zulu, compete for the party’s presidential ticket. Party insiders warn that unless the PF consolidates behind a single candidate, its chances of reclaiming power from President Hakainde Hichilema’s administration may diminish. The leadership contest is intensifying debates about the party’s ideological direction and long-term cohesion.

Makebi Zulu: From body politics to second independence

In a rallying call that has captured national attention, Makebi Zulu has urged Zambians to pursue what he calls the country’s “ Second Independence .” He emphasises economic empowerment, self-reliance, and greater democratic accountability. Zulu’s message appears aimed at connecting with younger voters and those disillusioned with traditional political structures, casting his campaign as both revolutionary and reformist.

The electoral map you’re viewing shows how many municipalities gave D66 the lead, transforming previously contested zones into zones of new influence.

This local-level terrain mirrors broader national turbulence. In June, the PVV abruptly left the governing coalition over immigration policy disputes, bringing down the cabinet and triggering early elections.

In practical terms, a map produced by The World in Maps depicts that the party's dominance across regions underlines the challenge ahead for any incoming government. No single party commands consistency everywhere, with rural, urban and suburban municipalities each telling a different story.

That means coalition-builders will have to assemble alliances capable of bridging diverse local mandates and priorities. For example, where D66 leads in urban clusters, parties such as the conservative-liberal People ’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD), the centrist-Christian Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) and regional alternatives each hold sway in other pockets.

Globally, this development in the Netherlands echoes a pattern seen elsewhere as electorates in advanced democracies increasingly shifting away from the extremes and toward centrist or eclectic coalitions that emphasise competence and consensus.

The big question, going forward, is whether a government born from this fragmented terrain can deliver coherence and vision.

After years of gradual decline in Africa in general, the same is now occurring in South Africa, specifically -- Western-style democracy seems to be losing its lure. The number of citizens supporting military rule has surpassed those opposing it.

Democracy: losing its allure in South Africa?

South Africans were asked the question: Is democracy the best form of government? Their response was surprising – at least to the West. Less than 50 percent said they preferred democracy to any other form. The results of the survey illustrate a growing dissatisfaction with democracy as the preferred form of government across the African continent.

The proportion of citizens supporting military rule in the country has surpassed those opposing it. For the first time in more than two decades – more support the military (rather than elected civilians) in assuming leadership of the country. 

Most South Africans, the report reveals, are dissatisfied with democracy as a form of political system. “…seven in 10 South Africans are dissatisfied with the way democracy functions in the country.”

The negative responses toward democracy are high among the middle-aged population, but even more so among the unemployed and economically disadvantaged. The common consensus within these groups was their perception that the politicians were ignoring their concerns.

Among the issues noted of concern to the respondents listed unemployment as the most serious – followed by crime, security, water, infrastructure, and corruption. The sense from the findings indicates that these seemingly intractable issues leave the population, generally, in a state of frustration. 

Not surprisingly, the report reflects concerns with the new South African administration. While 40 percent of the population believes the Government of National Unity (GNU) is effective, another 40 percent disagrees, feeling it is less than effective in solving the country’s most pressing problems.

Political analyst Stephen Friedman  described the trend as part of a broader global phenomenon. “Around the world, there is a great deal of dissatisfaction with democracy,” he explained. “It’s not that people have stopped believing in democratic values; it’s that the kind of democracy they experience no longer meets their needs.”

Friedman noted that many South Africans feel disconnected from political decision-making, with power concentrated in the hands of a few elites. “The problem with the model of democracy that has been sold to us for the past 30 years is that citizens have very little control over anything,” he said.

The growing openness to military rule -- a system once unthinkable in South Africa’s democratic landscape -- should serve as a wake-up call for leaders, and Western politicians in particular. It reflects not only a loss of confidence in political institutions but also a deep yearning for stability and effective governance.

Friedman added that voter apathy is another sign of alienation. “It’s no surprise that many South Africans are choosing not to vote,” he said. “When citizens feel their voices don’t matter, disengagement becomes inevitable.”

Democracy’s decline in Africa in general

Yet, this is neither a new phenomenon nor one limited to South Africa. According to the latest edition of the Afrobarometer report (2024), titled “African Insights: Democracy at risk – People’s perspective,” more than half of Africans (53% across 39 countries) are willing to accept a military takeover if elected leaders abuse power for their own ends.

“On average across 39 countries, support for democracy remains robust: Two-thirds (66%) of Africans say they prefer democracy to any other system of government, and large majorities reject one-man rule (80%), one-party rule (78%), and military rule (66%),” the report stated.

It noted that, “across 30 countries surveyed consistently over the past decade, support for democracy has declined by 7 percentage points, including by 29 points in South Africa and 23 points in Mali. Opposition to military rule has weakened by 11 points.

Political analyst Siyabonga Ntombela concurred with the 2024 report’s findings. The trend is not unique to South Africa. “This is happening continentally. There are a number of countries that are following Ibrahim Traore of Burkina Faso’s style of leadership. These countries appear to benefit more under the military rule than they have under years of democracy,” he said.

Ntombela explained that local politics also plays a role in this shift. “The majority of ANC faction parties (EFF and MKP) are predicated on military ideals,” he added. “They venerate leaders such as Thomas Sankara, Che Guevara, Fidel Castro and others. The material conditions have remained unchanged for the poor. Therefore, such an alternative rule promises hope for the downtrodden of the country.”

And this trend is also found among Africa’s youth . Younger Africans are more accepting of military rule, according to the Afrobarometer survey. Fifty-six percent accept a military takeover when civilian leaders abuse power. Sixty percent of youth are dissatisfied with the functionality of democracy in their respective countries. And forty percent believe their elected leaders are corrupt.

Ntombela warns that a rise in support for military-style rule could come with grave consequences. “With military rule, violence is inevitable. People like Frantz Fanon claim that violence is a necessary condition to decolonise and usher in true freedom,” he said

Across Africa, democracy is being tested – by rising authoritarianism and military coups as well as a growing disconnect between citizens and the institutions meant to represent them.

The latest flagship assessments noted above deliver a powerful warning. Over 60 percent of Africans are dissatisfied with how democracy works in their countries. Support for democracy, generally, remains not insubstantial, but belief in its effectiveness is fading, especially when citizens feel excluded from meaningful participation in decisions that affect them.

To state it succinctly: the crisis of participation results from people being absent from the room when decisions that affect them are made, and often that room is in London, Paris or Washington D.C.

The opinions and thoughts expressed in this article reflect only the author's views.

Dr. Wolf is director of The Fulcrum Institute, a new organisation of current and former scholars, which engages in research and commentary, focusing on political and cultural issues on both sides of the Atlantic. Our interest is in American foreign policy as it relates to the economic and foreign policies of the NATO countries, the SCO, the BRICS+ nation-states and the Middle East.

After service in the USAF (Lt.Col.-Intel) Dr. Wolf obtained a PhD-philosophy (University of Wales), MA-philosophy (University of S. Africa), MTh-philosophical theology (Texas Christian University-Brite Div.). He taught philosophy, humanities and theology in the US and S. Africa before retiring from university.

“We have an unfair electoral system that has been locked in place for months. We have called for far-reaching reforms to guarantee inclusive, transparent and credible elections ,” she said

The CEI on Monday, October 27, declared incumbent President Alassane Ouattara the winner, securing a fourth term in office with 89.77 percent of the votes. Former Commerce Minister Jean-Louis Billon received 3.09 percent, while Gbagbo garnered 2.42 percent, according to provisional results.

Gbagbo, who ran under the banner of the Mouvement des Générations Capab.les (MGC), said the results failed to capture the true mood of Ivorians, arguing that her campaign revealed deep public frustration with the current political system.

She also criticised the heavy political influence over the country’s electoral institutions and campaign financing, saying meaningful reform is crucial for the future of Ivorian democracy.

“Ivory Coast will not be able to build a sustainable democracy as long as electoral institutions remain under political control, as long as campaign financing is not fairly regulated, and as long as the transparency of results is not guaranteed by law and technology,” Gbagbo added.

According to the CEI, more than 8.7 million Ivorians were registered to vote in this year’s polls .

Once political identity becomes part of who we are – “I am CCM” or “I am Chadema” –  the goal shifts. People stop comparing policies and start defending their side while attacking the other. Political scientists call this affective polarisation : when people become emotionally attached to one camp and hostile toward another, no matter the issues.

Studies show that when this happens, support for equality, accountability, and the rule of law weakens .

In Tanzania, this is most visible in the long dominance of Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM). Many citizens identify with the party out of loyalty to its name rather than its performance. Wearing party colours, chanting slogans, and attending rallies become symbols of belonging, not of debate or reform.

From Citizens to Fans

Why does this happen? Because political membership increasingly looks like fandom. Fans stay loyal even when their team sucks. They love the colours, the chants, and the stars more than the results. And they rarely criticise their own side, even when things go wrong.

When politics becomes fandom, activism turns into performance. Supporters cheer louder instead of asking harder questions.

But this blind loyalty doesn’t just weaken citizens – it blinds the rulers too. In trying to maintain the illusion of mass approval, leaders begin to lose sight of the truth.

In Tanzania, we’ve seen politicians pay people to attend rallies, dress them in party regalia, and transport them in lorries and buses – sometimes even including secondary school pupils below voting age. The goal is simple: to stage a spectacle of popularity, to look powerful and loved.

Yet the reality is sobering. In a country where most people still struggle to make ends meet, many will cheer for anything that brings a free meal or a few coins. These displays are not signs of genuine support but symptoms of desperation. They show how easily loyalty can be bought and how rulers mistake performance for legitimacy.

This illusion feeds itself. Leaders surrounded by paid crowds and endless praise stop hearing reality. They listen to applause, not hunger. And when they can no longer see the truth, they lose the ability to reform. Real change requires vision – the courage to face uncomfortable facts, not the comfort of staged approval.

Party switching has become another symptom of this culture. Politicians move between parties not for ideology but for survival – chasing influence, resources, or relevance. At the same time, few parties have clear policy differences , making membership more about identity than conviction.

CCM’s dominance reinforces this trend. Although Tanzania is a multiparty state, the playing field is far from level. Some analysts describe the system as “ authoritarianism in disguise ,” where loyalty matters more than reform.

The Culture of Uchawa

Then there is uchawa – sycophancy. The term comes from the Swahili word chawa , a louse that feeds on blood. Figuratively, it describes people who feed off power through uncritical praise.

In Tanzanian politics, Uchawa is the culture of flattering leaders in exchange for favours, protection, or visibility. Musicians, businesspeople, and public figures often rush to declare support for the ruling party, not because they believe in its policies, but because loyalty pays.

It goes beyond ordinary political support. It becomes a performance of devotion – singing praise songs, wearing party colours, appearing at rallies, and posting flattering messages online. The message is clear: to survive or advance, you must be seen cheering for those in power.

The darker side of uchawa is silence. Those who depend on proximity to power often refuse to speak up against human rights abuses, corruption, or politically motivated prosecutions. They look away because the perpetrators are “on their team.” Their duty becomes defending and praising their leaders, not holding them accountable.

This mindset has spread far beyond party offices. In Tanzania, carrying a CCM membership card can feel like carrying a passport to opportunity. It signals safety, access, and belonging. Many people join the party not out of conviction, but because those connections open doors – to jobs, contracts, or local government support.

There are countless small examples: drivers flying party flags to avoid fines, shopkeepers displaying portraits of leaders to attract goodwill from officials. These gestures reveal a larger truth – political loyalty has become a survival strategy in a system where dissent is risky and power is centralised.

We have arrived at a culture where loyalty is currency and silence is self-preservation.

When blind loyalty rules

When blind loyalty replaces debate, democracy suffers. Citizens become less critical. If your identity is tied to a party or leader, it’s hard to question them, even when projects stall or money disappears.

Flexibility fades, too. Reform requires openness to new ideas and alliances, but fan-like loyalty clings to the tribe. Politics loses its results-oriented focus. Success starts to mean staying in power, not improving lives.

Parties that prize unity over honesty suppress dissent and stagnate. Politics becomes theatre – passionate, noisy, but empty of progress.

Tanzania’s risk

In Tanzania, political identity is woven into history, patronage, and regional networks. CCM’s power rests not only on ideology but also on deep institutional reach and state resources. Opposition parties face financial and legal barriers, leaving many citizens frustrated or disillusioned.

When people feel the system is predetermined, membership becomes about belonging, not changing outcomes.

One survey found that while 77 percent of Tanzanians support elections, nearly a third see political parties as divisive and irrelevant. It reflects both faith in democracy and fatigue with partisan politics.

Reclaiming change

To move from fandom to reform, both citizens and leaders must refocus on performance and accountability. Civil society and independent institutions can help separate identity from evaluation, encouraging people to judge politics by results, not rhetoric.

Coalitions built around common issues like jobs, health, housing – can bridge party divides. Within parties, internal democracy and open debate can turn supporters into active participants, not just cheerleaders.

There are reasons for hope. Research across Africa shows that while identity and loyalty remain strong, performance still matters . The challenge for Tanzania is turning that potential into real, reform-driven participation.

Conclusion

When partisan identity dominates politics, membership becomes fandom: loyalty and belonging take precedence over ideas and results. In Tanzania, decades of dominance, weak opposition, and deep loyalties have made this culture hard to shake.

But democracy depends on citizens who can see – who question, challenge, and demand better. The true measure of loyalty is not how loudly we cheer, but how firmly we hold power to account.

The opinions and thoughts expressed in this article reflect only the author's views.

Mweha Msemo is a Tanzanian freelance journalist based in Dar es Salaam. He focuses on stories of marginalised communities, social justice, and digital rights. With a passion for amplifying unheard voices, his work highlights the lives and challenges of underrepresented groups, reflecting his commitment to raising awareness and fostering understanding.

The imbalance has prompted critics to question whether the poll represents a genuine democratic contest or simply a formality to extend CCM’s near five-decade rule.

Opposition sidelined

Tanzania’s two largest opposition parties, CHADEMA and ACT-Wazalendo, are not taking part after accusing the government of orchestrating a systematic crackdown on dissent. Several of their key leaders have been barred from running, while others face ongoing court cases or arbitrary detention.

In April, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) disqualified CHADEMA’s presidential candidate on what the party described as “manufactured technicalities.” International news agency Reuters later confirmed that other opposition figures were similarly struck off ballots at local and parliamentary levels.

Human rights groups, including Amnesty International, have reported a “climate of fear”, citing arbitrary arrests, media restrictions, and enforced disappearances in the lead-up to the vote.

“Authorities have intensified repression ahead of the elections, instilling fear among activists, journalists, and ordinary citizens,” Amnesty said in an October report .

When Samia Suluhu Hassan took office in 2021 following the death of John Magufuli, she was initially praised for loosening restrictions on the opposition and reopening civic space. But over time, that image has faded.

Opposition activists say the state has perfected a softer, procedural form of authoritarianism — one that relies less on overt violence and more on bureaucratic obstacles, judicial harassment, and control of the media landscape.

Economic background

Beyond the political contest, Tanzanians continue to grapple with everyday struggles; unreliable electricity, water shortages, unemployment, and poor healthcare.

Still, many voters feel there is little space for genuine alternatives, with the ruling party dominating the political narrative and state machinery.

What’s next

Election observers from the East African Community (EAC) and the African Union have deployed missions across the country, but analysts remain skeptical about whether their presence will ensure transparency.

But one figure stood out: among the heads of state was a non-leader.

At the far end of the line stood U Hau Khan Sum, the permanent secretary of Myanmar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was there in place of his country’s leader, barred from attending.

The absence traces back to Myanmar’s turbulent recent history.

In 2021, the military seized power from the elected government, detaining Aung San Suu Kyi and installing a junta under Min Aung Hlaing. The coup sparked a civil war that has killed tens of thousands, with the military now controlling only about a fifth of the country.

Although the junta handed authority to an interim civilian government in July and announced plans for elections in December, observers warn the move could simply legitimise military rule.

ASEAN’s response has been firm. In 2021, the bloc — including Hlaing himself — adopted a five-point peace plan to end the violence and foster dialogue. Four years later, progress has been negligible.

Citing the junta’s failure to implement the plan, ASEAN has continued to bar Myanmar’s military leaders from attending high-level meetings. The country was also stripped of its turn to host the 2026 summits, a responsibility now passed to the Philippines .

Some member states have floated the idea of reintegrating Myanmar’s leadership, arguing that engagement might yield results. Yet for now, as the world ’s most influential leaders gather for the 47th ASEAN Summit, Myanmar remains on the sidelines.

Cadima, a retired academic and former public official, has spent more than twenty years analysing Latin America ’s political transformations.

Before addressing this, he clarifies that neither the left nor the right are monolithic. Within the left, he distinguishes between the populist, authoritarian current known as 21st-century socialism —seen in countries like Venezuela, Nicaragua, Cuba and Bolivia—and a more democratic, social left focused on inclusion and citizens’ rights. On the right, he identifies a neoliberal, populist trend linked to leaders such as Milei, Trump and Bolsonaro, alongside a more traditional liberal right that has largely faded but still seeks to regain space in national politics.

In his view, both the left and the right have evolved into populist and authoritarian versions of themselves, making it increasingly difficult to distinguish one from the other. “Maduro’s authoritarianism and Trump’s authoritarianism,” he points out, “are different in ideology but similar in conduct.”

For Cadima, the deeper problem is that populism has outlived ideology. Both left and right have adopted authoritarian traits and use democracy in a utilitarian way — not as a principle, but as a means of preserving power, consolidating parties, and protecting entrenched elite interests, known in Bolivia as " the rosca" and in Argentina as " the political caste" . From his perspective within what he calls the democratic left, the true confrontation in Latin America is no longer ideological. “It is not between left and right,” he says, “but between democracy and autocracy.”

According to Cadima, both camps are now operating within systems that sabotage democracy from within. Power becomes concentrated in a person or a small circle; parliaments may function, but freedom of expression and opposition are restricted, turning the system into the antithesis of democracy.

He envisions democracy in a broader sense: constitutional, institutional, and politically organised freedom that extends beyond voting and is sustained by citizens’ active participation. One that values dialogue, empathy, and diversity — thus closing the way to polarisation and violent confrontation. “Plurality,” he insists, “should not be seen as the enemy of unity, but as the foundation of a nation built on diversity.”

Rebuilding trust, Cadima concludes, requires more than regime change. Latin America must enter a new era — one that revives democratic conviction and restores faith in politics itself. In his vision, the region’s next political chapter will not be defined by who wins the ideological battle, but by who manages to protect and strengthen democracy.

The upcoming consultation forms part of a broader state plan that has already seen two nationwide votes this year, with six more expected in total. According to government figures, more than 36,000 local initiatives have been submitted so far, involving participation from over 47,000 community councils and 7,400 polling stations. The winning projects will receive public funding for their implementation.

Maduro also rejected accusations linking Venezuela to the criminal organisation Tren de Aragua , calling such claims “xenophobic” and “racist.” He insisted that Venezuela is not defined by crime but by the “dignity and hard work” of its people — a message that aligns with his ongoing effort to frame the country’s communal governance model as both participatory and patriotic.

Experts say the pattern isn’t random. Across these countries, a mix of economic frustration, governance failures, and growing security threats has created fertile ground for military intervention. According to a policy brief by the Baker Institute for Public Policy , weak state institutions and public disillusionment with civilian governments are the most consistent precursors to coups in Africa’s recent history.

In Mali, for example, the military stepped in after the government struggled to deal with Islamist attacks that killed thousands and displaced millions. Burkina Faso followed a similar pattern: rising violence, a struggling economy, and widespread frustration pushed soldiers to act.

In Niger, where President Mohamed Bazoum was overthrown in July 2023, the junta said it acted because of “the deteriorating security situation.” That line has become a familiar justification across the region.

But it’s not just about guns and insecurity. Economic pressures have made things worse. Countries like Mali, Burkina Faso, and Guinea depend heavily on raw materials such as gold and bauxite, yet many people feel the wealth never reaches them.

High unemployment and rising food prices have made daily life harder, especially for young people. When democracy doesn’t seem to deliver results, it becomes easier for soldiers to claim they can do better.

“People see elections, but they don’t see change,” said a researcher quoted by the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. “When the gap between promise and progress keeps widening, citizens start to see coups as a reset button.”

Foreign influence also plays a part. Many of the recent coups happened in Francophone countries that are trying to distance themselves from France. Military leaders often accuse Paris of meddling in local affairs, while openly courting new partners like Russia or China. Analysts say this shift has emboldened some juntas, giving them room to resist pressure from ECOWAS or Western governments.

Yet history suggests coups rarely bring lasting stability. Research from ISS Africa shows that countries with one coup are more likely to experience another within a few years. Promises of reform often give way to tighter media control, suspended constitutions, and extended transition periods.

People aren’t necessarily choosing the military; they’re choosing whoever promises a change they can feel.

Five years later, Keita was re-elected to continue his mandate in serving the people of Mali. But in the midst of a global coronavirus pandemic, sluggish reforms, a collapsing economy, deteriorating public services and schools, and a widely held belief that his government was corrupt, Keita was overthrown on August 18, 2020—the first of a wave of military coup d'états to hit the Sahel over the next three years.

Assimi Goita, Mali’s army general and president, masterminded the two coup plots that hit the nation in 9 months. In the August 2020 coup, Goita was installed as vice president of a transition government, and civilian Bah Ndaw as president, promising to hold elections in 18 months.

But soon after, a struggle for dominance broke out between the two sides as each sought to increase its influence.

Ndaw removed military leaders who had played a crucial role in the August coup when he reorganised the cabinet on May 24, 2021. He was detained by the military later that day, and a few hours later, Goita extended military rule and proclaimed himself president.

A study, which took place in Mali in July 2021, almost a year after the first military coup and only weeks after the second coup led by then Colonel Goita, found that when asked directly, 74.0% of respondents claimed to support the military regime, and only 24.7% of respondents claimed to trust the foreign armed forces.

However, using the List Experiment (LE), a different technique used to measure true opinions on sensitive topics — things they might not want to admit directly — the survey found that the support for the military regime was only 63.2%, meaning support was over-reported by 10.8 percentage points, and trust in foreign armed forces was 36%, significantly underreported by 11.6 percentage points.

People claimed support, given the politically tense and non-democratic environment of Mali, expressing support for the ruling military regime was the socially desirable and safest response, given the strong anti-foreign sentiment prevalent at the time and the fear of repression associated with criticising the government.

According to the researchers, “The opposite direction of misreporting of these two political attitudes is consistent with the military regime’s strong opposition to the international coalition led by France in Mali at the time of our survey.”

A year after Goita had overthrown Ndaw to proclaim himself leader of the West African nation, the last of the French troops stationed in Mali to fight against Islamic insurgency left the country, completing a withdrawal that ended the nine-year Operation Serval—carried out in response to an attack in the northern part of the country by the ethnic-Tuareg separatist movement that had partnered with an al-Qaeda affiliate.

In a constitutional referendum held in June 2023, 97% of voters favoured changes which granted the president the power to appoint and dismiss the prime minister and cabinet members. Out of 8.4 million registered voters, only 39.4% took part in the referendum. 

Opponents of the new constitution claimed that it would reduce the likelihood of democratic reforms and that the referendum had been tainted.

Goïta disbanded all political parties in May 2025 and indefinitely postponed the 2024 elections. The National Transitional Council granted Goita a five-year term on July 3, 2025, which can be renewed "as many times as necessary" and without an election.

In response to a private jet controversy, veteran opposition leader Paul Bérenger condemned what he described as “amateurism” and a lack of strict oversight by Mauritian authorities. Bérenger questioned how a high-profile individual fleeing a political crisis could enter the country without immediate checks and transparency from government agencies. He also called for tighter aviation, customs, and immigration regulations to prevent such lapses in the future. According to Bérenger, the event reveals a worrying absence of accountability and coordination within Mauritius’ administrative systems.

Mauritius marks 23 years of autonomy with a call for unity and good governance

Mauritius celebrated 23 years of autonomy, and the presidential message delivered a strong appeal for national unity and ethical leadership. The speech highlighted the values of “unity, inclusiveness, and transparency” as cornerstones of the nation’s continued success. The president emphasised that “alone we go faster, together we go further,” urging citizens and leaders alike to strengthen the country’s social fabric and democratic institutions. The commemoration served as both a celebration and a reminder of the challenges that lie ahead.

Creole language to make history in Parliament

The Speaker of the National Assembly has announced that an interim report on introducing the Creole language in Parliament will soon be submitted. The move represents a historic shift in Mauritius’s legislative tradition, acknowledging the language spoken by the majority of Mauritians as a key element of national identity. Advocates for the policy argue that allowing Creole in parliamentary proceedings would promote accessibility, representation, and transparency in governance. It would also mark an important milestone in decolonising public institutions and affirming local linguistic pride.

Businessman close to Madagascar’s president flees to Mauritius amid political turmoil

Mauritius has found itself entangled in a regional controversy after a businessman reportedly close to Malagasy President Andry Rajoelina fled Madagascar and landed in the island nation aboard a private jet. The man’s unexpected arrival has stirred political debate, particularly as Madagascar continues to face unrest and growing calls for transparency within its government. Authorities in Mauritius are said to be investigating the circumstances surrounding his arrival, with local media questioning how the private jet was cleared to land.

“For close to 10 days now, I've been hearing about platforms created by a presidential candidate purportedly to count ballots in the 10 regions,” Nji said. “I've also learned through international media about a trade union that has set up a platform to count votes and announce the results of the presidential election.”

“There is equally an initiative by a young lawyer in Douala who has created an application to count votes and publish the election results,” he added. “I would like to call on all candidates, especially those conspiring with people of dubious character, with plans to activate these illegal platforms, to abandon this criminal initiative, which cannot prevail.”

The statement followed opposition candidate Issa Tchiroma Bakary’s call for President Paul Biya to concede defeat ahead of the vote. Nji accused Tchiroma of planning to declare himself president from his home village. 

“This candidate, who is nursing such outdated and diabolical ideas, should know that his house does not have armoured doors,” he said. “And that in the event of the least blunder, MinAd will take immediate action and law must prevail.”

Reiterating the state’s position, Nji stressed that “only the Constitutional Council has the authority to announce the results of the presidential election after resolving any election-related disputes.” He added that “any unilateral publication of election results is high treason” and warned that those attempting to self-proclaim victory “would have crossed the red line and should be ready to face retaliatory measures commensurate to their crime .”

Cameroon has been ruled by President Biya since 1982, making him one of Africa’s longest-serving leaders. Twelve candidates are contesting this year’s election, but the opposition remains fragmented after failing to unite behind a single challenger to Biya, who is seeking another seven-year term at age 92.

The Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) has called on the authorities to ensure that its upcoming mass rally proceeds without obstruction , describing it as a peaceful exercise of democratic rights amid an increasingly charged political climate. The rally, expected to draw thousands from across the atolls, is being organised to protest what the MDP calls “erosion of institutional independence” and “selective application of justice.” The party has urged the government and police to uphold constitutional freedoms, warning that attempts to disrupt the event would deepen political divisions. Analysts see the rally as a crucial test of public sentiment ahead of local elections and as a reflection of the widening rift between the ruling coalition and the main opposition.

MDP launches campaign demanding release of Lootuvaifi rally detainees

The MDP has launched a nationwide campaign demanding the immediate release of detainees arrested during the earlier Lootuvaifi rally, where dozens were taken into custody amid allegations of excessive police force. The campaign combines street demonstrations with a digital outreach strategy aimed at international human rights organisations. Party leaders argue that the arrests were politically motivated and form part of a broader pattern of suppression against opposition voices. The government, in response, has defended the arrests as necessary for maintaining public order. The situation has reignited debates over the Maldives’ democratic backsliding, with activists calling for judicial oversight and accountability in handling political protests.

ECM schedules 25 October referendum to decide governance of southern islands

The Elections Commission of Maldives (ECM) has announced that a referendum will be held on 25 October to determine the administrative governance of Hulhudhoo, Meedhoo, and Feydhoo. The vote will decide whether these southern islands will remain part of their current administrative structure or be reorganised for improved local governance. The ECM will deploy 18 ballot boxes across the region to ensure full voter participation. Officials say the referendum aims to strengthen local autonomy and address calls for greater representation. Political observers note that this decision comes at a time when the government is emphasising decentralisation as a pillar of its development strategy, even as critics argue that it risks politicising regional administration.

Maldives president demands accountability for Gaza, rejects 'principles for profit'

In a striking foreign policy statement, President Mohamed Muizzu demanded international accountability for the crisis in Gaza, condemning what he described as the global community’s failure to act out of “principles for profit.” Speaking at a regional forum, Muizzu asserted that moral consistency should define international relations, not economic or political convenience. The Maldives has long positioned itself as a vocal advocate for Palestinian rights, and the President’s comments reinforce that stance amid renewed global outrage over escalating civilian casualties. His remarks have been widely shared across social media and have drawn praise domestically for affirming the Maldives’ humanitarian diplomacy.

Revised Foreign Investment Act expands opportunities for local businesses

The Maldives’ revised Foreign Investment Act has been lauded by the Economic Minister as a “milestone reform” that expands opportunities for local entrepreneurs and small businesses. The updated legislation simplifies licensing procedures, increases transparency, and introduces safeguards to ensure that foreign partnerships deliver tangible benefits to local communities. The government says the changes aim to create a more competitive investment environment while preserving national interests. Economic analysts note that this move could help diversify the Maldivian economy beyond tourism by attracting foreign capital into technology, fisheries, and renewable energy sectors.

"Ms Machado is receiving the Nobel Peace Prize for her tireless work promoting democratic rights for the people of Venezuela and for her struggle to achieve a just and peaceful transition from dictatorship to democracy," committee chair Jorgen Watne Frydnes said in a statement. "She has been a key unifying figure in a political opposition that was once deeply divided."

Maduro has previously labelled Machado as "toxic," accusing her of conspiring against the country and urging her to "leave Venezuela alone so that it can continue on its path of recovery and prosperity."

The decision sparked political reactions abroad as well. A White House spokesperson criticised the choice, saying the committee had "chosen politics over peace ."

Machado's Nobel Peace Prize win places her among a small number of Latin American figures to receive the honour and is likely to intensify debate over the role of international institutions in Venezuela’s ongoing political crisis.

President William Ruto has made a passionate appeal to Kenya’s young population, urging them to take an active role in shaping the country’s future by registering as voters ahead of the 2027 general elections. Speaking at a national youth forum, Ruto emphasised that the youth form the largest demographic block and, therefore, have the power to redefine Kenya’s political destiny. He highlighted that political apathy among young people undermines their ability to influence governance and economic policy. The President encouraged youth to rise above frustration and scepticism, asserting that meaningful change can only come through democratic participation. He also promised to address the systemic barriers preventing youth registration, such as limited access to national identification cards and logistical challenges in remote areas.

Matiang’i now formally declares joining Jubilee Party

Former Interior Cabinet Secretary Fred Matiang’i has formally joined the Jubilee Party, marking his official entry into partisan politics after months of speculation. Matiang’i’s move is seen as a significant development in Kenya’s evolving political landscape, especially given his past reputation as a technocrat and public service reformer. During his declaration, he expressed his commitment to revitalising Jubilee’s grassroots structures and contributing to national unity through policy-based politics. His entry has been welcomed by sections of the party leadership who view him as a capable organiser with a strong administrative background. Political analysts, however, note that his decision may also be a strategic step toward positioning himself for a larger political role in the run-up to the 2027 elections. Matiang’i assured supporters that his focus remains on governance, integrity, and service delivery.

Kenya losing billions annually to graft and state capture, says AfDB

A new report by the African Development Bank (AfDB) has revealed that Kenya continues to lose billions of shillings annually to corruption and entrenched systems of state capture. The findings paint a grim picture of systemic inefficiencies, fraudulent procurement practices, and misuse of public funds that have eroded economic progress. The AfDB warned that corruption remains one of the greatest obstacles to sustainable development and foreign investment in Kenya. It urged the government to strengthen institutional accountability, improve transparency in public spending, and enforce anti-graft laws with greater consistency. The report further recommended empowering oversight bodies such as the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) and enhancing judicial independence to ensure that corruption cases are prosecuted effectively. The revelations have reignited public debate about governance reforms and the government’s political will to address corruption at the highest levels.

What is clear so far is that October 12 will be a litmus test for Cameroon’s fragile democracy: It could either free itself from the grip of an ageing regime or slip further into the familiar rule of the 92-year-old Biya.

Contenders and outcasts

This year’s election pits Biya against 11 candidates, drawn from a record 81 hopefuls. The Constitutional Court disqualified several bids, including that of Hilaire Marcaire Dzipan of the Progressive Movement (MP), whose initial approval by the election body was later revoked.

Another major exclusion was Maurice Kamto of the Movement for the Renaissance of Cameroon, widely regarded as Biya’s strongest challenger. Kamto, who came second in 2018 with 14% of the vote to Biya’s 71%, was barred from running.

The following candidates have been confirmed and validated for the October 12 vote:

Since the list’s release in July, the race has shifted. Akere and Seta have withdrawn to back Bouba, one of the leading opposition figures to have consolidated support . Another contender, Tchiroma, secured backing from the Manidem Party. 

Both Bouba and Tchiroma are now seen as the top opposition candidates .

Biya’s dominance

To grasp the scale of Biya’s dominance , one must look to Cameroon’s history.

Biya is only the country’s second president, succeeding Ahmadou Ahidjo, who led from independence in 1960 until resigning in 1982. Ahidjo’s decision to appoint Biya as his successor backfired when the new president later had him tried and sentenced to death — a penalty later commuted to life imprisonment.

Cameroon has never held a presidential election without Biya on the ballot. In 1984, he ran unopposed when Cameroon was still a one-party state. When multiparty elections were introduced in 1992, Biya won with 40% — his narrowest margin. His vote share has not fallen below 70% since.

Here’s how Biya won in all the elections he has participated in: 

However, these numbers aren’t to be taken at face value. Nearly all elections have been mired in allegations of vote-rigging. As the International Crisis Group noted, “Given the likely magnitude of the election irregularities, it is almost impossible to determine what percentage of the vote each candidate really won.”

Cameroonian journalist Tony Vinyoh said such allegations have deepened public mistrust in the process.

“People don't trust the process,” he told Global South World. “I’ve talked to some parents, and they don't even want to register their kids.”

Out of a population of 28.3 million, only 8.2 million are registered to vote. Turnout has steadily declined: from 80% in 2004 to 68% in 2011, and just 54% in 2018, according to the International Foundation for Electoral Systems.

What’s at stake

For many, the October vote is about more than leadership — it’s about ending a culture that stifles dissent, discourages meritocracy, and sustains political dynasties as enduring as Biya’s.

“Stability, in Cameroon’s current context, is a deeply misleading term,” Cameroonian journalist Amindeh Atabong wrote in his column for Global South World . “It masks the profound erosion of civil liberties, the stifling of political dissent, and the lack of political will to reform electoral norms in order to sustain one man’s grip on power.”

Cameroon’s population is young, but its leadership is ageing. As problems in education, infrastructure, and the economy deepen, public frustration grows.

“People are worried about the state of their roads, the standards of education. There are parents who are worried about feeding their kids and sending them to school. They are worried about the training they will get in university and whether the training will be useful,” he said.

Elections like that of October 12 give Cameroon the appearance of democracy, but many say the reality remains far removed from its promise.

“Cameroon holds regular elections. It maintains a multiparty system. It boasts a constitutional council and an independent electoral body. But these structures have been hollowed out, their purpose repurposed to preserve a singular political dynasty. There is no viable path to power that doesn’t first pass through the gate Biya has locked shut,” Atabong said. 

“Unless opposition leaders find a way to unify, unless citizens reclaim the democratic space stolen from them, Biya’s eighth term will not be his last.”

As Cameroonians prepare to cast their votes, the stakes extend far beyond the ballot box. The election has become a reckoning with decades of stagnation — a test of whether a new generation can reclaim the promise of democracy from the world’s oldest ruler, or whether the familiar machinery of power will once again tighten its hold.

According to the Wikipedia overview of voting ages, most nations use 18 as the legal voting threshold. A handful lower it to 16 or 17, and the United Arab Emirates remains an outlier with a voting age of 25. That data is echoed in broader surveys: nearly 202 countries hold 18 as their standard voting age, while only 10 use 16, and 4 use 17.

In recent decades, some democracies have experimented with earlier enfranchisement, either nationally or for specific elections. For example:

A landmark move: United Kingdom to lower voting age to 16

In 2025, the U.K. announced sweeping electoral reforms that include lowering the voting age from 18 to 16 in all national elections, a move expected to take effect ahead of the next general election.

This change will bring England and Northern Ireland in line with Scotland and Wales, where 16- and 17-year-olds already vote in devolved elections.

Analysts cited by the House of Commons project that lowering the age will unlikely alter election outcomes, and in some cases, 16-year-olds have shown a higher propensity to vote than those just reaching 18.

The reform also comes alongside measures to simplify voter ID rules and strengthen campaign finance oversight to guard against foreign interference.

The day marked not only a pivotal moment in German history but also a turning point for Europe and the post–Cold War world.

The fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, had set the stage for this transformation. What began as spontaneous protests and border openings soon became a continental wave of change that swept away the communist regimes of Eastern Europe.

Through months of intense diplomacy, the path to unity was forged. The East German parliament voted to accede to the Federal Republic of Germany under Article 23 of the West German Basic Law .

In contrast, the “Two Plus Four Treaty” signed on September 12, 1990, by both German states and the four Allied powers, France, the United Kingdom, the United States , and the Soviet Union, restored Germany’s full sovereignty.

At midnight on October 3, 1990, the German Democratic Republic officially ceased to exist. Five eastern states, Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, and Thuringia, joined the Federal Republic.

Berlin was reunified as the capital. From that moment forward, Germany was one nation again, and October 3 became Tag der Deutschen Einheit, the Day of German Unity.

In the 35 years since reunification, Germany has emerged as Europe’s strongest economy and a cornerstone of democracy. But the process of knitting together two very different societies has not been without struggle. Economic disparities between the former East and West persist.

Former industrial heartlands in the East still lag behind their western counterparts in wages, infrastructure, and employment. Towns like Eisenhüttenstadt, once proud symbols of socialist urban planning, have lost much of their population and are now experimenting with creative revitalisation programs such as offering rent-free “trial living” to attract newcomers.

Even Germany’s geography still bears the imprint of division. Although Berlin is the nation’s capital, six federal ministries remain headquartered in Bonn, a vestige of compromise codified in the Berlin–Bonn Act of 1994.

This year’s commemorations in Saarbrücken, the host city for the 2025 Unity Day celebrations, underscore Germany’s ongoing leadership role in European cooperation. French President Emmanuel Macron is expected to attend , emphasising the Franco–German partnership that remains the foundation of the European Union.

China's Tang Renjian (death sentence)

China’s Changchun Intermediate People’s Court handed Tang Renjian, the former minister of agriculture and rural affairs, a death sentence with a two-year reprieve for corruption on Sunday, September 28.

According to the court , over the period from 2007 to 2024, Tang abused both central and local positions to assist companies in securing project contracts, adjust personnel placements, and also leverage his influence in exchange for money and valuables.

The total value of bribes was reported at 268 million yuan($37.6 million).

Tang, however, received a suspended death sentence, which allows for the punishment to be reduced to life in prison after two years if he commits no other offences.

China’s Communist Party expelled Tang in November 2024, just six months after an anti-graft probe removed him from office.

His arrest comes on the back of President Xi Jinping’s sweeping purge of security and political elites, which was launched in 2020 to enforce absolute loyalty. Before becoming agriculture minister, Tang served as governor of Gansu from 2017 to 2020.

DR Congo's Joseph Kabila (death sentence)

Joseph Kabila, who ruled the Democratic Republic of the Congo from 2001 to 2019, met his fate on Tuesday, September 30, when the country's high military court sentenced him to death in absentia.

Although he was not in court and represented by no lawyers, he was convicted of treason, war crimes, crimes against humanity, sexual assault and other grave offences, with the court highlighting his alleged collaboration with the Rwanda-backed M23 rebels, which seized a part of Congo..

Alongside the death sentence, Kabila was ordered to pay $50 billion in damages to the Congolese state and victims.

Kabila was the president of DR Congo from 2001 to 2019. His tenure is reported to have been fraught with chronic instability, resource conflict, and regional interventions in the country.

Brazil's Jair Bolsonaro (27-year sentence)

Brazil’s Supreme Federal Court convicted ex-President Jair Bolsonaro of conspiring to orchestrate a coup after his 2022 election defeat and sentenced him to 27 years and three months in prison on September 11.

He was found guilty of leading a criminal organisation, attempting to abolish democratic rule by force, plotting a coup, committing violent damage, and degrading government property.

Evidence included his alleged role in planning the January 8, 2023, attacks on federal buildings in Brasília, pressuring the military, and even plotting assassinations of President Lula and Supreme Court justices.

The trial was historic, making Bolsonaro the first former Brazilian president convicted for directly attacking democracy. He remains under house arrest in Brasília, denies all charges as political persecution, and has filed an appeal seeking release.

In July 2022, during a state visit by French President Emmanuel Macron, Paul Biya was asked whether he would seek another term. “I still have three years…and when the time comes, I will decide whether to retire to the village or not,” he replied, brushing off the question about his political future. Three years later, his decision is clear: Instead of packing his bags and returning to his native Mvomeka’a in the South, Biya—now 92 years of age—will stay in the capital Yaoundé and seek yet another term in office. And so it happens that as the October 12 presidential vote draws near, Cameroon finds itself at a political crossroads that feels all too familiar.

As long as Biya, the world’s oldest head of state, breathes, he rules—irrespective of concerns over his health, age and legacy. Beyond Biya’s bid for another mandate that could see him in power well close to a century old, the real story lies more in the systemic dismantling of opposition forces—an orchestrated effort that has left the central African nation’s democratic institutions hollow and its political future uncertain.

43 years and still counting

Biya’s uninterrupted presidency since 1982 has largely depended on a delicate mixture of autocratic rule, patronage , tactical patience, politics of silence, as well as nepotism and  tribalism . In over four decades, he has outmanoeuvred rivals, reshaped institutions, and ensured that any path to power—legitimate or otherwise—passes through him. In 2025, the strategy appears unchanged. The recent disqualification of Maurice Kamto, Biya’s former ally, main challenger and runner-up in the contentious 2018 poll, is emblematic of a regime that has turned legal procedure into political weaponry.

Elections Cameroon, the country’s election management body—which is supposedly independent but in fact dominated by presidential appointees—blamed Kamto’s exclusion from the race on “multiple investitures” by the MANIDEM party, which nominated him. The decision drew immediate backlash, notably from Human Rights Watch, which said the decision to exclude Kamto reflects the government’s long-standing intolerance for any opposition and dissent. Just before, there was widespread fear that the electoral commission’s decision could ignite unrest in major cities like Douala and Yaoundé. But Biya’s administration responded in predictable fashion, borrowing a leave from its playbook: pre-emptive deployments of anti-riot forces, dispersing crowds with teargas and arresting suspected pro-Kamto supporters—all amid vague appeals for stability.

Crackdowns and manipulation 

But stability, in Cameroon’s current context, is a deeply misleading term. It masks the profound erosion of civil liberties, the stifling of political dissent, and the lack of political will to reform electoral norms in order to sustain one man’s grip on power. As the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) 2024 indicates , democratic statehood, political participation, rule of law, political and social integration are on the decline since 2014, putting Cameroon in the category of “hardline autocracies.”

In March 2024, the government banned two opposition coalition platforms—the Alliance Politique pour le Changement and the Alliance pour la Transition Politique—accusing them of unlawful association. By targeting coordination efforts among rival parties, the regime effectively dismantled any chance of a united opposition front, long before the first ballot could be cast.

Meanwhile, the ruling Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM) continues to dominate the political landscape, sometimes using state resources and through institutional engineering. The decision last year to postpone parliamentary and municipal elections —originally scheduled for this year before the presidential poll—until 2026 is another glaring example. The official rationale cited the need to lighten the electoral calendar. But it seemed to have been designed to prevent key opposition figure Kamto, who required local representation to qualify under electoral law, from fulfilling eligibility requirements.

Opposition is fragmented, but new players arise

Opposition parties, while numerous, remain fragmented. Political figures like Cabral Libii, Joshua Osih, Serge Espoir Matomba, Patricia Tomaïno Ndam Njoya and Akere Muna failed to unite around a single platform, though a few have now stepped down in support of others. Regional rivalries, ideological differences, and suspicions—fuelled, in some part, by regime infiltration—have made meaningful coordination almost impossible. In the absence of unity, the opposition shares the remaining votes, and its impact is diminished to symbolic protest and social media outrage.

Still, the cracks in Biya’s edifice are growing, with the recent defection of prominent northern allies. Issa Tchiroma Bakary and Bello Bouba Maigari, both former cabinet members and longstanding collaborators of the regime, announced presidential bids of their own . Their exit from an alliance with the CPDM is not just an act of defiance; it’s a signal that things may not be the same in the north, which holds a strong sway in the vote. Their candidacies may lack broad support—also due to their ages, but they reflect a growing impatience within the ruling elite, particularly among those sidelined in Biya’s long twilight.

A country in a state of uncertainty

Meanwhile, outside of Yaoundé, the government’s authoritarian playbook continues to have deadly consequences. In the English-speaking North West and South West regions, armed separatists and government forces remain locked in a brutal conflict that has killed over 6,000 and displaced nearly a million people. Thousands have died, schools remain shuttered, and humanitarian access is limited. In the Far North, Boko Haram insurgents persist in attacking civilians and security forces. These crises have not only devastated lives; they’ve also provided convenient justification for voter suppression in regions unlikely to back the ruling party at this time.

Indeed, the state of uncertainty that hangs over these regions is not just a matter of war—it could also be considered as a deliberate electoral strategy. By doing little or nothing to encourage voting in crisis zones, which are opposition strongholds, the regime strengthens its numerical advantage. 

On the economic front, Cameroonians face both external and internal shocks, especially the burden of inflation and underemployment. With youth unemployment reaching alarming levels, and roughly 40 per cent of the population living below the poverty line, disillusionment is widespread. The median age in Cameroon is just 18, yet the political class—dominated by septuagenarians and octogenarians—remains deaf to the frustrations of a generation born and raised under them.

The gate to power is shut

It’s no surprise then that home-based youth are taking their frustration online, while youth-led protests by the country’s diaspora are common. But Biya’s regime has long perfected the art of deterrence. According to Freedom House, arrests, torture, detentions, and the use of a controversial 2014 anti-terrorism law to criminalise dissent have silenced even moderate critics. The media landscape, too, has been gutted. The Committee to Protect Journalists says journalists face censorship, intimidation, and imprisonment, with Cameroon consistently ranked among the worst countries in the world for press freedom.

And yet, the international community remains largely passive. France, Cameroon’s former colonial ruler, maintains close economic and military ties, while regional institutions like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the African Union have issued little more than muted statements. Western governments, wary of jeopardising counterterrorism cooperation, have avoided direct confrontation with Yaoundé. But in doing so, they tacitly endorse a regime that flouts democratic norms while claiming the legitimacy of an electoral mandate.

Cameroon’s hollow future

What makes Biya’s grip on power so enduring is not just repression—it is the illusion of legality. Cameroon holds regular elections. It maintains a multiparty system. It boasts a constitutional council and an independent electoral body. But these structures have been hollowed out, their purpose repurposed to preserve a singular political dynasty. There is no viable path to power that doesn’t first pass through the gate Biya has locked shut.

For all his frailty, Paul Biya is not a relic of a bygone era; he is the architect of a system built to outlast him. His true legacy may not be longevity, but the institutional paralysis he will leave behind. And unless opposition leaders find a way to unify, unless citizens reclaim the democratic space stolen from them, Biya’s eighth term will not be his last. 

The opinions and thoughts expressed in this article reflect only the author's views.

Amindeh Blaise Atabong is a freelance journalist based in Cameroon’s capital, Yaounde. He covers politics, security, and society across Africa. Atabong’s work spans radio, print, and digital platforms, and he has contributed to regional and global outlets such as Reuters, Quartz, The Times UK, The Continent, Semafor, Jeune Afrique, the German Press Agency, African Arguments, and Equal Times.

Nigeria’s economic reforms, particularly President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s removal of fuel subsidies and the unification of exchange rates, were intended to stabilise public finances and attract investment. Instead, they have fueled hardship. Inflation hit 34.2% in 2024, the highest in 28 years, while food inflation surged to 40.7% ( National Bureau of Statistics, 2024 ). With one in two Nigerians now living in multidimensional poverty, the country’s vast oil wealth has yet to translate into broad-based development.

Persistent insecurity

Armed groups remain a major destabilising force. Boko Haram, its offshoot ISWAP, and Ansaru continue to wage violence in northern Nigeria. The August 2025 arrest of Ansaru leaders Mahmud Muhammad Usman and Mahmud al-Nigeri was hailed as a turning point, but experts caution that extremist networks are resilient and prone to retaliatory attacks. Kidnapping-for-ransom and farmer-herder clashes further compound insecurity, undermining state authority in vast swathes of the country.

Democratic fragility

Since its return to civilian rule in 1999, Nigeria has struggled with electoral credibility. Nearly every presidential election has ended in legal disputes. Analysts warn that unless the 2027 general elections improve on the contested 2023 polls, Nigeria risks eroding public trust in democracy. Political scientists say this could embolden other West African regimes, already plagued by coups and authoritarian backsliding, to manipulate their own electoral processes.

Fragile social systems

Nigeria’s health and education systems expose the cost of weak governance. The country has one of the world’s highest maternal mortality rates, with 1,047 deaths per 100,000 live births ( WHO, 2023 ). In education, millions of out-of-school children, estimated at 20 million by UNICEF, threaten the future of a youthful population.

Energy and infrastructure gap

Despite its oil reserves, Nigeria’s power sector is one of the least reliable in Africa. Over 85 million people, that is 43% of the population, lack access to grid electricity ( African Development Bank, 2024 ). Power generation averages 4,500 MW for a nation of 228 million, constraining industrialisation and job creation.

A nation at crossroads

Nigeria’s strategic weight is undeniable since it is Africa’s largest economy, the continent’s biggest democracy, and a key security partner to Western powers. Yet its internal crises, rising poverty, governance deficits, and insecurity raise questions about its long-term stability. With over 70% of Nigerians under 30, the country faces a stark choice: either to harness its demographic dividend for growth or allow frustration to fuel instability and unrest.

As Nigeria turns 65, it teeters between resilience and fragility. Whether it tips one way or the other will depend on the government’s ability to turn ambitious reforms into real improvements for ordinary citizens.

According to the Country Similarity Index , a data-driven ranking that compares nations across five major dimensions, the United States’ closest cultural cousin is its neighbour to the north, Canada, with a striking similarity score of 79.2.

Trailing behind Canada are fellow English-speaking democracies Australia (71.8), New Zealand (70.5), and Great Britain (69.7), with Puerto Rico tying Britain at 69.7, which is unsurprising given its political connection to the U.S.

Ireland (67.3) rounds out the top five before the ranking widens to include European partners like Germany, France, Norway, and Switzerland. These nations share much of the United States’ institutional, infrastructural, and political framework, even if geography and some cultural elements diverge.

Canada and the U.S. not only share the longest undefended border in the world, but their economies are closely integrated under the USMCA trade agreement, their media and entertainment industries cross-pollinate, and both societies are shaped by waves of immigration and shared democratic norms.

The inclusion of Australia and New Zealand reflects a similar pattern, countries built on British colonial legal systems, English language dominance, and comparable political models. Even across the Atlantic, Germany, France, Norway, and Switzerland land on the list thanks to their high standard of living , advanced infrastructure, and liberal democratic traditions, making them natural partners for Washington on global issues.

This cultural and institutional proximity carries weight in today’s geopolitical climate. It explains why the U.S. often finds it easier to coordinate policy and form coalitions with these nations, whether in trade negotiations, climate summits, or military alliances.

Canada and the U.S., for example, are currently negotiating joint energy and security frameworks, while Australia and New Zealand are playing central roles in the U.S.’s Indo-Pacific strategy.

Across the Atlantic, Germany and France continue to collaborate with Washington on everything from NATO’s security posture to AI governance frameworks, even amid occasional tensions over industrial policy.

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The proposed constitution extends the presidential term from five to seven years, allows two terms, and crucially removes a ban preventing junta members, including General Mamady Doumbouya, from standing for office.

Additionally, it introduces a new Senate, one-third of whose members the president would appoint.

The vote comes ahead of planned general and presidential elections in December 2025, which the referendum is meant to enable legally.

The stakes

In September 2021, Doumbouya seized power in a coup, which dissolved the constitution with a vow to return the country to civilian rule. He initially promised that no junta member would run in future elections. That promise is now in shambles.

Opposition leaders, including Cellou Dalein Diallo, are either under suspension, in exile, or stripped of political space, and are calling for a boycott of the referendum.

The media landscape is also experiencing the heat with severe restrictions. Private outlets have been shut, websites suspended, and campaign coverage tightly regulated.

The AFP, however, reports that some media restrictions have been eased ahead of the vote.

Critics argue these conditions support a process that looks democratic on paper but is deeply curtailed in practice

What September 21 means

If the draft passes, Doumbouya is almost certain to run in December. A “Yes” vote would mark a legal framework that elevates executive power, leverages a compliant legislature, and further limits opposition.

If the referendum fails or if turnout is very low, legitimacy instantly becomes the issue. The junta would face internal pressure and external scepticism.

Delay or reform of the election schedule might follow. Unrest, protest, or resistance which have been banned in the country since 2022 could grow.

The coalition includes prominent organisations such as Activista, the Gambia National Youth Parliament, Team Gom Sa Bopa, the Solo Sandeng Foundation, Think Young Women, and the Kenya Human Rights Commission, among others.

The activists noted the removal came on September 15, International Day of Democracy, calling it a bitter irony. “On a day meant to honour freedom, justice and dignity, the Government instead chose to undermine constitutionalism and attack the foundations of democracy in The Gambia,” Dibba said.

They stressed that Gambia’s democracy is still fragile, less than a decade after the fall of Yahya Jammeh’s two-decade dictatorship. “The bitter irony is that the very individual who benefited most from the people ’s rejection of dictatorship, President Adama Barrow, is now dismantling the same democratic order that brought him to power,” Dibba declared.

Why is the removal unlawful?

According to the 1997 Constitution and the National Audit Office Act of 2015, an Auditor General can only be removed under four conditions : completion of a nine-year tenure, voluntary resignation, attainment of retirement age, or proven incapacity or misconduct confirmed by a tribunal or medical board.

None of these conditions applied, the coalition said, accusing Barrow of deliberately bypassing constitutional safeguards. “This is not a mistake or a misunderstanding. It is a deliberate and calculated assault on accountability, transparency and democratic governance,” Dibba said. The civil society groups warned that if the unlawful interference is allowed to stand, it could set a dangerous precedent, threatening the independence of other independent state institutions.

Here are five of their main objections:

1. Suppression of free speech and dissent

The coalition says the law has been used less for cybersecurity and more as a political weapon. They cited cases of bloggers arrested for “fake news,” an author detained for writing a presidential biography, and a developer targeted for building a Finance Bill monitoring tool. 

According to BAKE lawyer Mercy Mutemi, the law was a “panic response” to online dissent, not a genuine attempt to tackle cybercrime.

2. Abuse leading to harassment and even death

Perhaps the most shocking example is the case of teacher Albert Ojwang, who reportedly died in police custody after being arrested over a social media post. 

Lawyers argued the Act gives police sweeping surveillance powers, leading to harassment, abductions, and abuses that endanger lives.

3. Violation of constitutional rights

The coalition members claim the law infringes on freedoms of expression, privacy, and judicial independence. Section 50, for example, requires courts to automatically grant police access to digital data if “reasonable grounds” are claimed, a provision Mutemi said turns courts into “rubber stamps” instead of independent watchdogs.

4. Lack of public participation

Another key objection is procedural; significant amendments adding new “content offences” were introduced at the committee stage in Parliament without public consultation. Critics have therefore argued that this violates Kenya’s constitutional requirement for public participation in lawmaking, making the Act illegitimate.

5. Less restrictive alternatives exist

Lawyers insist that there are civil remedies, such as defamation suits, that can protect reputations without criminalising speech. As lawyer Dudley Ochiel argued, criminal provisions like those targeting false publications or cyber harassment are overly broad and open to abuse. Civil law, they say, would strike a better balance between protecting reputations and safeguarding free expression.

The state, represented by the Attorney-General, the DPP, and Parliament,  has urged the court to uphold a 2020 High Court ruling that declared the law constitutional, insisting that regulating digital activity is necessary in the age of technology. The ruling is set to be delivered in February 2026.

In a significant constitutional move, Tonga’s King has asserted control over foreign policy, sidelining parliamentary influence. The decision has sparked intense debate over the monarchy’s role in diplomacy and the balance of power between elected officials and the crown.

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Tonga’s Legislative Assembly has closed its latest session to prepare for the November General Election. Before adjourning, lawmakers passed several key bills, including the Whistleblower Protection Bill and amendments to marriage laws.

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The seemingly innocuous Jolly Roger has since become an anti-establishment symbol sweeping through countries like Nepal and France — both of which saw leadership changes after mass demonstrations — as well as Indonesia and the Philippines.

It began in early August, when the flag appeared across Indonesia as a sign of protest against President Prabowo Subianto. Authorities quickly warned that the One Piece flag must not be flown alongside the red-and-white Merah Putih national flag, with police seizing copies of the anime banner. 

Amnesty International Indonesia had questioned the legal basis for banning the flag.

“Has he incited hatred based on religion, ethnicity, race, intergroup relations, national origin or sexual orientation? Is he inciting discrimination on these grounds? Is he propagating a war? For example, of a state or an armed group? If not, then it cannot be banned,” Usman Hamid, the group’s executive director, told AFP. 

Hamid argued that the flag even reflects Indonesia’s own founding ideals.“If we connect it with Indonesia’s independence, on August 17, the spirit of One Piece is the same as that of the Merah Putih: fighting oppression, declaring independence and freedom, and striving for justice and the removal of all restraints,” he added.

Since then, the movement has grown quickly in the country of 280 million, reaching a tipping point in late August when thousands marched on Parliament to protest lawmakers’ housing allowances.

Protests turned violent after police in Jakarta fatally struck 21-year-old motorcycle-taxi driver Affan Kurniawan. At least 10 people have died since demonstrations began.

The unrest prompted the president to reshuffle his cabinet, replacing five ministers, including those for finance and security. Prabowo himself, however, remains in power. 

The same could not be said for Nepal, where a wave of “Gen Z” protests toppled the incumbent government and installed a new one, with its “nomination” of a new leader announced on the gaming chat app Discord.

Again, the skull-and-straw-hat flag has been a fixture in these anti-government demonstrations, which erupted after Nepal banned social media platforms like Facebook and X but also criticise widespread corruption and the lavish lifestyle of “nepo kids.”

Protesters torched Parliament, luxury hotels and residences, and the burning skyline became the backdrop for the flying One Piece flag. 

Interim Prime Minister Sushila Karki, Nepal’s first female premier, has taken over from K.P. Sharma Oli, who resigned amid the unrest. At least 72 people have died since the protests began.

On September 13, the flag flew again — this time in the Philippines. Thousands gathered at Manila’s EDSA Shrine, the historic site where millions once toppled a dictator, to protest alleged corruption in flood control projects. 

Demonstrators called for systemic reforms and warned that the misuse of public funds is only a symptom of deeper failures in governance.

More mass protests are planned in the country, prompting the government to place the armed forces on red alert. Though unsaid, it is apparent that there are lingering fear that, as in Nepal and Indonesia, simmering discontent could spill into something larger.

Though their causes and outcomes differ, demonstrations in Indonesia, Nepal, and the Philippines have united under a single banner: the skull-and-straw hat, co-opted into an emblem of defiance and protest.

Today, the One Piece flag flies not only over imaginary ships but over parliaments and city squares, from Jakarta to Kathmandu to Manila. It is no longer just the banner of a pirate crew, but the shorthand for a demand for justice and freedom.