Arisha has been part of the Mountain Training Centre for three years. She regularly takes part in training exercises with the Armed Forces’ Special Operations Forces and is involved in activities such as scaling mountainous terrain alongside soldiers.

In Congo, the group has caused immense suffering through its attacks on civilian communities, especially in Ituri and North Kivu provinces, causing many deaths and displacing thousands. One of the most recent incidents is the April 2 attack on Bafwakao village in Mambasa, where ADF killed about 43 Christians during Holy Week. 

“Some victims were burnt inside their homes, and others are still in the bush,” reported a member of a civil society organisation, who was worried that the death toll would rise and that more such attacks were highly likely if the government did not intervene.

In 2021, UPDF, in collaboration with FARDC, launched Operation Shujaa , aimed at countering the ADF. The campaign has destroyed the rebels’ camps, captured commanders, and confiscated substantial amounts of weapons and ammunition, degrading the ADF’s capacity to launch attacks on civilians in Congo and Uganda.

The recent rescue of civilians underscores the importance of collaboration in combatting terrorism in the East African Community (EAC) and, indeed, the African continent. In DRC’s case, the EAC must prioritise strengthening joint military efforts to offer better coordinated and more potent interventions that will help pacify the country’s rebel-infested eastern region.

The 2022 deployment of the East African Standby Force to contain the M23 insurgency was challenged by human rights concerns and a misalignment between the force’s agenda and the regional bloc’s political processes. The mission was further derailed by poor coordination with other actors like the UN peacekeepers and accusations of Rwandan forces colluding with the M23, culminating in a military withdrawal in 2023.

This exposes the gaps within Africa’s regional frameworks and highlights the need to integrate the continent’s structures and streamline them with people’s realities and needs.

The concept of a united African army , as touted by the late Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi in 2002, could advance peace efforts in a continent with some of the world’s most persistent conflicts and worst humanitarian crises.

“If we manage to unify all of Africa’s armies in a single army, Africa will have such power,” Gaddafi argued .

But for this to materialise, there must be a deliberate effort to harmonise political processes with defence strategy, manage the continent’s often conflicting national interests, and build sufficient consensus on guaranteeing Africa’s strategic security amid shifting geopolitics that disadvantage the continent.

The article solely represents the views of Simpson Muhwezi,  a Ugandan freelance writer and development practitioner.

While these huge sums are deployed daily for military activities, hundreds of millions of people still lack access to basic food.

According to the UN World Food Programme, ending global hunger by 2030 could cost around $93 billion per year, which is less than 1% of what the world has spent on military budgets over the past decade.

Yet, the U.S. alone spends roughly $2.7–$3 billion per day on defence when annual budgets are broken down into daily figures.

In simple terms, a fraction of global military expenditure could fund large-scale hunger reduction programmes.

In fact, the same conflicts that drive military spending often worsen hunger directly by displacing populations and disrupting agriculture.

A UN Development Programme report warns that rising military budgets are “diverting resources from the very foundations of stability,” including food systems and development.

The Boston Consulting Group notes that investment in sustainable agriculture can be four times more cost-effective than direct food aid, yet it receives only a small share of global funding.

So could the U.S. “solve world hunger” by redirecting war spending?

Reallocating hundreds of billions of dollars could dramatically reduce hunger. But ending it entirely would require sustained global coordination, institutional reform and long-term investment beyond emergency feeding.

But although the world can afford to end hunger, is it willing to prioritise it?

It is crucial to note, however, that the vote excluded major opposition parties, including the National League for Democracy, led by detained former leader Aung San Suu Kyi.

Min Aung Hlaing is expected to step down as commander-in-chief to comply with constitutional rules barring a president from holding both roles. General Ye Win Oo, a former military intelligence chief and long-time associate of the junta leader, has been promoted and is widely expected to take over the top military post.

Under the constitution, 25% of seats are reserved for the armed forces, while the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party won a large majority of the remaining seats in elections held in December and January.

Tom Andrews, the United Nations special rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar, has urged the international community to reject the election results and any political arrangements that follow, describing the process as an attempt by the military to legitimise its rule.

The political shift comes as Myanmar remains in conflict. According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data project and the UN Refugee Agency, nearly 93,300 people have been killed and 3.7 million displaced since the military seized power in February 2021. The Assistance Association for Political Prisoners says more than 30,600 people have been arrested since the coup, with about 22,500 still in detention.

An opposition shadow parliament formed by ousted lawmakers also held a parallel session this week, maintaining it is the country’s only legitimate legislature.

Operations of this kind are intended to decapitate a regime by removing its central decision-makers and disrupting its chain of command. Such strikes rarely occur by chance.

They typically reflect a prolonged process of intelligence gathering, surveillance and operational preparation. The ability to target senior figures simultaneously suggests highly detailed knowledge of internal structures and movements. In tactical terms, therefore, an operation that reaches the political and security leadership of a state constitutes a significant success. Yet the strategic implications are less straightforward.

But this isn't the end

The removal of high-ranking leaders does not automatically translate into the collapse of a political system. Authoritarian regimes in particular are often structured to withstand the loss of individuals, even at the highest level.

The Islamic Republic of Iran is not merely a collection of personalities. It is a layered institutional system combining ideological authority, religious legitimacy and an extensive security apparatus.

Succession mechanisms exist, formal and informal, and historically the regime has demonstrated an ability to replace key figures relatively quickly.

For this reason, the real test following such strikes lies not in the immediate casualties but in the regime’s ability to reconstitute its command structure. Can the leadership rebuild a coherent chain of authority?

Can it maintain internal order and prevent fragmentation within its security forces?

If the answer to these questions is yes, the strikes will ultimately represent a dramatic tactical blow rather than a decisive structural rupture.

And strikes can be counterproductive

The Iranian system has never been entirely unified. Long-standing tensions exist between hardliners and more pragmatic elements, between ideological conservatives and reform-oriented factions.

Even within the security apparatus there are differing views about strategy and risk. Some actors interpret the current confrontation as an existential struggle requiring uncompromising resistance. Others may consider that uncontrolled escalation threatens the survival of the regime itself.

External pressure can therefore produce contradictory effects. On the one hand, it may strengthen internal cohesion by rallying elites around the defence of the state. On the other, it can intensify disagreements over how best to respond. In moments of acute crisis, these divisions may become more visible.

The battle for control

The durability of the regime is closely linked to the interests of those who benefit from it.

Iran’s security elite is deeply embedded in networks of economic patronage and institutional power. At the centre of this system stand the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, numbering roughly 190,000 personnel, supported by the Basij militia and a range of internal security organisations.

These forces possess the capacity not only to defend the regime externally but also to suppress dissent domestically. The persistence of checkpoints, surveillance and internal security operations even during periods of external bombardment demonstrates that this apparatus remains operational. As long as the coercive machinery of the state remains intact, the regime retains the capacity to endure.

Alongside the Revolutionary Guards stands Iran’s regular army, a separate institution with a different historical identity and organisational culture. The Guards function as the ideological army of the Islamic Republic, closely integrated with the political leadership. The regular army, by contrast, represents a more traditional state institution. Should the regime face a severe crisis, the behaviour of the regular army could become decisive. It might remain neutral, support the existing system or attempt to act as an arbiter.

Iranian history offers a relevant precedent. During the revolution of 1979 the army initially participated in suppressing demonstrations but ultimately declined to intervene at a decisive moment. That episode continues to influence contemporary strategic thinking within the country.

So what IS next?

Another question concerns what might follow a weakened or collapsing regime. Some observers argue that Iran’s social structure and national identity make a descent into chaos less likely than in countries such as Iraq after 2003.

Iranian society possesses a strong sense of historical continuity and a relatively high level of education. Moreover, opposition movements exist, even if they remain fragmented and often operate outside the country.

These groups range from monarchists and republicans to centre-left movements and representatives of ethnic minorities.

Many share common demands centred on democratic governance, secular institutions and minority rights. Reza Pahlavi, the son of Iran’s last monarch, remains a controversial figure in this debate. While some see him as a possible rallying point for a transitional process, others question the legitimacy of any political figure who has spent decades in exile. A more sceptical view holds that organised opposition within Iran has been largely dismantled by decades of repression.

From this perspective, the absence of a coherent alternative could create the conditions for instability should the regime weaken dramatically.

This uncertainty creates a paradox.

Many Iranians may desire political change, yet fear the instability that might accompany the collapse of the current system.

The prospect of disorder can therefore slow political momentum and, in some cases, enable regimes under pressure to reconstitute themselves. It also explains why diplomatic appeals for negotiation may appear disconnected from the strategic reality of the conflict.

Once military operations begin targeting the highest levels of leadership, the confrontation moves beyond ordinary disputes. For the regime, the struggle becomes one of survival.

Under such circumstances, entering negotiations can appear indistinguishable from accepting defeat. The priority becomes internal consolidation rather than external dialogue.

There's a blame game

Perhaps the most destabilising element in such operations is not the immediate loss of leaders but the questions they raise about internal vulnerability.

Strikes that successfully target high-level meetings suggest either exceptional intelligence capabilities or the presence of informants within the system itself. In authoritarian regimes, the mere suspicion of infiltration can be corrosive.

Trust within the leadership becomes fragile. Senior figures begin to question the loyalty of colleagues and subordinates. Decision-making becomes slower and more defensive as individuals prioritise personal survival.

History shows that many authoritarian systems do not collapse primarily because of external pressure. Instead, they weaken when internal cohesion begins to erode.

The decisive question

For this reason, the critical issue is not simply the removal of key leaders. The decisive question is whether the Islamic Republic can maintain institutional, military and psychological cohesion after such losses.

If the regime’s elites retain confidence in one another and successfully reconstruct their command structures, the system may endure despite the shock. If, however, suspicion spreads within the leadership and the chain of authority begins to fracture, the consequences could be far more profound. In that scenario, the most consequential battlefield may not lie outside Iran’s borders but within the regime itself. This article is based on writing by François Chauvancy and Jean-Marie Montail for Atlantico.fr

In the United Kingdom, the regular army has fallen from 110,000 personnel in 2010 to 73,000 in 2024. British Defence Minister Al Khan has warned that the army, at its current size, could be depleted within six months to a year in a major conflict .

Russia, despite facing similar demographic pressures, has intensified overseas recruitment. 

According to Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha, about 1,400 African nationals are fighting alongside Russian forces. While some joined for ideological reasons, many were reportedly drawn by higher pay amid limited job prospects at home.

Africa’s labor force is projected to expand by 541 million over the next 25 years, even as the European Union ’s workforce is expected to shrink by 24 million. 

Jeffers said the deployment aims to provide “the security Gaza needs for a future of prosperity and enduring peace.”

Number of troops

President Prabowo Subianto, attending the meeting, said Indonesia would deploy troops within two months, starting with an advance team to assess risks and plan operations. The country has pledged up to 8,000 troops, the largest contingent of any ISF member.

Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Sugiono explained that the deputy commander role reflects both the size of the Indonesian contingent and the military’s extensive peacekeeping experience. 

“Indonesian troops are also the largest there, this deputy commander for operations is also something that honors and appreciates Indonesia's track record," Sugiono said. 

The ISF will operate under a U.S.-led Board of Peace. Indonesia’s forces will be deployed across Gaza’s five sectors — Rafah, Khan Yunis, Deir el-Balah, Gaza City, and Northern Gaza — with an initial focus on Rafah.

Humanitarian focus, not combat

While Indonesia leads the largest deployment after the U.S., its troops are assigned strictly to humanitarian and stabilization tasks, not combat. The government has warned it will withdraw if the ISF deviates from agreed mandates.

Other countries contributing troops include Morocco, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, and Albania, while Egypt and Jordan will train Gaza’s local police. The ISF’s long-term plan calls for 20,000 troops and 12,000 police officers on the ground.

The Board of Peace also aims to oversee Gaza’s reconstruction and demilitarization, a plan opposed by Hamas, which has rejected foreign intervention and disarmament.

Trump highlighted Indonesia’s role during the meeting, praising Prabowo for his commitment and leadership. Members of the board pledged $7 billion toward Gaza relief, a fraction of the estimated $70 billion needed to rebuild after years of conflict.

Nearly 200 of them were from Southeast Asia, according to data secured by Hatzlacha, an Israeli volunteer emergency medical service NGO. The list includes 111 Filipinos, 71 Thais, four Vietnamese, two Singaporeans and one Indonesian recorded as serving in the Israeli military.

Across Asia more broadly, the numbers are also notable: 201 Indian passport holders, 76 Japanese, nine each from Hong Kong and South Korea, seven from China, three from Taiwan , and two each from Nepal and Sri Lanka.

There have been no reported convictions of dual nationals over Gaza-related crimes so far, though complaints have been filed in several countries.

In Singapore, the Ministry of Home Affairs said it was aware of reports that two Singaporeans fought with the IDF but had no substantiated information confirming this. Singapore does not allow dual citizenship for adults.

Indonesia ’s foreign ministry said it could not immediately confirm the reported case of an Indonesian national but would coordinate with relevant agencies. 

Thailand , which permits dual nationality, does not criminalise foreign military service in general circumstances.

Does your country have a national fighting for Israel?

General Waker said the army had carried out its assigned responsibilities during the election period and was now awaiting instructions from the incoming administration.

The country has returned to democratic rule, he said, adding that the military would return to the barracks as soon as directed by the new government.

However, he noted that some troops would remain deployed temporarily to help maintain law and order until the police fully regain control of security operations.

This reflects an overwhelming acceptance of the recent polls ’ results, in which the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) won a decisive majority, securing 209 of 300 seats and giving it a two-thirds mandate to form the next government.

“The people of Bangladesh accept the result,” Bangladeshi journalist Samiur Rahman Sazzad told Global South World , dismissing criticisms from Hasina and her party in exile that the elections were a “well-planned farce” and were not inclusive.

After tight election security

Bangladesh’s army had been deployed nationwide in support of civilian authorities during the election, amid heightened political tensions. Additional forces sent out during the period have already been scaled back, according to meeting sources.

In his address, General Waker thanked army personnel for what he described as their professionalism and strong sense of responsibility while carrying out election duties.

“Whatever was necessary in the interest of the people has been completed,” he said. 

Referring to the military’s role in stabilising the political environment, he said the country and its people would remember the army’s service.

He also stressed the importance of maintaining discipline within the ranks, urging commanders to uphold the chain of command and sustain morale among troops.

The army chief cautioned personnel to remain vigilant against misinformation and disinformation, an issue that has become increasingly prominent during politically sensitive periods.

Bangladesh’s military has historically played a significant role during periods of political uncertainty, but General Waker’s remarks signal an intention to step back once the elected civilian leadership formally assumes office.

Images circulating online show the armoured vehicles being moved from the port area under escort, later proceeding through the city in an organised convoy formation.

In late January 2026, reports confirmed that Turkish F-16 fighter jets landed at Aden Adde International Airport.

The deployment marked Türkiye’s first forward stationing of manned combat aircraft in Somalia. The jets are believed to support counter-terrorism operations against Al-Shabaab and to enhance deterrence and rapid-response capabilities.

Prior to the jet deployment, Türkiye delivered three T129 ATAK attack helicopters to Somalia during 2024 and 2025 under an expanded defence cooperation agreement. Somali pilots reportedly completed training programs ahead of the transfer.

The helicopters strengthened Somalia’s close air support and counter-insurgency capacity.

Türkiye’s military assistance to Somalia began intensifying in 2020, when Ankara donated Kirpi armoured personnel carriers and military transport vehicles to the Somali National Army.

Additional shipments between 2021 and 2025 included MRAP vehicles, logistical trucks, ammunition, heavy weapons systems, and command-and-control equipment.

From armoured vehicle donations in 2020 to helicopter transfers in 2024–2025, and tank and fighter jet deployments in 2026, Türkiye’s military engagement with Somalia has progressed in structured phases.

The timeline reflects an expansion from mobility and training support to advanced air power and heavy armour, positioning Türkiye as one of Somalia’s significant long-term defence partners.

The Philippines and the United States conducted a joint sea patrol, signalling a firm position on maritime sovereignty at a time of heightened regional pressure. The patrol reflects Manila’s continued alignment with Washington in asserting its role in contested waters and reinforcing defence cooperation. This development is framed as a strong stance on the Philippines’ maritime rights and security posture.

Senate leaders push for a ceasefire in the China-Philippines diplomatic dispute

Philippine Senate leaders called for a ceasefire amid an ongoing diplomatic dispute between China and the Philippines. The intervention suggests concern within the country’s political leadership over escalation and the need for de-escalatory measures in regional diplomacy. The issue highlights how maritime and foreign policy tensions are now being debated at the highest legislative level.

House panel dismisses impeachment complaints against President Marcos Jr.

A House panel dismissed impeachment complaints filed against President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., effectively shutting down a major political challenge at this stage. The dismissal underscores the President’s continued institutional support within Congress and signals the difficulty of advancing impeachment efforts in the current balance of power.

Major raid exposes illegal cigarette factory tied to politicians and trafficking

Authorities carried out a major raid uncovering an illegal cigarette factory , reportedly linked to politicians and connected with human trafficking. The case highlights the intersection of organised crime, illicit manufacturing, and political protection networks, raising broader concerns about governance and enforcement capacity.

Comelec strained by budget shortfall ahead of Antipolo special election

The Commission on Elections (Comelec) is facing a budget shortfall in preparation for a special election in Antipolo, triggered by the death of a lawmaker . The situation points to logistical and financial vulnerabilities in election administration, even for single-district contests, and raises questions about institutional readiness for broader electoral demands.

They said the change is meant to adjust to " international standards.” 

Since the SDF was established in 1954, Japan has deliberately used rank names that differ from those of its pre-1945 military. The distinction was designed to signal a clean break from the wartime past and reinforce the force’s defensive role under Japan’s pacifist constitution.

Under the current system, Japanese rank names do not match the old imperial terminology, even though their English translations already correspond to standard military ranks used overseas. 

For example, the SDF rank equivalent to a colonel is “issa,” or “first field officer,” which replaced the imperial-era term “taisa.” While the Japanese titles were changed after the war , their English equivalents have long matched international military ranks.

Any change to rank names would require amendments to the Self-Defense Forces Law and approval by parliament.

Pusback

Inside the Defence Ministry and the SDF, however, the proposal has been met with scepticism .

Some officials noted that reviving terminology associated with the imperial military risks complicating recruitment efforts and unsettling public perceptions, especially among younger generations.

Particular resistance has focused on lower enlisted ranks such as ittohei (private first class) and nitohei (private). Critics argue that these terms carry outdated or negative connotations tied to Japan’s wartime army.

What’s more unsettling is that the debate has also drawn attention from Japan’s neighbours. 

China and North Korea have criticised the proposal as further evidence of Tokyo drifting away from its postwar pacifist stance.

A growing number of countries are showing interest in the JF-17 Thunder fighter aircraft, a jet developed jointly by Pakistan Aeronautical Complex and China’s Chengdu Aircraft Corporation. Reports suggest that at least 13 nations are exploring potential purchases, including states involved in active conflicts such as Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Nigeria, alongside others across Africa and the Middle East like Ethiopia, Morocco and Libya.

The JF-17 first entered service in 2007, and Pakistan has since rolled out increasingly advanced variants as part of a broader push toward military self-reliance and entry into the global arms market.

The aircraft is powered by a Russia n engine, but the rest of the jet, from its airframe to its avionics, is largely produced in China and Pakistan. While it is not a fifth generation fighter like the US F-35, China’s J-35 or Russia’s Su-57, the JF-17 is considered a 4.5-generation aircraft. It features modern radar systems and beyond visual range combat capabilities, although it lacks true stealth and can still be detected by radar. Comparable aircraft in this category include France’s Rafale, Sweden’s Gripen and the Eurofighter Typhoon.

What makes the JF-17 stand out is its cost. At roughly 30 million dollars per unit, it is around a third of the price of a Rafale and significantly cheaper than most Western alternatives. For many air forces, affordability is only part of the appeal - Western-supplied aircraft often come with restrictions on how they can be used, which weapons they can carry, and where they can be deployed. In some cases, suppliers can even limit operational use during conflicts or require oversight of training and maintenance.

By contrast, the JF-17 offers buyers greater freedom of use. That sense of strategic autonomy is a major selling point for countries that want fewer strings attached to their military capabilities. The financial advantages also extend beyond the initial purchase. Long-term costs for maintenance, upgrades and armaments can exceed the price of the aircraft itself, and here again the JF-17 undercuts many Western competitors.

This matters because many countries are still flying ageing fourth-generation jets designed in the 1980s. They need affordable upgrades to remain credible in modern air combat, even though most air forces rarely see real combat against a comparable enemy. Jets are counted, pilots are trained, and upgrades are tested, but actual high-intensity aerial warfare is uncommon.

One rare exception came in May 2025, following Indian missile strikes in response to a terrorist attack in Kashmir. A large-scale aerial engagement followed, involving more than 100 aircraft from both sides, operating almost entirely at beyond visual range distances. Pakistan claimed it shot down several Indian aircraft, including Rafales, although the details remain disputed and India has acknowledged only limited losses. The JF-17 itself was not credited with the reported kills, which were attributed to Chinese J-10CE fighters, but its presence in such a high-profile confrontation significantly raised its international profile.

Pakistan today ranks among the world ’s top ten arms exporters, though fighter jet exports remain relatively small. The JF-17 has been delivered in limited numbers to countries such as Nigeria, Myanmar and Azerbaijan. While these orders are modest, interest is growing, and the aircraft has become the flagship of Pakistan’s military industrial strategy.

By comparison, the United States has exported more than 1,500 F-16s worldwide and continues to sell the F-35. France has sold hundreds of Rafales, Sweden has exported Gripens across multiple continents, and Russia has long supplied MiG and Sukhoi jets to partners such as India, Algeria and Vietnam. Against these giants, the JF-17 is still a minor player in raw numbers.

Yet its significance goes beyond sales figures. The JF-17 represents a low-cost, politically independent and technically capable alternative for countries seeking to modernise their air forces without external constraints. More than just a fighter jet, it is Pakistan’s statement of ambition and an emerging symbol of its influence in the global defence market.

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World Reframed is produced in London by Global South World, part of the Impactum Group. Its editors are Duncan Hooper and Ismail Akwei.

ISSN 2978-4891

The assessment, dated 29 January, identifies the deployment of the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group and supporting assets as having "removed a key constraint that previously limited Washington's ability to act", making the threat of intervention "materially more credible" than earlier in the month.

Any strikes would likely target military and nuclear facilities rather than attempt to overthrow the Iranian government, with probable targets including Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps installations, missile and drone infrastructure, air defence systems, command centres, and potentially nuclear-linked facilities.

The warning comes as Iran faces what the assessment describes as "its most serious internal security crisis in several years", following nationwide protests that erupted on 28 December in response to severe economic deterioration. What began as demonstrations over economic grievances rapidly escalated into direct challenges to government authority.

Ending the blackout

The most violent phase of the crackdown occurred on 8-9 January during a nationwide internet shutdown, when security forces used live ammunition in multiple cities. Whilst exact death tolls remain impossible to verify independently, activist networks, medical sources and diaspora groups commonly cite figures ranging from several thousand to tens of thousands killed, with some estimates exceeding 30,000 deaths nationwide during January.

The assessment notes these figures should be treated cautiously but states there is "broad agreement that casualty levels are significantly higher than in recent protest cycles and that lethal force was used systematically".

A critical factor in the intervention timeline is Iran's partial restoration of internet connectivity, which began on 28 January. Intelligence analysts expect this will result in the rapid release of previously suppressed footage and testimony documenting the killings, particularly from the deadliest period.

"Once this material circulates, it is likely to intensify international outrage and domestic political pressure on the US administration, narrowing the space for continued restraint," the assessment states.

US options narrow

US President Donald Trump issued a public warning on 2 January that the United States would intervene if Iranian authorities killed protesters, introducing explicit external pressure into the crisis. The assessment suggests this has created "a difficult strategic corner" for the president.

"He has publicly framed the crisis as one involving mass repression and has repeatedly signalled that the United States would not stand by if protesters were killed," the document notes. "Earlier arguments for caution, notably limited US assets in the region, no longer apply."

The assessment warns that symbolic measures alone, such as statements, condemnations or incremental sanctions , are "unlikely to be viewed as sufficient", significantly raising the probability that Washington will demonstrate resolve through action.

Iran's deterrence strategy

Iran is expected to emphasise deterrence whilst attempting to avoid moves that would immediately justify a large-scale American strike. This includes heightened rhetoric, internal hardening and proxy signalling designed to widen the perceived cost of intervention.

However, the assessment warns that if Iran is struck first or judges an attack is underway, direct responses including missile or drone strikes on American bases, naval assets or regional partners "become much more likely, not just plausible".

Most likely Iranian retaliation targets include US military bases across the Gulf, particularly Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar and facilities in Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain and potentially the UAE and Turkey. Direct retaliation against Israel is also considered a realistic possibility if Tehran perceives Israeli involvement.

Senior Iranian clerics have warned that American-linked investments in the region could become targets, signalling a willingness to expand beyond purely military objectives to economic pressure points.

The Houthis in Yemen remain one of Iran's most effective tools for applying pressure, with their ability to threaten maritime traffic in the Red Sea allowing Tehran to impose economic disruption without direct confrontation. The assessment notes that even the threat of renewed Houthi activity can disrupt shipping routes, raise insurance premiums and affect global supply chains.

Regional implications

The document warns that Iran-aligned militias in Iraq represent "Tehran's most flexible and immediately usable response option", having already issued warnings they would act if Iran is attacked. However, even limited attacks on American facilities could prompt swift retaliation, potentially drawing Iraq into wider confrontation.

Hezbollah in Lebanon has publicly aligned itself with Tehran but appears constrained by Lebanon's economic struggles and the risk of overwhelming Israeli retaliation. The assessment notes that Hezbollah's involvement "would mark a sharp transition from contained escalation to regional conflict ".

Gulf Cooperation Council states are expected to seek to avoid involvement or visible enablement of American strikes, though heightened force protection measures, airspace restrictions and operational disruption are likely. The assessment references strikes last year involving both Israel and Iran on Qatari territory as having demonstrated that Gulf states are not insulated from escalation.

Cities Under Siege

Inside Iran, Tehran remains the centre of gravity for both political control and security operations, with checkpoints, patrols and rapid-response units highly visible throughout the capital. Mashhad, Iran's second-largest city and a key religious and transport hub, has emerged as a major pressure point, with protests met with firm enforcement even in this traditionally conservative area.

Western Kurdish-majority regions, including Sanandaj and surrounding areas, remain among the most volatile, with security operations particularly heavy and marked by frequent confrontations and heavier weapons use.

The assessment concludes that the risk of miscalculation is elevated, noting that proxy activity, maritime disruption or incidents involving American forces "could quickly escalate beyond Tehran's intended thresholds, particularly once US assets are forward-positioned and operating at high readiness".

He claimed the move was intended to “hush up” alleged abuses committed by the Congolese army and groups fighting alongside it, including local militias known as Wazalendo.

The allegations come following reports of renewed violence , looting and civilian displacement in Uvira following the withdrawal of AFC/M23 fighters from the city on January 15. After the rebels left, government troops, Wazalendo militias and other allied forces entered the city.

Local residents have reported gunfire and widespread looting, with homes, public buildings and places of worship targeted. Some residents, particularly from the Banyamulenge community, have fled the area fearing further violence.

AFC/M23 said it withdrew from Uvira as a gesture of good faith and called on the United Nations to deploy a neutral force to protect civilians and place the city under international responsibility. The Congolese government is yet to respond.

According to the figures shown on the above map, Portuguese respondents top the list at roughly 70% in favour of a common European army, while only Finland appears below the 50 % mark.

Countries across central and southern Europe also show solid majorities supporting an EU-wide defence force. What this really means is a growing appetite among citizens for greater strategic autonomy rather than outsourcing security entirely to external allies.

These trends reflect broader debates in European capitals about defence cooperation and self-reliance. A 2025 poll showed widespread support for deeper EU-level defence cooperation and increased defence spending, with some surveys reporting that more than three-quarters of EU citizens favour stronger joint defence initiatives.

The shift in opinion comes at a time of heightened geopolitical tension. Russia ’s war in Ukraine continues to shape attitudes toward security in Europe, and leaders from several EU states have publicly discussed the idea that the bloc should be able to defend itself independently if necessary.

That debate has taken on new urgency in light of recent friction between Europe and the United States over Greenland, the world’s largest island, controlled by Denmark but strategically located between North America and Europe.

U.S. President Donald Trump reignited discussion about acquiring Greenland, arguing the island’s location is vital to U.S. security interests in the Arctic and North Atlantic. Analysts note that Greenland sits astride key missile defence and early warning routes, making it a flashpoint in great-power competition.

Greenland’s government and Denmark have firmly rejected any takeover, and large “Hands off Greenland” protests erupted in Nuuk and Copenhagen in early 2026 in defence of the island’s sovereignty.

Donald Trump, on the other hand, has announced that eight European countries will face new import tariffs of 10% starting in February and to rise to 25% by June unless Denmark agrees to sell Greenland to the United States, a move he argues is critical for American national security.

The threatened tariffs target Denmark, Norway, Sweden, France, Germany, the UK, the Netherlands and Finland, and come amid Trump’s broader push to gain control or influence over the strategically important Arctic territory.

The EU is yet to convene to plan a countermeasure.

On 3 January 2026, U.S. forces launched what the White House dubbed Operation Absolute Resolve, an air and special forces mission in Venezuela that resulted in the capture and removal of President Nicolás Maduro from power.

The South American leader has since been flown to the United States to face federal charges related to alleged narco-terrorism and weapons offences. He is set to appear in a Manhattan court on Monday, January 5.

This marks the most forceful direct intervention by the United States in the region since the late 20th century, and it has triggered immediate global reaction.

Leaders across Latin America , Europe and beyond have condemned the operation as a violation of international law and a threat to regional sovereignty, while some U.S. lawmakers argue the White House bypassed Congress in authorising the action.

Since World War II, the U.S. has intervened in multiple South American countries. Venezuela now stands alongside Peru (1963, 1990), Bolivia (1971, 2019), Chile (1964, 1973), Paraguay (1954, 1989), Argentina (1976), Uruguay (1973), and Brazil (1964) in episodes where U.S. military pressure, support or direct action shaped national politics.

Those earlier episodes include Cold War-era coups and covert operations, often linked with U.S. fears of Soviet influence and domestic leftist movements.

One notorious example was Operation Condor, a coordinated campaign in the 1970s by several South American dictatorships (Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia, Brazil), which received tacit U.S. backing and targeted dissidents across borders.

The Trump administration has framed its 2026 intervention as part of a broader campaign against drug trafficking and threats to U.S. security, building on months of strikes against drug smuggling infrastructure and naval blockades.

Together, these crisis zones will shape migration flows, global security , trade routes, and diplomatic alignments well beyond their borders.

Sudan

Sudan remains the most severe humanitarian emergency globally. The civil war that erupted in April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces has devastated the country, displacing millions and pushing large populations toward famine. In the last year, the conflict showed little sign of resolution, with fighting increasingly fragmented and spilling into neighbouring states such as Chad, South Sudan, and Ethiopia. This year, the country could risk sliding further toward de facto partition, a scenario that would entrench instability across the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea corridor.

Yemen

In Yemen, the conflict is evolving rather than ending. While large-scale fighting has reduced in some areas, the country is increasingly divided between Houthi-controlled territories in the north and rival factions in the south backed by regional powers. This fragmentation weakens prospects for national reconciliation and carries global implications due to Yemen’s proximity to vital Red Sea shipping lanes. As maritime security concerns grow, Yemen’s instability in 2026 will remain tightly linked to regional geopolitics and global trade.

Myanmar

Myanmar enters 2026 locked in a protracted civil war following the 2021 military coup. Armed resistance groups now control significant territory, while the junta struggles to govern beyond major urban centres. Planned or proposed elections under these conditions risk deepening Myanmar’s legitimacy crisis rather than resolving it. The humanitarian toll continues to rise, with millions displaced and neighbouring countries such as Thailand, China, and Bangladesh absorbing the spillover effects.

DR Congo

In eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, violence persists despite diplomatic efforts to stabilise the region. Armed groups, including M23, continue to challenge state authority, exploiting ethnic tensions, especially in Goma and competition over mineral resources. Peace agreements reached last year still face serious implementation challenges , and failure to consolidate them in 2026 could destabilise the wider Great Lakes region, where conflict has long crossed borders and drawn in neighbouring states.

Nigeria

Nigeria’s crisis heading into 2026 is defined by overlapping insurgency, criminal violence, and worsening economic pressure, with jihadist groups such as Boko Haram and ISWAP continuing attacks across the northeast and northwest. In the Middle Belt and parts of the north, violence has increasingly targeted Christian communities, with deadly attacks in late 2025 killing dozens of civilians in Benue and Plateau states, particularly around the Christmas period.

The situation escalated internationally when the United States carried out airstrikes on December 24–25, 2025, hitting ISIS-linked camps in northwest Nigeria at the request of the Nigerian government. While the strikes disrupted militant operations, analysts warn that without addressing governance failures, poverty, and local grievances, Nigeria’s insecurity is likely to persist and deepen in 2026.

Taiwan vs. China

Beyond active war zones, strategic flashpoints are also reshaping risk in the Global South. Rising tensions between China and Taiwan, while centred in East Asia, carry global consequences that will be felt acutely across developing economies. Any escalation would disrupt trade , shipping routes, and semiconductor supply chains, forcing many Global South countries, deeply tied to both Chinese and Western economic systems, to navigate difficult diplomatic and economic choices.

These two countries join a host of others, like Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali and Gabon, among others.

Madagascar

After weeks of violent and deadly protests powered by Madagascan Gen Z over alleged corruption, the country's Army Personnel Administration Centre (CAPSAT) seized the sovereign power led by Colonel Michael Randrianirina . The Gen Z demonstrations grew beyond service issues into a broader rejection of the leadership of then-President Andry Rajoelina, who became the world's youngest head of state at 34 through a coup in 2009. The situation reached a tipping point when an elite military unit defected and joined the protesters, refusing orders to fire on civilians, effectively cutting Rajoelina off from core state security support.

This shift in military allegiance significantly undermined his ability to remain in power. Facing explicit threats to his life amid the rebellion and the loss of military backing, Rajoelina left Madagascar for a “safe location,” later confirmed to be outside the country, while claiming an attempted illegal power grab was underway. Colonel Michael Randrianirina has been in power since declaring a two-year transition exercise.

Guinea-Bissau

Army officers in Guinea-Bissau announced on Wednesday, November 26, that they had deposed President Umaro Sissoco Embaló , accusing him of mismanaging the political crisis and undermining democratic stability. The officers declared that the existing government had been dissolved and pledged to restore order and constitutional governance, though details about a transition timeline were not immediately clear. The announcement came amid heightened tensions following contested elections on the 23rd and reflected longstanding military influence over the country’s political landscape.

On the same day, sustained gunfire erupted near the national election commission headquarters amidst tensions over a tightly contested presidential election, with residents fleeing the area as shots were heard near multiple government buildings. The outbreak of gunfire occurred just as provisional results were expected. However, protesters took to the streets in Guinea-Bissau on Friday, December 12, to denounce the military coup and demand the restoration of democratic governance , highlighting deep public frustration with the political instability that has plagued the country.

Benin could have become the third country, but for the swift intervention of Nigeria and the country's loyalist forces that protected President Patrice Talon's sovereignty. Armed soldiers went on national television on December 7 to declare they had taken power in a coup , but by evening, the situation had calmed, and everywhere was clear.

Since August 2020, Africa has experienced ten coups.

The boys, aged between 11 and 15, disappeared during a military security operation in the southern neighbourhood of Las Malvinas on 8 December 2024. Witness testimony and evidence presented at trial indicated that the children were detained by soldiers and later found dead in a rural area outside Guayaquil, with severe injuries prior to their deaths.

Five additional soldiers received shorter sentences of 2.5 years for their cooperation with prosecutors, while one officer was acquitted. The trial, which followed months of investigation and international attention, highlighted both procedural scrutiny and demands for accountability from civil society groups and rights organisations.

The convictions come amid wider debate in Ecuador over the use of military forces in civilian security operations. The case has drawn attention beyond the country’s borders, underscoring broader global concerns about human rights and the conduct of armed forces in internal security roles. Observers say the ruling could have implications for how other nations address allegations of abuse during counter‑crime operations.

Guo described Japan’s comments as unfounded and hostile, accusing Tokyo of smearing China’s legitimate defence development. He said China’s record on peace and security compares favourably with that of other major powers and argued that Japan’s own history of military aggression undermines its credibility on such matters.

“As a country with a history of aggression, Japan has no right to comment on China’s defence expenditure,” Guo said. He added that the growth of China’s defence budget is lawful and justified, aimed at addressing security challenges, protecting national interests and fulfilling the responsibilities of a major country on the global stage.

The exchange comes amid renewed diplomatic tensions between Beijing and Tokyo. On Monday, Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi reiterated Japan’s position on Taiwan during a parliamentary session, referencing the 1972 Joint Statement that established diplomatic relations between the two countries. Motegi said the Taiwan issue should be resolved peacefully through dialogue.

China rejected that interpretation, accusing Japan of selectively citing the agreement and of attempting to create obstacles on sensitive issues while misleading the public and avoiding responsibility.

China currently maintains the world’s largest active-duty military, with more than 2 million personnel, compared with India’s approximately 1.45 million.

However, analysts at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) note that raw troop numbers tell only part of the story. China has increasingly emphasised modernisation, restructuring its forces to prioritise mobility, joint operations, and advanced technology rather than sheer manpower.

Air power remains one of the clearest areas of divergence. China operates more than 6,000 aircraft and helicopters, giving it a significant advantage over India’s fleet of just under 4,000. This gap has widened as Beijing invests heavily in fifth-generation fighter jets such as the J-20, long-range bombers, and unmanned aerial vehicles.

India, however, slightly exceeds China in the number of tanks and armoured combat vehicles, reflecting its strategic focus on defending long land borders, particularly along the contested Line of Actual Control (LAC). Since deadly clashes in 2020, both countries have reinforced troop deployments, infrastructure, and heavy equipment in high-altitude regions, underscoring how unresolved border disputes continue to shape military planning.

China, however, maintains a clear advantage in artillery and naval power. With more than 7,000 artillery systems, including long-range rocket launchers, Beijing has developed significant firepower designed for rapid escalation scenarios.

At sea, China’s navy has become the largest in the world by number of vessels, surpassing 370 ships. This expansion includes aircraft carriers, advanced destroyers, and a growing fleet of submarines, enabling China to project power well beyond its coastline.

India’s navy, while smaller, plays a strategically vital role. Positioned along major global shipping lanes, it serves as a key stabilising force in the Indian Ocean, where a significant share of global trade and energy supplies passes each year.

India’s maritime posture has gained additional importance as China increases its naval presence in the region, prompting closer cooperation between India and partners such as the United States, Japan, and Australia through frameworks like the Quad.

These military comparisons come amid broader shifts in global defence priorities. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute reports that China and India rank among the world’s top military spenders, with budgets increasingly directed toward missiles, cyber capabilities, space systems, and artificial intelligence rather than traditional force expansion.

How the regional drug trade works

Colombia remains the world's largest producer and exporter of cocaine, with an estimated 80% of the global supply originating within its borders.

The nature of the illicit industry has evolved over the years, challenging the efforts of local and international law enforcement

Fentanyl vs. cocaine

Another key point missing in the discussions, and especially Donald Trump's misleading claim that each drug boat destroyed saves 25,000 American lives, is that the drugs causing America's crisis are not coming from South America. Fentanyl, produced mainly in Mexico, not cocaine, originating in Colombia and Venezuela, is the most lethal substance.

And indeed, the crisis did not begin with drug gangs. Americans were hooked by their own big businesses as pharmaceutical companies co-opted doctors to prescribe highly addictive opiates. As Jorge Rodriguez, president of Venezuela's National Assembly, put it: "If they (the USA) want to bomb something, they should bomb the headquarters of Perdue Pharma."

Maduro and the "Cartel of the Suns"

The Trump administration has labelled President Maduro the "drug dealer in chief," alleging he heads an organisation known as the "Cartel of the Suns." While the Maduro government certainly has links to the drug trade, describing it as a centrally commanded, organised cartel is misleading.

The Venezuelan state is characterised by extensive corruption, with local officials and governors taking cuts from the trade. And the links between the Venezuelan government and transnational crime groups are well documented.

However, the US government's actions - such as the recent pardoning of former Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernández, who was convicted of drug trafficking in the US- underscore that the real issue is that Maduro is an ideological foe of the administration, not necessarily a unique threat in the drug trade.

Drugs as a livelihood

Much of the debate around the attacks on boats has centred around the question of whether those on board were drug traffickers or simple fishermen. It's impossible to know, but the difference is also not as stark as it might seem. In poor coastal regions, the drug trade is a significant part of the economy, along with agriculture and fishing.

Under most legal codes, a drug dealer or a fisherman would have the same status in law unless convicted in court: innocent.

This is where Colombian president Gustavo Petro, not a natural ally of Maduro, meets his neighbour ideologically. Both argue that the law is being ignored, and their citizens have lost their right to a trial.

Next steps

The US seizure of an oil tanker off the Venezuelan coast marks a significant escalation in the pressure exerted on Maduro. And while the Venezuelan president has already offered to resign, his terms were clearly not acceptable in Washington. Tensions are set to rise, and the people of Colombia and Venezuela, regardless of any links to the drug trade, will feel more pain.

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World Reframed is produced in London by Global South World, part of the Impactum Group. Its editors are Duncan Hooper and Ismail Akwei.

ISSN 2978-4891

“I think that relationship is really important to them. They've had a long, friendly relationship with Iran, both in terms of, you know, sanctions busting Iranian oil and and as well as the Iranians have a very important defence relationship with Venezuela,” she said.

Flynn noted that Iran has taken on a larger military role in the country. 

“In fact, there's an Iranian-built and run drone factory in Venezuela,” she said, pointing to growing cooperation between the two governments.

Iran-backed groups are also operating inside Venezuela, Flynn noted, citing the Kudz Force, Hezbollah, as well as Iranian special forces.

She argued that this activity could have direct consequences for Washington, as the issue “is very close to our homeland and having Iran have that kind of a presence in Venezuela is not helpful to us.”

US officials have long monitored ties between Tehran and Caracas, but Flynn’s comments highlight renewed concern over how Iran may be using Venezuela to expand its influence closer to American territory.

Watch the full interview:

“I think the Maduro government is more viable than people think, even though, of course, the winner of the last election was not Maduro and the winner, Machado, has just been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize,” she said. 

Her remarks come as international pressure on Caracas continues. Flynn argued that assessments of Venezuela’s political future must focus on what keeps Maduro in place. 

“When you look at a government, you have to look at the institutions and the sources of support that Maduro does have,” she said. 

Chief among these, she noted, is the armed forces. “The military is a key. And as far as we can tell, the military still supports him,” Flynn added. 

She said Maduro has maintained that loyalty through careful patronage. “And he’s, you know, like all good dictators, is very careful to make sure the military gets paid regularly.”

For now, Flynn believes those dynamics make any sudden collapse unlikely. While the opposition and much of the international community insist political change is necessary, the pillars of state power appear to remain aligned behind Maduro — at least for the moment.

Watch the full interview:

President John Mahama, addressing the tragedy, described the deaths as "a heartbreaking loss for the entire nation."

“The tragic news is that I have been informed by the military that six young women, who simply sought an opportunity to serve their nation, lost their lives in this heartbreaking incident. We are praying for the 12 others who remain in critical condition,” Mahama said.

Recruitment exercise suspended

In response to the tragedy, President Mahama has directed the Armed Forces to temporarily suspend the ongoing nationwide recruitment exercise.

“I have asked the leadership of the Armed Forces to temporarily halt the recruitment exercise and conduct a full investigation. We must take a fresh approach to ensure such unfortunate incidents do not happen again,” he added .

The Ghana Armed Forces confirmed the incident in an official statement, expressing deep regret and announcing the suspension of the Accra leg of the recruitment exercise.

"The Ghana Armed Forces deeply regrets to inform the general public that due to the fatal incident that occurred at the El-Wak Sports Stadium this morning... the exercise in Greater Accra has been temporarily suspended. This is to allow for additional measures to ensure a seamless exercise," the statement read in part.

A Board of Inquiry has been constituted to investigate the events that led to the stampede.

Calls for safer recruitment measures

President Mahama emphasised the need for improved crowd management and safety planning for all future public recruitment or national mobilisation events.

Meanwhile, the injured receive treatment at the 37 Military Hospital in Accra.

The military has assured the public that recruitment activities in the remaining 15 regions will continue under enhanced safety protocols.

Lavrov stressed that Russia, along with state arms exporter Rosoboronexport, is working with “friendly nations” to bolster their sovereignty and reduce reliance on Western countries.

He criticised former colonial powers, claiming many states remain economically dependent despite gaining political independence.

“Many countries that are now freeing themselves from the neocolonial dependence of their former metropolises... still remain economically dependent on the West,” Lavrov stated, adding that Russia’s defence cooperation helps partners build “full-fledged, independent statehood.”

Lavrov also referenced previous cooperation with NATO, recalling that the alliance once relied on Russian helicopters for operations in Afghanistan before opting for its own hardware.

His comments come after Rostec CEO Sergei Chemezov announced earlier this week that Rosoboronexport has supplied weapons to more than 120 countries over the past 25 years, with export deliveries exceeding $230 billion.

According to the graphic, Russia reportedly fields around 1.32 million active‐service soldiers compared to Ukraine’s approximately 900,000.

Russia also claims roughly 8,163 aircraft and helicopters versus Ukraine’s 608; around 137,277 tanks and combat vehicles against Ukraine’s 20,034; some 16,678 artillery systems compared to Ukraine’s 1,552; and approximately 758 naval vessels and submarines versus 125 for Ukraine.

These numbers align broadly with independent assessments. For example, the Council on Foreign Relations notes that Russia retains a “sizable advantage” in both personnel and equipment, even though the war has reached a protracted stalemate.

Meanwhile, comparative data tables highlight the larger scale of Russia’s arsenal and reserve forces in a conventional fight.

Yet the war is proving that raw numbers alone don’t guarantee success. Ukrainian forces have shown resilience through strategic use of Western‐supplied systems, terrain advantages and asymmetric tactics.

A recent study by the Dupuy Institute indicates that although Russia may have brought approximately 450,000 troops into Ukraine, Ukraine has kept up with a ground strength of nearly 575,000 when factoring in its reserves.

On the global front, this imbalance and war of attrition carry significant implications: Europe is increasingly urged to step up its defence commitments as the U.S. gradually reassesses its role in Ukraine’s support.

Organisers said that ADEX 2025 drew a record 600 companies from 35 countries, all showcasing advanced defence systems, drones , and aerospace technologies. 

The biennial exhibition ran its public days from October 17 to 19, featuring aerial displays and static aircraft exhibits. Business-to-business meetings, indoor exhibitions, and conferences will continue from October 20 to 24 in Goyang, Gyeonggi Province.

The annual APEC forum will take place at the end of October. South Korea will host the summit for the second time, having done so in 2005.

Their cases have been transferred to military prosecutors, marking the beginning of likely criminal proceedings.

General He Weidong was among the most powerful figures in China’s military hierarchy. As Vice Chairman of the CMC and a Politburo member, he was involved in strategic command, including operations related to Taiwan . His disappearance from public view months ago had sparked speculation, but Friday’s announcement delivered the first official confirmation of his downfall.

The Defence Ministry said the expelled officials were implicated in “extremely serious crimes involving exceptionally large sums of money,” though no specific allegations were disclosed. The purge includes leaders responsible for political work, armaments, and logistics, core sectors often linked to procurement and corruption.

The expulsions come just days before a major Communist Party meeting in Beijing, where leadership appointments and strategic roadmaps for the next five years will be finalised.

“This move is both political and strategic,” said Neil Thomas of the Asia Society Policy Institute. “It clears the way for Xi to appoint loyalists and tighten his control over the military at a critical geopolitical moment,” he said.

Since coming to power in 2012, Xi has made anti-corruption campaigns a hallmark of his rule, purging not only civilian officials but also dozens of senior commanders.

To be clear: Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine is India-specific and rooted in the principle of credible minimum deterrence. Its longest-range missile – Shaheen III – has a range of 2,750 km, sufficient to cover targets in the Indian subcontinent, including the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, where India maintains strategic assets. That is the extent of Pakistan’s nuclear ambition; it has no plans to develop ICBMs and remains the only nuclear-armed state without one.

Despite these facts, dubious speculation abounds suggesting that Pakistan wants an ICBM capable of reaching the US in order to deter Washington from intervening on India’s behalf in a future conflict. This faulty logic then suggests that since no ICBM-possessing country outside of Nato is considered a US ally, Pakistan therefore becomes a de facto adversary. Such assertions collapse under scrutiny.

Pakistan and the United States have been partners since 1947 . Over the decades—from the 1950s through the Cold War and into the post-9/11 era—the relationship has had ups and downs but has proved to be enduring. In contrast, Pakistan’s chief rival, India, has an uneven relationship with Washington, shaped by Cold War-era alignment with the Soviet Union and a long flirtation with non-alignment. Even today, despite grand declarations of strategic partnership, India continues to prioritise its ties with Russia . Since the Ukraine war began in 2022, India has capitalised on discounted Russian oil and gas , re-exporting it at a profit. It also leads BRICS initiatives aimed at challenging the US-led world order.

Why, then, the renewed effort to portray Pakistan and the US as potential adversaries? Who benefits from this fiction? In the May 2025 hostilities between India and Pakistan, President Donald Trump, Vice President J.D. Vance, and Secretary of State Marco Rubio chose diplomacy over partisanship. They mediated a ceasefire, underscoring Washington’s commitment to regional stability. The US chose even-handed diplomacy over partisanship in favour of India.

Furthermore, by attempting to smear Pakistan on the basis that no ICBM-possessing nation is a US ally, these speculative voices ironically draw attention to India, which has already tested the Agni-V platform, an ICBM with a range of 5,500 to 8,000 km. Has that made India a US adversary? India is now developing a MIRV-capable Agni-VI, with an estimated range of 9,000 to 16,000 km. If ICBMs automatically signal hostility, why is India exempt? The logic is inconsistent.

Partly to blame is the unchecked “ Indomania ” that skewed US policy under the Biden administration by exaggerating and mischaracterising the Pakistani military’s research and development programme. For instance, the development of large rocket motors for MIRV-enabled intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), with a declared range of 2,200 km, or for space launchers, is entirely within Pakistan’s defensive remit. Misrepresenting them as an ICBM programme, as a former US National Security Council official suggested last December, is inaccurate. The sanctions that followed—targeting four Pakistani entities—were unjustified.

India exploits such attitudes to undermine Pakistan by seeding disinformation through selected media outlets and amplifying it via domestic megaphone journalism—TV channels, newspapers and social media—all orchestrated by the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The real goal is to curb or cap Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities via US pressure, while deflecting attention from India’s rapid ICBM expansion. Though India claims these weapons are aimed at China, its intent is ambiguous, especially given its growing ties with Beijing and a hedging behaviour in light of the Trump Administration’s regional realignment .

Critics also ignore India’s growing military ambitions. It is accelerating the regional missile race by expanding its footprint in Tajikistan, Oman, Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles. By falsely accusing Pakistan, it tries to obscure its own ICBMs in plain sight while hiding behind a Beltway consensus, which is right now fraying, that frames India as a steadfast US ally. Despite Indian provocations, Pakistan has chosen restraint - committed to credible, proportional deterrence rather than open-ended arms competition. Its only adversary is India, right on its borders. The US, a long-standing partner of Pakistan, does not factor into this equation.

Many of those fanning fears about Pakistan’s missile intentions previously served as advisors during the Biden Administration and helped shape a narrative rooted in mistrust. Their talking points are out of step with current realities, particularly with the Trump Administration’s role de-escalating the 2025 India-Pakistan crisis. Contrary to some expectations, the US did not side with India. Since the ceasefire, President Trump has adopted a balanced approach, offering assistance on Kashmir and acknowledging Pakistan’s stabilising role. The latest round of speculative theorising not only omits this diplomatic progress but fails to recognise India’s increasingly aggressive posture, which only increases the threat that nuclear ICBMs pose to global peace.

The opinions and thoughts expressed in this article reflect only the author's views.

Masood Khan is Pakistan’s former Ambassador to the United States, United Nations and China.

What they said

According to William D Hartung, a senior research fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, and the writer of the US Military Aid and Arms Transfers to Israel, October 2023–September 2025 report, “Given the scale of current and future spending, it is clear the [Israeli army] could not have done the damage they have done in Gaza or escalated their military activities throughout the region without US financing, weapons, and political support.”

Within that total, there are some 128 confirmed “bases” in around 49 foreign countries, meaning many sites are smaller “forward operating locations,” cooperative security sites, or rotational deployments rather than full-scale bases.

These installations are spread across all inhabited continents. In East Asia and the Pacific, significant bases include those in Japan (e.g. Kadena, Futenma) and South Korea (notably Camp Humphreys).

In the Middle East , Qatar’s Al Udeid Air Base plays a central role, hosting U.S. Air Force and coalition forces. In Africa, installations like Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti and Camp Simba in Kenya serve counter-terror and intelligence missions.

While many hosts see these bases as partnerships for training, logistics, or regional security, critics argue they raise serious issues of national sovereignty, local social stress, and geopolitical friction.

Current flashpoints elevate base vulnerabilities

In 2025, regional tensions have underscored both their strengths and risks:

Speaking on state television, he described the flyover as “a threat to national security” and warned that Venezuela would mobilise its forces if attacked.

The incident comes amid a significant U.S. military buildup in the Caribbean. In September, Washington deployed 10 F-35 fighter jets, eight warships, and a nuclear submarine to Puerto Rico under what it says is an operation to disrupt narcotics trafficking.

U.S. forces have since sunk several boats allegedly linked to drug smugglers, leaving at least 14 people dead, according to official reports.

President Nicolás Maduro has denounced the U.S. operations as a cover for regime change and an attempt to control Venezuela’s vast oil reserves. In response, Caracas has staged military drills involving warships, helicopters, and 2,500 troops, and Maduro has said he is preparing a decree to declare a “state of external unrest.”

The confrontation underscores escalating tensions in the wider Caribbean, where Washington’s efforts to counter drug trafficking intersect with Maduro’s campaign to rally domestic support against what he portrays as U.S. aggression.

The comments reflect escalating tensions between Caracas and Washington, following recent US military deployments in the Caribbean . Gil’s statement underscores Venezuela’s rejection of accusations that have been used to justify foreign military presence near its borders.

The 80th session of the UN General Assembly, which began on 23 September, brings together leaders from 193 member states to discuss issues including peace, development, and human rights .

A new map plotting violations between September 2024 and 2025 starkly illustrates how Russia has taken the role of principal provocateur, regularly testing the resilience of allied air defences.

Meanwhile, in southeastern Europe, a long-running Greek-Turkish dispute continues to fuel hundreds of skirmishes each year.

The map highlights a clear pattern of most airspace violations traced to Russia during this period. Especially along the eastern flank of Europe, Russian drones and fighter jets appear intent on probing NATO’s boundaries.

In early September 2025, Polish military officials downed several drones that had intruded into their airspace during strikes against Ukrainian targets. Poland called the breach “unprecedented,” and NATO invoked Article 4 consultations.

Likewise, Romania has reported multiple drone fragments and incursions. In September 2024, drones reportedly flew into Romanian territory during nighttime attacks on Ukraine, one incident that drew condemnation from NATO.

Estonia’s airspace was violated by three Russian MiG-31 fighters, which Estonian officials say lingered in their airspace for about 12 minutes, even after being addressed by NATO jets. Moscow, however, denied any breach, claiming the aircraft remained over international waters.

While Russia dominates headlines on the Eastern front, the map reminds us that aerial confrontations are hardly limited to that border. Southeast Europe continues to see intense airspace friction between Turkey and Greece, especially over the Aegean Sea.

The Hellenic National Defence General Staff reported over 106 violations of the Athens Flight Information Region (FIR) by Turkish drones and maritime patrol aircraft since August (date of report).

Turkey’s violations have not receded entirely. In early 2025, two Turkish CN-235 reconnaissance planes entered Greek airspace over the southeastern Aegean, prompting interceptions under international law.

The Kenyan leader emphasised that the greatest obstacles to the Multinational Security Support Mission (MSS) were not the gangs themselves, but the logistical shortcomings that hampered operations.

“The biggest challenge and impediment was logistics, transport, support,” he said. “If that remains unpredictable, I'm afraid the next mission may suffer the same as MSS, and therefore it is very important that, as we create that transition, we make sure that resources, resourcing the new mission becomes at the heart of the transition.”

Ruto credited the United States with trying to fill some of those gaps. But he also underlined how inadequate resources placed personnel at risk, pointing to the consequences of being supplied with unreliable equipment.

“They did make available logistics, vehicles, but unfortunately, most of the vehicles were secondhand vehicles, and therefore they broke down a lot, many times, and in fact, it put our personnel in great danger when they broke down in very dangerous places,” he said. “But at least they stepped up. We didn't, however, get any useful support from any other quarter.”

Turning to the Haitian gangs themselves, Ruto downplayed their strength, insisting they retreat quickly when challenged. He suggested that their tactics showed vulnerability rather than strength.

“The gangs, in my very honest opinion, are cowards,” he said. “With very minimal intervention, they have literally gone into hiding, occasionally showing up. Some guerrilla warfare of some sort."

The president also defended the performance of the MSS.

“The achievements of the MSS are too often understated,” he said. “When the first contingent arrived in Port au Prince few could have imagined that a Boeing 787 one day, would land at the local airport without a risk of being brought down.”

Ruto also reiterated his message: that the international community had the means to turn the tide in Haiti, provided it acted with urgency and provided adequate support.

“Therefore, I thought I would use this meeting moving to the attention of the international community that the situation in Haiti can and must be solved.”

In the letter, dated September 6 and later published by Vice President Delcy Rodríguez, Maduro urged Trump to overcome “fake news” damaging bilateral relations, describing them as an obstacle to building a “historic and peaceful” relationship envisioned by Simón Bolívar. The Venezuelan leader also dismissed U.S. accusations of links between his government and drug trafficking , insisting Venezuela is a “territory free of drug production” and not a significant player in narcotics smuggling.

Maduro praised Grenell as a trusted channel of communication, pointing to past cooperation on migrant repatriation issues. However, Trump, when asked by reporters whether he had received the letter, gave a brief and ambiguous response: “We’ll see what happens with Venezuela ”. The U.S. president has recently warned Caracas of “a high price” if it fails to accept deported Venezuelans.

The exchange unfolds as Venezuela’s armed forces conduct nationwide drills, train civilians in weapons handling, and expand border operations in response to the U.S. naval deployment. While Washington says its presence targets drug trafficking, Caracas views the show of force as a threat aimed at regime change. The standoff has further strained ties, with Trump denying any formal plan to oust Maduro even as his administration doubles down on military pressure and sanctions .

However, Kibet says those papers were to enlist him in the Russian military.

After that, he says, his passport and phone were seized. He was moved to a military camp, where he was told he had one choice: fight or face death.

Fleeing the journey to his first mission, he approached Ukrainian soldiers with his hands up, pleading, “I’m Kenyan, don’t shoot.” He is now held in Ukraine, where he repeats that he never intended to join the military. His insights , posted by the Ukrainian army, remain unverified independently.

Russia’s foreign ministry has denied allegations that it uses visa renewals to coerce or trick foreign nationals into combat roles. Still, Evans’ story fits a pattern that international investigators and media outlets say is emerging.

By mid-2024, investigative outlet The Insider reported that over 600 African nationals were fighting for Russia. Many alleged coercion or deceit in how they were recruited.

Some accepted offers of high pay, passports, or promises of education and jobs. Others say they were lured in under false pretences.

Ukraine’s military intelligence (HUR) has issued reports that Moscow has intensified recruitment campaigns in African countries, including Rwanda, Uganda, Congo, and Burundi. Promised benefits include monthly pay, health insurance, and Russian citizenship for recruits and even their families.

Still, many recruited under such terms find themselves in life-or-death situations, with few avenues for escape or return. Evans’ case brings a human face to what researchers say is a growing global concern.

The proposed constitution extends the presidential term from five to seven years, allows two terms, and crucially removes a ban preventing junta members, including General Mamady Doumbouya, from standing for office.

Additionally, it introduces a new Senate, one-third of whose members the president would appoint.

The vote comes ahead of planned general and presidential elections in December 2025, which the referendum is meant to enable legally.

The stakes

In September 2021, Doumbouya seized power in a coup, which dissolved the constitution with a vow to return the country to civilian rule. He initially promised that no junta member would run in future elections. That promise is now in shambles.

Opposition leaders, including Cellou Dalein Diallo, are either under suspension, in exile, or stripped of political space, and are calling for a boycott of the referendum.

The media landscape is also experiencing the heat with severe restrictions. Private outlets have been shut, websites suspended, and campaign coverage tightly regulated.

The AFP, however, reports that some media restrictions have been eased ahead of the vote.

Critics argue these conditions support a process that looks democratic on paper but is deeply curtailed in practice

What September 21 means

If the draft passes, Doumbouya is almost certain to run in December. A “Yes” vote would mark a legal framework that elevates executive power, leverages a compliant legislature, and further limits opposition.

If the referendum fails or if turnout is very low, legitimacy instantly becomes the issue. The junta would face internal pressure and external scepticism.

Delay or reform of the election schedule might follow. Unrest, protest, or resistance which have been banned in the country since 2022 could grow.

Kim urged officials to “rapidly develop newly introduced artificial intelligence technology” and to expand serial production capacity for drones, emphasising that North Korea must match the role drones now play in modern conflicts.

The current levels of sophistication of North Korea’s drones remain uncertain, but Kim has repeatedly toured drone facilities and presided over field tests in recent months, showing his intent to make UAVs a key component of his military strategy.

A report from 38 North found Pyongyang had engaged in cross-border AI research with academics in China, South Korea and the U.S., suggesting “substantial efforts” to catch up. Much of this progress appears tied to China, one of the world’s leaders in AI technology.

Kim’s visit to the complex came just a week after he oversaw a test of a new solid-fuel rocket engine for intercontinental ballistic missiles. He hailed that test as a “significant” step in expanding the country’s nuclear strike capabilities.

North Korea has ramped up efforts to modernise its military despite international sanctions. Its programmes now span drones, loitering munitions, missile systems and a nascent spy satellite programme.

Regional tensions have risen as a result. In 2022, South Korea failed to intercept five North Korean drones that crossed the border, including one that flew near the presidential office in Seoul. 

Kim later called for mass production of attack drones. He accused Seoul of flying UAVs over Pyongyang, though South Korea has not confirmed this.

North Korea is already heavily militarised, having more than a million active troops and millions more reservists. Kim’s new focus on AI and drones suggests the next stage is to make the country’s weapons smarter, faster and more autonomous.

A map highlights the countries struck by Israeli forces: Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Oman, illustrating how the conflict has become a regional confrontation rather than a strictly local war.

Israeli operations have hit multiple fronts. In Yemen, airstrikes targeted Houthi command centres and military depots in Sanaa and al-Jawf, leaving at least 46 dead and 165 wounded. The Houthis, who have launched drone and missile attacks toward Israel, vowed retaliation, further heightening tensions.

In Syria, strikes have focused on Iranian-backed militia networks and weapons convoys, with analysts noting a sharp increase in frequency and precision since October 7.

Israel has also carried out targeted operations inside Iraq and Iran, hitting militia and drone facilities tied to Tehran. These attacks have sparked fears that the conflict could spill over into a confrontation with Iran, a scenario that would have profound consequences for the region.

The impact of these strikes is being felt well beyond the battlefield. Oil prices have spiked repeatedly on news of Israeli attacks against Iranian and Houthi targets, reflecting fears of disruption to shipping lanes in the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz.

European diesel prices have also risen as the conflict threatens critical energy flows. Investors are flocking to gold and U.S. Treasuries as safe-haven assets, while Gulf stock markets have dipped on days of heavy strikes.

Economists warn that if the conflict continues to expand, global growth projections could be downgraded, and inflationary pressures could persist longer than expected. For businesses and governments alike, the stakes are high: any escalation risks disrupting energy supplies, shipping routes, and trade flows that connect Asia, Europe, and Africa.

The map of countries targeted by Israel is no longer just a visual of military strikes; it is a warning sign of a region edging toward a broader conflict with potentially global economic consequences. Whether diplomacy can catch up to the pace of escalation will determine how deep and far-reaching the next phase of this crisis becomes.

The move comes as the United States increases its military presence in the southern Caribbean. Washington has deployed F-35 fighter jets to Puerto Rico, warships, submarines, and thousands of troops as part of counter-narcotics and maritime security operations.

A recent flashpoint fueling tensions was a U.S. strike against a Venezuelan vessel allegedly linked to drug trafficking and the criminal group Tren de Aragua . Eleven people were killed in the operation. The Venezuelan government rejected the accusation, questioned the authenticity of footage released by U.S. authorities, and denied any connection to narcotrafficking.

Adding pressure, the U.S. Department of Justice has doubled the bounty for information leading to Maduro’s arrest, raising it to $50 million under charges tied to drug trafficking. Maduro, in turn, insists that Venezuela is not a drug-producing country.

Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello, one of Maduro’s closest allies, stated that Venezuela does not seek war but must remain prepared for it. Meanwhile, the Pentagon emphasised that “the ball is in Maduro’s court”, framing U.S. actions as part of its anti-narcotics mission. Analysts have warned of the risk of a proxy conflict or, at a minimum, a sharp diplomatic and military escalation between Caracas and Washington.

This standoff marks a critical juncture in U.S.–Venezuela relations, with rhetoric hardening and military deployments multiplying, leaving the hemisphere closely watching whether the next step will be negotiation, sanctions , or confrontation.

Machar, who has been under house arrest since late March, is accused of being involved with the White Army, a loosely organised militia largely composed of fighters from the Nuer ethnic group, and using “political and military structures” to influence or direct their operations during the attack.

In addition to Machar, seven individuals aligned with his Sudan People ’s Liberation Movement/Army-in Opposition (SPLM-IO) have also been formally charged and suspended from their government posts.

Among them are Petroleum Minister Puot Kang Chol and Lt. General Gabriel Duop Lam, Deputy Chief of Staff of the army. A further 13 suspects remain at large.

President Salva Kiir, whose political relationship with Machar has been uneasy since the 2018 peace deal ended South Sudan’s five-year civil war, has suspended Machar as first vice president following the charges.

Machar’s spokesperson dismissed the charges as a “political witch-hunt”, arguing that the judicial system in South Sudan is not independent but instead “politically directed courts”. The SPLM-IO has warned that the move threatens to undermine the 2018 Revitalised Peace Agreement and could risk reigniting armed conflict.

Roads to Machar’s residence in Juba have been blocked by soldiers and tanks, heightening concerns about the potential for escalation. International actors, including the United Nations and the African Union, have urged restraint.

Vietnamese rice traders and exporters are holding back purchases after the Philippines, their biggest market, suspended all imports. “Prices remain low, but we dare not buy much,” Nguyen Chi Thanh of Angimex said , noting that traders in the Mekong Delta had scaled down to buying a few tons compared to hundreds previously. Vietnam exported 6.3 million tons of rice worth $3.17 billion in the first eight months of 2025, with the Philippines accounting for 2.6 million tons, making it the largest buyer.

Senate shake-up won’t derail legislative agenda

President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. expressed confidence that his administration’s priorities remain intact despite a change in Senate leadership. Senate President Vicente “Tito” Sotto reassumed the chamber’s top post, replacing Francis “Chiz” Escudero. Marcos called the reshuffle an internal matter, “The Senate knows how to organise itself; the Senate also knows how to do the work. If Senator Sotto is now the SP again, then I do not see that it will change very much from our agenda,” he added .

Philippines, Japan boost defence tech ties

Defence ministers from the Philippines and Japan agreed in Seoul to deepen cooperation on defence equipment and technology amid China’s growing assertiveness in regional waters. Japan may transfer retired Abukuma-class destroyers and air surveillance radar systems to Manila. “The two ministers concurred to promote defence equipment and technology cooperation,” Japan’s Ministry of Defence said. Experts noted the deal would be a significant step in strengthening Manila’s defence industry with Japanese support.

Duterte ‘not fit to stand trial,’ lawyer tells ICC

Former president Rodrigo Duterte’s legal team has petitioned the International Criminal Court to adjourn proceedings indefinitely, citing severe cognitive decline. His lawyer, Nicholas Kaufman, wrote that Duterte suffers from impairments that limit memory, reasoning, and orientation: “Mr. Duterte is not fit to stand trial as a result of cognitive impairment in multiple domains. Mr. Duterte’s condition will not improve,” the Enquirer quotes. The ICC is investigating Duterte’s bloody “war on drugs,” which left thousands dead.

Philippines eyes Indian underwater drones

Manila is weighing the acquisition of Indian underwater drones as an alternative to traditional submarines, part of efforts to modernise its maritime defences amid South China Sea tensions. Defence Secretary Gilberto Teodoro highlighted their cost-effectiveness, as India’s autonomous underwater vehicles offer surveillance, reconnaissance, and mine-countermeasure capabilities, Indian Defence News reports. The move affirms the close defence ties between Manila and New Delhi, including cooperation on missile systems and unmanned platforms.

Many participants carried signs urging peace—bearing slogans such as "Puerto Rico without militias, we demand justice " , "For peace, we all stand" , "Yankees out" , and "Trump murderer" —voicing deep-seated fears of renewed militarisation.

Speakers and analysts at the march voiced concern that Washington aims to repurpose Puerto Rico as a strategic base for action against Venezuela—an unacceptable scenario, they argue, especially given Puerto Rico's colonial status despite its "Commonwealth" designation.

One protester, Solimar Ortiz Jusino, voiced frustration over the memory of previous U.S. military presence in Vieques, asking: “Why should we turn a blind eye now, when Puerto Rico risks being used again in this way?” .

The protests coincided with the deployment of U.S. military assets to the island, including ten F-35 fighter jets—capable of carrying nuclear weapons—and amphibious landing exercises in southern Puerto Rico. These actions are part of a broader naval build-up in the Caribbean , which includes a fast-attack nuclear submarine and several other ships, prompting alarm from regional leaders.

Trump has received public endorsements from multiple countries, including Israel, Pakistan, Cambodia, Rwanda and Gabon, to become the first Republican U.S. president since Theodore Roosevelt in 1906 to take up the distinguished honour.

Pakistan declared its intention to nominate Trump on June 20, following diplomatic efforts that helped bring about a ceasefire during a conflict between India and Pakistan in May. In July, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu delivered a letter to the Nobel Committee during a White House visit, formally nominating Trump for the prize.

Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet joined the list of supporters on August 7, citing Trump’s role in a ceasefire between Cambodia and Thailand that ended a five-day border conflict in July. Similarly, Rwandan Foreign Minister Olivier Nduhungirehe and Gabonese President Brice Oligui Nguema have endorsed Trump for helping end a long-standing conflict between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

But why has he chosen to rename the DOD at this time? Trump said that the decision followed “long and hard” consideration and months of discussions. He explained that the original War Department had led the U.S. to victory in both world wars, whereas subsequent military engagements under the Defence Department often resulted in outcomes that were more drawn out and inconclusive, describing them as a “sort of tie.”

According to Xiangyang’s cyber police, Meng made “slanderous and derogatory remarks” on social media about the event, provoking anger online.

Police said his comments “insulted them and spread rumours, provoking strong anger among netizens,” but did not specify what he had written. 

They added that his remarks had “hurt people’s patriotic sentiments and caused severe negative social impact”.

“The great spirit of the war of resistance serves as the spiritual backbone of our nation,” Xiangyang cyber police said, referring to China’s fight against Japanese forces during the Second World War. 

“Any attempts to distort or smear the history, defame military personnel taking part in commemorating events or harm patriotic sentiments will be severely punished by public security authorities.”

Trump calls parade with Kim, Putin a ‘conspiracy’

The parade marked the anniversaries of the Second World War and the Second Sino-Japanese War. It was China’s largest military display in decades, lasting 70 minutes, and featured advanced weapons, tanks, missiles, fighter jets and domestically-built aircraft.

Leaders from 26 countries attended, with Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and North Korea’s Kim Jong Un joining President Xi Jinping on Tiananmen Gate as guests of honour. 

Other attendees included Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian.

Absent from the ceremony were leaders from the United States, the United Kingdom, South Korea, Poland and the Czech Republic. Poland and the Czech Republic, who attended in 2015, were replaced this year by Serbia and Slovakia.

U.S. President Donald Trump criticised the event, accusing Xi, Putin and Kim of conspiring against Washington.

“Please give my warmest regards to Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un as you conspire against the United States of America ,” Trump posted on Truth Social.

He also pointed to American sacrifices in the war: “Many Americans died in China’s quest for Victory and Glory. I hope that they are rightfully Honoured and Remembered for their Bravery and Sacrifice!”

Despite his criticism of the parade, Trump dismissed concerns that closer ties between China, Russia and North Korea could threaten Washington, saying they would not form a coalition against the U.S. because “China needs us.”

What’s at stake?

It was more than a local tragedy when four villagers were killed by armed men in the Ivorian town of Difita, which is close to the Burkina Faso border.  It indicated that the thin border that once divided the states of the Gulf of Guinea from the insurgencies of the Sahel is gradually eroding.  Having not experienced a fatal attack linked to jihadists since 2021 (attribution of the August attack is still being investigated), Côte d’Ivoire is now faced with renewed militant incursions along its northern border.

However, the implications go beyond national borders. There is also an increase in violence and instability in Ghana, Togo, and Benin.  These states work together to create a frontline against the southward movement of organisations such as Islamic State affiliates and Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM).  The risk profile for investors, humanitarian organisations, and international partners is drastically changing as violence approaches ports, commercial centres, and political capitals.

The background

The security situation along West Africa's coast has worsened in recent months.  In 2025, Benin—once thought of as a relatively safe area—saw its deadliest terrorist attack ever.  Twelve people were killed when suspected jihadists ambushed park rangers and security personnel in Pendjari National Park in July.  There is a pattern to this:  In 2023, there were 171 extremist attacks in Benin; since then, the violence has only increased, causing widespread displacement in the country's northern regions.

Lethal incursions have also occurred in Togo.  On May 10-11, eight soldiers were killed when JNIM-affiliated militants stormed a military outpost close to the Burkina Faso border.  The attack demonstrated how militants are undermining local security forces' credibility by testing state capabilities in border areas.  In 2023 alone, Togo saw 14 attacks and 66 fatalities; this trend is expected to continue in 2025.

Ghana, so far spared from major attacks, continues to play an increasingly dangerous role.  According to reports, militants take advantage of porous borders in northern Ghana to resupply, receive medical care, and handle logistics.  Although authorities deny allegations that Ghana is used as a "supply line" for extremists, the country's northern districts are home to more than 15,000 Burkinabe refugees , placing a strain on resources and raising concerns about radicalisation.

On top of all of this is a humanitarian crisis: by early 2025, over 160,000 people had fled the violence in Burkina Faso to neighbouring Ghana, Togo, Côte d’Ivoire, and Benin.  Resentment is growing, while infrastructure and host communities are overburdened.  Political instability is being exacerbated by the humanitarian crisis as Sahelian violence spreads southward.

Comment: coastal state defences under strain

A structural change in regional security is reflected in the southward movement of Sahelian insurgencies.  Extremist organisations are now openly targeting coastal states rather than scouring the borders.  Attacks like Togo's outpost raid and Benin's Pendjari massacre show that militants are looking for both propaganda value and territorial depth.

 Support from international partners is increasing.  Coastal state security forces now receive more funding, training, and intelligence sharing from the US, France, and EU.  However, there are still significant local capacity gaps.  Uneven coordination persists among Benin, Togo, Ghana, and Côte d’Ivoire, and internal politics - especially surrounding elections and governance challenges- run the risk of diverting attention from a collaborative and comprehensive security plan.

For Western governments, the stakes are high. The Gulf of Guinea is a critical trade corridor and investment destination. Similar to the political collapse in the Sahel, a destabilised coastal belt may encourage migration northward, interfere with supply chains, and create an environment conducive to further coups.

Assessment: near- and medium-term projections

Attacks in Benin and Togo's border areas are likely to continue in the near future as militants take advantage of vulnerable borders and overburdened military personnel.  There is a realistic possibility of intermittent incursions into Côte d’Ivoire, though Abidjan will seek to contain violence north of key commercial zones. Although there is a realistic chance of escalation due to the existence of militant logistics networks and refugee pressures, Ghana is still less vulnerable to direct attacks in the short term.

Like central Mali, northern Benin and Togo run the risk of becoming semi-permanent militant operating zones as a result of entrenched violence in the medium term.  Diplomatic and investor confidence may drastically change if Ghana is the target of any significant attack.  A growing security void along its southern flank, increased migration pressure, and heavier humanitarian burdens are all consequences of this trajectory for Europe.  The trajectory of violence indicates that coastal West Africa is entering a new and more dangerous phase of the Sahel conflict, despite increased external support.

Conclusion

The attack in northern Ivory Coast is not an isolated event but a symptom of a broader regional trend: the Sahel insurgency is pushing south, and coastal states are under mounting pressure. Benin and Togo are already suffering, Ghana is under strain, and Côte d’Ivoire is once again vulnerable. The Gulf of Guinea runs the risk of inheriting the Sahel's crisis and becoming a new epicentre of instability if regional governments and their international allies fail to bridge the gap between rhetoric and capability.

This report is compiled by  Eigenrac  is a Dubai-based boutique consultancy specialising in security risk management services, with a global presence and deep understanding of complex business risk environments. Eigenrac acts as a trusted enabler for clients operating in high-risk or demanding settings.