Poland recorded the world's fastest growth in its ultra-high-net-worth individual (UHNWI) population over the past decade, with the number of residents holding at least US$10 million in net assets rising 109.2%, according to The Wealth Report 2026 published by global property consultancy Knight Frank.

Knight Frank defines ultra-high-net-worth individuals as people with net assets of US$10 million or more, excluding their primary residence.

Poland narrowly outpaced Qatar, where the ultra-wealthy population increased 106.9%, while Türkiye ranked third with 93.6% growth. Romania followed closely at 93.0%, meaning four of the world's five fastest-growing UHNWI populations were located in Central Europe or the Middle East .

Greece ranked fifth with 74.0% growth, followed by Israel at 71.4%, Saudi Arabia at 69.2%, the Czech Republic at 67.4%, India at 63.4%, while Singapore and the United Arab Emirates shared tenth place with 54.5% growth.

Knight Frank said the rankings measure the percentage increase in each country's UHNWI population over the ten years to 2025, reflecting changes in wealth creation rather than the total number of wealthy individuals.

Poland's rapid rise has been driven by sustained economic expansion, rising business investment, increasing exports and the growth of domestically owned companies since joining the European Union in 2004. According to the World Bank, Poland has been one of Europe's fastest-growing major economies over the past two decades, creating new wealth across manufacturing, technology, finance and logistics.

Qatar and Saudi Arabia continued to benefit from energy revenues alongside efforts to diversify their economies through investment in finance, tourism, infrastructure and technology under long-term national development strategies. Türkiye's growth reflected the expansion of private enterprise and asset appreciation despite periods of high inflation and currency volatility.

India remained the only country from South Asia to enter the top ten. Knight Frank has previously identified India as one of the world's fastest-growing wealth markets, supported by expanding entrepreneurship, technology companies, manufacturing and financial services.

Knight Frank noted that wealth creation is becoming increasingly geographically diverse, with emerging markets accounting for many of the fastest-growing UHNWI populations, even as established financial centres continue to host larger absolute numbers of wealthy individuals.

The findings underscore how economic growth, business formation and rising asset values are reshaping the global distribution of wealth beyond traditional centres in North America and Western Europe.

Addressing the audience, Putin also acknowledged the challenges faced by those on the front line and behind the scenes, noting that fear is a natural response in difficult circumstances. However, he emphasised that resilience and unity remain key factors in overcoming adversity, highlighting the mobilisation of millions of people in support of the country’s goals.

It was a crisis response dressed up as diplomacy.

For those who have watched Australia’s agricultural supply chains with growing alarm, the arrival of the MV Medi Luna was not a triumph. It was a confession - that Australia, a continent that feeds 100 million people and exports more agricultural produce per capita than almost any other nation on earth – relies for its own food on a 21-mile-wide passage in the Persian Gulf.

The Strait of Hormuz is Australia’s farm gate. And someone else has the key.

How Australia got here

Australia consumed 8.7 million tonnes of fertiliser in 2024, valued at A$5.5 billion (US$3.8 billion). Of that, 7.9 million tonnes - more than 85 per cent - were imported. Domestic production has collapsed to just 1.3 million tonnes, 15 per cent of national consumption. When Incitec Pivot shut the Gibson Island urea facility near Brisbane in 2022, citing an inability to secure affordable long-term gas supply, Australia lost its last significant domestic nitrogen production capacity. From that point on, Australian farmers became entirely dependent on the goodwill of Middle Eastern petrochemical states and the uninterrupted passage of cargo ships through one of the most contested waterways in the world .

Perdaman’s planned new facility Karratha, Western Australia won’t go near to closing the shortfall.

Australia imports approximately 3.85 million tonnes of urea annually. More than half comes from the UAE, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia - countries whose gas production and export terminals are anchored in the Persian Gulf. More than 60 per cent of that urea travels through the Strait of Hormuz, a passage barely 21 miles wide at its narrowest point. As the UN has confirmed, up to 30 per cent of internationally traded fertilisers - nitrogen, phosphate, sulphur - move through this chokepoint. When the Strait closes, Australian farming is suffocated.

When the gulf closed

Following the US-Israeli strikes on Iran, maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz declined by more than 95 per cent. Qatar Energy halted downstream urea production. Saudi and UAE terminals fell silent. Nearly a million metric tonnes of fertiliser cargo were physically stranded in the Gulf, with major producers declaring force majeure. For Australian farmers entering their critical winter-crop planting window - April through June - the timing could not have been worse.

The price response was immediate and severe. Urea, which had traded at around A$675 per tonne in February 2026, broke through A$1,000 per tonne by the end of March - a 50% increase in seven weeks. As Professor Marit Kragt of the University of Western Australia observed: “The current impacts are much more profound. We seem to have not learned anything.”

She was right. This was Australia’s third major fertiliser supply chain disruption this decade. COVID-19 severed Chinese export pipelines. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 pushed prices to historic highs and shuttered the Gibson Island plant, at first temporarily and then permanently. After each disruption, Australia scrambled and promised to rethink its supply chains. After each one, it didn’t.

By April 2026, according to government figures, Australia had secured only 20 per cent of the urea it needed for the current farming season - still 1.25 million tonnes short. The government threw A$7.5 billion into a Fuel and Fertiliser Security Facility. Minister for Agriculture Julie Collins worked around the clock. Prime Minister Albanese cut short a trade tour to return to Geelong after a fire at one of Australia’s two fuel refineries added a second crisis to the first. To be clear, the country was never in danger of famine. But it is in danger of something that, for Australian farming, is almost as bad: a season in which the numbers just don’t add up.

What farmers actually lose

The arithmetic of fertiliser deprivation is merciless. Canola requires around 80 kilograms of nitrogen per hectare to reach optimal yield. Without it, farmers have three choices: plant anyway and accept lower yields, switch to lower-input crops like barley, oats or pulses, or leave land fallow. Each choice is a loss. ABARES forecast in March 2026 that the gross value of Australian agricultural production would fall to around A$95 billion in 2026–27, down from an expected A$101 billion the year before - a A$6 billion contraction driven substantially by fertiliser uncertainty and rising input costs. Farm profits were forecast to decline following several strong seasons, not because of drought or flood or disease, but because a geopolitical event 10,000 kilometers away had closed the pipeline through which Australia’s fields are fed.

The FAO has estimated that cereal producers globally could face income losses of up to 5 per cent in 2026, with lasting impacts through 2030. For Australian wheat and canola farmers competing in global markets, a 5 per cent yield reduction means a mortgage payment, a school fee, a piece of machinery not purchased, a farm debt that rolls forward another year.

And the damage is not limited to farms. One in five Australian households currently skips meals or goes full days without food, according to the 2025 Foodbank Hunger Report. Claiming that Australia is food-secure simply because it exports more calories than it consumes - as governments have repeatedly done - is, as Kimberley Reis of Griffith University puts it, “a mind-numbingly unenlightened thing to say.” Food security isn’t an abstraction about aggregate calories. For the household facing a grocery bill inflated by a conflict it cannot influence, in a country that chose not to build the buffer it needed, it is a weekly calculation.

Indonesia steps in

The deal with Indonesia was important, and welcome. PT Pupuk Indonesia, the state-owned fertiliser producer whose subsidiary PT Pupuk Kalimantan Timur operates the Bontang terminal, has a production capacity of 9.4 million tonnes of urea annually. Against domestic demand of 6.3 million tonnes, that leaves a meaningful export surplus. Indonesia is, in fact, the world’s fourth-largest urea producer. It was able to help when the Gulf could not, and it chose to do so.

The government-to-government framework coordinated by President Prabowo and Prime Minister Albanese - formalized into a commercial deal between Incitec Pivot Fertilizers and PT Pupuk Indonesia - will deliver 250,000 tonnes of urea to Australia by year’s end, with the potential to scale to 500,000 tonnes in a second phase worth approximately USD 440 million. The first cargo of 47,250 tonnes, loaded from PT Pupuk Kalimantan Timur’s terminal in Bontang, arrived in Brisbane on 22 June 2026. Indonesian Ambassador Siswo Pramono called it a demonstration of Indonesia’s growing contribution to regional food security. Australian officials called it a testament to the strength of the bilateral relationship.

It is both of those things. But the deal also illustrates exactly how fragile Australia’s position remains. In a moment of acute crisis, the country’s fertiliser security rested entirely on the discretion of a foreign government - one that, however friendly, had no obligation to prioritize Australian farmers over its own. Indonesia’s domestic fertiliser stockpile stood at 1.23 million tonnes as of June 2026, and its domestic subsidized distribution was running 30 per cent above the previous year. It could afford to be generous. In a different configuration of crisis, the answer from Jakarta or Riyadh or Doha might not be yes.

Alliances and bilateral frameworks are instruments of statecraft, not substitutes for industrial policy. The 250,000 tonnes secured from Indonesia covered roughly 20 per cent of what was still needed for the season. The remaining 80 per cent had to be sourced from wherever it could be found, at whatever price the disrupted market demanded. Prime Minister Albanese is right that strong regional relationships matter. What he hasn’t said is that relationships work best when there is something to offer in return. Australia imports its key fertiliser. It does not make any.

The case for domestic production

Australia has all the ingredients to be a world-class urea producer. It has vast natural gas and coal resources - not the coal of conventional open-cut mines, but deep seams, stranded deposits, coal that cannot be sold on export markets but can, through the proven technology of underground coal gasification, be converted into the syngas that feeds an ammonia and urea plant. It has the land, the port infrastructure, the regulatory frameworks, and - if it chose to deploy them - the sovereign capital.

For decades, Australia has debated sovereign fuel reserves, domestic manufacturing capacity, critical minerals supply chains, and defense self-sufficiency with varying degrees of urgency. Fertiliser has always been way down the list. The two largest short-term threats to Australian agricultural output are drought and a closed strait. We build dams for the first. We are still debating the building of plants for the second.

The question is when

Australia feeds 100 million people, including almost 30 million Australians. That is a responsibility, and currently, a gamble. Every tonne of wheat sown in the Wheatbelt, every canola crop planted across the Eyre Peninsula, every nitrogen application on every paddock from Western Australia to Queensland depends on an unbroken supply chain that passes through one of the world’s most contested maritime chokepoints.

The current crisis will pass. The Strait of Hormuz will reopen, as it has before. Urea prices will fall. Shipments will resume. And Australian agriculture ministers will announce that the supply chain has been “diversified” - meaning a few more cargo shipments from Southeast Asian producers have been penciled into trade agreements, and a working group has been established.

It can be done, as Perdamon’s Project Ceres demonstrates. But one plant won’t be enough.

Another domestic urea and ammonia plant, built in South Australia or Western Australia or Queensland, fed by gas produced beneath Australian soil, employing Australian workers, would still not entirely eliminate the risk of another disruption. But it would mean that the next time a strait closes or a government says no, Australia farmers aren’t scrambling. The MV Medi Luna was a lifeline. The question is whether Australia will use the time between crises, or simply wait to need another one.

Colombia occupies a position no other South American country shares: it has coastlines on both the Pacific and the Caribbean, sitting right beneath the southern approach to the Panama Canal. That geography does a lot of the economic heavy lifting. A container leaving Buenaventura on the Pacific or Cartagena on the Caribbean gets to North America, Europe, or Asia without the extra transit time that landlocked or single-coast neighbours like Bolivia, Paraguay, or even Pacific-only Peru and Chile have to absorb.

Then there's the equatorial position, near-constant daylight and rainfall for agriculture, four mountain ranges (the three Andean cordilleras plus a few outlying massifs) creating dozens of microclimates packed close together, and a slice of the Amazon in the south. Put it together, and you get one of the most naturally diversified resource bases in the hemisphere: coffee and flowers from the temperate highlands, oil and coal from the eastern plains and Caribbean basin, gold, nickel, and emerging copper from the Andean belt, plus a services and tourism sector growing fast around Bogotá, Medellín, and the coast.

Economically, Colombia is Latin America's fourth-largest economy, and it's built one of the region's more resilient middle-income economies over the last two decades: steady rather than spectacular, which is probably why it gets overlooked next to Brazil's scale or Argentina's boom-and-bust drama.

The numbers right now

2026 has been a mixed year for Colombia, and any honest account needs to say so. Growth has recovered from a weak 2023 (0.6%) to a steadier path: most forecasters now put 2026 GDP growth somewhere between 2.2% and 2.8%, with some houses (BBVA, Allianz Trade) projecting acceleration toward 3.5% in 2027. Inflation has re-accelerated though, to around 5.5% in core terms, which pushed the central bank to raise rates back above 11%. A very public dispute between the Finance Minister and the central bank in early 2026 has also raised questions about monetary policy independence for the first time since the 1991 constitution.

The fiscal picture is the bigger concern. Colombia suspended its fiscal rule in mid-2025, and the deficit has run as high as 6–7% of GDP, pushing public debt above 60%. Foreign direct investment inflows, roughly USD 6.6 billion in 2025, grew only modestly and remain below their post-pandemic peak. None of this is catastrophic by regional standards, but it's real, and it's why Colombia still trades below investment grade with some rating agencies.

Look past the headline numbers, though, and the picture brightens: a record coffee harvest, oil reserves that have outperformed expectations, remittances up over 8% to nearly USD 9 billion, double-digit growth in service exports, and a private consumption base (73% of GDP) that's proven remarkably sticky even through the inflation spike. Reserves sit near USD 66–67 billion, about ten months of import cover, which gives the country real shock-absorption capacity.

How Colombia stacks up against its neighbours

Brazil remains the region's undisputed heavyweight: roughly ten times Colombia's economy, the deepest capital markets, the most mature industrial base, including in defence (Embraer, a nuclear submarine program, satellite launches). That scale comes at a cost, though: it's harder and slower to enter as a mid-sized foreign investor, and Brazil's own fiscal and political cycles are at least as volatile as Colombia's.

Peru offers a more investor-friendly mining concession framework on paper, and it edges out Colombia in raw gold and copper output. But its parallel economy is arguably in worse shape. Peru's own data shows that of roughly 200 tonnes of gold exported in a recent year, less than half could be traced to a verifiable legal origin, and violence tied to informal mining keeps escalating, including a widely reported 2025 massacre in the Pataz region. Colombia's formalisation approach, incomplete as it is, gets cited internationally as a more structured model than Peru's indefinite "in-process" registry.

Chile is the clean, stable comparator: best sovereign credit rating in the region, most predictable rule of law, a copper-driven economy with a genuine sovereign wealth cushion. It doesn't have Colombia's resource diversity or its dual-coast trade geography, though; Chile's whole economic identity runs through one commodity and one coastline.

Argentina is the highest-variance story in the region right now. A real re-armament and reform cycle is underway (its first new fighter jets in nearly forty years arrived in December 2025), but that comes bundled with a much longer history of currency crises and policy reversals than Colombia has had over the same period.

Mexico , while technically North American, is the other natural comparator for scale and manufacturing depth. But it carries its own concentrated exposure to US trade policy that Colombia, with a more diversified export base, doesn't share to the same degree.

Line them up together and Colombia looks like the balanced generalist of the group. Not the biggest, not the cleanest, not the fastest-growing, but the only one combining a genuinely diversified resource and export base, two-ocean access, and a growth rate that, fiscal noise aside, has been positive and improving for three straight years.

Sectors worth watching

Energy and mining: Oil and coal still anchor export revenue, but copper is the emerging story. Colombia holds an estimated 9.7 million tonnes of underexplored copper resources along the Andean belt, and the national mining agency opened tenders for 14 strategic copper zones in late 2025. Less than 3% of national territory currently carries a mining title, which is either a governance problem or a long runway, depending on where you sit.

Defence and security: Colombia spends more on defence as a share of GDP than any other South American country, and its domestic threat environment (dissident guerrilla factions, organised crime, and growing concern about drone-enabled attacks) has kept demand for counter-UAS, ISR, and tactical equipment structurally high, even as broader procurement slowed under the outgoing administration. Regional analysts expect Colombia's defence market to grow faster than the rest of South America through 2031, off a smaller base than Brazil but with a clearer near-term pull.

Services, tourism, and agriculture: The most consistently positive story in the 2026 data. Service exports and tourism revenue both grew close to 10% year-on-year, and financial services are forecast to be among the fastest-growing sectors in the broader economy.

A new government changes the calculus

Mid-2026 brought the biggest shift in this whole picture. Abelardo de la Espriella won Colombia's presidential runoff on June 21 with just under 50% of the vote, ending the Petro era, and takes office on August 7. His running mate, José Manuel Restrepo, is a former commerce and finance minister, a credible, market-facing figure rather than a political outsider, which matters for how investors are likely to read the transition.

The new administration's platform is pro-business and security-led, built around a few concrete commitments:

Deregulation and tax cuts aimed at four growth engines (hydrocarbons and mining, infrastructure, agriculture, and tourism), including plans to eliminate the financial transactions tax and cut fuel taxes to free up liquidity for businesses and consumers.

A smaller state, with proposals to cut government size by roughly 40% and redirect spending from bureaucracy toward productive incentives.

A reversal on hydrocarbons policy , reactivating oil and gas development after several years of a renewables-first stance that analysts say constrained investment in the sector.

A security-first growth thesis. The incoming government has set an explicit target of 6–7% annual GDP growth, arguing that ending the "Total Peace" negotiations, resuming operations against illegal armed groups, and restoring territorial control will do more to unlock private investment than any single fiscal measure. Whether that growth number is realistic or not, most institutional analysts covering the transition share the underlying logic: that Colombia's discount to regional peers is as much a security-risk discount as a policy one.

Closer alignment with the United States and Israel on security cooperation, including a possible link to Washington's broader regional security initiatives, alongside a more cautious posture toward Chinese investment in critical infrastructure than the outgoing government held.

For defence and security specifically, this is a meaningful inflexion point. A government elected on a mandate to confront rather than negotiate with illegal armed groups, paired with a stated intent to deepen military cooperation with the US and Israel, points toward sustained or accelerating demand for exactly the equipment categories already in structural demand (counter-UAS, ISR, tactical gear, precision capability), with the added tailwind of a government more willing to move procurement through quickly instead of trading it off against social spending, which the outgoing administration often did.

The investor read on this transition has been notably positive. Analysts at the Atlantic Council and elsewhere have framed the election as a likely trigger for the "return of capital" to Colombia, pointing to improved visibility on security, a return toward sound fiscal policy , and renewed US relations as the key drivers, the same three variables that have weighed most heavily on Colombia's investment case since 2022. Colombia held investment-grade ratings and OECD membership as recently as the early 2020s, before the prior administration's fiscal drift; the new government's stated aim is to rebuild that standing.

Nothing here is a sure thing. De la Espriella won by a margin of roughly 250,000 votes out of nearly 26 million cast, and he'll need to build coalitions in a fragmented Congress to pass anything beyond what can be done by decree. But the direction of travel (tax relief, deregulation, hydrocarbons reactivation, and a security posture explicitly designed to de-risk the country for private capital) is the clearest positive catalyst Colombia's investment case has had in years, and it lands directly on top of the structural advantages already covered above.

The honest risk list

Any serious investment case has to sit alongside the real headwinds too: a fiscal deficit that needs credible consolidation, inflation still well above target, a May 2026 election cycle that introduced political uncertainty, persistent security risk tied to illegal armed groups and narco-mining, and structurally low R&D and productivity investment, which the OECD flags as capping Colombia's long-run growth potential at around 2.5% unless addressed.

Why Colombia still makes the case

Colombia isn't the safest bet in South America, and it isn't the biggest. What it offers instead is more specific: a resource base diversified enough to weather single-commodity shocks, a trade geography no other South American economy can replicate, a growth trajectory that's been quietly improving rather than spectacularly booming, and, particularly relevant for defence, security, and commodities operators, sectors where genuine structural demand exists independent of the political cycle.

The countries that look "safer" on paper (Chile for stability, Peru for mining regulation) each trade that safety for something narrower: a smaller economic base, or in Peru's case, a supply-chain integrity problem that may be worse than Colombia's rather than better. Brazil offers scale, but at a cost of entry most mid-sized investors can't easily absorb. Colombia sits in the gap: developed enough to have real institutions and market access, undercapitalised enough that genuine first-mover advantage still exists in mining formalisation, copper, and defence modernisation, and positioned geographically in a way that will matter more, not less, as global supply chains keep looking for alternatives to single-choke-point routes.

For an investor or operator already building relationships on the ground, rather than trying to enter cold, Colombia's combination of resource depth, dual-coast access, and structurally underserved sectors makes a stronger long-term case than its 2026 headline fiscal numbers suggest on their own.

The incoming government is what turns that calculus from wait-and-see to act-now. A pro-business administration cutting taxes, shrinking the regulatory state, and reactivating hydrocarbons is the kind of policy shift that tends to show up in job creation before it shows up in GDP statistics: construction, energy services, tourism, and agriculture are all labour-intensive sectors that respond quickly to lower financing costs and faster permitting. Layer defence spending on top of that: a government committed to confronting rather than negotiating with illegal armed groups will need to buy and maintain more equipment, train more personnel, and build out more domestic industrial capacity through INDUMIL, COTECMAR, and CIAC, all of which pulls in foreign contractors, local suppliers, and skilled labour at the same time. Security spending in Colombia has historically functioned as a de facto jobs and industrial-base program almost as much as a military one.

Put the three together: tax relief and deregulation pulling in private capital, restored security pulling in the foreign investors who were pricing in conflict risk, and defence procurement pulling through its own supply chain of contractors and jobs. This is the first time in several years all three growth levers have pointed the same direction at once. That's the real argument for treating 2026 as an inflexion point rather than just another data point in Colombia's long run of steady-but-unspectacular growth.

The article solely represents the views of Dean Tavakoli, C.E.O of Munimentum Systems Consultancy.

But there is another part of the story that deserves more attention: the navy.

Indonesia is an archipelago of more than 17,000 islands. It sits across some of the most important sea lanes in the world . It is huge, but split by the sea into many, many parts. And because it is physically different from other nations, it needs to think and plan differently.

So when Indonesia thinks about its navy, it is not thinking about sailing around the world to project power and menace adversaries. It is thinking about dozens of different roles. Protection. Enforcement. Disaster response. And something more fundamental: the ability to enforce the rules it says it believes in.

"Rules mean nothing if we cannot enforce them"

Start with President Prabowo Subianto, because his language gives us a useful way into the issue.

"Freedom of navigation is a sacred right that we must respect under all circumstances," Prabowo told French media outlet Atlantico. That sounds like a conventional statement of support for the international maritime order. But he followed it with the line that actually matters for Indonesia's defence policy.

"Rules mean nothing if we cannot enforce them. Hence, as you know, Indonesia is in the process of upgrading the capabilities of our navy, air force and army, not for aggression but to ensure we have the means to maintain a rules-based order."

A couple of things worth noting. First, notice the order in which a former army commander listed the three services. The navy came first. Second, there is a tension in that quote that Prabowo did not try to hide. Indonesia opposes Might is Right. But it recognises that Right needs Might.

The economic case for a stronger fleet

For the Indonesian economy to flourish, it needs the sea. The sea is what connects Indonesia with itself, as well as with the outside world.

Indonesia is a trading nation. But it does not want to be an exploited nation, as it once was, sending raw materials away for other countries to process and add value to them. So a few years back the country introduced a policy to protect one of its most valuable assets: nickel.

Somewhere between a quarter and a third of the world's nickel comes from Indonesia. It is a key ingredient in high-performance batteries, the kind you find in electric cars. Demand is not going anywhere.

What Indonesia's downstreaming policy means is that instead of exporting raw nickel ore, the country is forcing more processing, refining, and manufacturing to happen inside its own borders. The results have been significant. In just six years, Indonesia went from exporting a few billion dollars' worth of raw ore a year to ten times that amount in processed goods.

But all of that trade depends on ships being able to move freely to and from the country. And it depends on Indonesia being able to deter anyone who might want to pressure it over its policies, or claim chunks of its territory.

More than just deterrence

Protection and deterrence is only one function of the Indonesian navy. There are several others.

Illegal fishing costs the economy close to a billion dollars a year by some estimates. The navy has to monitor and police those waters. Indonesia is also one of the most disaster-prone nations on earth. Volcanoes, earthquakes , tsunamis, cyclones. Its geography makes responding to them exceptionally difficult. The navy plays a major part in any emergency response. During the Hajj season, it even operates as a logistics service, moving pilgrims between islands.

These tasks, officially termed Military Operations Other than War, are written into law as a formal part of the navy's role. The navy does not just need ships that can fight. It needs ships that can do a great many things.

The fleet being built to do it

Indonesia's navy is generally considered a green-water force. That sits somewhere between a coastal patrol navy and a blue-water navy capable of operating indefinitely far out to sea. A green-water navy is not designed to defeat a major power's fleet in open ocean. It is designed to operate effectively in nearby seas, around islands, in straits, and across the maritime approaches that matter most to national security.

For Indonesia, that makes sense. The country does not need to match China or the United States ship for ship. It needs to make sure that foreign vessels, illegal operators, and potential adversaries cannot move through Indonesian waters as though Jakarta is not watching.

To do that, it is building, buying, and designing in ways that reflect both its priorities and its geography.

The most striking vessel in the fleet is the KRI Golok stealth trimaran. It looks, and there is no more accurate way to put this, like something from a James Bond film. It has a shallow draft of around a metre and is driven by water jets rather than propellers, which means it can go where traditional craft cannot. It is fast, built from composite materials that allow it to slice through water, and should be resistant to corrosion. The weapons are not immediately visible, because they are concealed within the structure to preserve the stealth profile.

Light, fast ships remain the core of the fleet, built at public and increasingly private shipyards. Cutting reliance on foreign suppliers has become a priority, particularly after Norway blocked a missile sale to neighbouring Malaysia earlier this year. Indonesia does not want to find itself in that position.

There is also the KCR-60M, a 60-metre fast attack craft built domestically. Fast, affordable, and suited to patrol and enforcement work in crowded coastal waters. The fleet includes Bung Karno-class corvettes, built in Batam. Again, the larger point is not the individual ship but the effort to connect defence procurement with Indonesian industrial capacity.

Indonesia is also doubling to four the number of frigates it is building based on designs from British defence firm Babcock. A frigate is slightly smaller and less heavily armed than a destroyer, but these are still substantial vessels, around 140 metres long. Stand one vertically and it is roughly the height of a 40-story building.

Alongside those, Indonesia has acquired a pair of Italian-built PPA-class frigates. The first, KRI Brawijaya, arrived in 2025 after a six-week voyage and was soon followed by a sister ship.

Then there are the submarines, a small fleet of them. And, very soon, an aircraft carrier.

That last one is worth dwelling on. Only ten countries in the world currently operate fixed-wing-capable carriers, which puts Indonesia in significant company. The ship in question is the former Italian flagship Giuseppe Garibaldi, donated by Rome, which had found the $5 million annual running costs difficult to justify. Jakarta is not planning to use it in the classical sense to project power around the world. Instead it is envisioned primarily as a mobile emergency platform, capable of transporting supplies and helicopters to remote regions at scale.

Why these waters matter

Look at a map of Indonesia and the strategic geography becomes immediately clear.

The Malacca Strait sits to the north. It is probably the busiest maritime choke point in the world, on the shortest route between India and China, carrying perhaps a quarter of global seaborne trade. The Makassar Strait, between Borneo and Sulawesi, is a major north-south corridor through the archipelago. The Lombok Strait further south offers an alternative deep-water passage between the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

Then there is the South China Sea, the most contested maritime region in the world. Indonesians refer to the portion they claim as the North Natuna Sea. It is a sensitive area, and the Americans and Europeans send warships through regularly on so-called freedom of navigation operations.

Indonesia has never had a formal objection to those passages. But other nations' warships around your waters are a reminder that it helps to have some of your own nearby. Remember what Prabowo said. Rules mean nothing if you cannot enforce them.

For Indonesia, enforcement is not only about security. It is about sovereignty over the economic model the country is trying to build.

A different approach

Indonesia is not going to have the largest navy in Asia . It is not trying to match China's fleet or the United States Navy.

Its goal is more specific: to make Indonesian waters more visible, more enforceable, and more difficult for outsiders to treat as empty space.

That is why these ships matter. The fast attack craft, the trimarans, the frigates, the submarines, the domestically built corvettes, and the shipyards producing them are all part of the same argument. Indonesia wants to be a major economic power. It wants more of the value from its resources to stay at home. And it knows that in an archipelago, economic sovereignty has a maritime dimension.

Prabowo's line is a useful summary of the whole strategy.

Rules only matter if they can be enforced. Indonesia is now building the navy it believes can do that.

World Reframed episode 42

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World Reframed is produced in London by  Global South  World, part of the Impactum Group. Its editors are Duncan Hooper and Ismail Akwei.

ISSN 2978-4891

Tesla CEO Elon Musk has projected that humanoid robots could become one of the largest industries in history , forecasting a global market worth as much as $250 trillion by 2040 if billions of robots are deployed worldwide.

Speaking about Tesla's Optimus programme, Musk said he believes there could eventually be around 10 billion humanoid robots in operation globally, with each unit priced between $20,000 and $25,000. Based on those figures, the market could reach approximately $250 trillion, dwarfing the current valuations of the world's largest technology companies.

The prediction comes as Tesla accelerates development of Optimus, a general-purpose humanoid robot first unveiled in 2021. The company has demonstrated successive generations of the robot performing tasks such as walking, carrying objects, sorting items and operating in controlled factory environments.

Tesla plans to begin wider deployment of Optimus within its own manufacturing facilities before expanding commercial availability. Musk has repeatedly described the robot as potentially more significant to Tesla's long-term future than its electric vehicle business.

The forecast aligns with growing interest across the robotics industry. Goldman Sachs estimates the global humanoid robot market could reach tens of billions of dollars over the next decade, driven by advances in artificial intelligence , declining hardware costs and labour shortages in manufacturing, logistics and elder care.

However, Musk's projection remains far more ambitious than most industry forecasts. Analysts note that reaching 10 billion robots would require production volumes comparable to or exceeding the world's human population , alongside breakthroughs in AI, battery technology, safety systems and manufacturing capacity.

The scale of the prediction becomes clearer when compared with today's corporate giants. According to CompaniesMarketCap data, a $250 trillion market would be worth roughly 52 times Nvidia's market value , 60 times Google's parent Alphabet, 93 times Microsoft, 100 times Amazon and nearly 180 times Tesla's current valuation.

Despite the challenges, investment in humanoid robotics is accelerating. Companies including Tesla, Figure AI, Agility Robotics, Boston Dynamics, Unitree and Chinese manufacturers are competing to commercialise machines capable of performing repetitive and physically demanding tasks currently carried out by humans.

Whether Musk's $250 trillion forecast becomes reality remains uncertain, but industry analysts agree that humanoid robots are moving from science fiction toward commercial deployment, setting up what could become one of the defining technology races of the coming decades.

In public institutions, such as Banco do Brasil (BB), financing funds like  Mulheres no Topo  (Women at the Top) stand out. Launched in 2023, this platform integrates credit and training for female entrepreneurs. Since then, BB has come to serve more than 1.3 million women-owned companies, releasing over R$ 102 billion in resources through various lines of credit.

Air-Conditioned Store

  Aimed at individuals registered in the Unified Registry for Social Programs (CadÚnico) of the Federal Government , the  Acredita no Primeiro Passo  (Believe in the First Step) Program guaranteed access to low-interest credit for 176,160 female entrepreneurs—women represent 70% of the audience served by the initiative.

The social impact is visible. In Parnamirim, a city in the state of Rio Grande do Norte, self-employed worker Zenilda Aleixo owns a store selling clothes and cosmetics. With resources from the program, she set up her store in a property right next to her house.

"I managed to invest and expand the shop, and install air conditioning to make it more comfortable for customers because the climate here is very hot," Zenilda explains. 

"Financial autonomy allows us to dream and plan. I want to keep growing," she says. In total, R$ 2.27 billion was distributed by the beginning of 2026.

Rural Financing

In the Northeast, where the rates of women living below the poverty line are around 24%—above the national average— Agroamigo , a microcredit program by Banco do Nordeste aimed at farmers, reached 403,000 contracts signed by female entrepreneurs in 2025. This figure allowed them to surpass men in access to this type of financing.

For Luiz Sérgio Farias Machado, Superintendent of Agribusiness and Rural Microfinance at Banco do Nordeste, the numbers reflect a shift in gender patterns within the rural economy.

"The expansion of credit for women is directly related to the strengthening of non-agricultural initiatives, such as handicrafts, rural tourism , and small enterprises run by women, which diversify income and boost female entrepreneurship in the countryside," he said.

The diagnosis and results of the program are faithful indicators of the country's reality. According to data from the Brazilian Micro and Small Business Support Service (Sebrae), women represent more than 67% of credit borrowers from the National Program for Directed Productive Microcredit (PNMPO)—more than three million Brazilian women have been served by the initiative.

Higher Interest Rates

Despite the prospect of change, women still suffer from higher interest rates than men on financing aimed at small businesses. In 2024, the study  "The Financing of Female Entrepreneurship in Brazil: A Credit Market Overview,"  conducted by Sebrae using Central Bank data, revealed that loans for male small business owners were taxed at an average of 36.8% per year, while the female audience faced rates of 40.6%.

With more than 83.5 million people in default on debt in Brazil as of May 2026, according to the credit evaluation firm Serasa Experian, these higher charges obstruct the path for women—who account for 50.5% of debt holders in the country. However, they do not seem to slow down a movement of independent economic development sustained by entrepreneurship.

Image Credit: DepositPhotos.com

During my years as a foreign correspondent based in Washington, D.C., beginning in 2012, I witnessed the enduring impact of U.S.–China Strategic and Economic Dialogue , the bilateral dialogue mechanism Paulson was instrumental in establishing.

Launched in 2006, that dialogue proved invaluable in navigating the turbulent 2008 financial crisis, helping to usher in what many now view as a golden era of Sino-US cooperation.

Paulson built a reservoir of goodwill that granted him rare access and insight. Indeed, as he recounted in his book Dealing with China , President Xi Jinping personally shared with him the vision for a new development zone in Hebei province, south of Beijing.

Paulson became the first to reveal to the world the blueprint for the Xiong'an New Area—China’s ambitious "millennium plan". Yet, the geopolitical landscape Paulson surveys today is drastically different.

The trust deficit

At the CCG event, he characterised the current bilateral relationship as one of "managed stability"—a fragile equilibrium rooted in a state of "mutually assured economic disruption".

Both nations are acutely aware of their capacity to derail the other’s economy. However, as Paulson rightfully noted, the true peril we face is not the much-debated trade deficit, but rather a profound and widening "trust deficit".

Bridging this divide is an urgent global imperative. We are staring down a relatively high probability of future global financial disruptions, and with global sovereign debt at dizzying heights, the international community has significantly less flexibility to respond to an economic crisis. In such a climate, maintaining open lines of communication between US and Chinese economic monitors is not a diplomatic luxury, but a vital necessity. Whilst dialogue alone cannot predict a financial crash, pre-established trust is essential to minimise the global fallout when it inevitably occurs. But how do we begin to rebuild that trust?

The most viable bridge remains the undeniable reality of our planet's health. As Paulson highlighted, environmental crises—specifically climate change and biodiversity destruction—are not mere geopolitical risks; they are absolute certainties that no single country can solve alone.

A few years ago, whilst reporting from the World Economic Forum in Davos, I asked China’s Special Climate Envoy Xie Zhenhua and US Climate Envoy John Kerry about the state of their collaborative efforts. Both men emphatically affirmed the tightness and necessity of Sino-US cooperation in the climate sphere.

Today, navigating the drastically altered political realities and protective policies of Donald Trump’s second term, that era of seamless alignment can feel like a distant memory. Despite these shifting political winds, Paulson used his appearance in Beijing to emphasise that the immense, untapped potential for Sino-US collaboration in conservation and climate remains.

The Paulson Institute has long been at the vanguard of this effort, having famously helped introduce the national park system to China through groundbreaking pilot programmes in Yunnan province.

China, for its part, has made commendable strides on the supply side, leading the charge in electric vehicles, batteries, solar panels, and the diversification of energy sources. The geopolitical headwinds are undoubtedly fierce, and for today's global CEOs facing unpredictable export controls and sanctions , the temptation to retreat is strong.

Yet, Paulson’s warning remains stark: walking away from China is done "at your own peril".

Overcoming the defining challenges of our era demands pragmatic leadership. The world’s two largest economies must look beyond their mutual suspicion and close the trust deficit. The cost of failing to do so is simply too high for the rest of the world to bear.

Du Yubin is a journalist and chief editor for CGTN. He was stationed in Washington, D.C. and London for six years each, focusing on China-US and China-EU relations. He has over 16 years of experience in international communication and new media. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Prabowo Subianto told Atlantico that he did not regret radical decisions such as the creation of the powerful Danantara wealth fund.

“Some of the changes we introduced may have rattled people in the short run, but it is for the good of the country in the long run,” he said in an interview, pointing out that he has cut $18 billion of what he described as “fat” from the government budget.

This is money that would have gone “to the private coffers of corrupt officials - not for the people,” he claimed.

The Indonesian rupiah is at around record lows against the dollar as a result of surging energy prices caused by the War in Iran. Indonesia, like most of its neighbours, is a net oil importer which relies significantly on supplies from the Middle East.

But an even bigger drag has been years of trade manipulation, which has seen hundreds of billions of dollars lost as a result of companies avoiding levies by underreporting international transactions. Indonesia’s economy would have been 60 per cent larger today without this fraud, Prabowo said, adding that a range of measures were set to deliver results for his people in the coming years.

“I must admit, we could do better in communicating to the outside world what we are doing in Indonesia,” he said.  “The changes we are making today, with Danantara, with our single window for export policy, with the free meals program, with our Village Cooperatives and fisherman villages, are transformational.”

He hit out at biased commentators who he said have been misrepresenting these projects. 

The biggest economic shakeup of Prabowo’s presidency has been the creation of Danantara Indonesia, the seventh-largest sovereign wealth fund in the world, managing $900 billion in assets. 

The fund manages Indonesia’s vast state-owned enterprise portfolio and is charged with helping achieve government targets around economic growth and industrial transformation.

The fund reports to the presidency, unlike some other national wealth funds, because it needs to be accountable to the Indonesian people, Prabowo said. But it answers operationally to its own supervisory board and takes day-to-day decisions independently.

Might vs Right

Indonesia, the world’s fourth most populous country, has always steadfastly pursued a policy of non-alignment. Prabowo said the country has benefitted from tensions between China and the US as businesses seek alternative locations to diversify their supply chains. But he noted that the long-term interest of the whole world is for a harmonious relationship between the two superpowers.

Prabowo reiterated his absolute support for freedom of navigation, rejecting suggestions that Indonesia might one day seek to monetise shipping through the Strait of Malacca as Iran is trying to do in Hormuz. The country is expanding its military to ensure that it can defend the rules-based order, he told Atlantico: “Might must not make right.”

Indonesia subscribes to the One China policy, and Prabowo said that he believes China will always act “rationally” in its relations with Taiwan. Image via Deposit Photos

According to data compiled from Trading Economics , the ECB topped the global ranking with total assets of approximately $7.13 trillion, ahead of the People’s Bank of China and the US Federal Reserve.

China’s central bank ranked second with roughly $6.62 trillion in assets, while the Federal Reserve followed closely at $6.59 trillion.

The Bank of Japan placed fourth with more than $4.5 trillion, reflecting decades of aggressive monetary stimulus aimed at reviving growth and combating deflation.

Economists say central bank balance sheets expanded dramatically following the 2008 global financial crisis and again during the COVID-19 pandemic, when policymakers injected trillions of dollars into financial systems through bond purchases and emergency lending programmes.

The ECB and Federal Reserve were among the institutions that adopted large-scale quantitative easing policies to stabilise markets and support economic growth.

Analysts note that larger central bank balance sheets often reflect the scale of economic intervention rather than the overall strength of an economy.

Asian and European institutions also dominated the top 10 list, with the People ’s Bank of China, Bank of Japan, Reserve Bank of India, Monetary Authority of Singapore and Hong Kong Monetary Authority all ranking among the world’s largest central banks.

The Swiss National Bank and Bank of England also featured prominently due to active currency market operations and financial market interventions.

India’s central bank ranked seventh globally with assets exceeding $911 billion, highlighting the country’s growing financial influence as one of the world’s fastest-expanding major economies.

Central banks play a crucial role in controlling inflation, managing interest rates, stabilising currencies and supporting financial systems.

Their decisions heavily influence borrowing costs, stock markets, exchange rates and global investment flows.

The principle of Thucydides Trap, originally based on the conflicts between Greek Sparta and its rising rival Athens, was that conflict becomes the default when an emerging power begins to challenge a dominant rival. In interviews with Professor Allison at Davos and elsewhere, he consistently emphasised a single point: while structural contradictions are inevitable, human wisdom must prevail over historical destiny.

With President Trump’s current visit to China and the establishment of a new positioning for China-US relations - ‘Constructive Strategic Stability’  -the ‘Questions of History, the World, and the People’ previously posed by President Xi have finally found a clear, realist footnote. This positioning is no longer an abstract, grand vision; it is a ‘strategic contract’ forged from the realities of power dynamics and a shared consensus on survival.

How relations have evolved

The economic relationship between China and the US has long been regarded as the ‘ballast’ and ‘propeller’ of the bilateral bond. However, this ballast is undergoing a profound structural metamorphosis. In earlier decades, the trade relationship was often characterised by the phrase ‘800 million shirts for one Boeing aircraft’. This reflected the early stages of China as the ‘world’s factory’, relying on labour-intensive exports of garments and toys to exchange for American high-tech aviation.

I recall covering the early stages of the trade war in 2017 when ‘intermediate goods’ was the buzzword for understanding bilateral trade. At that time, an iPhone assembled in China featured design from California and key components from Japan and South Korea; China contributed only low-cost assembly labour. The ‘trade deficit’ debated so fiercely then often ignored the reality of global value chains, where the lion’s share of profit flowed back to American corporations.

Nine years later, as we re-examine the economic landscape between Beijing and Washington, the structure has fundamentally shifted. China has evolved from the era of ‘8亿 (800 million) trousers’ to a burgeoning epoch of robotics, artificial intelligence , and electric vehicles. The resulting competition is unavoidable, yet it has brought a new clarity: challenges such as AI safety, cross-border pandemics, and climate change (even if the current US administration remains sceptical) are ‘existential challenges’ that transcend national borders. These threats compel the two nations, amidst intense strategic competition, to carve out a ‘limited yet precise’ path for cooperation.

Even in the eyes of Washington’s staunchest hawks, the reality of this shift is inescapable. In recent days, the sight of US Secretary of State Marco Rubio giving a ‘thumbs up’ while gazing at the starlit ceiling of the Great Hall of the People , or the Chinese-style attire and ‘tiger-head pouch’ worn by Elon Musk’s young son, serve as micro-footnotes to this macro transformation.

A long history of interconnection

As a journalist who spent seven years stationed in the United States, I know intimately that the resilience of this relationship has never existed solely in diplomatic communiqués. At the Chinese Historical Society of America (CHSA) in San Francisco, I once stood for a long time staring at the rudimentary tools left by the Chinese labourers who built the First Transcontinental Railroad. They recorded blood, sweat, and a monumental contribution. From the Flying Tigers who fought side-by-side against fascism in WWII to the ‘Ping-Pong Diplomacy’ that thawed the icy silence, these bonds have played a role at every historical turning point.

Today, these ties are reviving in unexpected ways in the digital age. From the ‘Pickleball’ craze sweeping America to the ‘Chinaxxing’ tag trending on TikTok—where American youths share their authentic experiences of travelling in China—to US netizens singing and dancing along to the melodies of a Chinese ‘Auntie’, this bottom-up emotional exchange is deconstructing the cold narratives of politicians.

A former CNN colleague once shared a story with me about interviewing a ‘bangbang’ (porter) on the streets of Chongqing. The man, drenched in sweat, told him his greatest wish was to work hard to buy a car and send his daughter to the best school. My colleague remarked: “Isn’t that the purest form of the American Dream? The ‘Chinese Dream’ and the ‘American Dream’ are essentially the same.” The shared values of family responsibility, the pursuit of efficiency, and the belief in prosperity through hard work are deeply synchronised in the genes of both peoples. If Tsinghua University and the Peking Union Medical College are monuments to early cooperation, today’s scientists working side-by-side in labs and netizens engaging spontaneously on social media are writing the next chapters of this human connection.

The Four Stabilities

As President Trump’s motorcade swept past Beijing’s Central Axis towards the Temple of Heaven, the weight of history met the realism of modern diplomacy. The beauty of Chinese architecture is encapsulated in the concept of ‘Zhonghe’ (Centrality and Harmony). Within the red walls and blue tiles of the Temple of Heaven lies a dynamic balance—not a pursuit of absolute uniformity, but a search for coordination amidst opposites.

The newly established ‘Four Stabilities’— stability based on cooperation, healthy stability through moderated competition, routine stability through controllable differences, and enduring stability with the prospect of peace —represent a departure from earlier romanticism in favour of this ‘Zhonghe’ wisdom. This is a higher form of pragmatism. It acknowledges ‘cooperation without excluding competition,’ as competition drives efficiency; it insists on ‘peace without evading differences,’ as a mature relationship requires no feigned harmony. For too long, the West has misunderstood the Chinese concept of ‘Win-Win’ as China wanting to ‘win twice.’ The true Dao of ‘Zhonghe’ is that the world is not a zero-sum game; the vast Pacific Ocean is wide enough for two great powers to compete in their respective orbits and shake hands where they intersect.

A shared future

As the United States approaches its 250th anniversary, facing a China with five millennia of civilisational composure, both sides are learning how to manage expectations in an imperfect world. Compared to previous frameworks, ‘Constructive Strategic Stability’ is more honest: it accepts competition but rejects chaos; it acknowledges differences but pursues a lasting peace .

As President Trump noted at the state banquet, the American founding fathers held a profound respect for the wisdom of Confucius. Transcending the Thucydides Trap does not require the erasure of differences, but rather, like the structural integrity of the Hall of Prayer for Good Harvests, achieving steadfastness through the balanced intersection of diverse forces. The Pacific is indeed wide enough for two great nations. Seeking cooperation within competition and anchoring peace amidst differences may well be the most stable strategic dividend our generation can offer the world.

Du Yubin is a journalist and producer for CGTN. He was stationed in Washington, D.C. and London for six years each, focusing on China-US and China-EU relations. He has over 15 years of experience in international communication and new media. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

And a new study has dug into how the system perpetuates this inequality and exposed an even more chilling division - the environmental damage imbalance.

In terms of work, Low and Middle Income (LMI) countries need to invest more than 100,000 hours of labour to generate €1 million in exports, according to Osama Diab of the Catholic University of Leuven. That compares with 7,500 hours in wealthy nations, 13 times less. Prices of the commodities on which many LMI countries depend on are artificially deflated as a result of policies to depress local currency valuations, encouraged by the International Monetary Fund and other international institutions, Diab argues.

This creates the incredible situation where natural disasters such as droughts, crop failures or even conflicts can deliver an economic boost by depressing supply and forcing prices up. Because these commodities are essential to many global businesses, there is large scope for prices to rise without hurting demand, Diab writes in his paper The Monetary Dimension of Ecological Damage in the Global South in  Third World Quarterly . He gives the examples of cocoa and copper, observing that a 30% drop in supply could lead to price rises of 88% and 70% respectively.

The environmental cost

The divide is not just about undervalued labour. Another feature of inequality in the global economy concerns the environment. A million euros of exports from poorer countries generate 27 times more environmental damage than the same value for richer nations, according to Diab's analysis. This is led by the poisoning of water supplies as well as pollution on land. Greenhouse gas emissions are 2.7 times higher.

Wealthy countries are essentially exporting their pollution and then taking advantage of price discrepancies to buy up the "cleaned" products they want. How long can this continue?

Image via depositphotos.com

[This article was corrected on 14/5/2026 to replace a reference to the World Bank with the International Monetary Fund]

According to data from Companies Market Cap for May 2026 , Williams-Sonoma holds a market value of roughly $20.73 billion, placing it well ahead of competitors in the global furniture sector.

Online furniture retailer Wayfair ranked second with a market capitalisation of approximately $8.10 billion, followed by China’s Oppein Home Group at $4.39 billion and KUKA Home at $4.00 billion. Australian retail giant Harvey Norman rounded out the top five at roughly $3.92 billion.

The rankings reflect major shifts in consumer behaviour since the pandemic-era housing boom, which accelerated global demand for home furnishings, interior renovation and e-commerce-driven furniture sales.

Williams-Sonoma, which owns brands including Pottery Barn and West Elm, has benefited from strong demand for premium home décor and higher-end furnishings, particularly in North America. Analysts say the company’s combination of physical retail operations and digital sales platforms has helped it outperform many traditional furniture retailers.

Wayfair’s position near the top of the rankings highlights the continued expansion of online furniture retailing, despite broader concerns over slowing consumer spending and higher interest rates in several major economies.

China’s presence through Oppein and KUKA Home also reflects the growing scale of Asia ’s furniture manufacturing and home improvement industries. China remains one of the world’s largest furniture exporters, supported by great domestic demand and integrated supply chains.

Harvey Norman’s inclusion among the top five underscores the resilience of Australia ’s retail sector, where demand for furniture and household goods has remained relatively stable despite inflationary pressures.

The global furniture market has undergone a significant transformation over the past decade, driven by urbanisation, remote work trends, rising housing costs and growing interest in home design.

Industry researchers say consumers are increasingly prioritising multifunctional furniture, sustainability and digital shopping experiences, forcing traditional retailers to adapt to changing expectations.

The rankings also highlight the widening gap between dominant global furniture brands and smaller regional competitors struggling with supply chain disruptions, shipping costs and fluctuating raw material prices.

Despite concerns over slower global economic growth, furniture companies tied to premium branding, digital commerce and international supply networks continue attracting strong investor interest.

But it was the appeal to postpone gold purchases that stood out most in a country where gold is deeply tied to household savings, weddings and cultural traditions.

India imports nearly 85% of its gold requirements, making it one of the world ’s most gold-dependent economies. Gold imports jumped 24% in April to a record $71.98 billion, according to the article, adding to concerns over the country’s widening trade deficit as oil prices climb.

The call comes as Brent crude prices surged beyond $107 per barrel following tensions around the Strait of Hormuz, a vital shipping route through which roughly a fifth of the world’s oil supply passes. India imports about 88% of its crude oil , with up to half historically flowing through the strait.

Still, the appeal may resonate unevenly across India. For millions of households, gold functions not as a luxury purchase but as a form of savings and financial security , particularly in areas with limited access to formal banking and investment products.

Guyana is projected to remain the fastest-growing economy in the Americas in 2026, driven by its booming oil sector, while several of the region’s largest economies are expected to post far slower growth amid global uncertainty and domestic economic pressures.

According to the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook 2026 , Guyana’s economy is forecast to expand by an extraordinary 23% next year, extending one of the fastest sustained growth streaks in the world.

The South American nation has undergone a dramatic economic transformation since major offshore oil discoveries by a consortium led by ExxonMobil in 2015. Oil production has rapidly turned Guyana into one of the world’s newest energy exporters, reshaping public finances and infrastructure investment.

The Dominican Republic is forecast to record the second-fastest growth rate in the Americas at 4.5%, followed by Argentina and Panama at 4% each.

Argentina’s projected rebound comes after years of economic instability marked by inflation, currency depreciation and debt restructuring. The IMF has noted signs of stabilisation tied to fiscal tightening and economic reforms introduced by President Javier Milei’s administration.

Several Central American economies, including Paraguay, Guatemala, Honduras and Costa Rica, are also expected to outperform larger regional economies, supported by tourism, remittances and relatively resilient domestic demand.

By contrast, Venezuela is forecast to remain the region’s weakest-performing economy with GDP expected to contract by 3% in 2026. Haiti is projected to shrink by 1%, reflecting ongoing political instability, insecurity and humanitarian challenges.

Among the hemisphere’s largest economies, growth forecasts remain relatively subdued. The United States is expected to expand by 2.1%, while Brazil is projected to grow by 1.9%, according to IMF estimates.

Mexico and Canada are both forecast to grow by 1.5%, reflecting slowing industrial demand, tighter financial conditions and weaker global trade momentum.

The IMF has warned that high interest rates, geopolitical tensions and slowing global demand continue to weigh on economic activity worldwide, particularly for commodity exporters and heavily indebted economies.

Addressing the chronic water shortages in the north, he famously observed: "The south has plenty of water, while the north is dry. If possible, borrowing a bit of water would be fine."

To put the scale of this "borrowing" into perspective for a global audience, it is the equivalent of a transcontinental engineering feat that would divert the Danube to the Thames in Europe, or channel water from the Sierra Nevada in California across a thousand miles to irrigate the parched American Great Plains.

For decades, successive generations of Chinese leadership worked to reconcile vast resources with shifting demands, eventually turning that vision into a reality of steel and concrete. Today, the first phase of the Eastern and Middle Routes of the South-to-North Water Diversion Project has already diverted over 85 billion cubic metres of water, benefiting 195 million people across 48 major cities. As of April 2026, the ambitious Western Route -designed to "borrow" tens of billions of cubic metres annually from the Yangtze to the Yellow River - remains in the critical feasibility and technical research stage. This project serves as the backbone of the National Water Network, aiming to alleviate the water-carrying capacity issues of the Yellow River basin.

Building on the legacy of resource coordination like this, the CPC Central Political Bureau recently convened a meeting to address the modern economic landscape. The leadership explicitly proposed tapping into the potential of domestic demand by accelerating the planning and construction of "Six Networks": the Water Network, New Power System, Computing Power Network, Next-Gen Communications, Urban Pipe Networks, and the Logistics Network. Supported by an estimated 7 trillion yuan ($1 trillion) in investment through 2026, these networks represent the digital and green evolution of China's classic balancing acts, such as "West-to-East Power Transmission" and the computing-focused "East Data, West Computing."

Forward thinking, strategic planning

The "Six Networks" strategy represents a leap toward Systemic Efficiency. Rather than simply building more, the goal is to integrate energy, data, water, and logistics into a single, high-performance ecosystem.

A template for the world

The significance of the "Six Networks" lies in its capacity to resolve the core contradictions of modern development: the distance between green energy production and urban consumption, the gap between data generation and processing power, and the friction between rapid urbanisation and aging underground safety.

By treating compute power and water as utilities as fundamental as electricity, China is insulating its economy against inflationary pressures. A factory that accesses cheaper green energy via the Power Network and more affordable AI processing via the Computing Network can remain globally competitive regardless of shifting demographics.

While the rollout is state-led, the sheer scale of this 7-trillion-yuan initiative creates a vast frontier for international partnership. The "Six Networks" demand high-end precision engineering, advanced material science for non-invasive urban repairs, and sophisticated green finance structures - fields where global expertise remains in high demand. For nations across the Global South, this model demonstrates that the path to a "Smart City" or a "Green Economy" requires more than isolated technological gadgets. It demands integrated, national-level grids that treat data and ecology as the essential roads and bridges of the 21st century. China is not merely upgrading its own house; it is redesigning the architecture of modern growth.

Image credit: https://depositphotos.com/

Argentina’s outstanding IMF obligations are expected to reach $56.8 billion , representing roughly 38% of total IMF lending. The South American country remains heavily reliant on IMF support following years of economic turbulence marked by triple-digit inflation, weakening foreign reserves and repeated debt restructuring efforts.

Ukraine ranks as the IMF’s second-largest borrower, with projected debt exposure of $14.1 billion, or 9.5% of total lending, reflecting continued international financial support amid the ongoing economic fallout from Russia’s invasion.

Pakistan and Egypt follow closely behind, with IMF obligations projected at $9.9 billion and $9.4 billion, respectively. Both countries have faced mounting balance-of-payments pressures, rising import costs and persistent currency depreciation in recent years.

The IMF has repeatedly warned that higher global interest rates and slowing economic growth are intensifying debt vulnerabilities across low and middle-income economies. Countries already facing fiscal stress have been particularly exposed to rising borrowing costs and declining investor confidence.

Ecuador owes $7.2 billion to the IMF in 2026, while Côte d’Ivoire’s obligations stand at $4.9 billion, underscoring growing reliance on multilateral financing across parts of Africa and Latin America.

Kenya, Bangladesh and Ghana are each projected to account for approximately 2.6% of total IMF lending, with outstanding obligations of around $3.9 billion each. Angola rounds out the list at $3.4 billion.

Economists say the figures illustrate how the IMF has increasingly become a lender of last resort for countries struggling with external debt burdens, currency crises and fiscal imbalances.

Argentina’s position at the top of the list also reflects the scale of the IMF’s largest-ever country programme. In 2018, the Fund approved a record $57 billion financing package for the country, later restructured amid worsening economic conditions .

For Ukraine, IMF support has become closely tied to broader international recovery and reconstruction efforts, while countries such as Pakistan and Ghana have relied on IMF programmes to unlock additional financing from other multilateral lenders and private investors.

Sanctions countermeasures

The catalyst for this shift was the U.S. Treasury’s decision in late April to place firms such as Hengli Petrochemical (Dalian) and Shandong Shouguang LuqingPetrochemical on the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list. The move, based on allegations of involvement in Iranian oil trades, sought to sever these industrial giants from the global financial system. However, by activating the Rules on Counteracting Unjustified Extra-territorial Application of Foreign Legislation, Beijing has effectively neutralised the transmission belt of Washington’s "long-arm jurisdiction."

The Anatomy of the Shield

Under Order No. 21 of 2026, the Chinese government has transformed what was once a geopolitical grievance into a domestic legal mandate. The implications for entities operating within China—including multinational banks and insurers—are profound:

The genesis of these Blocking Rules lies in a direct response to the escalating use of unilateral sanctions and export controls by the United States. In formulating this mechanism, MOFCOM pointedly noted that such measures frequently leverage "secondary sanctions" to coerce entities in third-party countries into compliance. At the rules' inception, the Department of Treaty and Law at MOFCOM described these practices as a violation of international law principles—specifically sovereign equality—and a direct assault on the legitimate economic activities of Chinese enterprises.

In terms of institutional design, Beijing has not acted in a vacuum. The framework draws inspiration from "blocking statutes" pioneered by the European Union and other jurisdictions. By implementing these rules, China joins a global cohort of jurisdictions that formally refuse to recognise the extraterritorial validity of foreign administrative measures, thereby reasserting the primacy of international law over unilateral diktats.

Stepping up to the fight

For decades, Chinese enterprises were caught in a legal pincer movement: comply with U.S. sanctions and face domestic backlash, or remain loyal and be frozen out of the dollar-clearing system. This weekend's announcement suggests that the era of passive endurance is over.

"We are witnessing a coming of age for China’s legal toolkit," notes Xiaxi Luh, a Beijing-based trade analyst. "This is a domestic legal 'firewall' designed to force a choice. By penalising those who enforce foreign sanctions internally, Beijing is making the cost of following Washington’s orders prohibitively expensive."

The focus on Hengli Petrochemical—a linchpin of China’s refining sector—underscores the stakes. For Beijing, this is a matter of energy security . The message is clear: domestic stability will not be bartered for foreign administrative compliance, particularly when transactions are increasingly settled in Yuan via the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS).

The Pre-Summit Signal

The timing of this "institutional riposte" provides significant leverage ahead of Donald Trump’s visit. By codifying its resistance into law before the leaders meet, Beijing has removed the issue from the realm of mere "grievance" and placed it in the realm of "statute." It signals to the White House that the tools of unilateralism are losing their edge.

As the global community watches this legal tug-of-war, the underlying narrative is the accelerating erosion of dollar hegemony. When the two largest economies clash over who holds the gavel on international trade , the world is forced to reconsider the reliability of the greenback as a neutral instrument.

For now, the Ministry’s order stands as a stark reminder: within the Chinese market, the final arbiter of trade is no longer a Treasury office in Washington, but the law of the land in Beijing.

Du Yubin is a journalist and Executive Producer for CGTN. He was stationed in Washington, D.C. and London for six years each, focusing on China-US and China-EU relations. He has over 15 years of experience in international communication and digital media . The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Wameso said the policy also aligns with efforts to comply with anti-money laundering rules and international sanctions , including measures targeting individuals linked to conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. He added that the reforms were important as the country seeks to attract significant foreign investment, Viory reports.

Under the new rules, which took effect on April 9, individuals can still hold foreign currency but must use Congolese francs for cash transactions. Dollars can be deposited into bank accounts and used electronically. The policy is part of efforts to reduce dollarisation, which has persisted since the hyperinflation era of the 1990s.

The central bank said the reforms come amid improving economic indicators , with growth reaching 5.8% in 2025 and projected to rise further, alongside stable inflation and stronger foreign reserves.

Equatorial Guinea is forecast to record the weakest performance, with its economy expected to contract by around 2.7%. The IMF has repeatedly pointed to the country’s heavy reliance on declining oil production as a key factor behind its prolonged downturn, with limited diversification constraining recovery prospects.

Elsewhere, growth is expected to remain subdued rather than negative. Mozambique is projected to expand by just 0.5%, reflecting ongoing fiscal pressures and vulnerability to external shocks. South Africa, the continent’s most industrialised economy, is forecast to grow by only 1.0%, underscoring deep-rooted challenges including energy shortages, logistics constraints and high unemployment. The IMF has flagged these structural issues as major drags on the country’s growth potential.

Lesotho is expected to post growth of about 1.1%, while Seychelles, heavily dependent on tourism, is projected at 1.5%, a pace that reflects a gradual but uneven recovery in global travel demand.

Further along the list, Malawi and Senegal are both forecast to grow by around 2.2%, followed closely by Angola at 2.3% and Namibia at 2.4%. While these figures represent positive growth, they fall well below the regional average and highlight limited economic momentum.

The Central African Republic, projected at 2.6%, rounds out the group of slowest-growing economies, reflecting ongoing fragility linked to conflict, infrastructure gaps and reliance on subsistence sectors.

What stands out is the contrast within the region. While some African economies are expanding rapidly, others are struggling to gain traction. The IMF notes that Sub-Saharan Africa’s overall growth outlook remains uneven, shaped by commodity dependence, debt burdens and exposure to global financial conditions.

Countries reliant on a narrow range of exports, particularly oil, are among the most vulnerable. In Equatorial Guinea and Angola, fluctuations in global energy prices continue to have an outsized impact on economic performance. Meanwhile, economies like South Africa face domestic constraints that limit their ability to capitalise on global demand.

The implications extend beyond headline growth figures. Slower expansion can constrain job creation, reduce fiscal space and limit investment in infrastructure and social services. For many of these countries, sustaining even modest growth will require structural reforms, diversification and improved governance.

Recent export-import data shows India leading the global market with roughly $3.9 billion in spice exports, representing about 37% of the global share. Vietnam follows closely with nearly $3 billion, capturing around 30%, underscoring a duopoly that now controls well over half of global spice exports.

Industry data confirms the trend. India remains the world’s largest producer, consumer and exporter of spices, shipping products to more than 150 countries and generating over $4.7 billion in export value in recent years. Vietnam, meanwhile, has carved out a strong position through high-volume exports of black pepper and cinnamon, with exports reaching billions of dollars annually.

What this really means is that the global spice trade is no longer broadly distributed. Instead, it is increasingly concentrated in a handful of high-performing economies.

India’s strength lies in scale and diversity. The country produces more than 60 of the world’s recognised spice varieties and exports a wide range of products, from chilli and turmeric to cumin and spice oils . Its long-established supply chains and strong agricultural base have allowed it to maintain leadership even as competition intensifies.

Vietnam, by contrast, has taken a more specialised approach. Its dominance in key segments, such as black pepper, has enabled it to rapidly expand its global footprint, supported by efficient production systems and export-focused policies .

Beyond the top two, the market drops sharply. Mexico ranks third with about $1 billion in exports, followed by Peru, Uzbekistan and Pakistan, each contributing a far smaller share. Other players such as Chile, Turkey and Colombia maintain niche positions, while Ethiopia rounds out the top ten with a minimal share of the global market.

Global spice production has reached more than 6 million metric tonnes in recent years, with demand driven by shifting consumer preferences, growing interest in health-focused ingredients, and the growth of processed foods.

At the same time, the trade remains vulnerable to disruption. Climate change, supply chain bottlenecks and quality control issues continue to pose risks, particularly for countries heavily reliant on agricultural exports.

Recent reporting indicates a noticeable decline in the number of Pacific Australia Labour Mobility (PALM) scheme workers seeking asylum in Vanuatu. This shift suggests tighter migration oversight and possibly changing economic incentives both within Vanuatu and in destination countries like Australia. Officials have pointed out that earlier spikes in asylum requests were often tied to labour mobility gaps and worker dissatisfaction abroad. The current drop may reflect improved bilateral coordination or stricter enforcement mechanisms. What this really means is that Vanuatu is recalibrating its position within regional labour flows. The PALM scheme has long been a critical income pipeline for households, so any contraction in asylum-related activity could signal either stabilisation or reduced access to alternative migration pathways.

Supreme Court rejects application lacking legal merit

The Vanuatu Supreme Court has dismissed a recent application on the basis that it “lacks legal merit”, reinforcing judicial scrutiny over cases perceived as weak or procedurally flawed. While specific litigants were not detailed in the brief, rulings like this typically hinge on insufficient evidence, jurisdictional issues, or failure to meet statutory thresholds. This decision underscores the judiciary’s role in maintaining procedural discipline. It also sends a clear signal to litigants and legal practitioners: the courts are not a venue for speculative or poorly grounded claims. In a small but increasingly complex legal system, these rulings help manage caseload pressure and uphold institutional credibility.

Former prime minister calls for non-alignment stance

A former prime minister has publicly urged Vanuatu to maintain its long-standing non-alignment policy , particularly amid intensifying geopolitical competition in the Pacific. The call reflects growing concern over external influence from major powers seeking strategic footholds in the region. The catch is that Vanuatu’s foreign policy has historically balanced relationships across competing blocs. The former leader’s position reinforces that “non-alignment is not neutrality, but strategic independence”, a framing often used in Pacific diplomacy. The renewed emphasis suggests internal debate about whether economic partnerships are beginning to blur political autonomy.

Prison sentence reforms raise capacity concerns

Proposals or trends toward longer prison sentences are triggering concerns about correctional facility capacity in Vanuatu. With infrastructure already limited, any increase in incarceration duration could quickly lead to overcrowding, resource strain, and human rights challenges. Officials and analysts are likely weighing a difficult trade-off: tougher sentencing as a deterrent versus the practical limits of the prison system. Without parallel investment in facilities or alternative sentencing frameworks, the system risks becoming unsustainable. This issue sits at the intersection of justice policy and state capacity, and it is not easily resolved.

Passport inquiry controversy and political accountability

Former prime minister Sato Kilman has not been summoned in an ongoing passport-related inquiry and has denied any allegations tied to the case. The situation points to continuing scrutiny over Vanuatu’s citizenship and passport programmes, which have faced international attention in recent years. Even without a formal summons, the political implications are significant. Allegations around passport schemes often raise questions about governance, transparency, and due diligence. Kilman’s denial adds another layer to an already sensitive issue, particularly as Vanuatu navigates external pressure to tighten oversight of its citizenship-by-investment framework.

Ethiopia is expected to top the list with real GDP growth of about 9.2%, reinforcing its position as one of Africa’s most dynamic economies. The IMF has pointed to sustained public investment, expansion in services and gradual recovery from recent macroeconomic pressures as key drivers of growth.

Close behind, Guinea is projected to grow by 8.7%, supported largely by its booming mining sector. The country is one of the world ’s largest producers of bauxite, a key raw material for aluminium, and rising global demand has continued to attract foreign investment, according to IMF assessments.

Uganda is forecast to expand by 7.5%, with growth underpinned by infrastructure development and the anticipated ramp-up of its oil sector. The IMF has highlighted that energy projects, alongside agriculture and services, are expected to play a central role in sustaining momentum.

Rwanda, long regarded as a reform-oriented economy, is projected to grow by 7.2%. The IMF credits its consistent policy framework, investment in technology and efforts to position itself as a regional services hub for its steady performance.

Benin and Niger are also expected to post strong growth of 7.0% and 6.7%, respectively. In both countries, infrastructure spending and regional trade integration have been key contributors, with the IMF noting improved fiscal management and investment flows.

Côte d’Ivoire, one of West Africa’s economic anchors, is projected to grow by 6.2%, driven by agriculture, construction and services. The IMF has repeatedly cited the country’s diversified economy and stable policy environment as factors supporting its resilience.

Further down the list, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Tanzania are both expected to grow by 5.9%. In the DRC, mining, particularly copper and cobalt, continues to dominate, while Tanzania’s expansion is supported by tourism, infrastructure and energy investments.

Mali rounds up the top 10 with a projected growth of 5.5%, reflecting a rebound in key sectors despite ongoing security challenges.

IMF notes that fast-growing economies across Africa are increasingly driven by a mix of natural resources, urbanisation and policy reforms, offering pockets of opportunity for investors despite lingering risks.

Recent figures show that $1 converts to about 1.29 Singapore dollars and 1.28 Brunei dollars, placing both nations at the stronger end of the regional spectrum. Their currencies have remained relatively firm, supported by stable macroeconomic conditions and, in Singapore’s case, a tightly managed exchange rate system.

Bloomberg has noted that sustained capital inflows and prudent monetary management continue to reinforce the city-state’s currency resilience.

Across much of the region, however, the dollar stretches further. In Malaysia, it trades at roughly 4.04 ringgit, while Thailand’s baht stands near 32.59 per dollar.

The Philippine peso, at about 60.64 to the dollar, reflects ongoing pressures tied to inflation and external balances. According to Bloomberg analysis, currencies in these economies have remained sensitive to global financial tightening and shifts in investor sentiment.

Indonesia’s rupiah, hovering around 16,947 per dollar, illustrates this balancing act. While the country has benefited from commodity exports, Bloomberg reports that its currency remains exposed to global interest rate movements, prompting periodic intervention by the central bank to maintain stability.

The divergence becomes more pronounced in frontier markets. Vietnam’s dong trades at approximately 26,340 per dollar, while Laos and Cambodia register around 21,632 kip and 4,010 riel, respectively. Myanmar’s kyat, at roughly 2,100 per dollar, reflects deeper structural and economic challenges.

These variations go beyond exchange rates. They point to fundamental differences in purchasing power, economic structure, and policy frameworks. A stronger currency often signals stability but raises domestic costs, while weaker currencies can support exports yet reduce the ability to absorb imported inflation.

Monetary strategy plays a central role. Singapore’s reliance on exchange rate management contrasts with the interest rate-focused approaches seen in countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines. Bloomberg has highlighted how this divergence shapes currency performance, particularly during periods of global monetary tightening.

With the U.S. Federal Reserve maintaining a cautious stance on easing, the dollar has remained firm. Bloomberg suggests that this trend could persist in the near term, keeping pressure on Southeast Asian currencies and reinforcing the disparities seen across the region.

Taken together, the figures underline a simple but important reality: Southeast Asia is far from economically uniform. The reach of a single dollar continues to reflect the region’s varied economic conditions, offering insight into both opportunity and risk for policymakers, businesses, and investors alike.

"Made in China" was the undisputed mantra of the country’s rise. Today, however, a profound structural migration is underway. Following a landmark directive from China’s State Council, Beijing has formally mapped out an audacious future: a services economy projected to surpass ¥100 trillion (approximately $14 trillion) by 2030. This signals a decisive move away from a hardware-driven growth model toward a "China Service" era defined by intelligence, technology, and global standards.

The transition is already visible in the data. In the first quarter of 2026, services accounted for 61.7% of China’s GDP growth, signalling that the shift from a manufacturing-heavy economy to a high-value service hub is no longer a future projection - it is a current reality.

Factory brains

The first pillar of this strategy is the extension of "Producer Services" toward specialisation and the high end of the value chain. China recognises that the future of manufacturing lies not in assembly, but in the "industrial brain" behind it.

The science and technology hubs of Beijing, Shanghai, and the Greater Bay Area are serving as high-velocity engines for this shift, catalysing breakthroughs in robotics, drones, and general-purpose Large Language Models (LLMs). By integrating these frontier technologies into the core of producer services, China is moving beyond traditional consulting toward an "automated expertise" model that optimises industrial design, smart logistics, and predictive maintenance across the global supply chain.

For example, in the realm of tech-enabled services, the "Qi Yuan" model has transformed AI from a linguistic tool into a digitalised attending physician at the ICU bedside. Developed by Shenzhen-based medical giant Mindray and tech titan Tencent, Qi Yuan is the world’s first LLM clinically implemented for critical care. This shift toward high-end, specialised services is the engine driving the Chinese industry toward the apex of the global value chain.

  Quality of modern life

The second pillar is the transformation of "Life Services" to emphasise quality, variety, and convenience. As China's 500-million-strong middle class begins to prioritise "quality of life" over the mere accumulation of goods, the government is opening doors to satisfy increasingly diverse consumer demands.

In Shanghai’s Qingpu District, the launch of DeltaHealth Hospital Shanghai - owned by the British conglomerate Swire Pacific - serves as a vital bellwether. As the first general hospital in the city permitted to convert into a wholly foreign-owned entity, it represents an "airlift" of international management logic and specialised expertise into the heart of the Chinese market.

By attracting high-level international medical institutions, China is pursuing a dual-track strategy: meeting the sophisticated demands of high-income groups while simultaneously reducing pressure on public hospitals, which are often overcapacity due to China's massive population. Furthermore, Beijing is encouraging this competition to boost the overall quality of domestic healthcare services.

Meanwhile, a growing ageing population is seeking a better quality of life post-retirement. On the island of Hainan, China’s southernmost province and largest tropical territory, the "Silver Economy" is emerging as a major opportunity. In the Hainan Boao Lecheng International Medical Tourism Pilot Zone, the traditional silos between tourism, healthcare, and elderly care have vanished, replaced by a closed-loop ecosystem. This deep integration of "service + consumption" allows patients to access cutting-edge global drugs synchronised with international approvals, directly addressing health anxieties within an ageing society .

Why the pivot?

Why has China launched this trillion-dollar offensive now? Beyond hedging against rising manufacturing costs brought by geopolitics and other uncertainties, the move is rooted in a desire for resilient public well-being and a green future. Services are inherently less carbon-intensive, making them a natural vehicle for China’s "Dual Carbon" goals. Furthermore, by opening professional sectors like healthcare, education, and finance to global competition, China is using international standards to catalyse a domestic industrial upgrade, creating a more predictable and transparent business environment.

For global investors, this $14 trillion invitation is both a golden opportunity and a strategic challenge. Future dividends will no longer belong to those seeking cheap labour, but to those who can provide systemic solutions, high-end expertise, and innovative service models. From "Made in China" to "China Service," this is more than a change in name - it is a fundamental transformation of the nation's economic engine. In this new era, China will no longer just consume components and raw materials; it will consume the world’s most sophisticated intelligence and services.

Du Yubin is a journalist and producer for CGTN. He was stationed in Washington, D.C. and London for six years each, focusing on China-US and China-EU relations. He has over 15 years of experience in international communication and new media . The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Recent figures show that the worldwide total reached approximately 101.7 million colonies in 2024, marking a 46.6% increase compared with 1990 levels. The expansion reflects rising demand for pollination services and honey production, particularly in developing economies.

Asia accounts for the largest share, with around 45.2 million colonies, nearly half of the global total, and the fastest long-term growth rate at over 95% since 1990. China, the world’s leading honey producer, has been a major driver of this increase, supported by large-scale commercial beekeeping and agricultural intensification.

Europe remains the second-largest region, with about 25.4 million colonies, though growth has been more modest at just over 13%. Despite stable overall numbers, several European countries have reported periodic colony losses linked to factors such as pesticide exposure, habitat loss and climate change, according to FAO assessments.

Africa has seen a notable rise, with colony numbers climbing nearly 38% to 18.5 million . FAO data suggests that traditional and smallholder beekeeping systems continue to underpin growth across the continent, where honey production plays a key role in rural livelihoods.

In the Americas, colonies increased by around 20% to 11.6 million. However, the United States and parts of Latin America have faced well-documented challenges, including colony collapse disorder and disease, which have offset stronger gains elsewhere in the region.

Oceania, while accounting for the smallest share at roughly 1.1 million colonies, recorded a 44.7% increase over the same period.

The FAO notes that while global colony numbers are rising, this does not necessarily indicate improving bee health . In several advanced agricultural systems, higher colony counts are often maintained through intensive management practices, including artificial feeding and replacement of lost colonies.

Pollinators such as honey bees are critical to global food production, contributing to the reproduction of around 75% of crop species worldwide, according to FAO estimates. Their economic value is measured in hundreds of billions of dollars annually.

Tanzania, which imports nearly all of its fuel, is particularly vulnerable to global price swings. Energy Minister Deogratius Ndejembi said petrol prices rose by 69% between February and March 2026, while diesel jumped by 104%, with kerosene and jet fuel also seeing sharp increases.

Economist Kelvin Mouris pointed to the potential of natural gas and electric vehicles to reduce costs, but noted that infrastructure gaps remain a challenge despite Tanzania’s large gas reserves.

The government has introduced measures to stabilise supply, including building fuel reserves to cover at least three months. The price surge is linked to disruptions in global oil supply chains, particularly in the Strait of Hormuz.

The interim leader rejected suggestions that the delay signalled a rupture with Washington, saying Peru had no intention of confronting the United States and remained committed to maintaining strong diplomatic and commercial ties. His comments came days after U.S. ambassador Bernie Navarro warned that Washington would act to protect its interests if Peru negotiated “in bad faith”.

The proposed deal has faced criticism at home, with opponents questioning increased defence spending while Peru grapples with shortages in health and education. Defence Minister Carlos Diaz and Foreign Minister Hugo de Zela resigned on Wednesday in protest , saying contracts signed in April should be respected and warning that suspending payments could harm Peru’s national interests and relations with the United States.

Mazen Alloush, Director of Relations at Syria’s General Authority for Borders and Customs, said preparations had been underway for weeks.

The IMF estimates Asia’s nominal GDP at about $42.2 trillion , representing roughly 36% of global economic output. This places it ahead of North America, which contributes around $35.5 trillion, or 30%, and Europe at $29.6 trillion, or 25%.

The region’s leading position reflects the combined weight of major economies such as China, Japan and India, alongside fast-growing Southeast Asian markets. Over the past two decades, Asia has steadily increased its share of global GDP, driven by industrialisation, trade expansion and rising domestic consumption.

IMF data shows that emerging Asian economies continue to outpace global growth averages, reinforcing the region’s long-term economic influence.

Despite Asia’s lead, North America remains a dominant economic force, anchored by the United States, the world’s largest single economy. The region’s 30% share highlights its continued importance in global finance, technology and consumption.

Europe, with a 25% shar e, maintains a significant but comparatively smaller role. Its economy is spread across multiple advanced nations, including Germany, France and the United Kingdom, with growth shaped by both integration within the European Union and external trade.

Other regions account for much smaller portions of global output. South America contributes around $4.4 trillion, or 3.8%, while Africa’s total stands at approximately $3 trillion, or 2.6%.

Oceania, led by Australia and New Zealand , represents the smallest share among major regions, with about $2.1 trillion, or 1.8% of global GDP.

The United States exported roughly 4.0 million barrels per day (bpd) of crude oil in 2025, a 3% drop from the previous year despite record domestic production of 13.6 million bpd, the EIA said.

The Netherlands topped the list of U.S. oil importers, purchasing about 419 million barrels in 2025, accounting for roughly 10.7% of total exports.

Much of that oil flows through Rotterdam, one of the world’s largest energy hubs, where crude is refined or redistributed across Europe.

Mexico followed closely with 398 million barrels, while Canada ranked third at 324 million barrels, highlighting the continued strength of North American energy trade ties.

Other major buyers included South Korea, Japan, China and India, reflecting sustained demand from Asia even as regional flows shifted.

Top buyers of U.S. oil in 2025 (millions of barrels)

Europe remains dominant market

Europe has been the leading destination for U.S. crude since 2023, driven largely by efforts to replace Russian supplies following the Ukraine war.

However, exports to Europe fell by around 7% in 2025 as higher output from OPEC countries displaced some U.S. volumes.

Within the region, the United Kingdom recorded one of the steepest declines, with imports dropping roughly 35%, while the Netherlands increased purchases, offsetting some of the regional fall.

Exports to Asia and Oceania also weakened , particularly to China and Singapore. U.S. shipments to China plunged sharply amid trade tensions and competition from discounted oil supplied by countries such as Russia and Iran.

By contrast, India and Japan increased imports of U.S. crude, signalling a partial rebalancing of demand within the region.

Despite the 2025 decline, U.S. crude exports remain historically high. Since the lifting of a decades-long export ban in 2015, shipments have surged dramatically, rising to levels roughly 85 times higher than in 2011.

The United States has also maintained its status as a net petroleum exporter in recent years, reflecting strong production growth and expanding infrastructure.

A new visual dataset highlights how average monthly pensions in several European countries fall below €1,000 ($1,050), underscoring structural disparities that policymakers have long struggled to address.

The figures show Portugal at €961 ($1,010) per month, followed by Malta (€916 / $960) and Czechia (€843 / $885). Further down the scale, countries in Eastern and Southeastern Europe report markedly lower pensions, including Romania (€483 / $507), Serbia (€353 / $371), and Turkey (€281 / $295).

These figures align with broader Eurostat findings , which estimate the average pension across the European Union at roughly €1,345 per month (about $1,410) in 2022.

Annual pension income ranges from just €3,611 in Bulgaria to over €31,000 in Luxembourg, reflecting differences in wages, contributions, and welfare systems across member states.

Countries in the Balkans and Eastern Europe dominate the lower end of the spectrum . Bosnia and Herzegovina (€305 / $320) and Montenegro (€382 / $401) sit among the lowest, consistent with Eurostat data showing several of these economies have annual pensions below €8,000.

Turkey, a candidate country, remains at the bottom of the ranking, with pensions significantly affected by currency depreciation in recent years.

The OECD notes that public pensions account for more than 70% of older people’s income in many European countries, rising above 80% in some cases, making these disparities especially consequential for living standards.

Here’s the thing: pension outcomes in Europe are less about generosity and more about underlying economics.

Countries with higher wages, stronger tax bases, and mature social security systems, particularly in Northern and Western Europe, can sustain higher payouts. Meanwhile, lower-income economies tend to rely on more limited contribution systems.

The OECD estimates that, on average, pensions replace about 52% of pre-retirement income across member countries, though this varies widely depending on earnings level and national policy design.

Differences in retirement age, contribution rates, and the balance between public and private pension schemes further widen the gap.

Demographics are adding urgency to the issue. The OECD projects that the ratio of retirees to working-age people will rise sharply in the coming decades, putting additional strain on pension systems.

Across OECD countries, the population aged 65 and over is expected to surge , while the working-age population declines, raising concerns about sustainability and adequacy.

At the same time, replacement rates are projected to fall over time, meaning future retirees could receive a smaller share of their previous earnings.

When adjusted for purchasing power, disparities appear less extreme. Eurostat data show the gap between the highest and lowest pensions shrinks significantly when accounting for cost-of-living differences, though inequalities remain substantial.

China is shown as the largest single destination, taking roughly 23% of flows, followed by India at 13%, with Japan, South Korea and Southeast Asia also accounting for significant shares.

According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration , around 84% of crude oil and condensate shipped through the Strait of Hormuz in 2024 was destined for Asian countries.

China, India, Japan and South Korea alone accounted for roughly 69% of total flows, making them the most exposed to any disruption.

The International Energy Agency estimates that nearly a third of globally traded crude oil passes through the strait, with China and India together receiving about 44% of these exports.

The Strait of Hormuz handles around 20 million barrels of oil per day, roughly a fifth of global petroleum consumption, making it the most important oil transit chokepoint in the world.

It also carries a significant share of global liquefied natural gas, particularly exports from Qatar, one of the world’s largest LNG suppliers.

Despite its importance, alternatives remain limited. Pipelines in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates can bypass part of the route, but cannot fully replace their capacity in the event of a disruption.

By contrast to Asia, Western economies account for a much smaller share of direct imports.

The United States and Europe together receive less than 10% of oil flows through the strait, reflecting increased domestic production in the U.S. and diversified supply chains in Europe.

In 2024, the U.S. imported only about 7% of its crude oil from Persian Gulf countries via the strait, highlighting its reduced dependence compared with previous decades.

The Strait’s strategic importance has made it a recurring focal point of geopolitical tension.

Recent conflicts involving Iran, Israel, and the USA have once again highlighted the vulnerability of global energy supply chains, with shipping disruptions triggering price volatility and raising fears of broader economic fallout.

Nowhere is this more visible than in the revival of hanfu , traditional Han Chinese attire. In Beijing’s historic quarters, among the vermilion walls of imperial palaces and the expansive courtyards of classical gardens, young people are embracing styles rooted in dynastic history. These are not isolated performances staged for tourists, nor purely superficial gestures for social media. The attention to detail - from layered silks and embroidered patterns to carefully styled hair and accessories - reflects a deeper engagement with cultural heritage.

A decade ago, the fashion sensibilities of China’s urban youth often leaned heavily toward Parisian runways or New York streetwear. Today, those reference points are no longer dominant. Instead, a distinctly Chinese aesthetic is emerging, one that draws confidently from a civilisational past spanning millennia. Whether it was the best-selling fridge magnets modelled after Empress Dowager Xiaoduan’s phoenix crown or the operatic vocals layered over trending Douyin beats, the past is now "cool." This shift is not a rejection of global influence, but rather a rebalancing: Western trends are no longer the default benchmark, but one influence among many.

This cultural recalibration is reinforced by the digital ecosystem. Social media platforms and algorithm-driven content have accelerated the popularisation of traditional motifs, turning historical references into contemporary trends. Ancient symbols are reinterpreted through modern formats, from viral short videos to fashion collaborations, creating a feedback loop in which heritage becomes both relevant and desirable.

Time travel in Xi'an

At the same time, China’s tourism industry offers further evidence of this changing mindset. Domestic travel is increasingly centred on rediscovering and reimagining the country’s own historical and cultural assets. In cities like Xi’an, large-scale projects have transformed fragments of the past into immersive experiences. Nighttime districts inspired by the Tang Dynasty blend performance, architecture, and digital spectacle, attracting visitors not only as spectators but as participants in a stylised historical narrative.

These developments are not without complexity. Such projects often rely on significant investment and are shaped by the logic of the attention economy, raising questions about sustainability and long-term value. Yet their popularity underscores a broader point: there is a strong domestic appetite for cultural experiences rooted in Chinese history, even when mediated through modern technology and commercial frameworks.

Elsewhere, sites like Dujiangyan or the preserved homes of classical poets reveal another dimension of this trend. Here, the emphasis is less on spectacle and more on continuity - on the endurance of philosophical traditions, environmental harmony, and moral ideals. The steady flow of visitors to these locations reflects a renewed interest in the intellectual and ethical foundations of Chinese civilisation, suggesting that cultural confidence is not confined to aesthetics alone.

Confidence not fear

Importantly, this inward turn does not equate to isolation. China’s recent expansion of visa-free entry policies for numerous countries points in the opposite direction. By simplifying access for foreign visitors, the country is signalling openness and a willingness to engage. The ease with which travellers can now enter, navigate, and transact within China challenges outdated perceptions of inaccessibility.

However, this openness coexists with a more self-assured posture. The willingness to welcome outsiders is no longer accompanied by a perceived need to cater to external cultural expectations. Instead, visitors are invited to encounter China on its own terms and engage with a society that is increasingly confident in the value and appeal of its own traditions.

Taken together, these developments suggest a nuanced transformation. China is not closing itself off from the world, but it is preparing for a future in which cultural leadership is more diffuse and less centred on Western paradigms. Fashion, tourism, and everyday cultural practices are becoming vehicles for this transition, expressing a society that is rediscovering its roots while redefining its place in a changing global landscape.

In this context, the resurgence of traditional dress, the reinvention of heritage tourism, and the expansion of visa-free access all point to the same underlying reality: a country that is opening its doors wider, even as it grows more confident in what lies within them.

The article solely represents the views of Yubin Du, a journalist for Chinese broadcaster CGTN, who was based in Washington DC and London between 2012 and 2025.

The Chicago-headquartered group reported confectionery sales of $38.5 billion, maintaining a clear lead over rival Mars Inc., which posted $36 billion in revenue from its sprawling snacks division.

Italian firm Ferrero Group secured third place with $22.2 billion, while The Hershey Company and Nestlé rounded out the top five with $11.7 billion and $11 billion respectively, underscoring continued dominance by a handful of multinational players.

The latest rankings highlight the enduring influence of a small cluster of global heavyweights often referred to as “Big Chocolate”, including Mondelēz, Mars, Ferrero, Hershey and Nestlé, which collectively command a significant share of global confectionery revenue.

These companies benefit from vast manufacturing networks, strong brand portfolios and global distribution systems, allowing them to maintain scale advantages even as consumer tastes evolve.

Beyond the top five, Japan ’s Meiji Co., Switzerland’s Lindt & Sprüngli, Germany’s Haribo, Italy-based Perfetti Van Melle and UK-based Pladis complete the top 10 list, reflecting a mix of heritage European brands and Asian growth players.

The rankings come against a backdrop of steady growth in the global candy market, which is valued at approximately $78.8 billion in 2026 and projected to reach nearly $99 billion by 2031.

Manufacturers are increasingly responding to changing consumer preferences, including demand for premium products, reduced-sugar formulations and plant-based ingredients.

Digital commerce is also reshaping distribution, with online candy sales growing steadily as companies expand direct-to-consumer channels.

At the same time, emerging markets in Asia-Pacific are driving future growth, supported by rising incomes and urbanisation, even as Europe and North America remain the largest revenue centres.

Djibouti this week opened a major ship repair yard , a move aimed at strengthening its position along one of the world’s busiest shipping corridors. The facility is expected to provide maintenance services for commercial and military vessels passing through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a key chokepoint linking the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean. Officials say the project forms part of a broader strategy to transform Djibouti into a leading logistics and maritime services hub, reducing reliance on foreign repair facilities while boosting employment and economic diversification. The country’s ports already play a central role in regional trade, serving as the primary maritime gateway for landlocked Ethiopia and handling thousands of ships annually.

Energy flows and economic fragility

At the same time, Djibouti’s economic outlook remains closely tied to regional stability. Recent tanker movements into the country highlight its role in energy supply chains, particularly for neighbouring Ethiopia, which depends heavily on Djibouti’s port infrastructure. However, the International Monetary Fund has warned that the broader Horn of Africa remains vulnerable to external shocks, including instability in Gulf energy markets and disruptions to shipping routes. The Bab el-Mandeb Strait itself carries a significant share of global oil shipments, making any disruption to the corridor a major concern for international energy markets.

Rising tensions in key shipping routes

Concerns have intensified as conflict linked to Iran and its regional allies increasingly affects major maritime chokepoints. The Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb, both vital for global energy flows, have come under renewed scrutiny amid escalating hostilities. Recent developments in the Iran conflict have seen attacks on commercial shipping and the rerouting of vessels away from high-risk areas, raising costs and delays for global trade. Security analysts warn that if disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz intensify, the Bab el-Mandeb could become even more critical, placing Djibouti at the centre of shifting global shipping patterns.

The Horn of Africa as a new frontline

The region’s strategic importance is further underscored by its growing military significance. Djibouti hosts multiple foreign military bases , including the only permanent United States base in Africa, making it a focal point for international operations. Analysts say the Horn of Africa is increasingly being drawn into broader geopolitical rivalries, including tensions involving Iran, Israel and Gulf states. Military infrastructure, trade routes and alliances are turning the region into an “active front” in wider conflicts. Recent warnings suggest that strategic sites in Djibouti and neighbouring areas could become targets in the event of further escalation, particularly as proxy conflicts spill into maritime domains.

Recent data from Numbeo and GlobalProductPrices show that consumers in Switzerland now pay around $7.73 for a dozen large eggs, the highest globally, followed by New Zealand at roughly $6.19 and Puerto Rico at $5.64. Denmark, the Netherlands and Luxembourg also rank among the most expensive markets, reflecting broader cost pressures across high-income economies.

While European and developed markets dominate the top tier, prices in countries such as India, Pakistan and Nigeria remain below $2 per dozen, highlighting wide gaps in production costs, labour and purchasing power.

At the centre of the price spike is a prolonged outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza, commonly known as bird flu , which decimated poultry flocks worldwide in 2024 and 2025. Millions of egg-laying hens have been culled to contain the disease, sharply reducing supply and pushing prices higher.

In the United States alone, egg supply fell by as much as 15–20% during peak outbreaks, contributing to price spikes that exceeded $6–$8 per dozen in some regions.

The economic mechanics are straightforward, as fewer hens mean fewer eggs, creating a supply deficit that drives prices upward in a market where demand remains relatively inelastic.

Beyond disease outbreaks, producers are grappling with escalating input costs. Feed prices, particularly for corn and soybean meal, along with higher energy, transport and labour costs, have significantly increased the cost of egg production globally.

Regulatory changes are also playing a role. In countries such as Switzerland and New Zealand, stricter animal welfare standards and transitions to cage-free farming systems have raised operational costs, which are ultimately passed on to consumers.

Faced with persistent volatility, producers are investing heavily in biosecurity measures and rebuilding flocks, though recovery remains slow because hens require time to mature and resume laying.

Exporters and importers, meanwhile, are adapting trade flows to stabilise supply. Governments in some countries are exploring increased egg imports and financial support for farmers to cushion the impact of shortages and price swings.

Retailers and food manufacturers have also adjusted, introducing purchase limits and reformulating products to reduce reliance on eggs amid elevated prices.

A new voting simulation reported by El Comercio shows Peru’s 2026 presidential race remains highly volatile just days before the April 12 election. The poll suggests no clear frontrunner, with several candidates clustered closely and a significant share of undecided voters. Analysts say the “electoral board keeps shifting” as alliances and late campaign dynamics influence voter preferences. The fragmented landscape reflects broader political instability following years of institutional crisis. Experts warn that the lack of a dominant candidate could lead to a highly contested second round. The findings underline the unpredictability of one of Peru’s most uncertain elections in recent history .

One dead and dozens injured in Lima stadium incident

At least one person has died, and dozens were injured following a crowd incident outside Lima’s Alejandro Villanueva Stadium ahead of a match involving Alianza Lima. Authorities ruled out any structural collapse, indicating the incident was caused by disorder among fans gathered for a pre-match event. Emergency services treated numerous injured people, several of them in critical condition, as investigations continue into the circumstances. Officials and club representatives pledged full cooperation to determine responsibility. Despite the incident, the domestic league confirmed the fixture would go ahead as planned. The tragedy has renewed concerns over crowd control and safety at major sporting events in Peru.

Peruvian engineer joins historic Artemis II moon mission

Peruvian engineer Jackelynne Silva Martinez has been highlighted for her role in NASA’s Artemis II, the mission set to orbit the Moon. Her participation marks a significant milestone for Peru’s presence in global space exploration. According to reports by La Republica, Silva Martínez is contributing to key engineering aspects of the programme. The mission is part of broader efforts to return humans to the Moon and pave the way for future Mars exploration. Her achievement has been widely celebrated as an inspiration for young scientists in Peru. Officials and academics emphasised the importance of investing in science and technology to build on such successes.

Mining exports surge driven by gold and copper

Peru’s mining exports recorded a sharp increase of 47.6% in December 2025, according to figures from the Ministry of Energy and Mines of Peru cited by La Republica. The growth was largely driven by strong international demand for gold and copper, the country’s main export commodities . The figures highlight the continued importance of the mining sector to Peru’s economy, accounting for a significant share of export revenues. Authorities noted that global market conditions and production levels both contributed to the surge. Economists say the trend could support economic recovery if sustained. However, they also stress the need for diversification to reduce dependence on raw materials.

Peruvian scientists highlight climate impact in Antarctica

A group of Peruvian researchers participating in Antarctic missions have warned about the growing impact of climate change on the continent’s megafauna. According to La Republica, the scientists—described as ambassadors of Peru and science—are studying how rising temperatures affect marine ecosystems and species survival. Their findings point to shifts in animal behaviour and habitat conditions linked to global warming. The research forms part of Peru’s ongoing scientific presence in Antarctica. Experts stress that such studies are crucial for understanding global climate patterns. The initiative also highlights Peru’s contribution to international environmental research efforts.

The Namibian government has launched a Work Integrated Learning Policy , targeting one of the country’s most pressing challenges: youth unemployment. The policy is designed to bridge the gap between education and the labour market by embedding practical work experience into training systems. In Namibia, where youth unemployment remains persistently high by regional standards, policymakers have increasingly focused on skills alignment and employability as key levers for economic inclusion. This move signals a shift away from purely academic pathways toward industry-linked training, with the expectation that graduates will enter the workforce with relevant, job-ready skills.

Economic outlook hints at a gradual recovery toward 2027

Namibia’s economy grew by 1.7% in 2025 , missing expectations due to sharp declines in the diamond sector, livestock farming and investment. Growth started stronger early in the year but weakened overall. Analysts say early signs of recovery are emerging, supported by policy measures, monetary easing and rising credit activity, though the impact will take time to filter through. Growth is projected at 2%–2.5% in 2026, driven by agriculture, uranium and services, with stronger gains expected from 2027 onwards. Potential oil and gas investments could further boost the outlook, while household demand remains weak due to slow policy transmission.

Private sector leadership shifts as NCCI appoints new chairman

The election of Vetumbuavi Mungunda as chairman of the Namibia Chamber of Commerce and Industry (NCCI) marks a notable development in the country’s business landscape. The NCCI plays a central role in representing private sector interests, engaging with government on policy and promoting investment. Leadership changes at this level often signal shifts in advocacy priorities, particularly around business climate reforms, access to finance and support for small and medium-sized enterprises. Mungunda’s appointment comes at a time when closer public-private collaboration is seen as critical to unlocking growth.

Digital payments strategy targets financial modernisation

The Bank of Namibia (BoN), in collaboration with PAN, has launched a new payment system strategy aimed at modernising the country’s financial infrastructure . The initiative is expected to expand digital payment adoption, improve transaction efficiency and strengthen financial inclusion. Across Africa, central banks are increasingly prioritising digital systems to reduce reliance on cash and integrate informal sectors into the formal economy. For Namibia, this strategy aligns with broader efforts to build a more resilient and accessible financial system, particularly for underserved populations.

Gold supply deal signals strategic reserve strengthening

The Bank of Namibia has secured a gold supply deal , reinforcing its reserve assets. Gold remains a key instrument for central banks seeking to hedge against currency volatility and global economic uncertainty. The agreement suggests Namibia is taking steps to strengthen its macroeconomic buffers, particularly in a volatile global environment. This also reflects a wider trend among emerging markets to increase gold holdings as part of reserve diversification strategies.

Data compiled from energy agencies and industry analyses, including the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), show the U.S. has held the top spot since 2023 , overtaking long-time leader Qatar and reshaping global gas supply dynamics.

The LNG industry has undergone several distinct phases over the past three decades, driven by infrastructure investment, resource discoveries and changing demand patterns.

In the early years, Algeria led global LNG exports between 1990 and 1994, leveraging its pioneering facilities at Arzew. According to Britannica, Algeria was among the first countries to commercialise LNG exports, giving it an early strategic advantage.

That lead faded as newer producers scaled faster. By the mid-1990s, Indonesia took over (1995–2005), supported by large export terminals such as Bontang and Arun, and long-term contracts with Asian buyers, particularly Japan. Industry analyses from Incorrys note that this period coincided with a surge in LNG demand across the Asia-Pacific region.

From 2006 to 2021, Qatar dominated the global LNG market, setting a new benchmark for scale and efficiency.

Backed by the massive North Field, the world ’s largest natural gas reservoir, Qatar expanded production through its Ras Laffan industrial complex. According to industry data and EIA assessments, Qatar at times accounted for over 30% of global LNG supply, cementing its role as the central player in international gas markets.

Its success was built on long-term contracts, cost advantages and the ability to deliver large, consistent volumes to Europe and Asia.

The balance shifted again in 2022, when Australia briefly became the top exporter, driven by major offshore LNG projects including Gorgon, Wheatstone and Ichthys.

However, analysts note that Australia’s lead was short-lived, as production growth plateaued and operational constraints limited further expansion.

Since 2023, the United States has taken the lead, powered by the shale gas revolution and the rapid expansion of LNG export terminals along the Gulf Coast.

According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, the country’s export capacity has grown sharply in recent years, supported by facilities in Texas and Louisiana. The U.S. model differs from traditional exporters, offering flexible contracts and destination-free cargoes, making it particularly attractive to buyers.

Strong demand from Europe — especially following efforts to reduce reliance on Russian pipeline gas — and continued growth in Asian markets have accelerated U.S. exports.

Geopolitics and demand reshape the market

The shift in LNG leadership reflects broader geopolitical and economic changes.

Britannica notes that LNG plays a critical role in global energy systems by enabling natural gas to be transported across oceans, linking producers and consumers that are not connected by pipelines.

A regional breakdown of agricultural strengths shows Brazil at the forefront, producing major export crops including coffee, soybeans, corn, sugarcane and beef. Argentina follows closely, with strong output in soybeans, corn, wheat and beef, consolidating the Southern Cone’s role as a global breadbasket.

The trend reflects broader projections from Market Data Forecast, which estimates that Latin America’s agriculture market will continue to expand steadily, driven by rising global demand for food, biofuels and agricultural exports.

Brazil and Argentina anchor regional output

Brazil remains the world’s largest producer of coffee and one of the top exporters of soybeans and beef, according to international trade data. Its scale and diversified production base have positioned it as a cornerstone of global food supply chains.

Argentina, meanwhile, plays a pivotal role in global grain markets. As one of the leading exporters of soymeal and corn, the country is a key supplier to both Asian and European markets.

Market Data Forecast notes that strong export demand, coupled with technological adoption in farming, is expected to sustain growth across these sectors in the coming years.

Diverse specialisations across the region

Beyond the largest economies, Latin America’s agricultural landscape is defined by specialisation.

Mexico has built a strong export profile in high-value crops such as avocados, tomatoes and berries, supported by proximity to the United States and favourable trade agreements. The country is now one of the world’s top avocado exporters.

Colombia and Ecuador dominate in tropical commodities. Colombia is globally recognised for its coffee and cut flowers, while Ecuador leads in banana exports and is a major player in shrimp farming.

Peru and Chile have emerged as key exporters of premium agricultural goods. Peru has expanded rapidly in avocados, grapes and asparagus, while Chile’s agricultural sector is anchored by fruit exports, wine production and a globally competitive salmon industry.

According to Market Data Forecast, this diversification is helping the region reduce dependency on a narrow set of commodities, while tapping into higher-margin export markets.

Growing role in global food security

Latin America’s agricultural expansion comes at a time of increasing global concern over food security . The region accounts for a significant share of global exports in soybeans, maize, coffee and beef, making it essential to international supply chains.

Paraguay and Uruguay, though smaller in scale, contribute meaningfully through soybean production, beef exports and dairy products. Costa Rica, meanwhile, continues to supply global markets with coffee, bananas and pineapples.

Market Data Forecast highlights that favourable climate conditions, abundant land resources and increasing investment in agri-tech are strengthening the region’s competitive advantage.

“Of course, we want to celebrate ( Aidilfitri ), but I would like to urge moderation,” Anwar said, according to Bernama. “Look at the wars taking place, do not assume nothing will happen. They are disrupting oil and gas… So we must save a little.” He suggested scaling back festive food preparations, including making fewer types of kuih and less ketupat.

Anwar, who is also finance minister, said a thrifty approach was needed as supply chain strains and higher prices continued to weigh on households. His remarks came as the government had already moved to cushion holiday costs, including announcing an additional public holiday and a 15-day festive season price control scheme for essential goods.

The Middle East conflict was not the only strain hanging over Ramadan in Malaysia this year. 

Health authorities also warned of a rise in tuberculosis cases during a period marked by packed bazaars, communal iftar meals and other crowded gatherings.

Malaysia recorded 596 new tuberculosis infections in Epidemiological Week 6 of 2026, bringing the national total to 3,161 cases so far this year, according to health ministry figures cited in multiple local reports. The increase was 9.8 per cent from the same period a year earlier, with Sabah recording the highest number of cases, followed by Selangor and Sarawak.

Officials said the increase partly reflected better screening and case detection, not only higher transmission. Still, the ministry urged vigilance, especially in enclosed or poorly ventilated spaces. Tuberculosis is spread through the air and remains a public health concern during large gatherings, even though Ramadan activities themselves do not directly cause infection.

Together, the economic warning and the health alert gave this year’s Ramadan and Aidilfitri period in Malaysia a more cautious tone than usual.

Africa’s exposure to global disruptions is closely tied to its reliance on imports and limited intra-continental trade, Kuagbedzi said, arguing that recent crises have underscored the urgency of reducing that dependence.

“Well, I think that we have to deepen African trade,” he said, referencing the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which was created to boost trade among African countries but has yet to reach its full potential.

He warned that continued reliance on external suppliers for essential goods leaves African economies vulnerable when global supply chains are disrupted.

“We cannot continue as a continent to depend on, you know, others for our, you know, supplies in terms of crude oil, in terms of our cereals, in terms of sugar, in terms of everything that we actually import into this country.”

Economists have long argued that such dependence amplifies the impact of global shocks. Analysts, including Dani Rodrik, have pointed to the need for diversification and stronger domestic industries.

"Economic growth and development are possible only through the accumulation of capabilities over time, in areas ranging from skills and technologies to public institutions," wrote in his book, " The Globalisation Paradox ".

Nelson, during the discussion with Abigail Johnson Boakye, intimated that Africa must move beyond exporting raw materials and instead invest in value addition. “I think that we need to diversify our economic basis by adding more value to the raw materials,” he said, pointing to Ghana’s plan to stop exporting raw gold by 2030 as an example of policy direction.

He added that heavy reliance on imports has implications for employment and economic growth. “Once you continue to import, you are creating unemployment in your country, and you are creating a corresponding employment in that country.”

For Nelson, strengthening intra-African trade is central to reducing vulnerability.

“We should try as much as possible to trade within ourselves. We should try as much as possible to deepen our economic and financial relations. And we should also try as much as possible to build our economies based on African solutions that can solve African problems.”

Watch the full interview attached above.

The findings highlight the continued strength of pickup trucks in the American auto market, where large vehicles remain the top choice for consumers in both rural and urban regions.

The map visualisation illustrating the state-by-state breakdown was produced by The World in Maps with support from Mavin Mapping, using national vehicle sales data and industry reports.

Industry data from GoodCarBadCar and Statista shows the F-Series consistently selling hundreds of thousands of units annually, with more than 750,000 units sold in the United States in 2023 alone, far ahead of competing models.

The vehicle leads sales across large parts of the South, Midwest and Western United States, reflecting the strong popularity of trucks for work, transportation and lifestyle use.

While Ford dominates nationally, several other automakers lead sales in specific regions.

The data shows:

Tesla’s rise reflects broader trends in EV adoption. According to BloombergNEF and the U.S. Department of Energy , electric vehicle sales in the U.S. have surged in recent years, with models such as the Tesla Model Y and Model 3 becoming some of the best-selling electric cars nationwide.

Despite the rise of electric vehicles and compact SUVs, pickup trucks remain deeply embedded in American car culture .

Research from Edmunds and Kelley Blue Book shows trucks consistently account for several of the top-selling vehicles in the U.S. each year, driven by demand from construction, agriculture and outdoor lifestyle markets.

The F-Series in particular has become a symbol of the American automotive industry, combining work capability with consumer appeal.

Oil prices have surged above $100 per barrel as military strikes, tanker attacks and the disruption of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz rattle global markets.

Global energy watchdog, the International Energy Agency (IEA), said on Thursday, March 12, the conflict has created the "largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market", removing millions of barrels a day from the market.

The Strait of Hormuz alone normally carries about one-fifth of the world’s oil supply. With shipping traffic collapsing after Iranian retaliation and US-Israeli strikes, global energy markets have entered a period of extreme volatility.

For Africa, the consequences could be severe.

According to a Ghanaian financial analyst, Nelson Cudjoe Kuagbedzi, the biggest risk for African economies lies in the disruption of international supply chains.

“Okay, so I think the biggest risk has to do basically with the disruption in the international supply chains,” he told Global South  World. “Most of the goods and products that we use in Africa are imported, most especially petroleum products.”

That vulnerability is rooted in the structure of Africa’s energy sector. Despite producing crude oil, the continent lacks sufficient refining capacity and therefore imports much of the fuel it consumes.

In fact, Africa imports more than 70% of its refined petroleum products, leaving economies highly exposed to fluctuations in global oil markets.

Nelson says the continent’s limited production also makes it impossible to cushion the impact of a prolonged conflict.

“It is also important to know that the total crude output in Africa represents less than 10% of global crude output,” he explained.

The crisis also exposes another longstanding economic challenge of how Africa exports raw materials but imports many finished products.

“We haven't also developed our economies enough to the extent that we will use homegrown solutions to solve homegrown policies,” Kuagbedzi said.

“I mean, raw cocoa, raw gold, raw coffee, raw timber.”

For him, the war should serve as a wake-up call.

However, the Middle East remains the backbone of global oil supply. Many members of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) are located in the region, producing a significant share of the petroleum used worldwide.

According to Nelson, that concentration makes Africa particularly vulnerable.

“Most of the OPEC members that produce the chunk of the petroleum products, whether crude or refined, that we use in Africa, most of those OPEC members are in the Middle East,” he said.

With tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz disrupted and oil shipments stalled, markets are already reacting. Brent crude surged past $100 per barrel for the first time since the Ukraine war's energy shock.

If the crisis deepens, some analysts warn prices could climb much higher, intensifying inflation worldwide.

A regional overview of merchandise imports shows that China ranks as the first, second or third largest import partner across large parts of Europe, highlighting the deep economic ties between Beijing and European economies.

Official statistics from Eurostat show that China remained the European Union’s largest import partner in 2024, accounting for about 21.3% of all extra-EU imports, well ahead of the United States and the United Kingdom.

Total EU imports from China reached roughly €517.8 billion, compared with €213.3 billion in exports to China, creating a trade deficit of more than €300 billion.

Trade rankings suggest that China is the top import partner for several countries in Central and Eastern Europe, including economies such as Poland and Ukraine.

Across much of the region, China consistently appears among the top three sources of imported goods, driven by strong demand for electronics, machinery and industrial components.

According to global trade statistics, China accounted for about 17.5% of global exports, making it the largest exporter worldwide.

On the contrary, some Western European countries show more diversified import relationships.

For example, countries such as France and Spain source significant imports from neighbouring European economies as well as the United States, meaning China ranks outside the top five in some cases.

Even so, the EU and China maintain one of the world ’s largest bilateral trading relationships.

Total EU-China trade in goods reached about €732 billion in 2024, underscoring the scale of economic interdependence between the two markets.