This is a fair question, but it needs to be posed carefully. No principle of international law entitles a landlocked state, no matter how large, simply to acquire the sovereign territory of a neighbouring coastal state. Ethiopia cannot claim another country's coastline merely because it needs one. The sovereignty and territorial integrity of Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia and other coastal neighbours must be respected.

There is therefore another, more compelling way of asking the question. Does Ethiopia deserve secure, permanent and diversified access to the sea commensurate with its size, geography, economic needs and historical position in the Horn of Africa? The answer is much easier to defend. International law itself recognises that landlocked states should have access to and from the sea. Article 125 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea recognises the right of landlocked states to access the sea and freedom of transit, while also protecting the sovereignty and legitimate interests of transit states.

The principle is therefore not that Ethiopia has a right to someone else's territory but that geography should not be a destiny. The United Nations also recognises that landlocked developing countries face higher transportation costs, delays, restricted export opportunities, and greater vulnerability because they must rely on transit states to access international markets.

For landlocked Ethiopia, the problem is particularly acute as it is not a small country whose economic life can comfortably be organised around a single external corridor. With a population of 140 million, Ethiopia is the second most populous country in Africa and one of the continent's major political and diplomatic centres. It hosts the African Union and has become increasingly integrated into global economic and diplomatic networks. Yet it must move much of its international commerce through the territory and infrastructure of another sovereign state, Djibouti.

This phenomenon creates what Ali Mazrui once called unnatural micro-dependency, which arises when a large state's access to the global economy depends disproportionately on the infrastructure, political stability, and strategic calculations of a much smaller neighbour. The problem is not Djibouti. Indeed, Djibouti has provided Ethiopia with an indispensable economic service. Ethiopia's relationship with Djibouti should be understood as one of mutual interdependence rather than unilateral dependence.

The problem is the structural vulnerability created when a country's principal gateway to the world is concentrated in one corridor. Ethiopia therefore has a rational interest in multiple maritime gateways.

The above argument also has a historical dimension. Ethiopia did not become landlocked because its civilisation somehow naturally belonged to the interior of Africa. Its modern geopolitical condition emerged through the territorial transformations of the twentieth century, most consequentially the separation of Eritrea and the creation of the present international boundary between the two states. The result was geographically unusual. A country whose historical, commercial and strategic life had long been connected to the Red Sea found itself without a coastline. Ethiopia's landlocked condition is therefore relatively recent compared with the much longer history of Ethiopian interaction with the Red Sea world.

This does not invalidate Eritrea's sovereignty. But it does make Ethiopian access to the sea more than an ordinary commercial preference. It is a historical issue in the political geography of the Horn of Africa.

Indeed, the history of Ethiopian trade reinforces the argument. Before Ethiopia lost direct maritime access, Red Sea ports played an important role in the country's external commerce. The subsequent concentration of Ethiopian trade through Djibouti created a new pattern of dependence. UN analysis of landlocked states has specifically identified Ethiopia's loss of direct access to the sea and the consequent redirection of its trade through Djibouti as an illustration of the vulnerabilities faced by landlocked countries.

But Ethiopian diplomacy must therefore draw a distinction with great care: access is not annexation; a port is not a province; maritime connectivity is not territorial expansion. Ethiopia does not need to possess a piece of another country in order to have meaningful access to the sea. It could, for example, pursue long-term commercial leases, port concessions, jointly developed economic zones, railway-and-port agreements, or other mutually negotiated arrangements that give Ethiopia reliable maritime access while leaving the coastal state's sovereignty intact.

Such arrangements would shift the debate from borders to connectivity. This distinction is essential because Ethiopia's neighbours have legitimate security concerns. Ethiopia's search for maritime access should not become a justification for coercion, military occupation, or interference in the internal affairs of neighbouring states. The opposite is more likely to produce a durable solution. Ethiopia's objective should be a negotiated maritime settlement in which Ethiopia gains reliable access, and its neighbours gain economic benefits, security guarantees, and respect for their sovereignty.

That would be a regional bargain rather than a territorial revision. It could also become an instrument of peace. Imagine a Red Sea arrangement in which Ethiopian investment helps develop a coastal port; the coastal state retains sovereignty; Ethiopia receives long-term commercial access; neighbouring countries gain transit revenues and infrastructure; railways connect the port to the Ethiopian hinterland; and the entire arrangement becomes embedded in regional institutions.

The result would be more than a port. It would be a corridor of interdependence. This matters because Ethiopia's economic future is increasingly tied to the maritime economy. Modern development requires access not merely to land but to shipping, energy, technology, markets, and global production networks.

To be landlocked is therefore not merely a geographical condition; it is also an economic condition. And political imagination can transform economic conditions. Ethiopia's aspiration should consequently not be framed as a demand for the restoration of some lost imperial geography. Such a formulation would unnecessarily alarm Ethiopia's neighbours and reduce a legitimate economic question to a territorial one.

The stronger argument is simpler: A country of Ethiopia's scale, population, economic ambition, and historical connection to the Red Sea cannot reasonably be expected to remain permanently dependent upon a single maritime outlet.

Ethiopia needs the sea, but Ethiopia does not need to own the sea. Its neighbours need Ethiopia's markets, investment, and economic weight, just as Ethiopia needs their ports and corridors. This is where geography can become an instrument of cooperation rather than conflict .

Djibouti has demonstrated what such interdependence can accomplish, even while exposing Ethiopia’s vulnerabilities arising from its excessive reliance on one port. Eritrea's ports—particularly Massawa and Assab—possess obvious geographical relevance to Ethiopia. Somalia's coastline offers another potential dimension of regional connectivity. Ethiopia should not approach any of these possibilities as an entitlement to another country's territory. Instead, it should approach each through negotiation, reciprocity, and mutual economic interest.

The principle should be shared prosperity without shared sovereignty. Ethiopia's maritime future may therefore lie not in acquiring a coastline in the nineteenth-century sense of territorial expansion, but in constructing what might be called a twenty-first-century coastline: a network of secure ports, corridors, leases, commercial partnerships and regional agreements linking the Ethiopian hinterland to the world's oceans. Such a coastline would be invisible on the map but very real in economic life. It would give Ethiopia something geography has denied it, without requiring its neighbours to surrender what geography has given them.

A landlocked Ethiopia need not become a land-hungry Ethiopia. But neither should a landlocked Ethiopia be expected to accept permanent and unnatural maritime dependency as an immutable destiny. The future of the Horn of Africa may depend on finding a middle ground between these two extremes.

The opinions and thoughts expressed in this article reflect only the author's views.

Seifudein Adem is a visiting professor at the Institute of Advanced Research and Education at Doshisha University, Kyoto, Japan. He has taught in Ethiopia, the US, Japan and China and is the author of several books on international relations.

According to Marine Insight , here are eight of the most significant canals that have shaped international navigation:

Grand Canal

As the world's longest and oldest canal, China 's Grand Canal stretches over 1,770 kilometres, connecting Beijing north to Hangzhou south. Dating back to the 5th century BC, it has been instrumental in facilitating internal trade and cultural exchange within China, linking major rivers such as the Yellow River and the Yangtze River.

Suez Canal

Located in Egypt, the Suez Canal connects the Mediterranean Sea to the Red Sea, offering a direct maritime route between Europe and Asia. Spanning approximately 193 kilometres eliminates the need for vessels to navigate around Africa's Cape of Good Hope, significantly reducing travel time. Since its opening in 1869, the canal has undergone expansions to accommodate larger vessels and increased traffic. ​

Panama Canal

This 82-kilometre canal traverses the Isthmus of Panama, linking the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Inaugurated in 1914, the Panama Canal revolutionized maritime trade by providing a shortcut that bypasses the lengthy and perilous route around South America's southern tip. Its system of locks raises and lowers ships across the continental divide, facilitating the passage of approximately 14,000 vessels annually. ​

Kiel Canal

Situated in Germany, the Kiel Canal connects the North Sea to the Baltic Sea. Extending about 98 kilometres, it is one of the world's busiest artificial waterways, enabling vessels to avoid the longer journey around the Jutland Peninsula. The canal plays a crucial role in European maritime trade by facilitating the swift movement of goods between the two seas.​

The Volga–Don Canal, Russia

Completed in 1952 during the Soviet era, this key waterway links the Volga and Don rivers, forming a critical part of the Europe-Asia transport network. Its 13 locks allow for smooth passage through elevation changes.